

The Self-Disclosure of Jesus

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The Self-Disclosure of Jesus

*The Modern Debate About
The Messianic Consciousness*

by

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THE SELF-DISCLOSURE OF JESUS

by GEERHARDUS Vos

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Preface

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The time is not so long past when for the appraisal of what was of permanent value in Christianity the alternative was formed: Not Paul but Jesus. At present this formula is beginning to lose its dividing force. The alternative has been shifted back into the mind of Jesus Himself; the question, Whether Paul or Jesus? has become the question, Which Jesus? In the consciousness and teaching of our Lord, a solid preformation of the Pauline Christ has been discovered, and the offense taken at the latter has had to be extended to the former. It is the Messianic character of Jesus over which the anti-Pauline interpretation of Christianity now finds itself stumbling. What the cross was in the days of the Apostle, the Messiahship is to the modern advanced "Christian" mind, the great rock of offense. But it is a rock not easy to remove, and moreover one from which there is no further retreat backward except into plain liberal Judaism. The attitude towards it determines in the profoundest way the character of the subjective piety that would feed upon the New Testament. Let no one delude himself with the soothing comfort that the controversy is all about scraps of external belief and does not touch the core of practical devotion. With its decision the Christian religion stands or falls. *Tua res, pia anima, agitur!* For the purpose of helping to make this somewhat clearer the following book was written.

Religion

The author acknowledges indebtedness to the *Biblical Magazine* for permission given to incorporate certain material previously published in that journal.

GEERHARDUS VOS

Princeton, N. J.
September, 1926.

Editor's Prefatory Note

In preparing my father's book *The Self-Disclosure of Jesus* for publication by the Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, it has been my constant effort to preserve and to present with accuracy the thought of the author. I have gone through the material sentence by sentence and have made such merely verbal changes as seemed desirable from the standpoint of readability or clarity of style. At no point has any change in thought-content or meaning from what my father originally wrote been knowingly made.

Many very long paragraphs have been broken up into shorter ones. All Scripture references have been checked for accuracy. With a view to making the book more useful to the reader, indexes of names, subjects and Scripture references have been added.

JOHANNES G. VOS

Clay Center, Kansas

July 13, 1953.

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The Self-Disclosure of Jesus

CHAPTER I

The Strategic Importance of the Messianic Consciousness

ONE of the most significant developments in modern discussion of the life and teaching of Jesus is the growing disfavor with which the Messianic element in the Gospels is regarded by a certain class of writers. In making this statement, we are not referring to scepticism or denial in regard to the reality of Jesus' Messiahship, objectively considered. The question whether or not Jesus was the Messiah has meaning only within the limits of a strict Biblical supernaturalism; it presupposes the recognition of the supernatural provenience of both prophecy and the fulfilment of prophecy, and therefore finds its proper place in the controversy between Jesus and his opponents in the Gospel narrative, as also it has ever since been the dividing issue between the Christian Church and Judaism. But it would be foolish, on the other hand, to argue about the fact of Jesus' Messiahship with the *modern Jew*, since he has lost his belief in the supernatural, and on his premises the unreality of Jesus' Messiahship is included from the outset in his *a priori* denial of the possibility of supernatural phenomena.

The question about the Messianic consciousness belongs to a totally different situation. It deals exclusively with the problem of whether or not Jesus believed himself to be, and claimed to be, the Messiah. Those who are inclined to answer in the negative do not, as a rule, occupy the standpoint of supernaturalism. They are like the modern Jew in that they regard the reality of the Messiahship as impossible, and therefore devoid of practical interest. They regard Jesus as religiously valuable not in the capacity of Messiah, but under some other aspect, such as a religious genius, an ethical teacher, or a social reformer. One might expect from this theological detachment that such writers

would be peculiarly fitted to discuss the question of the Messianic consciousness on a purely historical and psychological basis, in the most calm and disinterested fashion, since the result of their discussion — whether affirmative or negative — should not affect nor disturb them in their inner religious conviction. This expectation, however, is not verified by the facts. It soon becomes evident to a careful observer of the trend of the discussion that something warmer and more exciting than ordinary academic interest is animating those who take part in it. Although the arguments plied to and fro are of a strictly exegetical and historical character, it is obvious that the heart “which makes the theologian” is not so wholly absent from this debate as some would have us believe.

How is this controversial atmosphere which colors the discussion to be explained? The explanation is not far to seek. Absolute disinterestedness in regard to Jesus is possible only to those who have lost all religious touch with Him and deny to Him all significance in the sphere of their own religious life; so long as any personal religious attachment to Jesus, of however attenuated a kind, is retained, the questions and problems centering around his Person cannot wholly lose their significance. No one who prizes the name of Christian can dismiss Jesus absolutely from his field of religious vision; there is always some category of pre-eminence or leadership under which He is classified. Hence the live theological issues are bound to assume Christological form, and that a form which can never be purely theoretical without practical bearings. But if this be true in general, with reference to all the elements and phases of the Christological question, it becomes far more pointedly true when the self-consciousness of Jesus is brought into the debate. Here all these objective issues mirror themselves, as it were, in the mind of Jesus, so that their practical importance for the religious life is intensified. Jesus' self-consciousness is the focal point in which all rays of religious contemplation of Jesus and communion with Jesus meet, and whence they derive their reflection. The real controversy ceases to be a controversy about Jesus: it becomes rather a testing out of the practical experiment of getting into the presence of Jesus at all and having religious converse with Him face to face. Admittedly the word “consciousness” is not alto-

gether satisfactory in connection with Christology; not seldom it is characteristic of the view that Jesus possesses his importance and wields his power by thought and teaching rather than by nature and action; as a piece of the movement towards the interiority of Jesus it is dangerously akin to the large modern trend towards placing all essentials and values of religion in the subjective sphere, detaching them from outward norms and forces. But this trend is an abuse and not a legitimate use of the conception. Jesus most assuredly had a vocational consciousness of self. Provided we can ascertain its content — and this we believe to be feasible — this consciousness becomes of eminently strategic importance: if it be seen as Messianic, it soon becomes evident that this Messianic consciousness is of a peculiarly unifying and comprehensive character. The Messianic consciousness might in this respect be compared to a single track mind: all else entering into it is inevitably held in subordination and subservience to its one regnant purpose; it straightway assumes dominance in the mental world wherein it has once found lodgement.

The Messianic concept has a long history behind it, and has in the course of time become subject to variations in content, but at no time in its history has it allowed of relegation to a subordinate place in the mind of one regarding himself as fulfilling it. Regarded from this standpoint, the Messianic consciousness proves a most delicate subject to handle for all who desire to crystallize their religion in various attitudes towards Jesus. The question arises, can religious communion exist with a mind thus Messianically constituted, if the Messianic construction proves uncongenial or even objectionable to the mind seeking such communion? We are often told that difference in theoretical scientific outlook need not preclude the sympathy and oneness in feeling and aspiration which many desire to continue cultivating with Jesus. Granting this for the sake of argument, the real core of the question is: can this be carried to the extent of emancipation from what was in Jesus himself the center of his self-consciousness? If we may judge from the analogy of interhuman fellowship in such forms as love and friendship, it must seem impossible to answer this question in the affirmative. Although differences of opinion can exist with reference to external matters, yet, even apart from religion, communion becomes difficult to maintain as

soon as the difference of opinion begins to touch the inner life, and particularly that point of the inner life where the self-estimate sits upon the throne. As soon as this happens, the very basis of spiritual fellowship becomes endangered. The central point upon which it is exercised loses transparency and accessibleness; there is created a dark area where the love or friendship finds its limit. But this must be so to a far stronger degree with every religious attitude towards Jesus, for in the religious sphere all spiritual powers acquire a heightened sensitiveness and develop a desire for absolute possession and interpenetration. How halting and inwardly disrupted a religious approach to Jesus must be which feels bound to stop short of accepting and receiving Him at the face value of his own central self-estimate! In proportion as one hesitates so to receive Him, a principle of reserve enters into the spiritual converse; the circles of the subject and the object intersect, and no longer perfectly coincide. No one can take a Saviour to his heart in that absolute, unqualified sense which constitutes the glory of religious trust, if there persists in the background of his mind the thought that this Saviour failed to understand Himself. If it be once established that Jesus meant to be that specific kind of spiritual helper which by historical right we designate as "the Messiah," then how can one refuse his help in that very capacity, and force upon Him a role of religious helpfulness which He was not conscious of sustaining? The inherent perverseness of such a situation, in a field where everything ought to be straightforward, is obvious. How so many modern minds can habituate themselves to it is one of the strangest riddles in the pathology of religion.

We believe that the doubt cast upon Jesus' Messianic consciousness not seldom springs from an inner dislike of it, and that this dislike springs largely from an instinctive perception of its unsuitableness and unmanageableness as a correlate to those other forms of approach in which "liberal" religion delights. This does not imply that there is anything intentional about this process, nor that the critical treatment of this element in the Gospel tradition evinces a conscious desire to manipulate the facts in the interest of a foregone conclusion; instances of such a procedure are fortunately rare in the history of Gospel criticism. But a process which is not consciously directed or intended may yet be

controlled by unconscious tendencies and predilections. One cannot help feeling that there is a certain uneasiness perceptible in the treatment afforded this particular subject. Two considerations incline to this. In the first place, the objective arguments of a historico-critical nature adduced against the reality of Jesus' Messianic consciousness are in themselves so inadequate as to suggest that theological proclivities make their weight appear greater to those who handle them than it really is. So much more, and so much of a more cogent character, can be urged in favor of the opposite view that one involuntarily looks for something back of the arguments *per contra* to account for the confidence placed in their sufficiency. And, in the second place, the actual content of the Messianic consciousness is such as to be exceptionally calculated to provoke a reaction of protest from the "modern" or "liberal" religious mind. It would be difficult, indeed, to find a case where two ways of thinking and feeling appear so pointedly at variance, and have so little in common, as the Messianic way of thinking, on the one hand, and the thought-form of "liberal" Christianity, on the other. A brief analysis of the Messianic concept, we trust, will suffice to show this.

In making this analysis we are not thinking of accessory elements of incidental shadings and colorings, but only of what is essential to the thing itself, that without which it could not have existed in any mind, and therefore without which it could not have existed in the mind of Jesus. Foremost among these ingredients stands the regal, authoritative note. The religious mentality centering in the Messiahship is necessarily one of absolute submission to a rule imposed from above. We do not, of course, by this mean "legalism" in the technical sense of that term. Legalism is a peculiar kind of submission to law, something that no longer feels the personal divine touch in the rule it submits to. Baldensperger has placed over against each other Nomism and Apocalyptic as the two contrasting and contending forces in the mind of Judaism.¹ It has been rightly pointed out that such a distinction cannot be consistently carried through. There was an amount of legalistic leaven mixed up with Apocalyptic, and the Nomism representing the opposite pole was not altogether

1. Baldensperger, *Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Lichte der Messianischen Hoffnungen seiner Zeit*, 1888.

un-eschatological in its outlook. Nor was its reverence for the divine rule in every respect and in every quarter identifiable with "legalism." Hence no reason can be given why the Messianism of Jesus, with all its apocalyptic affinities, should not have harbored within itself the strong, acute sense of that responsibility to the divine will which was the noblest fruit of the Old Testament religion. It is precisely in the Messianic concept that this element finds its supreme expression: the Messiah is the incarnate representation of that divine authoritativeness which is so characteristic of Biblical religion. It is not a later misdirected development that has made Christianity coherent under the formula of a "rule of faith and practice"; the normal starting point for this is given in the Messianic function itself. Even the intense anti-legalism of Paul has by no means obliterated the normal validity of this principle, nor was it the Apostle's intention to do so.

The idea of intensification of divine authority is present in the oldest Messianic prophecies. The "Shiloh" of Gen. 49:10 is the One to whom the obedience of the peoples shall be given in a unique degree. And the figure arising out of Israel in the oracle of Balaam (Num. 24:17) is that of One symbolized by scepter and ruler's staff. It is true that the Messianic reference of both of these prophecies has for a long time been under eclipse, but the trend of recent scholarship is toward its rehabilitation. Later on, when Messianism, of the family circle of eschatology, becomes wedded to the Davidic house, there can no longer be any question as to the predominance of the idea: henceforward the Messiah is the King *par excellence*. King and Judge are in the prophetic delineation of the figure of the Messiah practically synonymous. Nor does it require profound study of the life of Jesus to discover the vigorous exercise of this function in all his intercourse with his followers. The very conception of "following" can be understood only from this background. The solemn manner in which Jesus puts his "I say unto you" by the side of, or even apparently over against, the commandment of God, goes far beyond the highest that is conceivable in the line of prophetic authority (Matt. 5:20-43). The verses 17-20 in this same chapter are by no means a Jewish-Christian accretion to the original Gospel, but

in perfect consonance with the Messianic attitude of the speaker.² While distinguishing his precepts from those of Judaism as "light" and "easy," Jesus still retains for them the figure of "burden" and "yoke," and this is especially significant in view of the then current phrase, "taking the yoke of the law upon one's self," which designated the passing of the young man under the full regime of the law. It is nothing but the deep-seated Messianism of Paul that makes him speak of "being under law to Christ" (1 Cor. 9:21). The Christless Gospel is perhaps sometimes simply a product of the desire for a Gospel that shall have less of subordination in it. The overemphasis on the autonomy and spontaneity of the Christian life may have contributed towards bringing the Messianic idea into disfavor. As in so many other instances, this would be a case of a principally irreligious tendency presuming to take to task and endeavoring to correct what is deeply religious. Such a sentiment, at any rate, is quite in line with the conception of the modern Jesus, from whom much of the spirit of authority has evaporated. But it would hardly be congenial to the mind of Him, who in the plerophory of his Messianic *exousia* spoke the words of Matt. 7:24-27. The sentiment we are criticizing does not lead toward, but away from the Christ.

Less obvious, but none the less important, is a second ingredient: the Messianic is at bottom a species of the eschatological. Although the name Messiah does not itself express this, marking Him only as the Anointed King, yet He is to all intents the great final King, who stands at the close of the present world order and ushers in the coming world. When we say that the Biblical religion is an eschatological religion, we mean that it ascribes to the world-process a definite goal such as cannot be attained by it in the natural course of events, but will be brought about catastrophically through a divine interposition, and which, when once attained, bears the stamp of eternity. In the center of this eschatology-complex stands the Messiah. There is no place

2. It may now be considered as settled that the words "not to destroy either the law or the prophets" speak not of an idealizing perfection, but of an actual realization of the law in conduct. The context allows of no other exegesis. But even the function of "perfecting" the law or the prophets would postulate no less of Messianic authority.

for Him in a system of developments going on indefinitely within the limits of the present state of things. Our failure to realize this more clearly is due to the fact that for us the Messiah has already come and has accomplished a part of his task, and yet what we call the "eschatological" crisis is still future. But from the beginning it was not so; to the Old Testament point of view and the point of view of Jesus Himself, the coming of the Messiah signified consummation. Owing to the apocalyptic development through which the Messianic idea had passed, this identification of it with eschatological values had, if possible, become even more thorough than before. There may be a couple of Jewish Apocalypses which confine the Messiah's activity to the temporal scenes of the closing period of this world, thus debarring Him from the world of eternity. But even in these Apocalypses the Messiah's entire significance is derived from the final things to follow; his activity belongs to the sphere of the eschatological as the vestibule belongs to the house. And in the Christian representation of the matter no analogy for even this is to be found. Everywhere in the New Testament the Christ is, even as to his humanity, an eternalized figure whose redemptive significance is not subject to eclipse. Only the Pauline passage 1 Cor. 15:20-28 might seem to point in the opposite direction, in so far as it sets a terminus for Christ's kingdom of conquest, and identifies the eternal state with the kingship of God, the Father. Yet it is precisely Paul who most emphatically affirms the eternity-value and eternity-function of Christ through all the coming aeons: Rom. 5:17; 8:29, 38, 39; 1 Cor. 15:49; Col. 1:13-16; 3:4.

Nor would premillenarianism, though assuming a preliminary reign of Christ, think of this in uneschatological terms, or conceive of the eternal state as a de-Messianized state. The intensely eschatological atmosphere pervading the early Church is explainable only on the basis that, with the appearance of the Messiah, the first act of the great drama of the End was believed to have been already staged. That this was also a stable element in the consciousness of Jesus has been made more and more increasingly apparent by modern research. It is now beginning to be recognized even in circles where the traditional liberal construction of

Jesus had closed the eyes to it.³ Jesus being consciously the Messiah, his whole manner of thinking and feeling could not be otherwise than steeped in this atmosphere. It was an atmosphere in which the currents of air from this world and those from the world to come constantly intermingled, with the stronger breeze steadily blowing towards the future. Only for those to whom this state of mind is a religiously congenial state can there be more than a passing, superficial acquaintance with Jesus.

There is a very important corollary of the eschatological complexion of Messianism, and of a religion determined by it, as early Christianity certainly was. This concerns the "factual" structure of the New Testament religion, and of the Old Testament religion too, for that matter. By "factualness" we mean that the religious states of mind have in their subjective aspect no separate existence of their own, but entwine themselves around the outward acts of God, to which they are a response, and by which they are cultivated in continuance. In the Biblical religion the subjective element is nowhere lacking; on the contrary, it enters into the fabric of practical Christianity with exceptional richness such as no pagan form of piety can rival. But it always keeps in the closest touch with what God has done in the objective sphere, outside the subjectivity of the believer. The most instructive example of this is found in the cultivation of Abraham's faith through the objective promises and their objective fulfilment on the part of Jehovah. The consummate expression of this principle is seen in the eschatological outlook, both backward and forward, which accompanied Christianity from its very birth, and which Christianity derived from its oldest ancestry. This eschatological outlook is what holds the religion of the Prophets and the religion of Jesus and the religion of Paul together, despite all apparent variations in particulars. And it is the one supreme criterion of what constitutes, historically speaking, a Christian. It is the mother-

3. It remains the merit of the hyper-eschatologists that they have created a new sense of the unique importance and pervasive significance of the eschatological strand in the consciousness and teaching of Jesus. Undoubtedly this was done in a one-sided fashion; Jesus became, in this view, a person obsessed by the eschatological complex, an eschatologist for the sake of eschatology, instead of what He really was, an eschatologist for the sake of God. Our Lord's interest in eschatology was religiously oriented in the deepest and most ideal sense of the word.

soil out of which the tree of the whole redemptive organism has sprung.

Inseparable from the eschatological, however, is the further element of supernaturalism which also enters into the Messianic consciousness. The conception of the Messiahship is the most pronouncedly supernaturalistic conception in the whole range of Biblical religion. Its eschatological parentage implies that it does not and cannot mean the gradual evolving of higher conditions out of previously existing potentialities. On the contrary, the conception of the Messiahship implies the creation of a new system of things. The oldest and most striking formula for this is the Biblical distinction between the two ages or the two worlds. It is not a case of one world blossoming into another, but of an age or world of one nature being succeeded, or indeed rather superseded, by an age or world of a different nature. The second world or nature is, consequently, supernatural, because other-natural, in relation to the one preceding it. This bisection of all history is not as yet found in the Old Testament, at least not in explicit form, although as to substantial import it is there. Although the Old Testament views the Messiah as to appear in the line of succession of the Davidic dynasty, it would be a mistake to think that the Old Testament views this accession to the realm as something to take place after the ordinary quiet fashion of the average Judean king. The shoot out of the stock of Jesse and the branch out of his roots not only procures justice for the poor and the meek of the earth, and slays the wicked, but in his day there is to return the paradise-state which existed at the beginning: the wild devouring animals become tame; henceforth there is no more hurting nor destroying on the mountain of God (Isa. 11:1-9; 65:17-25).

It needs no pointing out that such a restoration of the primordial harmonies cannot come about without a tremendous world-shaking upheaval. The fact that the Spirit appears as the agent producing this upheaval cannot in the least detract from the supernaturalism of the crisis, nor from that of the ensuing new state. It rather emphatically confirms this feature, for the Spirit is pre-eminently, in such connections, the source of the supernatural: when the Spirit is poured out upon the people from on high, the result is nothing short of a total reversal of

existing conditions: the wilderness becomes a fruitful field, and the fruitful field a forest (Isa. 32:15). And from the crisis at the end this is inevitably carried back into the whole process which culminates in the crisis. The idea of a prolonged supernaturalistic world history followed by a thoroughly supernaturalized termination would be a monstrous conception, in which the body did not correspond to the head. The only normal thing here is the abnormal: the supernatural consummation must be preceded by an extended work full of equally supernatural transactions. The supernatural is the *liebste* Kind of eschatology. That the Old Testament expresses such things in figurative language affords no justification for de-supernaturalizing them. Anyone who lacks the sensorium for the supernatural cannot but walk through them as the rationalist would walk through the scenes of a wonder-land. The Messiah is simply a nucleus, a focus, of the supernatural. He carries it with Himself and radiates it wherever He goes. And, if all this be true of the idea and of its Old Testament projection, how could we expect it to be otherwise in Jesus Himself? As a matter of obvious fact He has fully absorbed this into His own consciousness. He knows the distinction between this world and the world to come.⁴ And He knows it not only theoretically, but also practically. He regards doubt concerning the resurrection as doubt concerning the supernatural exercise of the power of God. Those worthy to attain unto "that age" are thereby put on an equal footing with the angels, their bodily nature being entirely changed.

The miracles of the Gospels likewise come under consideration here. They are the appropriate supernatural concomitants of the supernatural Christ; they are signs of the times He is introducing, and prophecies of the more radical, comprehensive change still to follow. Every scheme for bringing Jesus down to the level of a man feeling at home in, and drawing His inspiration from, the purely natural realm is bound to be not merely a theological failure, but also a psychological failure, so long as the Messianic setting of the life is retained. A superficial reference to the parables of the mustard seed and the leaven is surely not sufficient to outweigh the overwhelming impression every simple reader of the Gospels receives of the supernaturalism

4. Cp., however, Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, I, pp. 120-125.

enveloping the story as a whole. So well is this felt that sometimes, by way of a desperate last resort, appeal is made to the Fourth Gospel, and passages quoted from it are adduced as evidence for the existence of an evolutionistic strain in the mind of Jesus. It is possible to do this because the fourth Gospel has such a vivid conception of the present, immanent operation of the Christ-life and the Christ-power. But the fact that something is presently existing, and working internally, does not by any means imply that it is subject to the law of natural evolution. Instead of things being naturalized and made less other-worldly in the Fourth Gospel, it would be more correct to say that the eschatological-supernatural appears in John in its highest potency, inasmuch as, turned backward, it draws the entire *ante mortem* life of the believer into the sphere of its transforming influence. Sometimes a text like John 10:10 is quoted with evolutionistic intent, but a simple comparison of this text with the principal statement of John 8:23 will show how misleading such a use of John 10:10 is. There is no more anti-evolutionistic representation of Jesus and His provenience conceivable than John 8:23. The life is indeed in the world and in the believer, but it is being sunk into them from above. It came together with Him who is the supernaturalism of heaven incarnate. And what is true of the Messianic concept of the Gospels is true in an even more pronounced sense of the Christ-figure of Paul, and, for that matter, of the remainder of the New Testament. To Paul Jesus is the One from heaven, the Second Adam, the prototype of the heavenly image believers are to receive in the resurrection. The robe of the supernatural with its folds of splendor envelops Him, and it is everywhere presupposed that He was conscious of wearing it while on earth, and continues to wear it in heaven.

Every attempt to penetrate back of this to an unsupernaturalistic core of Jesus' personality must, from the nature of the case, prove religiously futile. To de-supernaturalize the consciousness of Messiahship in Jesus means to unfit Him for being the recipient of any truly religious approach on the part of man. Jesus was not a Person the center of whose thought lay in the natural relation of man to God, with a little fringe remaining upon Him from the outworn garment of apocalyptic. He lived and moved and had His being in the world of the supernatural. The thought

of the world to come was to Him the life-breath of religion. Such a mind cannot be fitted into the humanitarian idealism of which the "liberal" theology would make Jesus the exponent. It would amount to His having to divest Himself of His own religion first in order to become the field for another religion to play upon. What really underlies the aversion to the idea of Messiahship in this respect is simply the desire to get rid of the large bulk of supernaturalism the Messiah trails in His wake. It is interesting to observe how this motive has asserted itself, and has done its work, along closely parallel lines in both Old Testament and New Testament criticism. There are not a few Old Testament critics who believe that the Messianic hope cannot have formed part of the teaching of the great ethical prophets of Israel, and they believe this on the ground that the Messianic hope is inherently bound up with magical miraculous — we would say supernatural — processes, whereas they hold that the interest of these prophets centered in moral movements dependent upon an appeal to, and a response from, the free will of man. In both cases it is the naturalism of the modern way of thinking that seeks to expel the supernaturalism of the old and, historically considered, the only possible view. And in both cases the strategic position of the latter is reconnoitered and attacked in the idea of Messiahship.

The next component element in the Messiahship is what, for the sake of convenience, may be called the "soteric" element. The Messiah stands for salvation; indeed, "Saviour" is the most popular name by which the Christ has come to be known among His followers. This saving aspect of the Messiah's work is inseparable from His vocation. Nor is this a later idea grafted upon the ancient stock through the Hellenistic custom of giving the *Soter* name to living or dead deified rulers. It is indigenous in the Old Testament stock itself. Without the hope of salvation to be wrought through Him, the greater part of the Messiah's reason for existence would fall away. In the great Messianic prophecies, such as Isa. 9 and 11, Mic. 5, Zech. 9, this feature stands in the foreground. It might be said, perhaps, that such a note, on account of its martial associations, could not possibly have found an echo in the mind of Jesus. His mind was a mind of peace, it is objected, not a mind of war. But the objection overlooks the fact that even in the Old Testament the martial element

is not of the complexion frequently ascribed to it. There is a perceptible difference between the character it bears in the later Judaism and its character in the older prophecy. To be sure, the martial setting could not be entirely absent from the prophecy, for it belongs to the ancient traditional form of the conception, as is evident from Genesis 49 and Numbers 24. But even though the setting be retained, the emphasis is increasingly shifted from the military exploits of the Messiah's followers to the miraculous, almost silent, operation of the Messiah Himself. According to Isa. 9, on His great day, as in the day of Midian, yoke and staff and rod of oppressor are broken, but it is Jehovah who breaks them, and the battle-scene remains in the dim background. The elimination of the warlike atmosphere is still clearer in Isa. 11. Here the earth is smitten with the rod of the Messiah's mouth and the wicked are slain with the breath of His lips. In Micah 5, He stands and feeds His flock in the majesty of the name of Jehovah, His God, and is great unto the ends of the earth, but when the Assyrian invasion is to be repulsed, this task, perhaps in order to detach it from the military apparatus, is devolved upon "seven shepherds and eight principal men."

Zechariah depicts the King as "just and having salvation: lowly and riding upon an ass"; chariot and horse and battle-bow are cut off, and the Messiah *speaks* peace to the nations. It would almost seem as though the martial features of the delineation had been relegated back to Jehovah, at least so far as they have not been spiritualized out of existence. It would be a very wrong inference, however, to say that with the gradual changing of the form, the substance of the saving character of the Messiah had been eliminated. Side by side with the supernatural execution by rod of mouth and breath of lips in Isa. 11 there stands the judging of the poor and meek of the earth. And the rider upon the animal of peace in Zechariah comes with salvation. Perhaps the Old Testament picture was not so unfit for assimilation by Jesus as is alleged to be the case. It should be noticed that Jesus by no means discards the imagery and vocabulary of conquest in connection with the Messianic program. He only lifts it to a higher plane: the powers to be conquered are not political; they belong to the world of spirits. In connection with Satan and the demons the consciousness of bringing deliverance is retained

without the least impairment.⁵ The exorcism of demons and the healing miracles are liberating acts, and as such they form a part of the general Messianic deliverance. Jesus claims to have been sent for the purpose of performing them (Matt. 11:2-6; Luke 4:18, 19). It can hardly be subject to doubt any longer that Jesus regarded this world of miraculous deliverance which, wherever He went, He carried with Himself, as in the strictest sense objective. It did not consist of acts that anybody apart from Him could perform. Wherever it is delegated to others, it is delegated in virtue of Messianic authority (Mark 16:17, 18). The Gospel of this, that is, the good tidings of the realization of these things promised in Old Testament prophecy, He must bring to every city (Luke 4:43). To Him the idea of His Messiahship would have been unthinkable without this. The benevolent aspect of these works is not, of course, absent; but they cannot be explained from a mere humanitarian desire to do good. John the Baptist is supposed to be able to draw from them the sure conclusion that Jesus is "the one to come," and that no one else need be waited for (Matt. 11:1-6).

We find, therefore, that Jesus placed upon the Messianic consciousness, which without a residue filled His mind, a solid soteric interpretation of the most realistic kind. It did not bear the modern, diluted sense of being a source of helpfulness to men by example or sympathy alone, or in some other similar way. He was a Saviour as no one else could be, and into this flowed all the powers of His Messianic life. According to the uniform usage of the New Testament — the Gospels no less than the Epistles — "to save" means, when applied in a spiritual sense, to rescue from the judgment and to introduce into the blessedness of the world to come.⁶

But this old solid idea of salvation, the basis of all evangelical religion, has become an offense to the modern mind in many quarters. While the terms "Saviour" and "salvation" are not discarded, the substance of the transaction which they stand for is entirely abandoned. In every possible way it is attempted to free the Jesus of the Gospels from this antiquated, "magical"

5. This is something totally different from the "spiritualization" which the idea has been made to undergo in the "liberal" interpretations of the consciousness of Jesus. There the essence of the idea is sacrificed.

6. Wagner in *Zeitschrift für die Neutest. Wissenschaft*, 1905.

idea of salvation, and to make Him the exponent of the new Pelagian evangel of "uplift." There is but one radical way of doing this, and that is by stripping Jesus of His Messianic character. The moment this falls off from Him, the distasteful soteric notions of atonement, regeneration, and whatever else belongs to this circle of ideas, one and all disappear with it. They are all enucleated in their Messianic root. And here also the Old Testament parallel is interesting. Among the motives that have led to the denial of the genuineness of some of the greatest eschatological prophecies has been the feeling that the ideas of free grace and supernatural transformation, so prominent in them, are out of keeping with the intensely ethical spirit of the prophets. It is nothing else but the Pelagian view of religion seeking to dislodge the Augustinian view from its double stronghold in prophecy and Gospel. All this anti-soteric effort, however, can have only one practical result. It is bound to raise an insurmountable barrier between the historical Jesus and the refusers of His supreme gift. As He is entirely and at every moment intent upon thus imparting Himself, every communion with Him assumed to be operating on any other, non-soteric basis, is only a pseudo-communion, impossible on psychological grounds alone, to say nothing of other reasons why it is unreal.

Lastly, the Messianic consciousness is most intimately interwoven with the specifically religious position the Messiah occupies between God and man. Basically it includes His right to receive worship and His identification with God. These highest of claims are inseparable from it. To be sure, it must be acknowledged that at this point the conjunction of the one with the other is of a somewhat different nature than in the case of the ingredients previously examined. There the conception of Messiahship, analytically examined, of itself yielded the elements in question. The title to deity and consequent worship are not given with the Messiahship as such. In the abstract a type of Messiahship is conceivable that could dispense with them. In the Messiah construed after the Jewish pattern, a royal leader and conqueror in the conflict with the pagan power, and subsequently the peace-bringing regent over the people of God, there is nothing postulating deity or reception of worship from those over whom the Messiah is appointed. His position would be close

to God, but at every point in his career, even the highest, it would remain distinctly marked off from the prerogatives of the Godhead as such.

But we are not dealing with Messiahship in the abstract. Our concern is with that specific type of the office which is present in the consciousness of Jesus. Here the indispensableness of strictly divine prerogatives in order to the adequate exercise of its functions springs into view. This is due to the thorough spiritualizing which the idea has undergone in the mind of Jesus. So long as the Messiah's task is conceived as lying in the sphere of external, national, earthly kingship and salvation, it remains possible to regard Him as the representative of God without investing Him with divine attributes. But when His function comes to lie in the sphere of spiritual relationship to God, in those high regions where God touches the soul and the soul touches God, then His calling immediately places Him in the center of the field where the forces of religion play. The directness and immediacy pertaining to every true exercise of religion in the ethereal Christian sense render it imperative that He shall Himself belong to the category of the divine. Otherwise our communion with God would be intercepted and diverted by Him to the impairment or nullification of it as a religious act. It will perhaps be said that the proposition just laid down — no Messiahship without deity, no consciousness of Messiahship without consciousness of deity — cannot be reversed. In the abstract this is true. It is logically quite possible to affirm the deity of our Lord, and His consciousness thereof, and yet to deny His Messianic character and His consciousness in regard to *it*. But practically, this is a negligible concession. The cases will be rare, if indeed any exist, where men are believers in the true deity of our Lord and yet draw back from affirming His Messianic office and state of mind. Such cases are oddities in the world of doctrinal thinking and of religious experience. Their place is in museums, not in the outdoor world of living faith. When faith has taken the infinitely greater leap of affirming the deity of Jesus, it can only by a queer perversity of mind hesitate to take the smaller one of affirming His Messianic character. The best confirmation of this lies in the fact that the deniers of the Messianic consciousness do not assume this position of denial

because of a claim that they have something higher and more inclusive to offer, something which would render the Messiahship superfluous as an article of faith. On the contrary, they deny the Messiahship because they wish to substitute something lower and less difficult to believe. We are not asked to cease calling Him the Christ because after calling Him Lord and God we could not possibly do more. On the contrary, we are asked to drop the name Christ, because Jesus shall suffice us as an example, a teacher, a leader, a point of departure in religion. And, because it is awkward to receive Him at this lower value with the historical fact staring us in the face that He Himself thought it necessary to offer Himself at an infinitely higher value, therefore it is held to be inconceivable that the Messianic consciousness should be allowed to retain its place in Jesus' life without molestation. The whole innate trend of modern religious thinking is against the recognition of Jesus' Messianic consciousness. The Messianic consciousness has become — though for different reasons — what it was to the Jews of our Lord's lifetime, the great *skandalon*, which produces not only the rejection of the Messiahship, but ultimately the rejection of Jesus Himself.

By the foregoing process of reasoning the impression may have been created that the conjunction of the divine and the Messianic elements is a purely logical one. Nothing could be farther from the truth. This conjunction appears in the record as approached from an eminently practical point of view. From the intensified experience of the Messianic at its highest spiritualized moments the conviction of the divine forces itself upon the disciples. The pathway of theological inference here coincides exactly with the pathway of religious experience. It is through the Messianic majesty of Jesus that the glimpses are caught of that even more transcendent glory which we have learned to recognize and worship as His deity. This is not to deny, of course, that there were occasions when our Lord's divine nature revealed itself directly, without the intermediary vehicle of the Messianic function. But these occasions were, as we shall see, rather the exceptions than the rule. That is precisely the reason why the divine in Jesus plants itself squarely in our pathway when the moment for dealing with Him religiously is upon us. As a matter of logical deduction one might perhaps presume to brush it aside. But

when it comes in the form of religious condescension by Jesus in His saving function brought to bear upon us, then to refuse utilizing it is more than unbelief, it is an impertinence offered to Jesus at the very moment when He can lay highest claim to our reverence and gratitude.

The contrasting viewpoints outlined above have only gradually become clarified through a long history of discussion. In the womb of modern biographical and historical occupation with the life of Jesus there lay from the beginning, like twin embryos, a principle of humanitarian idealism and a principle of eschatological realism. These two were incompatibles, but for forcing this fact upon the modern mind two things were necessary. On the one hand the liberalizing transformation of the character of Jesus had to have time for development up to a certain point of maturity, enabling it to provoke reaction from the opposite side. On the other hand, the figure of the eschatological-Messianic Jesus had to be sculptured out with a degree of realism that would compel recognition of its presence as a potent, in fact as the dominating, factor in the Gospel drama. So long as either of these two processes remained incompleting, the antagonism of the two principles remained latent. It was, however, the realistic-eschatological element that suffered its eclipse in the earlier period. The Messianic was supposed to have lain more or less on the periphery of Jesus' mind; no sufficient vitality was ascribed to it to endanger the other ideals in His consciousness which the liberals had particularly at heart. This attitude proved all the more easy and natural because the humanitarian idealism had laid hold upon the eschatological-Messianic ingredients in the Gospel record themselves and had fashioned them to its own liking. Inwardly denatured, "the other Jesus" lacked the strength to reveal and assert His true nature. Thus the open conflict was averted for a long time, since of the two portraits the one that was favored had in a measure assimilated the other to itself. There had been produced a quasi-Messiah, whose specific consciousness was limited to feeling Himself perfect in the ethico-religious sphere and to the sense of vocation for imparting the same character to others. Even so robust a figure as the Messianic Son of Man retained, under this treatment, only a minimum of Messianic appearance. But while this was retarding the open

outbreak of the conflict, the mutually antagonistic forces were in the meantime silently gathering strength.

In due time attempts began to be made to render the eschatological safely innocuous through its resolute removal from the authentic record. Colani (1864) and Weiffenbach (1873) distinguished in "the great eschatological discourse," towards the close of the Gospels, a hortatory address uttered by Jesus in view of the foreseen judgment to be visited upon Jerusalem, and what they called "the Jewish-Christian Apocalypse"; with the latter, it was claimed, Jesus had nothing to do.⁷ With Volkmar (1882), in every respect the most acute and farsighted of the liberal school of critics, anticipating by his reasoning, sometimes even as to startling details, the later epoch-making skepsis of Wrede, we are at last face to face with the comprehensive denial of the historicity of the eschatological-Messianic strand of thought in the mind of Jesus.⁸ The whole thing, not excluding the Messianic Son of Man figure, arose, according to him, under the influence of the later Christian dogma, from which source it invaded the thought world of Judaism. What remained for the historical Jesus (for in this respect Volkmar stays behind the subsequent position of Wrede, that he still believes in a historical Jesus with determinable features) is this, that Jesus desired to be a mere reformer, the spiritual deliverer of the people of God, to realize *upon earth* the Kingdom of God which all were seeking *in the beyond*, and to extend the reign of God over all nations. This note of universalism is, of course, out of place in a de-eschatologized construction, for, historically speaking, universalism belongs to the circle of Messianic ideas. But, apart from that, a state of mind more remote from the Messianic state of mind is scarcely conceivable. In Volkmar's case the preferential treatment given by most critics to the Gospel of Mark, as reflecting more faithfully than the others the true character and course of development of Jesus' life, had something to do with his repudiation of the elements in question, as it has in general smoothed

7. Colani, *Jésus-Christ et les Croyances Messianiques de son temps*. Weiffenbach, *Der Wiederkunftsgedanke Jesu*. Here the idea of the return of Jesus is equated with the idea of the resurrection. Strangely enough, it is not perceived how ill the thought of the resurrection fits into an uneschatological frame of mind, such as the writer ascribes to Jesus.

8. Volkmar, *Jesus Nazarenus und die erste Christliche Zeit, mit den beiden ersten Erzählern*.

the way for minimizing or expelling the Messianic idea, for in Mark there is comparatively little of discourse, and it is precisely in the Matthean and Lucan discourse that the Messianic obtrudes itself. And Volkmar was an enthusiastic champion of the precedence and superiority of Mark. Still in the consequences drawn he continued to stand more or less isolated. Now, however, something more influential and decisive was approaching. As early as 1851 Dillmann, and in 1864 Hilgenfeld had opened the door of the house of Jewish Apocalyptic.⁹ At that juncture, to be sure, this did not seem to have any perceptible effect. However when Baldensperger on the basis of a comprehensive survey of the literature construed the Messianic consciousness of Jesus with the Son of Man title as its center, the situation was suddenly changed. Liberal idealism had so far been on the offensive, keeping back, or more and more forcing back, the eschatological-Messianic factor; the roles were now reversed. It was the merit of this writer to have compelled attention to the Messiahship of Jesus. That the proper reaction leading to a correction of the liberal position did not even then follow was due to a twofold cause. The first reason was that Baldensperger himself had not allowed his "rediscovery" of the Messianic Jesus to have its natural effect upon his own delineation of the latter. He himself still stood so much under the influence of the liberalizing tradition that he modified the Son of Man concept in an unhistorical fashion, imparting to it an ethico-religious coloring strongly reminiscent of the school in which he had received his training and to which he did not venture to become disloyal. The second reason was that the liberal school at precisely this point made a desperate effort to retain the undisputed ascendancy it had so far enjoyed, and which now threatened to slip from its grasp. This was done in the elaboration of the linguistic argument against the historical possibility of the title Son of Man. Lietzmann in a way neutralized the impact of Baldensperger's views, even more than the latter's own irresoluteness in carrying them through had done.¹⁰

After the flood of this linguistic discussion had receded, and through the word of Dalman and others the first flush of victory had given way to a feeling that after all nothing certain had been

9. Dillmann, *Henoch*. Hilgenfeld, *Jüdische Apokalypitik*.

10. Lietzmann, *Der Menschensohn*, 1896.

established and the battle had proven a draw, the field was cleared for a renewed and this time more consistent offensive from the eschatological-Messianic side. This countermove is identified with the two names of Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer.¹¹ Both broke thoroughly with the tradition that the center of Jesus' self-consciousness had lain in the present time and in this present world. They boldly shifted it to the future and gave it the complexion of other-worldliness. This was done by both with impartial application to the idea of the Kingdom of God and to the idea of the Messiahship. They held that each of these lay for Jesus in the future and that He had little of occupation with the present in them. Weiss, however, proceeds more cautiously than Schweitzer in his methods. Schweitzer, notwithstanding all his brilliancy and acumen, outdoes himself in a ruthless eschatologizing of the life and consciousness of Jesus such as leaves no room for undertones and shadings in the account. It goes without saying that such a procedure severs all connection between the historical Jesus and the modern religious mind, which is so intensely engrossed by the present world. Schweitzer himself is too thoroughly modern not to acknowledge this openly, but at the same time he is too much of a "historicist" not to insist upon it uncompromisingly. So far as religion is concerned it was inevitable for a mind like his, after having run the entire gamut of eschatology to its very last note, to break with it as something that had figured in the mind of Jesus as a hopeless cause from the beginning, and had of necessity proven an utter disillusion to Himself in the end. The following sentences from his book reflect with a striking, but pathetic, clearness the conclusion into which for him the whole problem resolves itself:

"The Messianic consciousness of the uniquely great Man of Nazareth sets up a struggle between the present and the beyond, and introduces that resolute absorption of the beyond by the present, which in looking back we recognize as the history of Christianity. . . . Protestantism marked a step in that acceptance of the world, which was constantly developing itself from within. . . . But it will be a mightier revolution still when the last remaining ruins of the supersensuous other-worldly system of

11. Johannes Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu, vom Reiche Gottes*, 1892; second edition, 1900. Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (English translation), 1910.

thought are swept away in order to clear the site for a new spiritual, purely real and present world. All the inconsistent compromises and constructions of modern theology are merely an attempt to stave off the final expulsion of eschatology from religion. . . . At that last cry upon the cross the whole eschatological supersensuous world fell in upon itself in ruins. . . . The Son of Man was buried in the ruins . . . there remained alive only Jesus the man."

Surely no man ever made a more desperate disavowal of a conception which he had pursued all his life for its mystic loveliness! If mankind must arrive at this, the judgment passed not only upon modern or liberal religion, but upon all religion as such, is nothing short of annihilating. Of what value is the service of a God who, Himself eternal, confines His occupation with us to the little span of this pitiable life? This stands at the opposite pole from the conviction of Jesus, who protested to the Sadducees of His time that it would be unworthy of God not to reclaim from death Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, even as to their bodies, for the simple reason of His having declared Himself their God. But Jesus was a consistent eschatologist in the very core of His religion; He had grasped eschatology as something without which religion ceases to exist. And still further, more is at stake than merely religion as a matter of eternal moment between God and ourselves; only one degree less momentous is the question of what, on such premises, becomes of the relation between Jesus and the "Christian." Let Schweitzer himself again give us the answer:

"The study of the Life of Jesus has had a curious history. It set out in quest of the historical Jesus, believing that when it had found Him it could bring Him straight back into our time as a Teacher and Saviour. . . . But He does not stay; He passes by our time and returns to his own. What surprised and dismayed the theology of the last forty years was that . . . it could not keep Him in our time, but had to let Him go."

Which is to say that the promised recovery of the historical Jesus has turned out to be an eternal separation! He went, but contrary to His own promise, He has not returned to us. After this, does it not sound like a futile resurrection of the old discredited liberal formula when Schweitzer tells us that "a mighty spiritual force proceeds from Him," and that therein lies "the solid foundation of Christianity"? How does this differ from the

"liberal" phraseology on which Schweitzer from the beginning to the end of his book pours out such contempt? The issue of thoroughgoing eschatology could not be otherwise, because from the beginning it failed to distinguish between eschatology as a theological obsession, and eschatology as the finest flower of religion cultivated for the glory of God. The latter, not the former, eschatology surely was for Jesus. And in Him it was as deep as His religion itself.¹²

12. Cp. *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, pp. 284, 397.

CHAPTER II

The Denial of the Messianic Consciousness

FROM the foregoing it will have become clear to us why the Messianic consciousness of Jesus creates serious practical difficulties for what is usually called "modern liberal Christianity." The Messianic consciousness gathers up in itself and brings to a head certain uncongenial, unassimilable elements which trouble this type of religion in its employment of the figure of Jesus. And these elements bulk so large and are so omnipresent as to obstruct the pathway of approach at almost every point. The realization of them tends to make the liberal movement of religion prefer to take its departure from Christ in addressing itself to the world, rather than a movement seeking the Person of Christ in order to occupy itself with Him. A religion intended to be first of all centripetal has become alarmingly centrifugal. The discomfort arising from this situation of having to attach oneself to something which, by a change of position of the lens of religion has been placed out of focus, naturally drives the liberal scholars to unusual critical measures of readjustment. This is the real explanation of the concerted action on the part of the liberals towards eliminating the Messianic consciousness from the mind of Jesus.

As might be expected in a subject so busily agitated, there are many shadings of the suspicion entertained and of the denial registered. The following may be enumerated as entitled to separate, and rather detailed, discussion.

1. First, there is the position of outright denial of the historicity of the Messianic consciousness in Jesus. This position not merely doubts the presence of the Messianic consciousness in Jesus' mind, but even claims to be able to prove its absence therefrom.

2. There is the agnostic position, which refuses to commit itself, and that not as a preliminary standpoint taken from modesty or in the interest of caution or safety, but as a matter of positive conviction of absolute and permanent unknowability. The watch-

word of this position might be said to be *Ignoramus et ignorabimus*. It holds that the records are in such a state as to be useless for ascertaining the truth of the matter.

3. A theory of consciousness of prospective Messiahship has been formed, which holds that Jesus was conscious — perhaps intensely conscious — of His Messianic vocation, but did not lay claim to the exercise of the function or to the enjoyment of its privileges during His lifetime. It is held that He regarded these things as indeed in store for Him, but that He must await the pleasure of the Father for the moment of their bestowal.

4. A somewhat different compromise is offered in the hypothesis of a gradually developing consciousness of Messiahship in the mind of Jesus. According to this theory, He began His activity in an un-Messianic, simply prophetic frame of mind, but He outgrew this and received in the place of it the conviction of divine appointment to the Messianic office. This fourth view, it will be perceived, easily permits of combination with the third, because the self-interpretation Jesus grew into may well have been, though it need not have been, that of prospective Messiahship. It is conceivable that at first He only felt destined for the task; but it is equally conceivable that all at once He awoke to the sense of being in the midst of the discharge of it.

5. The view is maintained that the Messiahship was for the religious life and work of Jesus a merely formal conception, something in no wise touching the essence of His permanent significance as the center of Christianity. The effect of this theory is not the elimination of the Messianic consciousness from the mind of Jesus, but rather the minimizing of its importance both for Him and for us.

Let us now proceed to examine these several views in order, both as to the arguments adduced in favor of them, and as to the criticism to be passed upon them.

The theory of outright denial¹ appeals first of all to a certain dualism alleged to exist in the Gospel tradition. There appear, we are told, in the tradition, side by side, two different strands, the one Messianic, the other non-Messianic, and that in the sense of the non-Messianic strand excluding every idea or consciousness

1. As three representatives of this view may be named Volkmar, Martineau and Nathaniel Schmidt.

of Messiahship. These two strands are, as we find them, closely interwoven, but it is claimed that critical skill and patience can disentangle them, without so injuring the texture of the non-Messianic strand as to destroy its historical value. It is claimed that when criticism is brought to bear upon these two strands in the tradition, the difference in point of historicity between them immediately becomes apparent. It is alleged that the Messianic strand lies open to suspicion in many important respects, while the non-Messianic elements of the narrative evince themselves as proof against all critical attacks. Therefore, it is held, these non-Messianic elements must be the original bedrock of the tradition, while the Messianic representation looks like a subsequently formed stratum.

A second cause that has contributed to cast suspicion on the historicity of the Messianic element in the Gospels is connected with the title Son of Man. This is the favorite self-designation of Jesus; indeed, the Gospel writers never represent others as having so designated Jesus. Both by reason of its frequency, and by reason of the manner of its use, this title seemed to belong to the very backbone of the Messianic tradition. Moreover in the Gospels the title Son of Man is coupled with the highest and most unmistakably Messianic predicates. Hence to this title the revival of appreciation of Jesus' Messianic character, which took place in the latter part of the nineteenth century, largely attached itself. At first the intense occupation with the Apocalyptic literature by such a man as Baldensperger looked towards the full recognition and evaluation of the Messianic character in the life of Jesus. It is one of the paradoxes in the history of modern New Testament science that the interest in the Messianic problem thus excited, and particularly the further study of the phrase Son of Man, should have led to the opposite result to what the first stage of the movement seemed to promise. The investigation was soon shifted to the field of linguistics. The question was raised what could have corresponded in the vernacular of Jesus to the Greek phrase *ho huios tou anthroopou*, as found in the Gospels. Jesus spoke a dialect of the Aramaic language. And in the Aramaic idiom the phrase "son of man" was found to be a common, trite designation of the individual of the human species. It just means "a man," "somebody," and there is nothing mysterious about it.

Now, in view of this, the question arose how a phrase of such general meaning as "a man" could have been employed by Jesus as a characteristic self-designation. The conclusion reached was that He could not, and therefore did not, so employ it. It was held that the use of this title was unhistorical, because linguistically impossible, on the lips of the Aramaic-speaking Jesus. How the use of the phrase as a title, in the face of this, nevertheless actually entered into the tradition and the written Gospels, remained a question in itself, to which varying answers were given which do not at this point concern us. Our sole object here is to point out that the suspicion cast on the authenticity of this title struck, to the minds of many, a serious blow at the actual presence and operation of the Messianic factor in the life of Jesus. For it should not be forgotten that the frequency of the phrase Son of Man in the text of the Gospels or in the tradition back of the text, constituted the most weighty piece of evidence in support of the Messianic interpretation of Jesus by Himself. With this apparently falling away, the entire structure seemed in danger of collapse.

A third reason for the denial is found in the radical transformation the Messianic concept undergoes in the Gospels. The Messianic expectation and the national hope of Israel had previously been closely united. The Messiah was regarded as a national patriotic figure; to sever Him from Israel would be to deprive Him of all significance. It is deemed historically inconceivable that Jesus should have entertained the idea of His Messiahship, and yet permitted the break between Himself and Israel to occur and develop in the manner described in the Gospels. Even if at the beginning of His career He had believed in His Messiahship, it is held, still the progress of events, carrying Him and Israel farther and farther apart, must soon have disillusioned Him, and with His loss of every positive relation to Israel the last remnant of faith in His Messianic vocation must have vanished.

This, however, is only an external incongruity between the Messianic idea and the situation in which Jesus is placed by the Evangelists. A more fundamental impossibility is alleged to lie in the fact that the Jesus of the Gospels makes out of the Messiahship something *materially* different from what it had always been. It appears transposed from the key of victory and power into the

key of service and suffering. Its symbol becomes the cross. It is especially after the episode of Caesarea Philippi that this new type of Messiahship emerges most distinctly. In the section of Mark 8:27-10:45, which Wellhausen with one of his striking phrases has called "the nest of the gospel," it is claimed that this Christianizing transmutation of the Messiahship becomes most obtrusive. It is held that the later paradoxical interpretation of the cross, with the peculiar dogmatic ideas crystallizing around it, has here been carried back into the lifetime of Jesus. In the actual history, it is said, such a construction would have moved like a phantom, out of all touch with surrounding scenes and events. The persons to whom it is ostensibly presented, it is alleged, would have been utterly incapable of apprehending it. The phenomena in question, however, are not confined to this single section of the Gospel narrative. Almost everywhere the Messiahship of Jesus bears the marks of passivity. And it is believed that the whole difficulty can be most easily removed by assuming that such a paradox never occurred in actual history, but was rather the product of the dogmatizing occupation of the early Church with the tragic ending of the life of Jesus, which, in order to provide it with a halfway reasonable explanation, was forced into the ill-fitting garment of the Messianic concept.

The deepest reason, however, for the suspicion under which the Messianic consciousness has fallen lies in its alleged incompatibility with the ethico-religious character of Jesus. The difficulty is a psychological one. It is found hard to believe that in one and the same mind two such divergent ideals can have lodged together. Holtzmann, while not rashly yielding to the impulse to remove one of the two, has given striking expression to the sense of their discordant character in the following words: "One is made to feel, as though upon the fair fields of a world of wholesome moral renewal, there suddenly burst forth out of regions far removed from all actuality a scorching withering wind of Oriental frenzy, and it is this feeling that has lent countenance to the various efforts, deserving serious consideration, to cut out the Messianic idea, as a diseased foreign body, from the otherwise healthful organism of the life of Jesus and from the make-up of his preaching."²

2. Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, second edition, I, p. 308.

The Jesus in whom liberal Protestantism finds its supreme ideal is the Jesus of the Sermon on the Mount, the sublime self-forgetful altruist, the man of delicate tender sensibilities, who puts all the intensity of His interest in the problems of the subjective spiritual life of man, and treats all matters lying outside of this one thing needful with neglect or disdain. The more ethereal and idealistic the complexion of Jesus' mind, the less would it have been likely to harbor dreams and hopes of such extreme and bizarre character as to expose it to the charge of bigotry. There is altogether too much self-consciousness, too much sense of self-importance inherent in the Messianic aspiration, to agree with the atmosphere of the Sermon on the Mount, it is held. Professor Schmidt has well formulated this feeling. In commenting on Matt. 11:27, he observes: "Such an utterance is out of harmony with the admittedly genuine sayings of Jesus, and casts an undeserved reflection upon his character. . . . How can the gentle teacher . . . be supposed to have imagined himself possessed of all knowledge, and regarded all other men as ignorant of God?"³ That is to say, in the last analysis it is the humility of Jesus which is regarded as ruling out the Messianic consciousness. Moreover, a model of religious sobriety and moral sanity, as this school loves to depict the Saint of Nazareth, must live and move and have his being in the present, not brood on the future. If obsessed by the thought that the fashion of this world quickly passes away, his ethical counsels would, it is held, be apt to become interimistic and perfunctory. But of such half-heartedness no trace is found in Jesus' teaching. He speaks about divorce and covetousness as though the present world-order, with its fight against sin and evil, were to continue indefinitely. Therefore, it is said, the Messianic obsession, which would inevitably have interfered with this ethical single-mindedness, cannot have existed. Moreover, what the Gospels ascribe to Jesus is not a mild, subdued eschatological interest, but a most intense, passionate absorption in the thought of the end; and this fact, it is claimed, greatly increases the difficulty of believing that the Messianic consciousness was historical. If the two principles of ethical idealism and of eschatological preoccupation cannot dwell together in peace, then the surmise is warranted that the Messianic consciousness was never actually

3. Nathaniel Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, p. 152.

there, but represents an element introduced later by the early Church, which carried back the storm and stress of its own conflicting emotions into the tranquil mind of Jesus.

To the above statement of the grounds for denial of the Messianic consciousness we immediately subjoin our critique of their validity. The weakness of the argument drawn from the dualism in the tradition about Jesus lies in the subjective character of the tests applied. If it were possible to show that the Gospels, judged by objective criteria, easily divide themselves into an earlier and a later stratum, and then could be further shown that the earlier stratum, though determined without regard to the problem of Messianism, turned out to be free of the Messianic idea, whereas the later stratum happened to contain all the Messianic material, then, to be sure, it would seem that a plausible case had been made out for the later origin of the Messianic delineation of Jesus. But no argument against the Messianic consciousness has been, nor can any be, constructed along such objective lines. The average conclusions of Synoptical criticism do not in the least invite to it. As a matter of fact, the advocates of the view under discussion do not appeal to the conclusions of criticism. They do not seek support from the two-document hypothesis. The latter would at least have furnished them with an objective basis for ascertaining the earliest accessible tradition from Mark and the Logia. But Mark, as they well perceive, does not, when compared with Matthew and Luke, show any appreciable approach towards the conception of a non-Messianic Jesus. Nor does the so-called Logia-source, reconstructed from Matthew and Luke, point in that direction. And the same still holds true when out of Mark a more primitive document, the so-called *Ur-Marcus*, is distilled. This *Ur-Marcus* would not be one whit less Messianic than the finished Gospel of Mark. But, say some critics, the Messianizing re-editing must have taken place at an earlier stage of the process of tradition, before the literary stage was reached. This however amounts to supporting by appeal to the unknowable what the knowledge of history is unable to verify. As a matter of fact the procedure of the critics in this matter is not an objectively verifiable procedure at all. It depends on eliminating the Messianic indications in each case

separately. The critics operate from case to case, from passage to passage. They seize upon one or the other detached phenomenon which renders some incident or some saying suspect to their mind. The phenomena thus seized upon vary in the individual cases. Such a procedure creates a strong presumption that the actual motive determining the decisions springs from a preconceived antipathy to the Messianic evidence. In the last analysis, it is not that the Messianic element is ruled out because the passages criticized offer just ground for suspicion, but on the contrary, the passages are subject to suspicion because the Messianic idea appears in them. The necessity of resorting to such various disconnected trains of reasoning tends to destroy confidence in the conclusion. Even granting (which it is by no means necessary to grant) that in some instances considered by themselves a fairly plausible case has been made out, yet the number of instances it is necessary to get rid of, either by excision or by eliminative interpretation, is so great as to weaken the argument as a whole most seriously. Besides, even with all this mass of material neutralized in one way or another, one cannot help feeling that the Messianic spirit is still there in the Gospels, intangible perhaps, but none the less real. It is a spirit that will not be exorcized by tackling individual cases. Its name is Legion, and it easily slips from one body into another. The only method for effectually getting rid of it is by destroying the organism in which it dwells and which it pervades as the soul does the body.

The second ground for denial is taken from the supposed linguistic impossibility that Jesus, in the Aramaic dialect which He spoke, could have called Himself the Son of Man in designation of His Messiahship, in view of the fact that the term *bar enash* in that and in the cognate dialects means merely "a man," and this does not lend itself for use as a title. We do not intend here to lose ourselves in a labyrinthine discussion as to what the title could or could not have meant in the mouth of Jesus. We shall have occasion to revert to this question later. How bewildering and literally covered by confusing trails this part of the field is may be seen from the learned article by Nathaniel Schmidt in Vol. IV of the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*. All we shall attempt at this point is to make some observations which would seem to weaken the force of the linguistic argument.

At the outset it should be acknowledged that the passage Dan. 7:13, to which the phrase in the Gospels undoubtedly goes back at least in part, does not use it as a title. It is there simply a description of the visionary figure seen coming with the clouds of heaven. This figure was like "a son of man," that is, "like a man." However, to grant that the usage in Daniel is descriptive is not quite equivalent to granting that it is purely symbolical of the Kingdom of God, just as the beasts of verses 2-8 are claimed to be symbolic of the world-powers. Both contentions are inexact. Neither the beasts nor the man-like figure directly symbolize the powers for which they stand. They do so only indirectly, through symbolizing the rulers of these several kingdoms. Therefore it is said in the subsequent interpretation: "These great beasts, which are four, are four *kings*," (verse 17). The phrase "like a man" in like manner proximately describes the King, although this does not, of course, exclude the possibility of the thus described King symbolizing the nature of the Kingdom over which He is to rule. We may assume, then, that the Messiah is actually introduced in the passage in Daniel 7; that the phrase "like unto a man" is not a title, but a description of His appearance, and that through this description of His appearance He becomes collectively symbolical of the Kingdom of God. The collective symbolism is recognized; only it is not conceded to be an argument against the presence in the passage of a concrete figure.⁴ Nor can it be reasonably doubted that this figure is the Messiah. The objection raised against this from verse 18, where "the saints of the Most High" are said to receive the kingdom, is by no means conclusive. If it proved anything at all, it would prove that the author was not only non-Messianic but that he was pointedly anti-Messianic in his eschatology. To allow kings for the world-powers and to

4. A special reason facilitating the transition from the purely symbolic into the concretely descriptive of a single person lies in this, that the kings of the world-kingdoms are a succession of rulers and as such are incapable of being represented otherwise than symbolically, whereas the Ruler of the Kingdom of God is One, without successors, so that to depict Him symbolically must mean at the same time to describe Him personally. The Messiah is always One and undivided.

The best statement of the argument in favor of the personal-concrete character of the figure "like unto a son of man" in Daniel is found in Grill, *Untersuchungen über die Entstehung des vierten Evangeliums*, pp. 55ff. Grill himself comes to the conclusion that the figure meant is that of the angel Michael, Israel's celestial patron; so likewise Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, p. 50.

leave the final rule of God kingless could hardly be interpreted on any other principle. And such an anti-Messianic program would have no analogy in the Old Testament. On the other hand, there are not a few prophecies which join together both Messianic and non-Messianic representations. In Isaiah eschatological pictures of both types occur. The assumption of Grill, Schmidt, and others, that not the Messiah but an Angel-Prince, the guardian of Israel, is meant, would be just as much subject to the objection mentioned, for he likewise received no notice whatever in verse 18.

The important point for our purpose is that a concrete figure is referred to. For, when the question is raised as to how the transition came to be made from a descriptive phrase to a formal title, it makes some difference whether the descriptive phrase served the purpose of pure, collective symbolism, or had back of it a concrete person. Obviously a descriptive phrase relating to a person would more easily change into a title than would the mere symbol of a collective body. A point of departure for the change was furnished by the mysterious setting of the scene in Daniel itself. The feature of the figure resembling a man, if standing alone, might not have drawn attention to itself. But when this figure like a man is seen coming with the clouds, i.e., in a theophany from heaven, the fact is striking enough to fasten the scene upon the memory. The man with such surroundings would easily become "the Man," the peculiar man known from Daniel. At first the quotation-character would be consciously felt, but in the course of time this might be lost sight of, and the abbreviated form, cut loose from reminiscence of the circumstances of his first appearance, might become current. So, we say, it might have happened; but there is no reason to believe that the syncopating process reached its extreme point much before the time of Jesus. "The Man" in the Gospels repeatedly appears in company with the clouds, which shows that the association with the scene in Daniel has not been obliterated. Then, with the Hellenizing of the phrase, introducing the double article, and thus adding mysteriousness and majesty by means of outward form, the process was completed. But this last step was not necessary to produce the titular significance. In all probability the phrase meets us as a title earlier than the Gospel history, viz., in the Parable Discourses of the Book of Enoch, XXXVI-LXXI. Good

critical authorities date these discourses from the last century before the Christian era. True, the hypothesis of Christian interpolations, striking at the very passages where the title Son of Man occurs, would rob the argument drawn from this quarter of all force. But, as Schürer, a witness of weight on such subjects, has observed: "Nothing of a specifically Christian character is to be met with in this section." In this document, Enoch is described as asking the interpreting Angel concerning "that son of man." He receives the answer: This is "the son of man who has righteousness." The terms further applied to him leave no doubt about his being the Messiah. He is seated on the throne of the Lord of Spirits. He was hidden before, and the Most High preserved Him in the presence of his might. The sum of the judgment is committed to Him, Chaps. XLVI; LXII; LXIX. Notwithstanding the difference that here the Son of Man functions as the judge, a feature lacking in Daniel, there can be no doubt as to the dependence of these various statements on the Daniel passage, and we are consequently justified in the conclusion that to the author of these pieces in Enoch the figure in Daniel meant none other than the Messiah.⁵

In these sections of Enoch the phrase occurs in a twofold form, with the article, "the Son of Man," and with a demonstrative pronoun, "that Son of Man." In XLVI.1 we meet first the description "as the likeness of a man," and next the enquiry about "that son of man," verse 2. In verse 3 the relative clause "who has righteousness" works to the same effect of seeming to make "son of man" a generic noun for "man," subsequently determined so as to mean one particular man, and the titular meaning of the phrase thus disappears. In XLVIII.2; LXII.5, 9, 14; LXIII.11; LXIX.26, 28; LXX.1, 2 the same pronoun "that" occurs. This has given rise to the view that perhaps the alleged development from descriptive phrase to title in Enoch rests on a misunderstanding. It has been suggested that in all the passages after XLVI.1 there is nothing more than a backward reference to the first introduction of the figure as "in the likeness of a man." The

5. Cp. Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 266: "Confronted with the Similitudes of Enoch, theologians fell back upon the expedient of assuming them to be spurious, or at least worked over in a Christian sense, just as the older History of Dogma got rid of the Ignatian letters, of which it could make nothing, by denying their genuineness."

translation then ought to read "that man," viz., that man previously shown. If this were correct, Enoch would not go beyond Daniel. In neither book would the phrase be a title of the Messiah, but simply a description of the figure seen, which may or may not be the Messiah in Daniel, and undoubtedly is the Messiah in Enoch. Of course, the joining of the demonstrative pronoun to "son of man" disqualifies it for forming a title. It is possible to say "that man," but not possible to speak of "that Messiah." The matter is not so simple, however. For side by side with "that son of man" there are two instances of "the Son of Man." Thus, even if it were to be granted that all the other references containing the pronoun were simply retrospective, and went no further than a descriptive "like a man," the problem of the substitution for this of "the Son of Man" in these two instances, LXII.7 and LXIX.27, would still remain unsolved. And it would not be an implausible theory that here in Enoch we have before our eyes the very transmutation that made a title out of the description.

As a matter of fact the case for recognizing a title throughout, always with the exception of XLVI.1, 2, stands better than might be inferred from the foregoing. The pieces dealt with exist in the Ethiopic language, and of late it has been suggested that the Ethiopic pronoun "that" may be simply the translation of the Greek article, so that in the Greek text underlying the Ethiopic all the passages would uniformly speak of "the Son of Man."⁶ If this be correct, the extra-Christian or pre-Christian appearance of the title would come to rest on a solid basis. And this would be of great value for those who believe the title to have been used by Jesus, as recorded in the Gospels. For, as above stated, the controversy revolves about the alleged impossibility of such a generic phrase ever having done service as a title. If it did service as a title in the Aramaic milieu of the Parable Discourses of Enoch, then in the face of the *fact established* the assertion of impossibility would lose all force. What could be done by the writer of the Parable Discourses could be done half a century, more or less, later by Jesus.

As for the linguistic argument, considered on its own merits, none but experts in the philology of the Aramaic dialects can,

6. Charles, *Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish and Christian*, second ed., p. 261.

with any degree of accuracy, weigh the data bearing on the matter in the existing literature of these dialects. Were the conclusions reached by these scholars uniform, it would be impossible to deny them considerable weight, so far as the linguistic facts are concerned. Such uniformity, however, does not exist. Against Wellhausen and Lietzmann, deniers of the possibility that a title could be made of the most common expression for "man," Dalman, easily no less of an expert in Aramaic linguistics, holds both that "son of man" was a possible expression in the vernacular of our Lord's time, and that by its very singularity it was adapted for use as a title. Fiebig, another authority in this line of research, reaches the conclusion that "the Son of Man," or rather "the Man," was in our Lord's day a current title for the Messiah.⁷

If there are linguistic difficulties in explaining the occurrence of the two meanings of "man" and of "Son of Man" side by side in the same word, the theory of denial of the use of the latter by Jesus causes no less of difficulty. In the Greek Gospels the phrase *does* occur as a title. This is not denied by anyone. So the problem arises how it underwent this change from a most common word to an apocalyptic title. To this problem no theory of denial has been able to give a satisfactory answer. To be sure, a point of contact for the transition is usually found in the fact that Jesus on certain occasions is supposed to have used the Aramaic term in the ordinary sense of "man," either speaking in general or speaking of Himself. Or, He may have given to it the peculiar idiomatic turn which made it mean "I," a sort of more or less current substitution of the third person for the first. When the Greek translators later had to render this, they failed to understand the strange way of speaking, and, especially where Jesus had referred to Himself by means of it, they fancied to find in it a mysterious title, therefore they rendered it most literally, retaining the two articles, by *ho huios tou anthroopou*. And it is claimed that in a number of Gospel passages which now have the title, the original appellative use, as intended by Jesus, still clearly

7. Gunkel, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1899, pp. 581-611, admits the possibility of *Bar-nasa* having simply meant "man" and nevertheless having been used as a self-designation by Jesus. Jesus had borrowed, he thinks, the mysterious term going back to Dan. 7, from the apocalyptic literature, putting into it the meaning of "The Man of God" in contrast to the anti-Christian "Man of Sin."

shines through, because it is the only meaning in accord with the context. We shall look at these passages presently. Here the question must be asked why, if *bar-nasa* was such a common word, and therefore hardly limited to the naming of Jesus in the Aramaic Gospel, it should have been properly understood and correctly translated in all other cases, and only in the case of Jesus through a misapprehension yielded this strange designation "the Son of Man," which no one employs but He Himself. If Jesus actually made it a form of self-designation, it is not difficult to account for this phenomenon. But why should translators, familiar with the idiom, have created a distinction between passage and passage, unless the Messianic import of the phrase were previously known to them? And if it was previously known, how did it arise before entering into the Gospel tradition? A Greek-Christian apocalyptic usage, prevailing in certain circles, can easily be postulated, but thereby is neither proven nor explained. Still further, if translators knew to make a distinction between the common and the highly specialized meanings of a word, why should the handling of such a distinction be *a priori* denied to Jesus?

But what about the passages, now Messianic, but believed to have referred in the mouth of Jesus to man as such? These passages are Mark 2:10 (Matt. 9:6; Luke 5:24); Mark 2:27 (Matt. 12:8; Luke 6:5); Matt. 8:20 (Luke 9:58); Matt. 12:32 (Luke 12:10). In regard to the last of these four the possibility can be reckoned with that Jesus may have spoken of man generically, and that through misunderstanding in the process of translation into the Greek the title Son of Man slipped in. A distinction is drawn in this passage between speaking a word against the "son of man" and speaking a word against the Holy Spirit. The former may receive forgiveness, the latter not. Now in the casting out of the demon, with reference to which this was said, Jesus had emphatically maintained that He worked through the Holy Spirit. He and the Holy Spirit were identified in the transaction. If over against this combination, Jesus-Holy Spirit, the son of man is placed, as one against whom words spoken are pardonable, then it seems plain that this son of man cannot also be Jesus. To avoid this conclusion certain refinements of distinction between Jesus in some other capacity and Jesus as Son of Man have been introduced,

but these are too unnatural to commend themselves.⁸ As soon as for Son of Man the simple "man" is substituted, everything becomes perfectly clear. Speaking a word against a man may receive pardon, but speaking against the Holy Spirit, and against the One working through the Holy Spirit (for these two are inseparable), will not receive pardon, neither in this world, nor in the world to come. The same reasoning may be applied to Luke 12:10, although here the saying appears detached from the situation of Matthew. From Mark 3:28, 29, the other parallel passage, the title Son of Man is absent, which might tend to confirm the correctness of the above exegesis. Perhaps some weight is also lent to it by the occurrence in the same statement of Jesus, immediately before, both in Matthew and in Mark, of the phrase "sons of men" relating, of course, to man generically.

The other passages appealed to give no real support to the theory under review. In Mark 2:10 (Matt. 9:6; Luke 5:24) the Son of Man is affirmed by Jesus to have authority to forgive sins. The reasons adduced for understanding this of man as such are two. The first is found in the question of the scribes, "Why does this *man*" (but in Luke, "who is this that") "thus speak? . . . Who can forgive sins but One, even God?" The second reason is found in the words of verse 8: "But when the multitudes saw it, they were afraid, and glorified God, which had given such power unto *men*." These reasons can avail little in the face of the indisputable fact that, according to the common Christian and Jewish faith, the forgiveness of sins was exclusively a divine prerogative. How can we impute to Jesus the monstrous idea that every man has the authority to forgive sin? A modern Jesus, assimilating man to God, without principial difference, might perhaps have thought so, but scarcely the historical Jesus. If He actually proceeded to forgive sin on the basis of the "rights of men," then all we can say is that the scribes were right in their insinuation, and Jesus was wrong in His religious usurpation. Surely, what our Lord laid claim to cannot have been this, but only that the Son of Man possessed this right. Even the scribes did not mean to dispute the Messianic prerogative to forgive sins in the abstract,

8. E.g., Dalman's suggestion that Son of Man might here designate the Messiah in his humiliation, a word spoken against whom might be forgivable, in distinction from a word spoken against the glorified Messiah. Cp. Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 282.

when exercised on the basis of the close association of the Messiah with God. What they protested against was that one who as a mere man laid claim to Messiahship should exercise this right, and moreover that, even allowing his claim to Messiahship, that He should presume to exercise it in the preliminary stage of His office, while as yet on earth. In His heavenly, exalted state, of which the title Son of Man strongly reminded, in His advent as the Judge, they would have conceded that the Messiah was empowered to forgive sin, but not in any previous state. Hence Jesus does not clothe His answer in the general form that the Son of Man has authority to forgive sin, but gives it the very pointed form that the Son of Man has authority *on earth* to do so. And that such authority belongs to Him on earth He proves by performing the miracle. The reasoning from His mere manhood would logically have implied that man as such had likewise the power to work miracles. The impossibility of Jesus' having meant this reduces the whole argument *ad absurdum*. Instead of the facile identification between "man" and "son of man" in this context, there is rather a pointed antithesis between "this man" of verse 7 and "the Son of Man" in verse 10. The remark of Matthew, in verse 8: "But when the multitudes saw it, they were afraid, and glorified God, which had given such power unto men," was certainly not meant to affirm that every single man as man henceforth had authority to forgive sin and to work a miracle. The Greek term for authority, *exousia*, is in its very conception a delegated thing which the one, not the many, possesses. Hence the multitude say that it has been *given*. It has been committed to Jesus. This word, therefore, cannot be made to prove that in the original understanding of the story the generic meaning of "men as such" was attached to the Aramaic term in the mouth of Jesus. As the Evangelist reads the mind of the multitude, they glorified God, because He had honored mankind through delegating the authority to forgive sin and to work a miracle to one of the human race. Upon the technical meaning of the phrase Son of Man they scarcely reflected. But they inferred from Jesus' utterance that a man possessed such authority. As to the deeper meaning of the equivocal phrase in Jesus' mouth this disproves nothing. Matthew, or whoever else appended the remark, cannot have found any conflict between Jesus and the multitude; other-

wise he would have conformed the one statement to the other. Finally, the words "they were afraid" fit badly into the state of mind the new interpretation would ascribe to the multitude. The feeling of awe was in keeping with the unique demonstration of the supernatural they had just witnessed in Jesus, while the glorifying arose from the reflection that this had been mediated through a man.

Mark 2:27 (Matt. 12:8; Luke 6:5) is much of the same order. When Jesus infers from the Sabbath's having been made for man that the Son of Man is Lord of the Sabbath, the term, we are told, must have the same sense in the conclusion which it has in the premise; otherwise the argument would lack all cogency. It is true that there must be a logical connection between the two. It is not necessary, however, to find this in the equating of man and Son of Man. The argument is just as conclusive when Son of Man is understood of the Messiah. This Messianic name suggested to Jesus, as we shall see later, that all things affecting the interests of man lay particularly within His jurisdiction. Inasmuch as the Sabbath partook of this character to a high degree ("made for man"), He possessed the right to regulate its observance. The instances cited by Jesus in justification of the conduct of the disciples are not instances of mere men as such, but instances of men such as occupied a relatively high place in the service of God. David, Abiathar and the priests had the super-ceremonial freedom which they exercised, not as men in general, but by reason of what they were and of the circumstances specified. The general law underlying Jesus' reasoning seems to be that in the service of the Theocracy the lower must give way to the higher, and provision for the special servants of God and the performance of their functions must take precedence over the ordinary routine of religious duty; the ceremonial must give way to the ethical. But the decision about such things is not left to the free choice of men; the Son of Man is sovereign over it. That this is the correct interpretation follows further from the phrase "even (also) of the Sabbath" in both Matthew and Mark (not in Luke). "Even" suggests that, besides many things of relatively lesser importance to which the authority of the Son of Man extends, it covers also such an important matter as the Sabbath. This manner of speaking is scarcely in keeping with the relegation of

the Sabbath to the sphere of *adiaphora*, as to which every man is free to follow his own preference. The Sabbath stands high in the scale of religious sanctities. And in general also it is difficult to believe that the historical Jesus should have so far emancipated Himself from this most venerable institution of Old Testament religion as the modern exegesis implies. Finally, the statement of verse 6 in Matthew, in which Jesus declares Himself greater than the temple, proves that He lays claim to authority, not as a mere man, but in some official role.

There remains for consideration only the saying of Matt. 8:20 (Luke 9:58). As this saying stands, it is an answer to the scribe (Luke, "man"), who had expressed willingness to follow Jesus, for Jesus wishes to test the resoluteness of the man by a vivid description of what happens to Himself and to His followers. To paraphrase, "animals have shelter, but man has none," would, besides being inexact, introduce a touch of sentimentality elsewhere foreign to Jesus into the statement. To avoid making it a Messianic self-confession recourse might perhaps be had to the peculiar idiom, well-attested, it seems, in Aramaic dialect, which puts "a man" or "the man" for the personal pronoun I. Still this would not much relieve the difficulty. Either Jesus used "the son of man," on this view, with no appreciable difference from "I," in which case the motive for the circumlocution is obscure, and the manner of speaking unnatural; or there lies back of this "I" a strong hyper-contrast which goes beyond the simple contrast between the animals and man. In the latter case the paraphrase would be: "The animals have shelter, but I, who stand so high in the scale of manhood, I have not even where to lay my head." This is possible, but it would reveal a consciousness of importance hardly interpretable in any other terms than Messiahship. It would indeed eliminate the formal title from the passage, but it would by no means prove that the Greek rendering contains a mistaken substitution of Messiahship for mere manhood. The sole mistake would be that the translator had changed the implicit Messianic self-consciousness contained in such an "I" into the explicit Messianic self-designation "the Son of Man." The contrast between animals and the Son of Man receives far fuller justice if we abandon the whole attempt to read "man" into the passage. The natural meaning, after all, lies on the surface:

"animals have shelter; I, though (and perhaps because) I am the Messianic Son of Man, have not where to lay my head." The circumstance that Jesus speaks of the Son of Man in the third person has, of course, no significance for determining the meaning of the term. The same peculiar manner of speaking occurs in passages which are undoubtedly Messianic, as we shall have occasion to observe later on.⁹

9. The discussion about the vernacular of Jesus' speech has a long history, which was at various points influenced by theological prejudice. An illuminating survey will be found in Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus*, pp. 270-285. In the seventeenth century the Jesuit Inchofer argued that Jesus must have spoken Latin, on the ground of that being the language of heaven, which assumption was in turn based, no doubt, on the status of Latin as the official language of the Roman Church. On the other side the learned philologist, Vossius, led by a more substantial theological motive, maintained that Jesus spoke in Greek, since otherwise the authority of His utterances resting on inspiration would be rendered subject to doubt through the process of translation. The main developments in the later discussion have been as follows: a first attempt at retranslating the Gospel sayings into their original tongue was made by Bolten, *Der Bericht des Matthaeus von Jesu dem Messias*, 1792; emphasis on the possible familiarity of Jesus with Greek as well understood, at least in Galilee, determined both the Rationalist Paulus and the Catholic Hug to cast their vote in favor of this language; in the nineteenth century Aramaic, long mistakenly called "Chaldee," became the subject of careful philological investigation, in result of which two grammars appeared, that of Kautzsch in 1884 and that of Dalman in 1894, the former dealing with Biblical Aramaic in general, the latter with the Jewish Palestinian Aramaic. Arnold Meyer in his *Jesu Muttersprache* (1896) called attention to the sporadic remnants of Aramaic speech appearing untranslated in the Greek Gospels, such as *Abba*, and the cry on the cross (Mark 15:34), the latter a case in which our Lord set aside a Hebrew original for the — apparently to Him more familiar — Aramaic rendering. Next the distinction was raised between a Galilean and a Judean Aramaic dialect. The Judean dialect was laid at the basis of the more systematic attempts, now setting in, to retranslate the sayings into Aramaic. Meanwhile the discussion had concentrated on the Son of Man problem through the epoch-making work of Lietzmann, *Der Menschensohn, ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Theologie* (1896). Lietzmann's startling conclusion was that inasmuch as the title did not, and could not have existed in Aramaic, the phrase in question meaning simply "man," Jesus could not have made use of it as a title; if it did occur in His speech, it was used in no other than that general sense. Then taking the matter up again in 1898 Lietzmann further worked out his view by assuming that early Christian theology had, through a misunderstanding of the generic term "son of man," too literally translated this into the Greek *ho huios tou anthroopou*, thus creating a new Messianic title. Contemporaneously with this Dalman published his valuable work, *Die Worte Jesu*, a comprehensive review of the most prominent concepts entering into the teaching of Jesus and the Gospels, the investigation aiming at determining the meaning of these concepts through comparison with the vocabulary and terminology of the post-canonical Jewish writings. His conclusion was that, since in the Jewish-Palestinian Aramaic dialect the expression *bar-enash* was not current, Jesus could seize upon it as a significant, unusual

term by which to designate Himself as the Messiah, though after a veiled fashion. Then Baldensperger in *Die neuesten Forschungen über den Menschensohn* in *Theologische Rundschau*, 1900, brought the matter, as to its theological implications, to a focus by observing that the question ultimately at stake in this long-drawn-out linguistic combat was nothing less than the question, whether Jesus was (more accurately would have been, "meant to be") the Messiah or not, and that Dalman by his proof of the linguistic possibility had saved the Messiahship of Jesus (quoted by Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 278). But Baldensperger's assumption that the question had now once for all been definitely settled, proved premature. Still later there appeared Fiebig's *Der Menschensohn* (1901), which in minuteness of detailed investigation goes even beyond Dalman, and only partially agrees with him. Cp. further the note of Burkitt in Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 279, and the painstaking discussion by N. Schmidt in his learned article, *Son of Man* in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*.

CHAPTER III

The Denial of the Messianic Consciousness (Continued)¹

WE NOW come to the charge that the Messianic concept has undergone in the Gospels such a radical transformation as is inconceivable on the basis of historical fact, but must be the result of subsequent dogmatizing interpretation of the things that actually did happen. As intimated above, the alleged transformation related to two points, the break of Jesus with Israel, and the association of the Messiahship with suffering and the cross instead of with power and victory.

In regard to the former of these two points the argument of the deniers is as follows: Jesus could not, if having the Messianic consciousness, have broken with His people, it is said. What happened in reality was rather that the break with the people appeared to His mind as a break between a prophet or teacher and those to whom He addressed Himself in that capacity. But, it is alleged, the disciples after His death came to regard Him as the Messiah. They had to adjust the two inherently incompatible things, namely Messiahship and estrangement of the people, and, in order to do this at least mechanically, they originated the paradoxical conception of a Messiah without a people.

The most obvious answer to this whole line of reasoning is that it must have been infinitely more difficult for the disciples to conceive the idea of Jesus' Messiahship, with the accomplished fact of His break with the nation before them, than it could have been for Jesus Himself to entertain this idea, and maintain it, while as yet the break was only a threatening possibility, to be, humanly speaking, decided in the future. Looking at the matter from a purely psychological point of view, where would one seek

1. Cp. Schlatter, *Der Zweifel an der Messianität Jesu*, to which treatise the writer is indebted for many particulars as well as for the general structure of the following argument.

the profound originality required for the joining together of these two ideas into a paradox? Would it not be more likely to exist in the mind of the Master than in the minds of the disciples? In a case like this, paradox might almost be considered a proof of authenticity rather than a symptom of spuriousness. Had Jesus never revealed Himself to the disciples as the Messiah before His death, then it would be hard to understand how they could ever have risen to the conviction of His Messiahship after that discouraging event. To say that their belief in the resurrection helped them over the difficulty only apparently solves the problem. For belief in the resurrection also, as a mere belief, psychologically conditioned, could not have sprung up in them or gained any strength of conviction had they not been previously given to understand that He was the Messiah. If they had been told this, and had learned to believe it before, then it becomes perhaps conceivable that they might have weathered the tempest of His death, and proved equal to the heroism of faith in the resurrection. But to start with the other theory, that during Jesus' entire earthly life and in all His associations with His followers, the Messianic idea had been foreign to both His and their minds, must involve in inexplicable mystery the sudden genesis of both convictions, that He was the Messiah and that He had risen from the dead.

The same reasoning, *mutatis mutandis*, may be followed with regard to the alleged impossibility of Jesus having joined in His mind the Messianic consciousness and the idea of the cross. This also is no more — rather, even less — understandable from the standpoint of the disciples after the cross had been raised than when as yet it only cast its shadow before. The cross as such, dissociated from all previous germs of Messianic suggestion, must have been very destructive in the mind of Jesus of every optimistic outlook, and fatal in the minds of the disciples to all Messianic belief. But, if Jesus had once envisaged and accepted the paradox, then after the event the idea of the Messiahship with which the cross had been paradoxically joined together could possibly survive.

Thus far we have proceeded on the supposition that both ideas, that of a break with Israel and that of the cross, were actually blind facts, joinable to the consciousness of Messiahship only perhaps by the irrational process of positing a paradox. But the

question must be put whether the features commented upon were actually so unassimilable to the Messiahship as they are made out to be. To give an intelligent answer to this we must first of all make clear to ourselves from what point of view Jesus regarded His Messiahship. The modern reconstruction of His figure and mind has made it difficult to ascribe any other principle to Him, in any course of action, other than that of the most one-sided humanitarianism, excluding all but the most superficial and indirect concern for the interests of God. This, it cannot be too often repeated, was not the state of mind of the Jesus appearing in the Gospels. The dominating characteristic of Jesus' Messiahship in the Gospels consists in its being absolutely God-centered. The office exists primarily for the sake of God. It is commonly admitted by those who believe in the Messianic consciousness as the center of His religion that He made the idea far more profoundly spiritual and ethical than it had ever been before. But this is only the smaller and more obvious half of the truth. The other half, possessing a far deeper source and a far wider reach, consisted in its God-centered character. He felt that as the Messiah He had come to give God what was God's, and that in the discharge of all the functions pertaining to the Messianic program this was so much the chief interest at stake as to render compliance with any peripheral feature, or even the apparent frustration of any secondary end, relatively unimportant, provided only the one great purpose of glorifying God might find fulfilment. There is, *si licet magna componere parvis*, something truly Isianic in this religious poise of mind. As a matter of fact Jesus found Himself at this point in sharp antithesis to the Judaistic Messianic concept, which had increasingly been tending toward a man-centered form of hedonism. Not God but Israel was in it the chief figure of the world to come, and the Messiah appeared as the agent who would raise Israel to this greatness. Jesus resolutely turned His back upon this irreligious perversion of the idea, and set His face toward the fulfilment of that God-centered form of it, which He recognized as already outlined in the Isianic Servant of Jehovah.

If once allowance be made for the supremacy of this thought in His mind, then the question whether He could have contemplated a Messiahship without the allegiance of Israel, or a Mes-

siahship organized around the cross, assumes a different complexion. Jesus' conflict with Israel was the direct result of the fact that in the name and for the sake of God He proceeded to charge the people with sin, declaring them unfit for entrance upon the eschatological inheritance, and summoning them to repentance. Therefore, so far from being something that clashed with the Messiahship, the ensuing break must have appeared to Him as the inevitable result of the consistent carrying through of His Messiahship under the given circumstances. To dare to be a Messiah rejected by the people meant for Him nothing else but to give God what was God's in the Messiahship. To be sure, if the isolation into which the Messianic service of God brought Him had meant *absolute* isolation, then it would have involved a mockery of the very idea of Messiahship. A Messiah without an eschatological people of God is indeed inconceivable. But Jesus never regarded His isolation as either complete or final. The truth is that to Him the entire relation hitherto supposed to exist between the Messiah and the people had been reversed. The principle was no longer to be that he who belongs to Israel will participate in the fruits of the Messiahship; henceforth the principle will be that he who participates in the Messiah will thereby be assured of his place in the new Israel. It is not a case of Israel joining itself to the Christ; on the contrary, it is a case of the Christ creating His Israel.²

We can clearly trace this trend of thought in Jesus' mind. In the parable of the wicked husbandmen He describes the ultimate rupture between Himself, as the last and supreme ambassador of God, and the nation. He is irrevocably rejected. But, instead of this frustrating His mission, it has the very opposite effect of making Him the nucleus of a new congregation: "The stone which the builders rejected, the same is made the head of the corner." We see, therefore, that the thought of dispensing with Israel was due, not to any toning down of the Messianic idea, not to any depotentiation of it which would have voided it of its true content, but precisely to raising it to the highest and most God-centered plane of development of which it was capable. Here again Isa. 6:11 and 8:16-18 may be compared to advantage with Mark

2. On this point particularly Schlatter's well-put argument, as above summed up, should be read in the original.

4:11, 12 and Matt. 13:13-15. And what applies to the break between Jesus and Israel applies *pari passu* to the acceptance by the Messiah of the cross. In this also the incompatibility exists only from an outside point of view. To Him the suffering Servant of Jehovah was a Messianic figure; consequently the ideas of Messiahship and suffering were capable of joint existence in His mind. Nor was the association a purely external one, barely tolerable, because obedience to the divine word or will required it. Everything goes to show that Jesus discerned in it a positive purpose, and intelligently incorporated this in the great service of God which He as Messiah was called upon to render. To accept the cross meant for Him minding the things of God, according to Mark 8:33; Matt. 16:23. So long as regard was had to what man would get out of the Messiahship, the cross could not but appear preposterous. But Jesus sought the cross from the love of God. In dying, as in all else He did, He hallowed God's name. Not in the frame of mind of a martyr, but in the fulness of His Messianic purpose did He set his face toward Jerusalem there to make His decease. His death is that act whereby the promise of the great eschatological cleansing from sin will be fulfilled, and a new and holy Israel be made ready for God. So that again the conclusion of the matter is: because Jesus had made His Messiahship absolutely God centered, and, as a part of it, had subordinated His cross to the interests of God, therefore not only could these two go together, but the former postulated the latter.

As a last instance against the historicity of the Messianic consciousness we must examine the alleged incongruity between it and the ethical idealism of Jesus. Here also a conflict undoubtedly exists, but it is not a disagreement between two portraits of Jesus found side by side in the Gospels. This Jesus who is too high-minded or too idealistic to have anything in common with the Messianic hope has no existence in the Gospels, but is entirely a product of the "liberal theology." From the outset his figure has to such an extent been made to serve a partisan purpose in the propaganda and defence of "liberal" ideas that its devotees finally became unable to see in this Jesus anything other than the reflection of their own cherished opinions. Schweitzer well observes that, like a Nemesis, this inability has pursued their method

of studying the life of Jesus. They became more and more obsessed with the belief that they had a mission to perform in bringing about exclusive acceptance of their construction. But in reality what they were engaged in was a desperate struggle to reconcile the "modern" religious spirit with the spirit of Jesus in the Gospels. This gigantic self-delusion is now in process of being exposed through the work of the hyper-eschatologists, who, whether their vogue be long or brief, have at least rendered the cause this eminent service of showing up the one-sidedness and perverseness of the ideas in vogue previously to their time.

It has not yet been sufficiently recognized that there is no ethical teaching of Jesus in the Gospels which does not derive its specific character from the consciousness of His Messiahship. Of course it is true that general moral axioms occur, such as might have been enunciated at any time and under any circumstances, and are in so far independent of the historical situation. But these do not constitute the specific strand in Jesus' ethical teaching; they are not the things that render it new and unique. Some enlightened Jew of that period might and may have enunciated them before Jesus did. But, if we take Jesus' ethical teaching as a specific phenomenon in the history of ethics, then it immediately springs into view that its differentiating character lies in its Messianic complexion. His contemporaries felt this better than the modernizers of His figure seem to do, for they recognized that His teaching was, in point of authority, unlike that of the scribes. Nor did this relate merely to the difference between the Rabbinical appeal to tradition and the authoritativeness of the prophetic mode of speech in Jesus. The *exousia* of Jesus far transcended the self-assurance wherewith even the greatest prophet might have claimed the identification of his message with the very word of God. Jesus speaks not only as authoritative, but as *sovereign in the sphere of truth*. One feels that His authority in the world of ideas rests on His sovereignty in the realm of realities, to which the ideas belong. He did not come as a thinker to propound a new system of ethics; He came to summon into being a new kingdom of moral realities. He stands in and speaks out of the midst of a great redemptive movement in which He Himself is the central and controlling factor. In this profound sense the Messianic idea underlies all the high idealism of His ethics, and

alone renders it historically intelligible. The element in the Gospels which cannot be duplicated elsewhere is not the holding aloft of a high standard in the abstract, nor the preaching that men should be sons of God and perfect as the Father in heaven is perfect, but the silent, majestic assumption that all this has now become possible, and is now to be called into being in a great epochal revelation. This is in evidence in the Sermon on the Mount, and that not merely at the close, where Jesus represents Himself as in the day of Judgment deciding the destiny of men on the basis of their ethical relation to Himself, but equally much at the beginning, where He links to the fundamental ethical and religious requirements the absolute eschatological promises: *theirs* is the kingdom of heaven; *they* shall see God; *they* shall be satisfied with righteousness. Viewed in this light, the Beatitudes are just as profoundly Messianic as is the parable of the wise and foolish builders. We simply have no groups of moral teaching of Jesus from which the Messianic spirit, thus conceived, is absent. Nor is there any tradition-material in which Jesus appears pre-occupied with His own ethical condition, as could not have failed to happen had His consciousness possessed no higher content than that of being the ethico-religious ideal.

But while this pervasiveness of the Messianic spirit in all the ethical teaching is an indubitable fact, it nowhere bears features that could even remotely endanger the most ideal standard of conduct. To be sure, if upholding of the principle of justice and retributive punishment, if moral indignation against sin and sinners be at the start ruled out as unworthy of the highest ethical attainment, then there is no need of further discussion. These are the very features that in the view of ordinary Christians enhance Jesus' moral greatness. But where, apart from this, can a saying be pointed out against which on commonly accepted grounds the ethical instinct would protest? Looked at closely, the charge of unethicalness resolves itself into a refusal to concede to Jesus more than a place of *primus inter pares* in the ethical realm. Why else should there be such shrinking from a saying like Matt. 11:27? There is certainly nothing unduly self-assertive in its tone and temper. Nor can fault be found on that score with the majestic invitation following it: "Hither to me all," which is only putting into practice the sublime self-consciousness

voiced in the preceding prayer. For in this very invitation the words occur, "I am meek and lowly in heart." And the title Son of Man, around which so many transcendental associations gather, Jesus uses in the third person, as though hesitating to put a simple "I" behind the high predicates joined to it. Those who thus one-sidedly stress the fineness of the fibre in Jesus' ethical nature are not seldom the very ones who protest against the doctrine of His sinlessness. In reality they are on the way toward another, differently complexioned, dogma of His faultlessness in the more limited sphere of humanitarian equalization of all men. Such a dogma is apt to turn into its opposite. It may easily lead to discovering in Him an indifference to sin in others, or even to a sense of the relativity of His own perfection.

The feature of "self-importance," on account of which the Messianic character and consciousness prove objectionable to modern sentiment, is not the only feature in the Gospel delineation of Jesus that has been made subject to criticism on ethical grounds, and regarded as of dubious authenticity. The same has happened to the strain of other-worldliness in the self-disclosure and teaching of our Lord. This is a strain for which many pious believers in all ages have loved Him, but at which modern Christianity in some of its phases has begun to shy, and which, in the drift of that modern sentiment, criticism has attempted to cut out of the genuine tradition, especially through the rejection of the great eschatological discourse at the close of the Gospels. Perhaps the hyper-eschatologists have sinned in stressing this strain overmuch, and thus by a sort of scientific reaction given new life to the opposite one-sidedness. It must also be admitted that not a few morbid movements in the subsequent life of the Church have drawn nourishment from it. But all this cannot alter the fact of its being there. And we dare not neglect or ignore it simply on the ground that to our circumscribed vision the temporal significance of Christianity, in its immediate application to the present life, appears so urgent. Let us beware of incurring the charge of making Jesus fit the times, instead of fitting the times to His teaching. There are still other times than ours for the instruction and inspiration and encouragement of which His figure must remain intact. The thing to do is neither to reject such a trait on critical grounds, nor to leave it in obscurity for pragmatic

reasons. Let us endeavor to understand how this ingredient in Jesus' ethics was deeply rooted in His God-centered frame of mind. Our Lord was interested in these things because from the highest religious viewpoint the coming world, the state of eternity, meant for Him the only possible religious consummation. His other-worldliness was a God-centered other-worldliness. The wings on which it soared were of the finest and purest and most unselfish spirituality. Once this is remembered, the question whether intense eschatological interest and due regard for the duties of the present hour can go together, has in principle received its answer. The two things were compatible in Jesus' mind because both alike drew their life-sap from His absolute absorption in the love of God. The cosmical movements of the great eschatological drama and the little private experiences and concerns of the individual soul, the prayer in the closet, the alms in secret, met together in that they both subserved the glory of God. Thus every possibility of His sacrificing the one to the other was in principle precluded. If that be defective, "monastic" ethics from the modern point of view, we can only rejoin that to us the substitute offered seems denatured ethics. To our taste the old wine is better.

CHAPTER IV

The Agnostic Position: Wrede

HAVING considered the outright denial of the Messianic consciousness, we must next examine the agnostic position in regard to the same subject. This differs from the position of denial in that it does not trust itself to put in the place of the Messianic Jesus another Jesus with non-Messianic aims and ideals, but stops short at the negative conclusion that the portrait drawn in the Gospels is historically impossible, and yet bulks so large as to shut off from our view even the slightest glimpse of the real Jesus who must once have stood behind it.

This agnostic view is associated with the name of Wrede, who gave it expression in his work *The Messianic Secret*. Wrede's book is not directly concerned with the problem of Messianism in the life of Jesus, but rather offers itself as a contribution to the criticism of the Gospel of Mark. Its main purport is to destroy the naive confidence of modern Gospel criticism in the superiority of Mark above Matthew and Luke as a recorder of the actual life of Jesus. Naturally, however, the test to which the commonly accepted superiority of Mark is put is taken from the latter's attitude toward the Messiahship. The Messianic idea is supposed to have been the propelling power in the development Mark is understood to describe. Thus the superiority of Mark as a recorder of the life of Jesus and his credibility as a witness to the development of the Messianic consciousness go into the crucible together. Under the hands of Wrede they both come out damaged beyond repair. And what discredits Mark *a fortiori* discredits Matthew and Luke, who in the point of Messianism followed his cue. The end of the investigation is absolute scepticism with reference to the entire compass of the Gospel tradition.

Let us first briefly note what Wrede has to say about the Messianic phenomena, and in the second place consider the theory

(for in spite of agnosticism there is a theory) which he offers in explanation of the phenomena.

As to the former, the gist of the matter is that the whole representation concerning the Messianic character of Jesus is found to be self-contradictory, confused and unintelligible. Jesus, Wrede says, performs in public the most stupendous miracles, and yet He forbids the people to tell of these and make Him known. The demons, who recognize Him, are charged to keep silent about their discovery. Even the disciples, to whom Jesus reveals His Messiahship, are forbidden to divulge it. Besides this, it remains a secret to them in still another way. We are told by the Evangelist that they absolutely failed to apprehend what Jesus disclosed to them on the subject. Peter confesses the Messiahship at Caesarea Philippi, and this is hailed by Jesus as a remarkable confession, and yet on a previous occasion we find the disciples already recognizing Him in a Messianic capacity. All these phenomena Wrede subsumes under the title of "the Messianic Secret." He draws from them a twofold conclusion. On the one hand, he holds, they show that the Gospel according to Mark does not deserve the nimbus of lucidity and credibility with which the liberal critics have crowned it. Tested in regard to this one central problem, Wrede finds that Mark turns out to be just as confused and confusing on the question of the Messiahship as are the other two Synoptic Gospels. He finds in Mark no more trace of historical verisimilitude or rational development than in Matthew or Luke. Wrede further lays down the principle that the secrecy-phenomena noted are so remarkably alike and have such a uniform bearing that they must all have a common explanation. And that explanation must have something to do with the history of the Messianic idea in the early Church.

What, then, is Wrede's explanation of this secrecy-complex? It may be briefly stated as follows: the oldest view in the primitive Church was that Jesus had not been the Messiah, nor acted as such during His earthly life, but had been made the Messiah through the resurrection. This oldest view is still recognizable, according to Wrede, in passages like Acts 2:36 and Rom. 1:4. Soon, however, it began to be felt that, if Jesus during His earthly life was destined to become the Messiah, then some evidence of His high vocation and of His extraordinary equipment must have

been already visible during the days of His flesh. And out of this feeling of the early Church, according to Wrede, there gradually developed the rival opinion which put the Messiahship before the resurrection, carrying it back bodily with all its prerogatives and functions into the earthly life of Jesus. Two views thus came to stand side by side, one of a Messiahship beginning with the resurrection, the other of a Messiahship antedating the resurrection. The writer of the Second Gospel felt the force of the motivation underlying each of these two views. He was not willing to give up the belief that Jesus had worked as the Messiah from the beginning, and yet he was not prepared either to obliterate entirely the remembrance of the fact that the Messianic dignity had first been ascribed to Jesus after the resurrection. He accordingly adopted a compromise scheme, which, after a fashion, was intended to do justice to both representations. This compromise was effected by the theory that before the resurrection there had indeed been a Messiahship, but only a *secret* Messiahship, and that this had been succeeded by the *revealed* Messiahship from the resurrection onwards. In other words, during His life on earth Jesus had been the Messiah and yet had not been the Messiah. The idea of secrecy enabled the Evangelist to take back with the one hand what he had given with the other. All the phenomena commented upon were introduced to lend a certain semblance of reality to this — in itself impossible — notion, that the Messianic character had lived a sort of hidden pre-existence. The whole construction is, of course, according to Wrede, purely dogmatic and utterly unhistorical, a mere *tour de force*. And, since it can be shown that it has pervasively affected the portrayal of Jesus' life, this portrayal becomes by it thoroughly discredited. Mark's is indeed the oldest Gospel, but it already gives, according to Wrede, a totally unhistorical representation. The varnish which it lays on so overspreads the whole canvas that it is impossible to see through it and to reach the historical Jesus.

It is undoubtedly true that these phenomena of secrecy to which Wrede calls attention are an outstanding feature of the Gospel narrative, and require some explanation. The question is whether Wrede's explanation is according to the facts and historically satisfactory. It is very captivating in that it reduces the phenomena to a single cause, and thus attempts to solve the whole

problem at one stroke. But in the field of historical investigation the maxim *simplex sigillum veri* does not always hold true. Of course, if the phenomena of secrecy were certainly due to some literary or dogmatic motive, then the demand for uniformity of explanation could hardly be refused. But on the other hand, if they should turn out to be phenomena of actual, historical life, then there would be nothing inherently improbable in the supposition that not one single cause but a number of causes of varying nature had produced them. Actual life is not rigid and simple, but plastic and complex. Nature has a way of bringing the uniform out of the multiform, no less than the reverse process. Wrede's contention, therefore, that no other than a uniform explanation is worthy of consideration, cannot *a priori* be granted. It prejudges the question at issue, whether we are dealing with a literary, dogmatic construction, or with a piece of living history. The claim that the phenomena of secrecy cannot be *uniformly* explained on the basis of actual occurrence may, we think, be granted. But this is by no means equivalent to granting that they cannot be explained on the basis of actuality at all, once the insistence upon uniformity of explanation is waived. The sole question is, whether discounting uniformity, and drawing upon all the factors entering into the situation, we can give a reasonable account of the way in which secrecy played a role in Jesus' earthly life. The thing above all else to be remembered is that, according to all the Gospels — Synoptics no less than John, Mark no less than Matthew and Luke — Jesus was a supernatural Person. On that view it was inevitable that an atmosphere of mystery should envelop Him. It would be unnatural to expect that the career of such a Person should unfold itself smoothly and transparently, that there should be no riddles, no problems, no apparent contradictions. And a certain amount of secrecy might also reasonably be expected. The privacy of the supernatural, its tendency to withdraw from the glare of public exposure, must be taken into account. And this claims recognition altogether irrespective of the question whether we are here dealing with fact or legend. From a purely literary point of view, is it not likely that Mark, writing the life of such a Person, should have taken pains to introduce something of the chiaroscuro in which the supernatural

is wont to veil itself? In this sense the Messianic secrecy was discovered and depicted by Rembrandt long before Wrede.

In descending to particulars it is not difficult to see how a variety of factors might have come into play to produce the result observed. Take, for example, the case of the recognition of Jesus by the demons. Wrede has acutely observed that the element of secrecy enters here in two ways. First of all, there is the circumstance that the demons first — and for some time they alone — discover Jesus' supernatural and Messianic character; this implies that this character is a secret. They can discover it because they themselves are supernatural beings, who instinctively discern what is hidden from the gaze of men. And in the second place, the element of secrecy enters through the injunction of Jesus that the demons are not to make known what they have discovered. If now we ask what there is in all this, taken by itself, to make us think of dogmatic construction, the answer is not obvious. Why should not the demons, assuming that such beings exist, have made the discovery in question? And, supposing they had made it, why should not our Lord have enjoined them from divulging such knowledge? It is natural enough to assume that Jesus did not want to conduct His ministry from the outset on the basis of a publicly professed Messiahship. Not only would His permitting this have opened the door to error, but in all probability it would have brought His career to a premature close by inviting the intervention of the Roman authorities. Besides, the demons were not proper agents to publish abroad the fact of His Messiahship. How little a rigid, preconceived scheme is to be applied to cases of this kind may be seen from Mark 1:25. Here Jesus' rebuke to the demon, "Hold thy peace, and come out of him," seems to have no further purpose than to suppress the unseemly noise made by the evil spirit. Discounting this, there are only two cases where a prohibition laid upon the demon to make Jesus known is recorded, namely Mark 1:34 and Mark 3:12. Over against these stand two other instances, in which Mark relates with some detail the casting out of a demon, and yet fails to record any injunction of silence: Mark 5:7-9 and Mark 9:25. In the case of the Gerasene demoniac, Mark 5:19, the man is expressly charged by Jesus to go home to his friends and tell them the great things the Lord has done for him.

All this certainly does not look as though Mark had slavishly followed any dogmatic scheme, for in that case he would have handled all encounters of Jesus with demons in strict conformity to it, adding the stereotyped prohibition everywhere. Similar strictures on Wrede's reasoning may be made where the miracles of healing come under consideration. These differ from the demonic cases in that in the healing miracles the secrecy practiced did not have such a strict reference to the Messiahship as was the case with the casting out of the demons; in the case of the latter a recognition of the Messiahship preceded so as to place the secrecy from the beginning in a Messianic light. In the case of the healing miracles the concurrence of various motives is conceivable. A too large concourse of people desiring to be healed might easily have interfered with the orderly progress of Jesus' ministry. After the healing of the leper, and the injunction of silence upon him, which he did not obey, we read that Jesus could no more openly enter into a city, but was without in desert places (Mark 1:45).

We learn of another motive in Matt. 12:15 ff.: ". . . great multitudes followed him, and he healed them all; and charged them that they should not make him known, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Isaiah the prophet, saying, Behold my servant, whom I have chosen, my beloved, in whom my soul is well pleased. . . . He shall not strive, nor cry aloud, neither shall any one hear his voice in the streets." In accord with this prophetic utterance, Jesus desires to perform His miracles in as unostentatious a manner as possible. This sprang not merely from the ethical principle of humility, but equally from the soteric purpose of bringing His miracles into harmony with the law of humiliation imposed upon His earthly life. He acted on the basis that no glory should accrue to Himself from His works. In such cases it was not Jesus' intention to keep His Messiahship *as such* secret, but only to keep the inherent glory of the Messiahship veiled so far as possible. At the same time He could not help performing these miracles, for they formed an essential part of His task in connection with the preaching of the Kingdom. If there exists a contradiction here, it is one inherent in the nature and conditions of our Lord's office. The retirement appropriate to the state of humiliation and the publicity inseparable from

certain aspects of the Messianic task came into conflict. Jesus' compassionate desire to heal and His desire to keep Himself in the background collided. He wanted to remain in hiding, and He could not be hid. It is impossible for us to determine in detail how Jesus in the various emerging situations solved this problem, nor why in some cases He took measures to ensure secrecy when He did not in others. Some miracles were performed in public; sometimes there were even mass-healings. In such cases any injunction of secrecy would have been useless: Mark 1:32; 6:56. In still other cases the injunction was unnecessary: Mark 7:29. A downright absurdity such as might really render the account subject to suspicion would occur only if miracles performed in full publicity had the injunction of secrecy joined to them. But no such cases are recorded. Had the writer been guided by the fixed idea that the Messianic secrecy must always accompany the Messianic miracles, then he also would not have failed to introduce the idea of secrecy uniformly and consistently. As it is, there are not a few instances in Mark where Jesus heals and yet puts no restriction as to publicity upon the recipients of His cures.

No more weight can be attached to the construction put by Wrede upon the Gospel treatment of the parabolic teaching, and of the hardening effect ascribed to it (Mark 4:10-12). Mark represents Jesus as speaking in parables, not — at least not exclusively — to make the truth clear and vivid, but in order to veil it, lest the people should understand: ". . . unto them that are without, all things are done in parables: that seeing they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest haply they should turn again, and it should be forgiven them." This, we are told, is only another form of the principle of secrecy on which Mark makes Jesus act, and the secrecy refers here as elsewhere to the Messiahship, for that, according to Wrede, is what is meant by "the mystery of the kingdom of God," given to the disciples but not to those without (Mark 4:11).

In answer to this it should suffice to say that, while Wrede's observation deserves attention, he seems to have sought the solution of the problem in too specific a quarter. The real solution does not pertain specifically to the Messiahship, but rather to that strain of apocalyptic eschatology that is cognate to predestinarianism. This may be an unpleasant subject to speak about, and to

many it would seem safer to devolve the whole burden upon the shoulders of Paul. But in this matter Paul evidently had Jesus as his predecessor; or, if it be deemed more correct to put it the other way, both Jesus and Paul obeyed the inner law of the nature of eschatology, the enunciation of which in Paul's case was made more sharp by reason of the accentuated exclusion of Israel from the Messianic kingdom. For it was a belief of long and accredited standing that there was to be a division in the last times. True, there were moral factors involved in this, but an exercise of the divine sovereignty also enters, and it is not necessary to go to the Fourth Gospel to find in the words of Jesus the expression of this mysterious principle.

Apart from this predestinarian aspect of the secrecy, there is perhaps another reason discoverable for its appearance in the parabolic teaching. The "mystery" of the Kingdom, besides its application to the veiled presentation of the truth, may have had reference to the nature of the Kingdom, no less than to the form of its announcement. The mystery (or "mysteries" in Matthew and Luke) may have lain in the latent, spiritual character of the preliminary stage of the Kingdom to which some of the parables pointedly refer. For the secrecy is represented as Kingdom-secrecy throughout. And yet Wrede is not altogether wrong in bringing it to bear upon the Messiahship. In the understanding of the Evangelists the two movements, that of the Kingdom idea and that of the Messianic idea, run closely parallel. As the Kingdom passes first through a hidden, invisible, secret stage, so the Messiah first exists in a hidden, invisible, secret form. And as the Kingdom is to come at some future time in the outward manifestation of visible glory, so the Messiah will have His day, when He will be manifested openly to the world. But this parallelism goes to show that the one way may be just as historical as the other. Historical reasons which will fully account for the facts are no more lacking for the veiling of the Messiahship than they are for the veiling of the Kingdom. There is no ground, then, to assume, on the score of the parabolic teaching, that Mark and the others are here plying some cunningly devised theory in which the secret Messiahship was equivalent to the non-existent Messiahship. What can be explained from the actualities of life needs no artificial accounting for from problematic conjectures. In our opinion it is extreme-

ly questionable whether the simple mind of Mark could have been so expert in the weaving of highly complex trains of thought as was the subtle "boring" intellect of Wrede, who was easily the most brilliant of his school of critics. His scheme seems very captivating when looked at through the lenses of the twentieth century. But transported back into the period of the Gospel formation it looks strangely out of place. Wrede has dealt with the material ingeniously, but has not sufficiently projected himself into the mind of the alleged framer of the scheme, which, after all, would have been the first duty of the historian.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that the secretive use made of the parabolic teaching is strictly confined to this one situation in the Gospel history. Neither Mark nor the other Synoptics teach that Jesus habitually employed His parables for such a purpose. This does not favor the view that the whole representation is due to a dogmatizing fiction. For, if the Evangelist had had such an idea in mind, he would probably have applied it to the whole range of the parabolic teaching, all the more so since the idea of the Messianic secret is supposed to have pervaded his writing from beginning to end. In the Gospels the secretive use of the parables is not a constant phenomenon but a local one. The question demands an answer: Why did the writer introduce this idea here and here only? To this question Wrede gives no answer. Whether the situation be historic or not, within the book it is a real situation. Either in the actual development of Jesus' ministry, or in Mark's conception of the course of events, there must have been a sufficient cause for making it occur precisely where it does and nowhere else.

In a still different form the Messianic secrecy is believed to appear in the manner of reception of Jesus' disclosure of his Messiahship by the disciples. It will be perceived that here the secrecy no longer lies in the attitude of Jesus, but in the failing response of His followers. It is a secrecy produced by utter lack of apprehension. The thing had come to light, but in the confusion of those who had received the revelation it remained a secret no less than before. The non-understanding is only another device to keep the atmosphere of secrecy around it till the end. Although Jesus distinguishes the disciples from the multitude, and reveals to them what He hides from others, nevertheless the

whole thing remains a riddle to them. Once and again we read that the disciples do not apprehend, do not understand it, although they have been told in the plainest, most explicit terms. Therefore Wrede again concludes that the situation is unreal in the extreme. This whole alleged self-revelation of Jesus, he holds, is but a fiction of the Evangelist. In the unfolding of the actual drama it remains inoperative, produces no effect; it makes no history, and consequently must itself be unhistorical. And this lasts, he asserts, until the resurrection; not until then is the veil taken off the minds of the disciples, not until then do they understand. This latter representation is only an indirect way of saying that Jesus' Messiahship did not become a reality until after the resurrection. Wrede applies this train of reasoning first to the prophecies of Jesus concerning His passion and death, but then extends it to the other self-disclosures also. He does not even exempt from it the episode of Caesarea Philippi, where Jesus causes Peter to confess the Messiahship, which used to be considered by critics of all types the best authenticated item in the Gospel history. Wrede suggests that even here the point of the narrative in Mark is that Peter's mind remained impervious to the great truth.

Although there is considerable exaggeration in Wrede's rehearsal of these facts, it must be acknowledged that the remarkable lack of apprehension ascribed to the disciples is not easy to understand. The question is whether it can be made to any extent psychologically intelligible, or whether nothing remains but to call it an unreal and impossible play of puppets. It can be shown, we think, that the psychology involved is not so unexplainable as might seem on the surface to be the case. According to the Gospels, the disclosures related to something more particular than the Messiahship in the abstract. Back of the latter lay, and through it was borne in upon the disciples, the Sonship of Jesus, His whole supernatural character, what we call His Deity. If it had been mere Messiahship, the disciples might perhaps not have been so bewildered.

To this must be added the previous non-committal attitude, whereby, though by no means repudiating the claim to Messiahship, Jesus did not self-assertively insist upon it either. This also would be apt to create an element of perplexity. Still further,

where the lack of apprehension appears most acute, where it is affirmed with reference to an outright declaration of Jesus, the lack of understanding relates to one particular feature of the Messiahship, viz., to the Messianic suffering and death and the resurrection to follow (Mark 9:10, 31, 32). We should not lump all the statements together on account of a certain formal similarity. They are not all alike in character. To say that the disciples did not understand the announcement of the death or the resurrection is something far different from saying that they failed to apprehend the Messiahship. In the case of Jesus' death the apprehension was made all the more difficult because no *rationale* of the fact had been offered at the beginning. It was first submitted as a blind fact. We do not mean to offer these considerations as an exhaustive and fully satisfactory solution of the problem involved. All we mean to suggest is that the matter is perhaps not so hopelessly incredible and fantastic as we are asked to believe. It should not be denied that there remains an unexplainable residuum. We shall be best made to feel this by observing the form in which Luke presents the matter in one passage: "Let these words," says Jesus, "sink into your ears, for the Son of Man shall be delivered up into the hands of men." And the Evangelist adds: "They understood not the saying, and it was concealed from them, that they should not perceive it, and they were afraid to ask him about the saying" (Luke 9:44, 45). It seems to be intimated here that there was a positive divine purpose in keeping the disciples from apprehending Jesus' meaning: it was concealed from them, that they should not perceive it. But why? So far as we know no satisfactory explanation of this statement has ever been given. Plummer in his commentary remarks on the passage: "They were not allowed to understand the saying then in order that they might remember it afterwards, and see that Jesus had met his sufferings with full knowledge and free will."¹ But why their not understanding it and their remembering it afterwards should have shown this to them more clearly than if they had understood the saying from the beginning, is hard to see. But even if there were nothing but unexplained mystery here, we should still have to maintain that Wrede's hy-

1. Plummer, *Commentary on the Gospel of Luke*, in loco.

pothesis does not solve the riddle. In three respects it fails to meet the test.

1. In the first place, the scheme attributed to Mark is not consistently carried through. The disclosure of the Messiahship to the disciples does not always remain unapprehended by them. At Caesarea Philippi the Messiahship is confessed by Peter. Wrede, to be sure, is of the opinion that Mark, unlike Matthew, does not want this confession of Peter to be understood as an epoch-making or specially commendable act. He thinks Mark simply introduces the case as one more instance of Messianic recognition followed by prohibition. The stress lies, he thinks, on Jesus' charge that they should tell no man of Him (Mark 8:30). But this is not in harmony with the fact that, according to Mark no less than according to Matthew and Luke, Jesus solicits the confession from Peter. The confession in Mark, therefore, does not appear as a mere peg to hang the prohibition on, but possesses in the mind of the Evangelist a positive and independent significance. The avowal of Messiahship comes here in the form of confession, and this proves that in this case at least Mark ascribes a true, if not a full, apprehension of the fact to Peter. The same must be affirmed with reference to the instance of James and John asking of Jesus that He place them on His right hand and on His left in His glory. Even in regard to the suffering and death Mark does not mean to deny all understanding to the disciples. At Caesarea Philippi Peter knew perfectly well what Jesus meant, for he took Jesus apart and rebuked Him. Rebuke would have been out of place if it had been simply a case of failure to understand Jesus' meaning. Jesus treats the incident after a far more serious fashion: Peter's rebuke of Jesus involved a temptation. Satan had his hand in it. Peter had disapproved of the program of suffering and death announced by Jesus. There is here, then, apprehension of the *fact*, even though it be without apprehension of the *purpose* of the fact. But the purpose was precisely that which Jesus had not as yet explained. Perhaps a realization of the impending, unavertable tragedy is also implied in Mark 10:32: "They were on the way going up to Jerusalem, and Jesus was going before them, and they were amazed, and they that followed were afraid." Here the writer's meaning seems to be that the disciples were amazed and afraid at Jesus' resoluteness in going up

to Jerusalem. Wrede would have us believe that this being amazed is but a species of being bewildered, of wondering, of not understanding what Jesus was doing, so that after all the case would still fall under the rubric of non-apprehension. But the "being afraid" cannot be explained on that ground — even if it could be granted that Wrede is right about the "being amazed" — and there is no objective reason for eliminating it from the text, as Wrede feels constrained to do.

2. In the second place, if all this lack of understanding is only Mark's way of expressing the thought that until the resurrection there was no knowledge of the Messiahship, then why does not the Evangelist give effect to this thought through making Jesus after the resurrection lay aside all the secrecy in such a way as to compel the disciples to understand and believe? If the secrecy meant that the Messiahship was unreal, then the reality of the Messianic conviction from a certain point onward ought to have been expressed by the removal of the secret. Mark does not say that Jesus did this. It is a mere surmise that in the original conclusion of the Gospel, believed to have been lost, something to that effect existed. Luke 24:16 proves that the later Evangelist, at least, extends the not understanding into the post-resurrection period.

3. In the third place, finally, we must ask how such a trait of the repeated failure of apostles and disciples to comprehend the plainest statements of the Lord, and that on such a fundamental part of the faith, could ever have been subsequently invented, and, if invented, how it could have been tolerated as a fictitious contrivance in the service of a dogmatic theory. The early Church held the original followers of Jesus, especially the apostles, in too high honor to produce such a train of thought of its own accord, or to countenance it, if and when produced. There seems to be no other way of accounting for this than to assume that it embodies so firm and persistent a tradition that the early Church could not evade it by eliminating it from the record.

CHAPTER V

The Theory of Prospective Messiahship

HAVING now discussed the absolute denial of the Messianic consciousness and the agnostic position in regard to its historicity, we must next consider a third view, in which affirmation and denial are combined. This compromise between apparent irreconcilables is effected by qualifying the idea of Messiahship in such a sense that what is conceded to Jesus is no more than the prospect of inheriting the office and the function of Messiah at some future point of time. According to this theory, Jesus did not lay claim to the Messiahship as a present dignity, and did not act out of the consciousness of any of the prerogatives pertaining to it while He was on earth. He looked upon Himself as the One destined to become the Messiah, but not yet inducted into the office. And so, it is said, the early disciples regarded the matter when they declared afterwards that He had been made the Messiah through the resurrection (Acts 2:36). It will be perceived that according to this view the Messianic idea could retain its prominent place in the consciousness of Jesus. His mind was full of the thought; it determined His outlook, colored His self-estimate, and to some extent shaped His procedure. In making full allowance for this, the theory escapes some of the difficulties that beset every non-Messianic explanation of the life of Jesus. It need not resort to the extreme critical operations which are required for the wholesale purging of the record of all Messianic material. At the same time it seems to offer a plausible explanation for the reserved, non-committal attitude of Jesus toward the Messianic question during the earlier part of His ministry. He was indeed the Messiah by appointment, but none the less lacked the warrant for proceeding to act as the Messiah *de facto*. The secret Messiahship of Wrede would thus appear to be at bottom nothing else but the prospective, unrealized Messiahship, which, for the very reason of its purely provisional, appointive character,

would carry with it a certain atmosphere of secrecy and mystery.

It is not difficult to guess where the advocates of this view are likely to be found. It is in the camp of the thoroughgoing eschatologists. Those who believe that Jesus staked His whole life upon the future, and attached no value to the present, naturally extend this point of view likewise to the Messiahship. The present interimistic, transitory state, which is already laboring to bring forth the end, cannot lay claim to possessing the great transcendent things — least of all can it lay claim to possessing the Messiahship. The apocalypse of the age to come coincides with the apocalypse of the Messiah. The bearings of this view can be best appreciated by holding it in close connection with the idea of the Kingdom attributed to Jesus by the same class of writers. We are accustomed to finding in Jesus' teaching the idea of a present spiritual Kingdom, realized, in the invisible, internal sphere, through His ministry on earth. We assume that He regarded the Kingdom as in principle already present, although He regarded the eschatological consummation as still future. But the ultra-eschatologists have changed all this. They insist that to Jesus the Kingdom was in no sense present, but exclusively future; that He did in no wise regard its coming as a gradual process, but wholly as a catastrophic cosmic event; that He did not think of bringing about or expediting its arrival by any spiritual efforts of man, Himself included, but left all to the supernatural interposition of God; and they insist that consequently He regarded His own ministry as purely preparatory, intended to make the people ready for the coming of the Kingdom, a second and heightened form of the ministry of John the Baptist. Now it is precisely after this fashion that Jesus is alleged to have placed His Messiahship in the future. The Kingdom and the Messiahship go together. And this works both ways. One standing outside the Kingdom and merely preparing the way for its reception cannot be the already arrived Messiah, whatever He may be destined to become afterwards. And, on the other hand, one actually engaged in setting up the Kingdom of God as a present reality can be nothing short of the Messiah. The identical consequences that follow from the relegation of the Kingdom to the future must follow from the relegation of the Messiahship to the future. It is agreed on all hands that Jesus made the Kingdom of God and the

Messiahship the great pivotal points of His world-view. If all the spiritual activity in which He engaged, all cultivation of righteousness, all enjoyment of religious sonship, were purely preparatory to the future Kingdom and the future Messiahship — mere means to an end — then they become excluded from the inner essence of these two, and in so far the Kingdom and the Messiahship appear de-ethicized, de-spiritualized, de-idealized. Jesus is regarded as an eschatological enthusiast for the sake of eschatology, pure and simple. Ethics and religion have been shifted from the center to the periphery of His consciousness. On the other hand, if Jesus' Kingdom-idea and Messianic-idea were in a real sense religiously oriented, if in both He sought the supremacy and glory of God, then it will follow that He cannot have failed to find in the spiritual values of His activity, by which the divine glory and supremacy were established in the spiritual sphere, something of the real beginning of the Kingdom of God and of His own central position in it. The present and the future, being thus made jointly subservient to the God-centered movement of things, must in that case have appeared to Him as integral and mutually integrating stages in the coming Kingdom of God and in the fulfilment of His own Messianic destiny.

This parallelism between the ideas of the Kingdom and the Messiahship will be useful to us in determining the element of truth there is to be found in this theory of prospective Messiahship. In the same sense and for the same reason that Jesus regarded the Kingdom as lying partially yet in the sphere of futurity, He could likewise so regard certain aspects of His Messianic activity. The solution of the two parallel problems is not to be sought through projecting the entire realization of the idea into the future, but through recognizing a cleavage within each of the two ideas, assigning part of the fulfilment of each to the present and part to the future. The Kingdom was and was not yet; even so the Messiah was and was not yet. As the future coming of the Kingdom, so frequently affirmed, was not meant to deny the very real existence of a present phase of the same, so neither did the prospective contemplation of the Messiahship exclude every mode of present realization in its case. There was a point of view from which Jesus could regard His Messiahship as a future thing. According to the prevailing Old Testament

representation the reign of the Messiah will be a reign of glory. Especially in Daniel 7, whence the title Son of Man is derived, this feature is made prominent. The Old Testament takes the Messiahship as an eschatological unit, and overleaps, as a rule, the preliminary relative states so familiar to us. Accordingly Jesus, approaching the idea from the Old Testament point of view, could let His eye rest on the glorious consummate state, and after the ancient fashion call this the Messiahship; indeed, He could even speak of its future arrival as *the coming, the appearing*, of the Messiah. Nor was this a matter of mere formal adherence to a traditional way of speaking. We must here take into account what may be called the *absolutism* of our Lord's way of thinking. He grasped things, not in their relative, but in their absolute, ideal aspect. To Him, the thought of consummation was inseparable from the great realities handled in His teaching. The Kingdom of God, in order to be truly the Kingdom of God, is the *perfect* Kingdom of God, in which the divine will shall be done on earth after no less absolute a fashion than it is done in heaven, and only at this acme of its realization does it fully deserve the name of God's Kingdom.

In the same way the Christ of God, in order to be truly His Christ, must be the consummated Christ, on whom all the Messianic authority and power and glory shall have fully descended, and only at this summit of His career does He fully deserve the name of Messiah. In fact this absolutism is characteristic of the eschatological frame of mind in general. In turn its occurrence in our Lord is one of the indications of His fundamentally eschatological outlook. Traces of its influence upon His way of speaking are found in connection with the Messiahship no less than in conjunction with the Kingdom. He sometimes refers to the eschatological crisis as "*the coming of the Kingdom of God*," just as if no kingdom truly worthy of the name had previously existed: "For I say unto you I will not drink of the fruit of the vine, until the kingdom of God shall come" (Luke 22:16-18). Notice, He does not say, "until the kingdom shall be perfected," nor "until the eschatological form of the kingdom shall come," but simply "*until the kingdom of God shall come*."

In precisely the same way Jesus refers to His Messianic appearance as a future thing. He speaks of His *parousia*, His advent.

We put into such statements, if not explicitly at least by implication, the idea of a *coming again*, on the basis of the familiar distinction between a "first" and a "second" advent. While not meaning to deny that this distinction has a real basis in the teaching of Jesus, we should note here the use of the word *parousia* which means "coming," not "coming again." We miss the fine point of such sayings if we fail to observe that to Jesus the *parousia* was the coming of the Messiah, because then, and not before then, He would appear in the adequacy of His Messianic character.

Likewise, without the use of the technical term *parousia*, Jesus speaks of this future manifestation as His "coming," Mark 13:26, 35, 36; 14:62; Matt. 24:30, 42; 25:6; Luke 12:37-45; 21:27. We also hear of the *apocalypsis*, "the revelation" of the Son of Man, Luke 17:30. Attention should further be called to the peculiar way in which Jesus speaks of the Son of Man in the third person. While obviously referring to Himself, He yet does not say "I." Probably the peculiar objectivity of this way of speaking was induced by more than a single motive. In many of these statements the transcendent honor and glory of the Messiah in His eschatological manifestation are referred to. It would be fully in keeping, not merely with our Lord's humbleness of mind, but also with the proprieties of His state of humiliation, for Him to shrink from introducing into such connections the pronoun "I." An interesting parallel may be cited from the writings of Paul. When speaking of the wondrous revelation wherewith God had honored him, Paul hesitates to say: "This happened to me," but says instead: "I knew a man in Christ caught up into paradise," etc. (2 Cor. 12:1-4). Conjointly with this motive of humility, and in part underlying it, there may perhaps be found in our Lord's third person use of the title Son of Man a recognition of the fact that the Son of Man was something future, and in so far something yet different from Himself, identical in Person, to be sure, but nevertheless different in equipment and mode of appearance and activity, something that in a sense was yet strange and mysterious to Jesus Himself, and therefore could be spoken of in the third person. In a couple of passages this manner of speaking approaches a formal distinction between Jesus Himself as such, and Jesus as the Son of Man. In Mark 8:38 (Luke 9:36) Jesus declares: "For whosoever shall be ashamed of me

and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels." Similarly Luke 12:8: "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of man also confess before the angels of God."¹ Plainly, when Jesus says "I" and "me," He speaks as the humble and humiliated subject, the One whom it is easy to be ashamed of, whom it takes courage to confess, whereas in the other clause of each sentence, where he uses the term Son of Man, He speaks prospectively of His Person in an altogether different setting as the One who comes to judge, with the glory of His Father, and attended by the holy angels.

This same contrast between the Messiah who is now, and the Messiah who is to be, only with clearer avowal of personal identity of the two, finds expression in Jesus' statement at His trial: "Thou hast said" (that is to say: "I am the Christ even now in my present abject condition"); "nevertheless I say unto you, henceforth ye shall see the Son of man" (that is to say: "you shall see a wholly different form") "sitting at the right hand of Power and coming on the clouds of heaven" (Matt. 26:64). Such at least is the clear antithesis in Matthew, although it appears less pointedly in Mark and Luke (Mark 14:62; Luke 22:69).

There is, then, this element of truth in the *affirmative* part of the theory of prospective Messiahship, that Jesus could, as it were, objectify to Himself His future glorious state as something with which He had not yet fully grown together or in experience familiarized Himself. But over against this element of truth there stands a larger element of error in what the theory ventures to *deny*. By assuming that Jesus looked upon His activity during the earthly life as non-Messianic, a mere preparation for the later Messianic life, it comes into conflict with the plain statements of the Gospels. According to the Gospels there was a great deal of Messianic reality in the life of Jesus on earth. First of all there was the Messianic appointment, as the accounts of the baptism show. It is simply out of the question that Jesus could have counted the appointment to the office itself as belonging to the futurities. The advocates of the prospective Messiahship fail at

1. The parallel passage in Matthew (10:32) has the personal pronoun in both clauses.

this point carefully to distinguish between futurity of both the appointment and the work, on the one hand, and futurity of the work alone, on the other, the appointment having been already received. It must have made an immense difference to the consciousness of Jesus whether He knew that the divine choice had already fallen upon, the divine summons already come to, Him, even though the active discharge of the task may still have remained for the future, or whether the whole thing, including the appointment and call to the office, remained still in the future. The assured conviction of being under divine appointment and consecrated to the great office is the least that we can postulate for the mind of Jesus from the very outset. Without that, the consciousness of unique greatness and of unique importance, so prominent and pervasive in His self-estimate, become unexplainable. They cannot be accounted for by assuming the bare prospect of a high position in the future. Only the knowledge that the office had already been solemnly conferred upon Him could normally produce such an exalted state of mind. But, while this is the least to be insisted upon, it by no means exhausts the content of present possession which the Gospels represent Jesus as carrying within Himself. Jesus was conscious of standing in the midst of the actual discharge of Messianic functions. On the fact of His allowing Messianic names such as "the Son of David," "the Holy One of God," "the Son of God," to be applied to Him, no stress need be laid here, for this could be set down to a prophetic use of such titles. According to Dalman, the Rabbis do not hesitate to call the Messiah by his official name before his public appearance. Even Peter might thus have confessed Him the Christ by way of anticipation. But there are other and unequivocal data which must be given consideration. Side by side with His future coming Jesus speaks of a past coming, which He couples not merely with prophetic work, but with specifically Messianic tasks. He came not to call the righteous, but sinners (Mark 2:17). The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many (Mark 10:45). He came not to destroy either the law or the prophets, but to fulfill (Matt. 5:17). He came not to send peace, but a sword (Matt. 10:34). He came to cast fire upon the earth (Luke 12:49). The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which

was lost (Luke 19:10). It is not maintained, of course, that the use of the verb "came" in such connections of itself proves that Jesus was conscious of having appeared as the Messiah, for a "coming" is predicated of both Jesus and John the Baptist in the same sentence (Matt. 11:18, 19). But the argument derives its force from the fact that this coming is coupled with specifically Messianic functions. To cast fire, to save, to fulfill — these acts are just as much the result of a Messianic appearance as are the stupendous eschatological events that will result from His future coming with the clouds of heaven. Although the Messianic glory may be outwardly absent, the internal essence of the Messiahship, consisting in the exercise of authority and power for establishing the Kingdom of God around the nucleus of a new Israel, is there from the beginning. He claims the right to forgive sin, and expressly stipulates that this right belongs to Him, not merely in the future exercise of judgment as the heavenly Son of Man, but even now in His earthly stage of activity (Mark 2:10). He sets aside Old Testament institutions, cleanses the temple, appoints apostles, institutes the Supper. The works of casting out demons, healing the sick and setting at liberty the bound are fully Messianic in His own estimation. In all of them a sovereign, real, absolute will asserts itself. Finally, the suffering and death are not simply preparatory to the future exercise of Messiahship; they are themselves Messianic acts, indeed they constitute the very core of the task the Christ came to accomplish.

It will by now have become sufficiently plain that the theory of a purely prospective Messiahship, either including both the appointment and the performance, or including the performance alone, runs contrary to the facts. Before leaving the subject, let us for the sake of greater clearness endeavor to formulate the New Testament view concerning our Lord's accession to and entrance upon the Messiahship.

There is a twofold Messianic commission, and there is a twofold opening up of Messianic activity corresponding to this. The first commission underlies the public ministry, and finds formal expression in the voice from heaven at the baptism. It is to this first commission that Jesus refers in the great Messianic monologue of Matt. 11:27: "All things were delivered unto me by my

Father." Under this commission all the ministry of the days of our Lord's flesh must be subsumed.

The second commission, which from the standpoint of the first and its discharge was prospective, dates from the resurrection. It is with reference to the latter that our Lord after the resurrection again declares, only now in a higher and more comprehensive sense, that all power is given unto Him in heaven and on earth (Matt. 28:18), and that Peter after the ascension declares that God by raising Him from the dead has made the crucified Jesus both Lord and Christ (Acts 2:36), and that Paul affirms Him who was born of the seed of David according to the flesh to have been effectually declared the Son of God in power out of a second resurrection-birth (Rom. 1:4).

Under this new and greater commission is exercised all the Messianic work now carried on in the state of glory, and that which Jesus will perform at the acme of His Messianic epiphany at the end of the world. These two steps in His appointment and these two stages in His activity are organically connected together. The second completes the first and brings it to full fruition, but in essential character both are equally Messianic. It is not, therefore, the Messiahship as such, but only the second, full-grown phase of it, that can have presented itself to our Lord as a future attainment.

CHAPTER VI

The Theory of Development of Jesus into the Messianic Consciousness

THIS theory represents another form of compromise between the denial and the affirmation of the presence of the Messianic consciousness in Jesus. Both positions are chronologically distributed over His life. It differs from the theory of prospective Messiahship in that it posits a period at the beginning during which the idea was totally absent from Jesus' mind, whereas according to the view discussed in the preceding chapter the thought was in the mind of Jesus from the beginning as a vision of something future.

At the same time the theory of development admits of combination with the prospective view in that the development assumed to have taken place might have been a development into the prospective frame of mind at first. For our present purpose, however, this is negligible. Our enquiry is into the alleged transition from a wholly non-Messianic state of mind to one in which the Messianic concept played a role, regardless of whether this be regarded as a matter of mere futurity or one of actuality. It is alleged that during the first, wholly non-Messianic, state Jesus considered Himself as no more than a prophet, a teacher, a reformer. At a later point the conviction arose in Him that God meant Him to be the Messiah. The point at which this took place is found by some in the episode of Caesarea Philippi, by others at an earlier date in the Galilean ministry.¹

The development to which the enquiry refers must be, of course, a development during the active ministry of Jesus. With the delicate and purely speculative question of the growth of the mind of the youthful Jesus during His private life before the baptism, the discussion is not concerned, except in so far as it might

1. As representatives of the theory of development Strauss, Renan and H. J. Holtzmann may be named.

be assumed that the experience of the baptism was the climax and product of a process of mental evolution previously undergone — a view which in the nature of the case would have to remain a mere hypothesis, incapable of proof, since biographical data for the pre-baptismal period of Jesus' life are lacking.

As to the question as to how to conceive of the two successive states of mind through which our Lord passed, we find ourselves confronted with a twofold possibility. On the one hand, the original state of mind in which He began His labors might have been entirely void of all occupation with the Messianic question. Or, on the other hand, it is possible that He might have labored under the definite conviction that He was *not* the Messiah. It may be admitted that, psychologically considered, the former alternative possesses a certain charm of naivete, an absence of clear self-consciousness at the beginning which left room for the natural unfolding of the later matured conception of Himself which characterized the days of momentous decision at the close of His ministry. But unfortunately the situation in which Jesus' activity opened precludes such a simple process of gradual, undisturbed growth. It must have been impossible for Him not to take His stand at the outset in regard to the bearing of the Messianic issue upon His own person. For the air was surcharged with eschatological currents. John the Baptist had already made the Messianic question a matter of vital actuality. In the face of that, Jesus could not simply ignore it or brush it aside. He had either to deny or affirm. If He denied, no subsequent passing over into a Messianic state of mind would be possible without recantation of this original non-Messianic self-estimate. Such development, therefore, would inevitably be beset with initial error and failure to interpret aright the signs of the times. But as a matter of fact there is no detectable break in our Lord's self-consciousness, such as this self-correction would inevitably have produced, at any point in His career. On the contrary, all the evidence tends to show that Jesus with clear consciousness of what He was doing stepped into the only position that John's eminence, as the greatest of those born of women, had left open — the position of the Messiah.

If John was already the preparer, then Jesus could not assume the role of a second preparer without upsetting the entire eschato-

logical program. From John's case we can see how essentially different was the state of mind of a preparer from the state of mind actually present in Jesus. And an impartial examination of the evidence proves that the beginnings of our Lord's ministry do not differ from its closing days as far as conviction on this point is concerned. There is indeed a difference, but it is merely a difference in Messianic avowal to others, not a difference in consciousness within Himself.

The fact that Jesus strongly felt Himself to be a prophet, and that particularly at the beginning of His ministry, of course proves nothing contrary to a fully settled Messianic conviction. As a matter of fact this prophetic self-avowal is so intense, and its utterance is so emphatic, as to allow of no other explanation than that of a Messianically rooted prophetic consciousness. It was not modeled upon the general Old Testament conception of a prophet, but rather upon the specific figure of the Servant of Jehovah found in the later prophecies of Isaiah. This becomes clear at once from the address in the synagogue at Nazareth, where the prophetic Spirit is claimed by Jesus on the ground of Jehovah's having anointed Him to be the Christ. And later, in the parable of the wicked husbandmen, while His own mission is put on a line with that of the Old Testament prophets, it appears none the less as climactic; its prophetic aspect is absorbed by its Messianic aspect. Hence also the effects which He associates with His prophetic activity go far beyond what a prophet as such could expect to accomplish. He not merely brings good tidings to the poor, but also proclaims release to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, the arrival of the great acceptable year of Jehovah, the year of Jubilee, in which all things disturbed by sin and evil return to their normal and wholesome condition.

From the first Jesus, while not speaking much about the Messiahship, acts, and obviously thinks and feels, as the Messiah. A very early proof of this, at least if any reliance may be placed on Mark's sequence of events, occurs in the statement of the parable where Jesus compares Himself to the bridegroom, and the time of His presence with the disciples as the period of Messianic joy. The event at Caesarea Philippi is the only thing the advocates of the development view are able to seize upon as marking an epoch in the attitude of Jesus toward the Messiahship

indicative of a change in His consciousness. An epoch it undoubtedly is, but not because it revealed to Jesus something new concerning Himself; it is an epoch only because it settled something in the minds of the disciples. Jesus by His own question solicited Peter's confession, which implies that to Jesus' mind the question, if any decision was necessary, had already been decided before this event took place.

But even with reference to the disciples, the keynote of the narrative is not the revelation of something new, but rather the confession of something revealed and learned at a previous time. Jesus, in order to lay the proper basis for the prediction of His death and resurrection, wants to focus into an explicit avowal what the disciples had already for some time apprehended with varying degrees of lucidity and conviction. That the significance of the episode lies in the sphere of confession appears also from the relation in which the event stands to the building of the Church, for the Church is based upon confession. When Jesus pronounces Peter blessed because of something which had been revealed to him not by flesh and blood but by the Father in heaven, there is no necessity whatever of understanding this of instantaneous enlightenment first experienced at that very moment. Probably the reference is to the supernatural process which had accompanied Peter's association with Jesus from the beginning and which made him ripe for the great confession at Caesarea Philippi.

But the question at issue may also be tested in a different way. Supposing that there was a development, we may inquire as to what were the historical or psychological factors which furnished its motive power. No satisfactory answer has been given to this question. P. W. Schmiedel and Schürer find the starting point of the process in Jesus' recognition of the inadequacy of the law to form the basis of an ideal religion. But this explains nothing, unless there be added to it a conviction on Jesus' part of having been personally called to remedy the inadequacy by substituting a new and higher law. As soon as this element is added, however, we have clearly arrived at a point where the Messianic consciousness exists, and are no longer dealing with a sub-Messianic state of mind. Reform of the law must have appeared to the ordinary Jewish mind and to Jesus Himself as a distinctly Messianic pre-

rogative. No one could entertain the thought unless conscious of the authority, and to be conscious of that meant to be conscious of Messiahship.

This applies likewise to the somewhat more general suggestion of Holtzmann that the approach to the Messianic conviction lay for Jesus through the intense and vivid feeling of having something new and unique to offer. For those new things which our Lord felt competent to offer were so unique and far-reaching that to believe oneself able to dispense them would differ only verbally from the belief of being the Messiah. Holtzmann more particularly speaks of a new and absolutely unforensic conception of God, alleged to have been evolved by Jesus, as a possible source of the Messianic consciousness. But certainly it is a far cry from the feeling of having obtained a new insight into the character of God to the conviction of being the Messiah.

We shall not speak now of the favorite hypothesis that the Messianic consciousness was a development of Jesus' experience of ethico-religious sonship, as this will come up for discussion later in another connection.

The widespread belief that a development in the self-consciousness of Jesus is traceable in the Gospels, especially in Mark, is largely due to the fact that no sufficient distinction is made between our Lord's subjective state of mind and the objective expression of that state of mind to others. To be conscious of Messiahship is one thing, to give this consciousness the proper disclosure and effect under particular circumstances is another thing. Not a little of the paradoxical character of the representation in the Gospels arises from the seeming disproportion between these two things. The record joins together the strongest conceivable Messianic consciousness with the least conceivable effort for asserting and enforcing it. Through the whole history our Lord seems to feel that the dignity is His, yet He refrains from stressing it. Both in the beginning and at the end, as well as in the period between, He appears to have looked upon His Messianic honor and glory as something which it was not proper for Himself to seek and to disclose, but for the Father to seek and to bring to light. At the baptism it is not Jesus but God who declares our Lord's divine sonship and His Messianic election. At Caesarea

Philippi the great confession is not heard from our Lord's own lips but from Peter's lips. At His entrance into the holy city, though the entire staging of the thing implies His kingship, yet He leaves it to His followers and to the children to sound that note of praise. If no human mouths are found to do so, then the stones will have to speak out, for the thing must needs be told — only Jesus Himself is the last one to tell it. Even at His trial, it is not until the question, "Art thou the Christ?" is pointedly put to Him, that He answers "I am." And even here, before Pilate (according to all three of the Synoptics), and before the Sanhedrin (according to Matthew and Luke), His answer assumes the form "Thou hast said it," or "Ye say that I am," a way of speaking which, while assenting to the fact, emphasizes the circumstance that it is not He but His judges that have made affirmation of the fact. A certain passivity and reserve, therefore, continue to characterize our Lord's attitude in this matter to the very end.

Nevertheless, a clearly marked difference is observable between the period preceding Caesarea Philippi and the time following it. While previously to Caesarea Philippi He had not hesitated to speak and act as Messiah, yet He had not made the Messiahship a subject of professed instruction to the disciples. After Caesarea Philippi, however, this is changed. It was now possible to make the change, for the situation had so shaped itself that if now He spoke of Himself as the Christ, it had to be in terms placing the essence of His Christhood in suffering and death.

But it had not merely become possible to do so — it had actually become necessary, owing to the same hastening on of the crisis to the end. Jesus had to make it plain that He meant to suffer and die, not in any other capacity, but exclusively in the capacity of Messiah. Under the circumstances, therefore, an avowal of Messiahship was inevitable.

In regard to the public the change came somewhat later, because it was only after a period of seclusion with the disciples that He again came in contact with a wider circle of people. In the cleansing of the temple, in the parable of the wicked husbandmen, in the argument about the Davidic sonship of the Messiah,

the altered attitude can be clearly seen. But there is nothing to indicate that this varying adjustment to the situation was in any way the result of an inward development. On the contrary, the firm, unhesitating, yet tactful, progressive opening up of the subject to others proves all the more convincingly that for Jesus Himself it was not a matter of growth, but an assured conviction from the outset.

CHAPTER VII

The Theory of Purely Formal Significance of the Messianic Consciousness

THE various unfriendly attitudes toward the Messianic consciousness which we have discussed were found to assume the form of historico-critical elimination of the facts. There exists, however, still another way of attempting to neutralize the material which is regarded as objectionable. This differs from the former theories in that it recognizes the reality of the Messianic idea, with self-application, in the thought and life of Jesus. But, since the same shrinking from the implications and consequences of the fact is felt, the attempt is made to reduce the significance of the fact to the smallest possible proportions.

This is done through representing the Messianic consciousness as a more or less accidental vehicle of self-expression through which Jesus tried to convey His deepest convictions concerning His Person and calling. As such, it is held, the Messianic consciousness must be carefully distinguished from the inward core, not only of His religiousness, but also of His deepest, more or less unclarified, self-interpretation. These latter, it is held, not only allow of other forms of expression: they actually require such other forms of expression if what Jesus thought of Himself is to be made intelligible to present-day religion. It is admitted that to Jesus the Messianic concept was an inevitable mode of self-apprehension, because He shared the formal religious concepts of His age, although He was far in advance of that age in His perception and experience of the ultimate realities of religion, for conveying which to others He had to put up with this inadequate traditional form. And therefore, it is said, in order to do Him justice we must separate the substance from the form, and cast it into some other, more modern, mold.

In many cases the adherents of this view do not attempt to point out any indications in the consciousness of Jesus that would

suggest a distinction between substance and form. In their opinion this distinction was not consciously drawn by Jesus Himself. He is held to have been naively unaware that there lodged in His soul, side by side, these two things: the eternal essence of His religious and vocational experience, and the Messianic form in which this eternal essence vainly strove to express itself. It is held that the essence so far outdistanced the form that, had Jesus really thought Himself through, He would have found it necessary to discard the form and to substitute for it some other, permanently valid, category of self-interpretation. But, it is said, He did not thus introspectively analyze His own mind, and hence never discovered that its form of expression fell far short of its essence.

In other cases, however, the unsatisfactoriness of leaving the matter in this shape, and basing the distinction entirely on a judgment brought to bear upon Jesus from the outside, is realized. An endeavor is therefore made to obtain from Jesus' own mind and from His actions psychological support for the view advocated. In some way or other it is sought to introduce the distinction between religious substance and Messianic form into Jesus' own thought as an element of His self-knowledge. It is claimed that He Himself came to feel that the Messiahship did not and could not cover all that He meant to be and to accomplish. The phenomena which are held to indicate such a state of mind in Jesus are the following.

First of all, attention is called to the minor emphasis which, in comparison with other ideas, the Messianic thought receives in Jesus' teaching. Jesus, we are told, never dwells upon it as a matter of supreme interest, as He does upon such things as the Kingdom, the fatherhood of God, and the ethical value of man. Of these He speaks much and insistently, of the Messiahship little and evasively.

The argument which we have just outlined is based upon silence or lack of emphasis. But others endeavor, in the second place, to prove by positive evidence that the Messianic form of self-interpretation oppressed Jesus with a sense of utter inadequacy. He felt the Messiahship as a burden, it is claimed — a burden under which He labored and suffered, to which He never quite recon-

ciled Himself, and which never became to Him a source of true religious joy.

Thirdly, however, the reason most frequently assigned for the alleged purely formal character of Jesus' Messianic consciousness is that it is believed to have sprung from a deeper and more fundamental consciousness, that of sonship. Jesus came to regard Himself as the Messiah, it is said, because He knew Himself to be the Son of God. This theory assumes that what was primary in development must also have been, in Jesus' own estimate of matters, primary in point of importance. If Jesus learned to believe in His Messiahship only on the basis of His sonship, it is asserted, then all that is necessary to insist on for religious purposes is the sonship; the Messiahship may be discarded as a mere form in which, under particular historical limitations, the sense of sonship strove to express itself.

In dealing with this view of purely formal significance of the Messianic consciousness, the two ways of applying the distinction made — that of bringing it to bear objectively upon the appraisal of Jesus' life, and that of importing it into His own subjective reflection, require different treatment. So far as the former method is concerned, the obvious answer is that it does not represent Jesus' own judgment as to what was essential and what merely formal, but the judgment of those who apply the method. There is no guaranty whatever that our Lord, had He been led to discriminate between essence and form, would have drawn the line in this particular way, and not rather have regarded the conception of Messiahship as pertaining to the essence. The method we are criticizing is one of dogmatic appreciation rather than of historical investigation. It tells us what Jesus, from a certain preconceived standpoint, *ought* to have considered fundamental, and what He *might* have regarded as negligible; but it does not tell us what Jesus actually did assign or would have assigned to these respective categories had the question been put to Him.

The utterly subjective character of the procedure under criticism is obvious from the fact that in each case the various writers single out precisely that which constitutes the core of the writer's own personal theological belief, and then declare that that is the essence of Jesus' self-interpretation, while everything else is declared to be merely the non-essential, perishable form. The

"liberal" theologians declare that the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man constitute the substance, whereas the Messiahship is merely the form. Harnack says that the substance consists in three things: the Kingdom of God and its coming; the fatherhood of God and the infinite value of the human soul; the better righteousness and the commandment of love; whereas, he says, the Messiahship is merely the form. Another noted scholar, Shailer Matthews, affirms that the substance consists of: Jesus the incarnation of God, the revealer of a forgiving God, the type and teacher of the perfect human life, the source of supernatural life; whereas the Messiahship is the form.

It is perfectly clear that the liberal theologians define the substance as they do because they are humanitarians; Harnack defines it as he does because he is a Ritschlian; Professor Matthews defines it as he does because he is a Baptist liberal. Each of these writers is, of course, fully entitled to his own dogmatic estimate. But we should not be asked, on the basis of this, to believe that *Jesus* was inclined to make light of His Messiahship as a mere matter of form.

The case becomes quite different when it is claimed that traces of a depreciating estimate of the Messiahship can be found in Jesus' own mind. Here the dispute is one as to facts, pure and simple. Is it true that Jesus places less emphasis upon the Messiahship than upon other things? Is it true that He feels the Messiahship as a drawback and a burden? It is true that His conviction of being the Messiah was an outgrowth of His ethico-religious sense of sonship?

As to the first point, the view under consideration does not sufficiently distinguish between making much of a matter and speaking much of the same. It is quite true that for a considerable period of His ministry Jesus spoke much more, and much more openly, of the Kingdom and of the fatherhood of God than He did of the Messiahship. But it by no means follows from this that His comparative silence with reference to the Messiahship implies that He regarded the latter as of slight importance. On the contrary, while preserving silence in His verbal teaching on the subject, we find Him at the same time *acting* most definitely out of the fulness of His Messianic conviction. Had the silence or lack of emphasis been the result of a low valuation of the Messiah-

ship in His mind, then His mode of action ought to have been in accord with this low valuation, but as a matter of fact such was not the case. Therefore the relative silence in this case is no reliable guage for deciding the importance which Jesus in His own mind attached to the conception of Messiahship.

When Jesus, during the later period of His ministry, breaks the silence and avows His Messiahship, this is not done after any half-hearted fashion, but with the energy of an unfaltering purpose. Such an attitude is hard to understand on the assumption that Jesus' acceptance of the idea of Messiahship was purely formal or perfunctory. As Schlatter has strikingly observed, the advocates of such a theory are too prone to conceive of Jesus as treating the Messianic idea after a purely theoretical fashion, as an element in a system of thought, and therefore they readily persuade themselves that He might have held the idea in all sincerity, and yet might have attributed to it no more than a purely formal significance. But the Messiahship never was such a purely academic or theoretical matter, nor indeed could it be such to anyone claiming the office for himself. Least of all could it be this for Jesus, who placed His whole life in the most absolute sense in the service of God, and to whom, therefore, the category under which He subsumed His service acquired the character of unqualified obligatoriness, so as to exclude every thought if its being merely formal or non-essential.

To Jesus the Messiahship was a matter of the will, a matter of obedience to God, and to put into it anything less than His whole heart and soul and mind and strength would have been, in His view, not merely to falsify the idea, but actually to prostitute the office. For this reason the assertion that Jesus felt the Messiahship as a burden, not as a joy, is as untrue to the actual facts of the life of our Lord as anything could possibly be. If this assertion were true, it would imply a most serious schism within Jesus' own religious life. It would mean that He had to concentrate His energies of service upon something into which He could not carry the enthusiasm of His heart. But there is nothing in the Gospel record to warrant such an assumption. Not only are there no indications whatever of any indifference or reluctance with regard to the Messianic function, but we find positive evidence for the very opposite. The one outstanding occasion on

which the record represents our Lord as rejoicing in the Spirit and pouring out His soul in jubilant gratitude to God is an occasion where He reflects on His Messianic calling and views Himself as the personal center of the entire process of Messianic revelation (Matt. 11:25-27; Luke 10:21, 22).

Nor must we forget that Jesus derived from His Messianic calling the necessity for His suffering of death. This is the crowning proof that He did not treat the Messiahship as a non-essential idea that could be discarded or retained as the circumstances might seem to advise. To Him it was something for which nothing else could be substituted, something by which He felt absolutely bound in His conscience, something that He could not and would not surrender even to escape the loss of His life. The Messiahship was a vital concern between God and Himself: He clung to it with the utmost religious energy, and carried it through without swerving or wavering to the bitter end. Is it seemly, we may well ask with Schlatter, is it seemly in the face of this to say that the Messiahship was a mere form which we can set aside without subtracting anything from the vital values of His life and work on our behalf?

In the third place, there still remains the argument that the Messiahship must be secondary and non-essential because developed in our Lord's mind from His sense of sonship. This argument rests on a correct observation: Jesus Himself represents His Messiahship as based on His sonship. The utterances in which this is either affirmed or implied will be examined at a later stage of the discussion, in connection with the import of the name "Son of God." Here we shall content ourselves with observing that the data there to be weighed afford no real support to the alleged secondary character of the Messianic consciousness. For, in the first place, it should be observed that in these utterances of our Lord the connection between Messiahship and sonship is a purely objective one. Jesus means to affirm that in the sphere of objective reality, in the objective order of events, the Messiahship came to Him as a divine appointment because He was antecedently the Son of God. But He does not intimate in any way that in the subjective sphere, in the unfolding of His own consciousness, the one grew out of the other. What the statements of Jesus

imply is objective interdependence in point of fact, not psychological evolution of the one conception from the other.

And, in the second place, the sonship which Jesus regards as basic to His Messiahship is something *toto genere* different from the kind of sonship brought into play where the attempt is made to prove the Messiahship secondary in Jesus' mind. According to the theory we are dealing with, the sonship is nothing more than an ethico-religious sonship differing only in degree from the filial relationship to God that any disciple may attain in the Kingdom. It consists in the perfect reciprocation and enjoyment of the love of God, on the one hand, and in the perfect accord of obedience with the purpose and will of God, on the other hand. It is alleged that Jesus at first lived in this ideal ethico-religious atmosphere wholly without any Messianic thought or aspiration, and that only in the course of time did the perception dawn upon Him that, since He was the only one who possessed all this, and since it was the privilege of others to attain unto it, He must be called of God to mediate it to others, which conviction of a divine calling to make men participate in His own religious attainment was, it is said, equivalent to the consciousness of Messiahship.

It does not require much historic sense to perceive that such a construction fails to do justice alike to Jesus' idea of sonship and to His idea of Messiahship. In the circle of this theory, both ideas move as pure abstractions, without any semblance of either present or future reality of concrete existence. A conception of Messiahship in which the office would be exhausted by the making of men perfect in a religious and moral sense Jesus could never for a moment have entertained as a full-orbed expression of what the Messiahship had historically come to stand for. It is not, of course, as though that task had been excluded from the Messianic function as Jesus saw it. That is not the point; the question at issue is whether He could *identify the Messiahship as such* with this task, and therefore infer from the incumbency of that task upon Himself that He must be the Messiah. This cannot be too strongly denied. The inference would have been valid only if, in addition to a consciousness of perfect oneness with God, Jesus had felt possessed of all-comprehensive supernatural knowledge and power such as no degree of moral or religious perfection could have produced in Him, nor have led Him to believe He

possessed. Jesus expected to be the heir and representative of God in the most comprehensive sense, to sit at God's right hand, to quicken the dead, to judge the world.

In view of all this, who does not feel that the sonship adequate to furnish the basis for such a Messiahship, either in point of objective fact or psychologically, must have far transcended the limits set for it in the theory we are considering? As a matter of fact the sonship to which our Lord traces back His Messianic commission is not something which we have in common with Him, but something unique, something reaching back into His pre-existent, pre-mundane life. In a word, it is nothing less than His Deity, or, strictly speaking, the relation which in His divine nature He sustains to the Father. Now, if the sonship of Jesus be taken in this solid, intra-divine sense, and not in the attenuated, moralizing sense to which it has been reduced by the liberal theology, then the problem of the comparative importance or secondariness of the sonship and the Messiahship assumes quite a different complexion. To be sure, it remains as true on this as on the other construction that the Messiahship is in Jesus' life the secondary thing, not merely in the order of being, but also in the order of importance. When seen in the perspective sketched above, the Messiahship will have to be classed with the things that are relative, not with the order of absolutes. This relative-ness it shares with all other historical things, as compared with the inner life of the Deity. Of the world itself in its totality, and all that is in the world, of man, of redemption, no such absolute value and significance can be affirmed, as it is the essence of religion to affirm of God. All these historical things could not be; of God alone can it be said that He and the content of His life are *essential* in the absolute sense. To this inner life of the Deity the sonship of our Lord belongs if we give it the full meaning which He Himself ascribes to it. It is an *absolute* fact, as the Godhead itself is an absolute reality.

On the other hand, the Messiahship is historical; it is an element in the world-fabric. Though belonging to the highest plane in the world-order, yet it does not pass beyond, but remains included in the historical realm, and therefore must needs partake of the relativity belonging to the world as such. It is the core and goal of the world-movement, and within the world-movement all

things exist for its sake, and converge toward it. Nevertheless, having said this, we cannot go on and say that the Messiahship is essential as God is essential. In a very real sense, therefore, we are bound to admit that the Messiahship and the Messianic consciousness of Jesus are secondary. But saying this, we have affirmed their secondary character in a sense quite different from that in which the view we are criticizing would affirm it. For, not as compared with the Godhead and the eternal sonship, but as an element in the world-process, within the sphere of religion itself, within the very order of salvation, within the historical life of Jesus, we are asked to believe that the Messiahship is a mere accidental form of conception, and that the ethico-religious sense of sonship, an element likewise belonging to the order of history, is alone the important and essential thing. On our view of the matter no such conclusion can be legitimately drawn. Though undoubtedly the world and redemption might not have been, yet, the world existing, and the world being subject to redemption, the Messiahship is a primary and essential factor. In other words, there are things in our relative world which are none the less essential to, and primary within, this order of creation and salvation, and the Messiahship of Jesus is such a thing. While our Lord, looking back (we speak after the manner of man) from the standpoint of His earthly life upon His pre-mundane, eternal abode with the Father, could regard all this temporal Messianic task and experience as a fleeting episode, yet, relating Himself to the plan and history of redemption, He could not but regard this same Messiahship as a cardinal fact, transcending all other historical facts in its intrinsic importance.

The gist of the matter may be briefly summed up in the following three propositions:

1. As compared with the divine, eternal sonship, the Messiahship is a secondary and relative thing.
2. As considered within the order of redemption, the Messiahship is a primary and essential thing.
3. As compared with Jesus' own ethico-religious sonship, the Messiahship, so far from being inferior in importance, occupies a higher rank than that sonship. Our Lord's whole human nature and all that entered into it of spiritual experience was not something existing for its own sake; it existed and operated for the

sake of His Messianic calling. It was a means to the end of His Messiahship; the Messiahship was *not* a mere form for its expression. So long as Christians glory in the human nature of Jesus no less than in His Deity, on account of what, side by side with His Deity, His human nature means for their salvation, they will feel bound to place the Messiahship above the religious and moral sonship in the scale of values.

CHAPTER VIII

"The Christ"

JESUS calls Himself "the Christ" in Matt. 16:17, 20; Mark 9:41; Luke 24:26, 46. He is so called by others in the Gospel story in Matt. 16:16 and Luke 4:41. Indeed, if any reliance is to be placed on the tradition, He must have been commonly so designated, as witness Matt. 27:17, 22 and Luke 23:2, 35; not to speak now of the fact that the Evangelists freely give Him this title.

It is not our present purpose to test the historicity of these passages from a critical point of view, but rather, assuming them to be authentic, to inquire what precise meaning was associated by Jesus Himself and the other speakers in the record with the name. Was it already at that time a purely formal and traditional designation, practically amounting to a proper name, or did it still come to the minds of the users laden with its etymological significance?

The Old Testament is usually believed to be full of the title "the Messiah." This is, however, a misunderstanding. The question is not, of course, whether what was *later* called "the Messiah" appears in the Old Testament as the figure of the great eschatological King, for that is beyond dispute. The question is only whether, or to what extent, the figure referred to bears in the Old Testament the technical name of "the Messiah." At the outset it must be granted that the simple, brief form of the title, "the Messiah," does not occur in the Old Testament at all. The word always has a qualifying genitive or suffix attached to it: "the Messiah of Jehovah" ("the Lord's Anointed"), or "my Messiah" ("mine Anointed"). This is of some importance because it shows that the name had not yet been petrified into a conventional designation, but was a phrase the force of whose original conception was still being felt.

After the Old Testament times the phrase became abbreviated into the simple "the Messiah." Dalman has suggested that this

was due to the later Jewish tendency to avoid the use of the name of God.¹ Instead of saying "the Anointed of Jehovah," the Jews said simply "the Anointed," according to Dalman. This may be correct, although it should be noted that the fuller form did not go out of use entirely, as is shown by *Psa. Sol.* 17:32, "the Lord's Christ"; 18:6, "his Christ"; *Syr. Apoc. Bar.* 39:7; 40:1; 72:2, "my Messiah"; *En.* 48:10; 52:4, "his Messiah."

In the Gospels, with the exception of *Luke* 2:26 ("the Lord's Christ") and possibly *Luke* 2:11 (if the reading *Kurios* be changed into the genitive form *Kuriou*), the simple *Ho Christos*, "the Christ," occurs everywhere. Still it is certain that Jesus clearly reflected upon the idea of anointing implied in the word, and specifically upon the source of the anointing in God, for in the synagogue at Nazareth He derived His Messianic equipment from the anointing imparted to Him by the Spirit of Jehovah, quoting from the prophecy of *Isaiah* 61:1 ff.

Back of this question of the shorter or longer form of the name lies the far more fundamental question as to whether the Old Testament passages, which use the full form, actually mean by its use to designate the eschatological King, or merely make it a metaphorical description of the people of Israel. The latter idea has of late been advocated in all seriousness. The adoption of such a view would make the name Messiah as the name of a particular eschatological figure disappear entirely from the Old Testament, although, as stated above, the figure itself would not on that account disappear, as it would remain present under other names. It would also follow from such an assumption that our Lord, as well as the apocalyptic literature before Him and the whole New Testament after Him, are to be charged with a fundamental misunderstanding of the Old Testament application of the phrase, since, on this theory, they wrongly transferred it from Israel to a particular individual person.

As for the Old Testament, the question is largely one of the exegesis of a number of Psalter passages: *Psalm* 2:2; 18:50 (2 *Sam.* 22:51); 20:6; 28:8; 84:9; 89:38, 51; 132:17. To these must be added the Psalmodic passages in 1 *Sam.* 2:10 and *Hab.*

1. *Die Worte Jesu*, I, pp. 238-9.

3:13, as well as Isa. 55:3.² Each of these passages ought to be considered on its own merits. In Hab. 3:13 and Psalm 28:8, where the *parallelismus membrorum* favors it, the equation of Israel with the Messiah may be allowed. In other passages, such as, for example, Psalm 2, this equation lacks plausibility because here it would be the giving of the title King, in addition to that of Messiah, to the people, which seems improbable.

A sufficient basis for the self-application of the title on the part of Jesus would in any case remain. Moreover the two representations, that of Israel as the Messiah and that of the individual eschatological King as the Messiah, are by no means mutually exclusive. The "anointed" King and the "anointed" people are closely related. The parallel case of the attribution of "sonship" to both suggests the possibility of the common possession by both of the "anointing." In the New Testament the anointing is bestowed both upon Christ and upon believers. Also the case of the Messiah and the Messianic people jointly bearing the name "Servant of Jehovah" in the latter part of Isaiah furnishes a parallel.³

A really serious objection to the theory would arise only if it were advocated in that extreme form in which the Messianizing of the nation is considered an intentional substitute for the hope of an individual Messiah. This would amount to an anti-Messianizing polemic. Usually Isa. 55:3 is cited as furnishing either an instance or the original precedent of such a replacement of the Messiah by Israel, somewhat after the fashion of a nation setting aside its monarchical ruler in order to turn itself into a republic, and taking to itself all the titles and insignia of the former occupant of the throne. But the passage from Isaiah does not require or even favor this interpretation. In view of the fact that it calls the mercies of David "sure," that is, unalterable, reliable, it seems absurd to find in a statement emphasizing this

2. For a more extensive discussion of this point, the reader is referred to the author's article on *The Eschatology of the Psalter* in *The Princeton Theological Review*, 1920, pp. 31-34 (reprinted in *The Pauline Eschatology*, 1952, pp. 351-357), where also the most important literature on the subject is cited.

3. This parallel would of course disappear if the individual understanding of the term "the Servant of Jehovah" were entirely eliminated from these prophecies, as is done by Giesebrecht and others.

very thing, the idea of the abrogation of the mercies of David and their transfer to another subject.

Next, we must inquire what is the original meaning of the term "to anoint," and to what extent its Old Testament associations were carried over by Jesus in the application of the idea to Himself. *Mashiach* is linguistically a stronger form than the passive participle *Mashuach* would have been. The latter form would only affirm that an act of anointing had taken place; the former implies that the recipient of the anointing in virtue of it possesses the abiding quality of "an Anointed One." The difference is approximately that between "one who was (on a certain occasion) sent" and "an ambassador." Attention, therefore, is called no less to the character borne than to the appointive origin of it. The Old Testament already strongly stressed the appointment, as may be seen from the Second Psalm. In fact, the appointment is the first element in the anointing, which makes the latter first of all a declarative act. Even where a regular succession of kings had been provided for, as in the dynasty of David, it was not omitted nor deemed unnecessary. The theory that not all new ascendants of the throne, but only those who were the first of their family to become king, or at least only those who had rivals in their claim to the dignity were anointed, has no sufficient basis; but even if it had, this circumstance would only the more strongly bring out the importance and decisiveness of the divine approval with reference to the office.⁴ But that all successors of David were actually anointed follows clearly from the current designation of the king as "the Anointed of Jehovah." The fable of Jotham in Judges 9 ("the trees went forth at a time to anoint a king over themselves") shows that the customary way of appointing a king was through anointing him. Perhaps it is not amiss to find in this regular repetition of the act in the case of each Davidic king a reminder that the real dignity and power of the office were not something which it inherently carried within itself, but something which had to be ever anew derived from Jehovah. Our Lord's arguing with the Pharisees about the sufficiency of the succession from David furnishes at least a point of contact for this. That something legally authoritative lies back of Christhood is also

4. Cp. Weinel in *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, Vol. XVIII, p. 21.

implied in the connection between Master and Christ in Matt. 23:10. Jesus' attitude is throughout that He labors under a law of commission, to which the authoritativeness of His procedure both in teaching and in acting is in a large measure due. Even where He most strongly emphasizes the unity of nature existing between Himself and God, as in Matt. 11:27, the reference of the actual delegation of the right to reveal and to teach is not lacking.

The favorite modern idea that in the life and development of our Lord everything proceeded with the naivety and smoothness of a growing self-apprehension, is not in accord with that aspect of His ministry which the Christ-name expresses. If in present-day usage the name Christ is in danger of suffering neglect, and the name Jesus, mostly without realization of its etymological import, has almost become the exclusive designation, this is perhaps a symptom of the generally shifting attitude in the religious appraisal of our Lord from the official to the merely human. Paul and the whole early Church, in making and favoring the combination "Jesus Christ," expressed a strong feeling of appreciation for the legitimate standing of Jesus in His office of the Christ. The voice from heaven at both the baptism and the transfiguration, in its second statement, "whom I have chosen," places at the very beginning of our Lord's ministry the attestation of His holding it under the sovereignty of God. And from this peculiar form of introduction the office derives a peculiar coloring of authoritativeness throughout. To judge from the view of the Master, those who would eliminate so far as possible all elements of binding obligation from the consciousness of His professed followers are out of touch with at least this one aspect of the origins of the Christian faith.

Next to the declarative or appointive element, there enters into the concept of "anointing" the close association with God and the consequent sacrosanctness of the one on whom the anointing has been bestowed. Through the pouring on of the oil, the person anointed is brought into close contact with Jehovah, so close, in fact, that injury done to him amounts to sacrilege. Against Jehovah's anointed no one dares put forth his hand, even though personal enmity might instigate him to do so: 1 Sam. 24:6; 26:9; 2 Sam. 1:14. The murder of a king was a most terrible sin;

king-cursing and the cursing of God are named together, 1 Kings 21:10, 13. The full phrase, "Jehovah's Anointed," serves to bring out the seriousness of the crime; evidently the genitive "Jehovah's" is not so much felt as expressive of the source of the anointing as it is regarded as an expression of the close relationship to Jehovah resulting from the ceremony. A peculiar shade of reverence appears to have entered into the feeling of the people for their king, a reverence partaking far more of a religious than of a merely patriotic character. And traces are not lacking in the mind of Jesus of this association of ideas. It is safe to say that what passes currently for an unstudied expression of religious feeling toward God actually has in it a strong ingredient of official attachment and devotion to His Sender, although, of course, the two would naturally blend, and it is impossible for us to separate them.

With the anointing goes the holiness, and the name "Holy One" applied to Jesus on the supposition of His Messiahship, and not repudiated by Him, expresses this idea. The disciples come into awesome contact with it through the miracle of the great draft of fishes and the perspective it opened to them of the supernatural Messianic potencies stored up in the Person of Jesus (Luke 5:1-11). The experience made Peter exclaim: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord." It also explains, to some extent, the atmosphere of mystery enveloping Jesus as He walks through the Gospels. And it is one of the channels through which the apperception of that which was even higher than Messiahship broke in upon His followers.

The bestowal of the Holy Spirit belongs, in one aspect, to the first two elements of the anointing, which we have already discussed. The very gift of the Spirit amounted to a declaration on the part of God that the recipient of the gift was the Messiah. To be sure, not every impartation of the Spirit has such significance, for in that case every prophet would also be a Messiah. But the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus at the baptism was wholly unique; it was intended for permanent possession, and not limited by any measure of communication (John 3:34). Peter in Acts 10:38 may thus in identifying the baptism with Jesus' anointing have understood the gift of the Spirit as in part a declarative act, although the emphasis here plainly rests upon the anointing as an equipment.

As regards the second aspect, it is one of the commonplaces of Biblical teaching that the possession of the Spirit marks the possessor as partaking of the holiest intimacies of God. Therein lies the reason why sin against the Holy Spirit in His Messianic operation is declared to be unforgivable. In the Holy Spirit the blasphemer touches the very sanctities of God, which inhere in the Messiah. Peter likewise finds the extreme criminality of the action of the Jews in the fact that it was directed against God's Anointed (Acts 4:26, 27).

The conception of "anointing" has, however, still a third element rendering it important for understanding the Christhood of our Lord. The anointing implies not merely that a certain stamp is placed upon the anointed one, nor merely that a close bond of relationship is established between him and God, but also that something substantial is communicated from God to him. Whatever may have been the original associations of the element of oil in such an act, particularly in pagan ritual, whether it was superstitiously supposed to convey a certain "holiness-substance," there can be no doubt that among Israel it was regularly connected with the Spirit of Jehovah. Here also the Old Testament antecedents are decisive. In 1 Sam. 16:1-3 the fact is clearly established: when Samuel takes the horn of oil and with it anoints David, the Spirit of Jehovah comes mightily upon the latter (verse 13).

The conclusive proof for this sacramental significance of the oil lies in the development of the verb "to anoint," which in course of time acquires the metaphorical meaning of "to endow with the Spirit," and is so employed where no actual manipulation of oil is involved. Such is the usage throughout the New Testament, where, with the exception of James 5:14, the ceremony has disappeared, and only the thing signified remains. 2 Cor. 1:21 is highly suggestive here: "Now he that establishes us with you in Christ, and anointed us, is God; who also sealed us and gave the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts." This shows how entirely self-explanatory the ideas of anointing and of imparting of the Spirit were in the time of Paul. Nor can there be any doubt that this applied equally to the mind of Jesus. If He ascribes the utterance of His Messianic words and the performance of His Messianic acts to the Spirit, He can have derived them from no other source than from the occasion when the Spirit had come

upon Him. To Him the baptism must have been the anointing at the opening of His public career, and the anointing must have been that which fully made Him the Christ. And such possession of the Spirit was that which marked His entire life, with all its activities, to Himself and to others, as belonging to the sphere of the supernatural. For the Spirit is to Jesus, while not excluded from the sphere of the specifically ethical and religious, above all else the author of God's wonderworld in general.

Thus far we have looked at the Christhood, and at the anointing from which it derives its name, only from the viewpoint of the royal office. The question arises whether the priestly and prophetic functions pertaining to the Messiah are anywhere brought into connection with the anointing act. If they are, then they would be integral parts of the Messiahship, not mere concomitants of it.

In the Old Testament, the anointing is by no means restricted to the office of king. The High Priest is called "the Anointed Priest" in Leviticus 4:3, 5, 16; 6:22. The word here rendered by "anointed" is not the passive participle *Mashuach* but the adjectival form *Mashiach*, so that the phrase may properly be read "the priest, the Messiah," or "the Messiah-priest." It is evident that there is more involved here than merely a reflection on the mode of induction into the office; the word has become a semi-title. As shown by Ex. 28:41; 30:30; 40:15; Levit. 7:36; 10:7; Num. 3:3, the ordinary priests were likewise anointed, but they did not bear the title "Anointed Priest," the ordinary participial form being used in their case.

The prophets were not regularly anointed, and consequently no regular designation resulted in the case of the prophetic office as there did in the orders of kings and priests (compare 1 Kings 19:16).

The anointing of the king and that of the priest are probably historically two co-existing institutions, though one in their root-conception. There is no reason to suppose that either of the two developed out of the other. The view has been held that the king-anointing was derived from the priestly ceremony, so that the rite applied to the king was understood to impart to him priestly

dignity and powers.⁵ On the other hand, Wellhausen has suggested the opposite view, that originally no priestly anointing existed. In ancient times the priest was inducted into his office through the act of *mille jadh* ("filling of the hand"), as shown by Judges 17:5, 12; 1 Kings 13:33. The later ritual, while retaining this practice of "consecration," added to it the rite of anointing. According to Wellhausen, this "filling of the hand" originally meant the first payment made to a hired priest, and as such was regarded as symbolical of his appointment to his office. Then in the later representation of the Priest Code, it is alleged, its meaning was changed so as to make it signify the placing of the pieces of the first sacrifice upon the hands of the newly consecrated priest, that he might "wave" them before Jehovah. Wellhausen further believes that he has discovered the origin of this change in the ceremonial. His idea is that after the Exile, Joshua let himself be anointed in order to qualify for the office of secular ruler for which alone the rite of anointing had previously been used; Zech. 4:14.⁶ But this view is implausible for several reasons. According to Judges 17:5, Micah fills the hand of his son, whom he would scarcely have remunerated for ministering as his priest. As a matter of fact, the usage referred to nowhere occurs in other relations. Wellhausen, to be sure, considers this explainable from the circumstance that in ancient times the priesthood was the only paid profession. But this surely was not so in later times. The prophet even makes it a reproach that the priests teach for hire, Micah 3:11. Nor has the argument from Zech. 4:14 any force for proving that the royal anointing developed out of the priestly rite. Joshua and Zerubbabel are here called "the two sons of the oil," that is, the two anointed ones. As stated, it is assumed that Joshua here let himself be anointed in order that he might appear the head of the congregation. The ceremony was meant to make him priest-king over the people, and this is what the high priesthood henceforward actually was. But the fatal objection to this aspect of the theory is, that the anointing

5. Stade, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, I, p. 413; Benzinger, *Hebr. Archaeologie*, p. 254; Nowack, *Hebr. Archaeologie*, I, p. 310. Stade subsequently abandoned this view. Cp. Weinel, *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, XVIII (1898), p. 59, note 2.

6. Wellhausen, *Isr.u.Jüdische Geschichte*, p. 149; Weinel, *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, XVIII, pp. 63-5.

of Joshua could not possibly have borne such significance so long as Zerubbabel was still on the scene. Zerubbabel as a "son of oil" could only bear this title as the royal representative of Jehovah.⁷

There is no ground, then, to call in question the antiquity of the priestly anointing, or to hold that it is derived from the anointing of kings. Much, however, can be said in favor of the view that through the anointing which both kings and priests received in common, certain functions of the priesthood were communicated to the king at his accession to the kingdom. Some of the kings offered sacrifices, and this can hardly be accounted for by the prerogative alleged to have belonged to every father of a family. David danced before Jehovah girded with the priestly linen ephod on the occasion of the return of the ark of the covenant to Zion, 2 Sam. 6:14. Both David and Solomon blessed the people at the great assemblies, 2 Sam. 6:18; 1 Kings 8:14. Thus the impression is created that the kings exercised priestly functions. On the other hand, the fact that a special order of priesthood existed would indicate that priesthood and kingship were not identical offices. This is an instance where the Old Testament institutional lines had not as yet entirely converged. But that they would eventually do so seems to be rather clearly intimated by the facts cited above. And from our Lord's appropriation of the prophecy of Isaiah 61 to Himself, in which the anointing applies to the Servant of Jehovah, the most priestly of all Messianic figures (Isa. 61:1; Luke 4:18), it appears that there lay in the consciousness of Jesus a clear apprehension of this goal of convergence. The task of the Servant described in this prophecy also has far more priestly than regal coloring. Peter, in dependence upon the same prophetic word, emphasizes, as the result of the anointing, features and acts lying in the priestly sphere, Acts 4:27; 10:38.

There was still another feature for the expression of which the inclusion of the priestly office within the Messianic anointing offered an opportunity. The royal Christhood is not equally transmissible as the priestly is. For our Lord to think of Himself in terms of anointing would create room for that aspect of Mes-

7. Wellhausen, *Proleg.*, 4, pp. 127, 149 ff.; Benzinger, *Hebr. Archaeologie*, p. 407, but differently in second edition.

sianic self-communication which looms so large in the discharge of His ministry. In His argument with the scribes He quotes from the Melchizedek Psalm (Psalm 110), in which the regal and priestly dignities are united in one Person. If Jesus brought the priestly ministration among His people in connection with His anointing, this furnishes the strongest conceivable proof that a more, that a far more official motivation underlay His soteric activity than is commonly supposed. There are not two figures of Jesus in the Gospels, the one clothed with the mantle of royalty, the other bent upon the pursuit of purely humanitarian tasks; these two are one and the same. They have their common principle in the requirements imposed and the equipment conferred by His Messianic anointing.

From the thought that the Spirit anoints Jesus, and at the same time forms the gift which the anointing carries with itself, the transition seems to be easy to the representation of Jesus as "Anointer" in virtue of His being "Anointed." The passive here naturally, almost inevitably, shades off into the active. So far as the teaching of Jesus in the Gospels is concerned, there is no evidence of His having pursued this train of thought. That which He confers upon His followers is nowhere called an anointing, not even with reference to the apostles, however much the richness and the Spirit-source and the Spirit-character of the gift might have cooperated in suggesting this. Both Paul and John are familiar, however, and presuppose their readers to be familiar, with so much of this idea at least that the Christian receives an anointing *analogous* to that of Christ: "Now he that establishes us with you in Christ, and anointed us, is God," 2 Cor. 1:21. It will be observed, however, that even here it is God the Father, not Christ, who has conferred the anointing which is analogous to that conferred upon Christ. As for 1 John 2:20, 27, the exegesis depends on whether the words "the Holy One" and the pronominal forms "of him" and "in him" be understood of God or of Christ. The context plainly favors the latter interpretation. The *Chrisma* received by them and abiding in them and teaching them is from the *Christos*, and itself consists precisely of the Holy Spirit.

The same principle of the Messianic recipient communicating what He has received to His followers finds expression, though without reference to the figure of anointing, in the divine injunc-

tion given John the Baptist, John 1:33: "... he ... said unto me, Upon whomsoever thou shalt see the Spirit descending, and abiding upon him, the same is he that baptizeth in the Holy Spirit." The figure that here binds the two ideas together is that of baptizing. Perhaps it is this figure that, except in the name Christ, has almost wholly replaced that of anointing.

The careful tracing of these fugitive trains of imagery that weave themselves around the anointing enshrined in the name Christ would be rendered entirely superfluous if we could adopt the etymological hypothesis proposed by Lagarde.⁸ According to this scholar, the title Messiah is not derived from the common Aramaic *Mashichah*, but corresponds to a Nabataean *Mishshichah*, which would make it an active, intensive form, signifying "one who professionally anoints," viz., with the Spirit. Lagarde claims that on this view the *e*-sound in the first syllable of the Greek transliteration, and the duplication of the sibilant in the same, can best be accounted for. The linguistic argument, however, is not decisive, because the Greek transliteration of Semitic forms sometimes puts *e* for *a*, e.g., Jephies for Japhia (2 Sam. 5:15), and also sometimes duplicates the *s*, e.g., Jessai for Jishai. The ancient versions render the name passively: the Septuagint by *Christos*, the Vulgate by *Unctus*.

In the Old Testament the expected eschatological King nowhere appears as anointing others. This is a later idea, which is first met with in the New Testament, and even there but rarely. Besides the idea of baptizing with the Spirit, already commented upon, and a couple of passages where the reception of an anointing by the Christian occurs, there is nothing to support this interpretation; and, moreover, the entire drift of the doctrinal tradition would have to be violently deflected to make out of "the Anointed One" uniformly "the Anointer." It would involve universal misunderstanding, on the largest of scales, of the typical name and title of our Lord.

In conclusion, it may not be amiss to express a word of admiration for the theological tradition of the Church, which in

8. *Abhandlungen der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, XXXV, pp. 93-109.

defining the threefold office of Christ as that of Prophet, Priest and King has with fine instinctive feeling seized upon what is actually the innermost core of the Saviour's Messiahship. A better formula in this sphere cannot be devised. It is exhaustive and it keeps in the closest touch with the etymological import of the name.

CHAPTER IX

"The Lord"

THE name *Kyrios*, Lord, in the New Testament, aside from its occurrence in the four Gospels, is a specific designation of the exalted Saviour. Peter declares that God, through the resurrection, has made the crucified One "both Lord and Christ," Acts 2:36. According to Paul also "the name above every name," which is none other than the name *Kyrios*, was bestowed upon Jesus in reward for the obedience of His humiliation, and therefore subsequently to it, Phil. 2:9; cp. for the same connection Rom. 14:9. Obviously it is a name expressive of the Messianic sovereignty upon which our Lord entered to a new degree when He was raised from the dead, and to which He Himself refers immediately before His ascension in the words, "All authority was given unto me in heaven and on earth," Matt. 28:18.

Notwithstanding this post-resurrection origin, not a few instances occur in the Gospels where Jesus is addressed with this title, or even applies it to Himself, and apparently with a peculiar, heightened accent going beyond the ordinary form of polite address. Such manner of intercourse cannot well be imagined without supposing that it involved a consciousness and approval on Jesus' part of the unusual role in which it placed Him. Was this consciousness of the sub-Messianic kind, or did it rise to the height of the Messianic? In the latter case we may confidently expect important information in regard to the content and associations of the Messianic function in Jesus' mind.

The problem may be somewhat differently formulated by asking whether the usage of this name and title in the Gospels stands in the line or forms a solid preformation of the usage soon afterward to prevail in the early Church, or has perhaps no vital connection with the latter, so that the thought of continuity between the two would have to be given up.

In order to reach clearness in a discussion notorious for its snares and pitfalls, certain distinctions should be sharply drawn at the outset. The first of these distinctions relates to the persons who speak of Jesus as "the Lord" in the Gospels. Are these in certain instances the Evangelists as authors, or are they the actual personages within the Gospel story, whose words the Evangelists reproduce? It will make a great difference for the purpose of our inquiry whether the Evangelist says: "And when the Lord saw her, he had compassion on her," Luke 7:13; or whether the disciples are introduced as saying: "The Lord has need of him," Luke 19:34. In a case of the former kind we have, of course, nothing but an instance of the custom which generally prevailed at the time when the Gospels were written, of referring to Jesus as "the Lord." The Evangelist must have followed this custom in his daily speech, and no reason can be discovered why he should have refrained from following it in writing, even though it should have been, strictly speaking, an anachronism. For not only the Evangelist, but also the readers for whom he proximately wrote, daily so expressed themselves. Grammatically analyzed — though of course this was not consciously realized — the language used means simply this: "He, whom we now call the Lord. . ." No legitimate inference can be drawn from such a case as to either the writer's opinion or the actual facts about the names applied to Jesus during His earthly life. Even if one were to assume that the title was never applied to Jesus while on earth, it would be the height of pedantry to charge the Evangelists on that account with stylistic slovenliness, even if they had made the freest use of the title for the purpose of their narrative.

In point of fact there are but few instances in which the Gospel writers, referring to the pre-resurrection period, appear to have availed themselves of this their indisputable literary privilege. Matt. 3:3 and Mark 1:3 quote from Isaiah 40:3 (combined in Mark 1:2, 3 with Mal. 3:1) to the effect that John the Baptist went before "the Lord." It is uncertain, however, whether by "the Lord" they mean the reader to understand Jesus, or, as apparently the prophetic word intends it, Jehovah; or whether they perhaps assume the identity of Jesus as "the Lord" with God bearing the same name in the Greek version of the Old Testament.

On the second supposition even these two instances, the only ones in Matthew and Mark before the resurrection, fall away. The same uncertainty exists in regard to the word of the angel, Luke 1:17, and that of Zacharias, Luke 1:76. On the other hand, Luke himself in the text of his Gospel, as it lies before us, repeatedly speaks of "the Lord." Twelve cases of this occur: 7:13, 31; 10:1; 10:39, 41 (correct reading of the Greek text); 11:39; 12:42; 13:15; 17:6; 18:6; 19:8; 22:61. But the ancient versions seem to show that in all these Lucan passages "the Lord" may be a later substitute for "Jesus" or "He," introduced from a liturgical motive.¹ In John there are the following cases of "the Lord" in the discourse of the Evangelist relating to the period before the resurrection: 4:1; 6:23; 11:2. Nothing certain can be built on the text of the first of these references. Hort says about it: "On the whole the text of the verse can not be accepted as certainly free from doubt."² Zahn likewise feels doubtful about the text, and that partly on the ground that John does not elsewhere introduce "the Lord" in his narrative.³ The other two Johannine cases have the peculiarity that they occur in side-remarks, inserted parenthetically into the narrative by the Evangelist. One can conceive of them as marginal annotations written by the author's own hand. Consequently they should not be counted as clear evidence of what the writer made his practice in the regular, straightforward flow of his narrative.

We find, therefore, in all our Gospels a remarkable scarcity of references to Jesus as "the Lord" on the part of the Evangelists themselves. And it should be further noted that when these writers come to deal with the period after the resurrection, the same abstention is no longer observed, except by Matthew. Mark says (16:19): ". . . the Lord Jesus . . . was received up into heaven . . .," and speaks in verse 20 of "the Lord working with

1. The above view, it should be stated, is not the only possible explanation of the phenomena in Luke. According to Foerster (*Herr ist Jesus*, p. 213), the reason can be found in the destination of Luke's Gospel for Christians who were already familiar with Jesus as "the Lord." Matthew and Mark, on the other hand, being intended primarily for missionary propaganda, do not from the outset introduce a recognition of Jesus to the acceptance of which they still had to win their readers. But, apart from the critical implications, this leaves unexplained the concurrence of the ancient versions in omitting "the Lord."

2. *The New Testament in Greek*, Appendix, p. 76.

3. *Das Evangelium des Johannes*, p. 226.

them." Similarly we read in Luke 24:3: "... they ... found not the body of the Lord Jesus." And in John 20:20: "The disciples therefore were glad, when they saw the Lord." In John 21:12: "And none of the disciples durst inquire of him, Who art thou? knowing that it was the Lord." Still, even after the resurrection none of the Evangelists entirely drops the old way of speaking. On the contrary, after the resurrection as before it, they continue to employ the proper name (Jesus) and the pronoun (he, him).

The facts in regard to these phenomena of use or non-use of the title Lord now lie before us. What can we gather from them? The Evangelists evidently agree with Peter and Paul in attaching a higher and richer significance to the name *Kyrios* beginning with the resurrection. They indicate this position by their occasional employment of the name soon after that point. They do so negatively by refraining, almost entirely, from its use during the earlier period. This latter feature might possibly be explained from a special fondness for the name Jesus, so that there would be involved no real avoidance of the title *Kyrios*, but only an unintentional submergence of it. But it is doubtful whether the endearing "Jesus" had any advantage over the submission-implying "Lord." The early Christians were not so one-sidedly occupied with "the historical Jesus" as certain groups of modern Christians are. Their preoccupation in daily intercourse and prayer was rather with Christ in heaven. The exalted Christ was "the Lord" *par excellence*. Especially must this have been so with a man of the type of John, whose mind was so post-resurrection-centered as to lead him to lay stress, in his treatment of the earthly life of Jesus, on precisely those aspects of it that prefigured the glorified state. Here, then, one would *a priori* expect to find a generous use of the title "the Lord." If this does not appear, we are inclined to look for some counteracting motive. Is it implausible to find this in a sense of historical propriety on the part of the Evangelists? The writers, it seems, desired to make the very framework in which they set the picture of Jesus' life of a coloring harmonious with the picture itself. Feeling that through their literary presence, as it were, at the scenes of the Saviour's earthly life, they witnessed something differently complexioned from the glory of the exalted Christ, they refrained from introducing a title so closely connected with the latter. In this respect they evinced

a sensitiveness even greater than can be exacted from the average historian.

So much for the narrative practice of the Gospel writers. Turning now to the other member of the distinction drawn — that relating to the use of the title Lord by persons within the Gospel story — we find this giving birth to a second distinction. A difference must be recognized between the use of Lord as a mode of direct address and “the Lord” in instances where Jesus is referred to as a third person. It is evident that these two usages are sufficiently different to warrant careful discrimination. The twofold usage of the English “Sir” may illustrate this. In the common mutual address of people such as “Yes, Sir” or “No, Sir” the word has quite different associations from where some nobleman is addressed as “Sir A” or “Sir B.” We shall proceed to deal with each of these categories of usage in the Gospel record separately.

The following are the cases where Jesus is spoken of as “Lord,” “the Lord,” “my Lord,” by people in the Gospels: in Luke 1:43 Elisabeth greets Mary as “the mother of my Lord”; according to Luke 2:11 the angels speak to the shepherds of “a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord”; in three instances, each of which is recorded in all three of the Synoptics, Jesus designates Himself as “Lord”; the first of these is in the case of the controversy about the observance of the Sabbath, where He declares the Son of Man to be Lord of the Sabbath; the second occurs in the argument about the Davidic sonship of the Messiah, where Jesus proves from Psalm 110 that the Messiah is David’s Lord; the third is in connection with the entry into Jerusalem, where the disciples are instructed to say to the owners of the colt: “The Lord has need of him.”

Further, according to Mark 5:19, Jesus instructs the healed demoniac: “Go home to thy friends, and tell them how great things the Lord has done for thee.” All this belongs to the period before the resurrection. After the resurrection we have: Matt. 28:6, the words of the angels to the women: “Come and see the place where the Lord lay”; Luke 24:34, where the disciples exclaim: “The Lord is risen indeed.” Finally, Mary’s words, John 20:2: “They have taken away the Lord out of the sepulchre”;

John 20:13: "They have taken away my Lord"; and in verse 18 Mary's report to the disciples that she "had seen the Lord."⁴

In endeavoring to ascertain what these passages imply we may eliminate, as of uncertain bearing on our question, Mark 5:19, where "the Lord" may possibly refer to God. Although the man carries out Jesus' injunction to proclaim what *the Lord* has done for him by publishing what *Jesus* has done for him, this action is by no means decisive of the question of Jesus' intent or the writer's intent to identify Jesus and "the Lord." Luke, at any rate, did not so understand it (Luke 8:39). The desire of Jesus to keep in the background, which is evident in similar cases, may have here also come into play. In that case His meaning was for the man to refer the cure to God, but the man, not heeding this injunction, brought on Jesus the publicity which the latter wished to avoid. It is also somewhat strange that Jesus, on this particular occasion, and for no apparent reason, should have called Himself "the Lord." In the message to the owner of the requisitioned colt it is different, as we shall presently see.

The remaining cases cited fall into two categories. In some of them Lord appears as a formal title, in others it is used as an adjectival attribute. "Lord of the Sabbath" means, of course, nothing less than the authoritative disposer of that institution. Up to a certain point this applies also to the lordship over the colt; it expresses the right of disposal of the animal. At the same time something more is involved here, in so far as the right of disposal of the colt is connected with the fact that Jesus is recognizable to the owner as "the Lord" *in general*. Acquaintance with the designation as expressing a certain shade of recognition within a certain circle is certainly implied; otherwise it could not have served as a means of identification of the one requiring the use of the colt.⁵ But, closely looked at, even the saying about the Lord of

4. We leave out of account here the other instances where there exists doubt as to whether the title refers to Jesus or to God; cp. Luke 1:17, 28.

5. There is an exegesis of this episode which would entirely eliminate it as evidence for the recognition of the *Kyrios* character of Jesus during His walk on earth. It is based on the reading of some of the versions. *Syra Vetus* renders "its lord" both in Mark and in Luke; the Curetonian Syriac, the Ethiopian and Armenian versions have in Matthew "their lord" (the plural referring to the ass and its colt). These readings, either in the ancient versions only, or also in the Greek text which they presuppose, take "the Lord" as the lord — the literal owner — of the animal or animals. The implication is that Jesus instructed the disciples to tell

the Sabbath, while not suggesting a title, has a larger background of comprehensive sovereignty. For it will be noticed that both in Mark and in Luke it reads: "The Son of man is Lord also (or even) of the Sabbath." Jesus possesses a wide lordship over things in which many other, though less weighty, matters are included. In the other case, since Jesus was not the owner of the animal in the ordinary sense, and an extraordinary right of use is assumed, it follows that the latter cannot have been restricted to this one animal, but must also have included other things. There is but one step from the ascription of such a comprehensive ownership to the expression of this fact in a fixed designation, and for that the *Kyrios* name would have been the almost inevitable form.

Again, in the argument about the Davidic sonship of the Messiah He is placed not only as sovereign above David, but this relation is also definitely fixed through David's calling Him "my Lord." Besides, the main purport of the argument does not lie in the genealogical sphere; rather it is to vindicate for the Messiah a position of transcendental sovereignty in protest against the earth-bound idea of the scribes, which expressed itself in the other title, "Son of David." We shall not be far wrong if we paraphrase: "The Messiah, being Lord of even so high a person as David, and that after David's death, must needs be regarded as Lord universal."

Once more, when Elisabeth in her salutation to Mary names the unborn child "my Lord," this falls in no respect short of a formal Messianic title. The question might indeed arise whether it did not actually pass beyond this and anticipate, through extraordinary prophetic insight, the later *Kyrios* as a title of Deity. The other interpretation, according to which this is only a striking case of extravagantly polite Oriental salutation, as though Elisabeth, desiring to honor Mary as her mistress, had done so indirectly through the formula "mother of my Lord," hardly satis-

whoever might question them about their procedure that the man owning the animals had momentary need of their use, but would, when through with them, return them to the place of keeping. There are two objections to this interpretation. In the first place, it neglects the force of "again": "he will send them back again," which seems to imply that not the owner but some borrower would restore the animals. Secondly, this view does not sufficiently take into account how impossible it must have been for the Evangelists — to say nothing of Jesus Himself — and their translators to ascribe such a deliberate practice of deception to Jesus.

fies, because in such a case the indirectness of the greeting would have contributed nothing to its force, but rather would have detracted from it. Between cousins, moreover, such extravagance of politeness would hardly seem, even in Oriental style of address, in place. The feeling expressed by Elisabeth is not that of politeness, but of reverence, and the cause for the reverence must lie in the unborn child; and since the child was yet unborn, it could not concern the child as such, but must have to do with its destiny and dignity.

The statement of the angels to the shepherds, if the usual reading be retained as the correct text ("Christ, the Lord," not "the Lord's Christ") treats "the Lord" as a formal title entirely on a line with the title Christ, to which it is joined, unless we give to *Christos* its adjectival sense and render "the anointed Lord." But even in that case "Lord" would bear no other interpretation than that of a Messianic title. The only way to avoid acknowledgment that Jesus is here, at His very birth, technically called Lord, would lie through the altering of the text, above hinted at. If, from desire for assimilation to Luke 2:26, one should prefer to read "the Lord's Christ," then of course the word *Kyrios* would refer to God, and the passage would be eliminated from our investigation.

In the instances after the resurrection, it is plain that the angel at the tomb and the disciples use the title Lord in a high sense fraught with reverence for a new and unique dignity in Jesus. Apart from this, however, these passages are interesting, because they prove a degree of familiarity with the title through previous use. It is, of course, not inconceivable that through the event of the resurrection, overwhelming as it must have been, the title as something wholly new might have suddenly sprung to the lips of the disciples. But the angel presupposes that it is already known to the women, and Mary makes use of it before she is aware of the fact of the resurrection; but in itself it was of earlier origin. This suggests that the pre-resurrection cases above commented upon were by no means so isolated as might otherwise appear to be the case. It cannot have been an entirely exceptional thing among the disciples to speak of Jesus as "the Lord."

A few words should be devoted to the parables in which Jesus, chiefly toward the close of His ministry, speaks of a *kyrios* ("lord") or a *kyrios tes oikias* ("lord of the house") or *oikodespotes* ("house-

holder"; "master of the house") for the moment absent from his servants who keep the house for him, but expected to return in the near future. The references are: Matt. 24:45-51; 25:14-30; Mark 13:34-37; Luke 12:35-38; 41-46; 13:25-28. To these may be added the semi-parabolic speech of Matt. 10:25, where Jesus refers to Himself, in contrast with the disciples, as the *oikodespotes*. This last reference goes beyond the parables cited, for in it Jesus explicitly refers to Himself as "the master of the house," whereas in the parables the reference to Himself is left implicit. In fact, if one were to insist upon it, he might perhaps reject the reference to Jesus as due to misplaced allegorizing of the parables, confining the point of comparison to the duty of watchfulness required in both situations. This, however, would certainly be a strained interpretation. For the figure of Jesus is injected into the parables through the very idea of watchfulness being incumbent upon the disciples. The disciples are to wait for Him, not merely as others wait for a lord, but precisely *because* Jesus is "the Lord." And the expression "coming" is used with such obvious reference to the *parousia*, that an allegorical identification of the *kyrios* or *oikodespotes* with Jesus inevitably ensues. Could the disciples fail to understand this? And could they possibly have understood it otherwise than on the basis of a realization that an owner-*doulos* relationship existed between Jesus and themselves? Of course, these parables are spoken in anticipation of Jesus' future absence from the disciples. In this respect their eschatological character is quite in harmony with the eschatological setting in Matt. 7:22. But He was "the Lord" before leaving them.

Thus far the enquiry has been based entirely upon the data of the Gospels. To some extent, however, the later records furnish reminiscences of the Gospel-ministry usage. Paul's manner of speaking of the brother(s) of "the Lord," in 1 Cor. 9:5; Gal. 1:19, is most naturally taken to mean: the brother(s) of Him who was even then the Lord. The expression *Maranatha* (1 Cor. 16:22), while it does not necessarily reflect usage prior to that of the early mother-church, certainly goes back at least to the early period of the church.

From the foregoing we may properly draw the conclusion that in this mode of referring to our Lord during His lifetime on earth

there was a real anticipation of the subsequent usage. Even then He was "the Lord" to many, although they could hardly always have realized clearly what a stupendous significance was stored up in this name. It is indeed not impossible that, as a Jewish Christological term, the title "the Lord" may have been older than the Gospel history period. At any rate the testimony of the Evangelists as to its early use during the ministry of Jesus is not open to doubt. We need not suspect that there is in this a carrying back of the later custom of calling Jesus "the Lord" into the earthly life of the Saviour. As has already been shown, the Evangelists observe great restraint from injecting the title *Kyrios* into their own discourse within the Gospels, although they might have done so with entire propriety. How confidently, then, may we trust them for not making the contemporaries of Jesus speak of Him as "the Lord" unless there were sufficient grounds for believing this possible and that it actually happened.

We now turn to another class of occurrences of the word *Kyrios* in the Gospels, viz., in the form of the vocative of address, *Kyrie*. The enquiry into this gives rise to a third distinction. It related to the extent and quality of the reverence conveyed by the address — whether it can be explained on the basis of mere politeness, or reflects the specifically religious recognition of some extraordinary dignity in Jesus, either Messianic, or extending beyond this into the sphere of Deity. On the former supposition the politeness might shade into respect, and might admit of various colorings according as Jesus was regarded as a teacher or friend or in any other honorable capacity. All this, of course, would not necessarily involve overstepping the limits of ordinary human intercourse; it would not need to be regarded as specifically religious. On the other hand, if the address of Jesus as *Kyrie* partook, in any degree, of the feelings with which the later Christians invoked the heavenly Christ as "Lord," then the usage would imply the singling out of Jesus from all others. *Kyrie* does as a matter of fact occur in the Gospels as a form of polite address of man to man, and that not merely in the setting of parables, (where it must be remembered that the figure of Jesus stands in the background, and consequently no conclusive evidence is afforded as to what was possible between man and man as such; cf. Luke 14:21, 22), but also in the account of actual life, as from the Jews

to Pilate (where, however, the note of respect for authority could not be absent; cf. Matt. 27:63); from the Greeks to Philip, John 12:21; from Mary to the supposed gardener, John 20:15. The possibility cannot be denied, therefore, that the address *Kyrie* may on some occasions have been so intended with reference to Jesus. This seems to be further favored by the fact that *Kyrie*, in the Gospels, stands side by side with *Didaskale*, "Teacher," and that in certain passages where one Evangelist uses the former, another has the latter. In fact, in the Gospel of Mark there is only a single instance of the *Kyrie* address, that by the Syro-Phoenician woman; in all other cases *Didaskale* is used. In Matthew both forms of address are found, and in Luke there are the three forms, *Kyrie*, *Didaskale*, and *Epistata*.

In view of these facts it is not surprising that it has been held by some that the address *Kyrie*, in the case of Jesus, had no other meaning than when addressed to others, except possibly varying in the degree of respect conveyed, as it would indeed vary in all instances of its use, but not implying any singling out of Jesus as in any sense unique over against all other men. According to this view, the usage of *Kyrie* implies nothing as to the estimate — Messianic or otherwise — placed upon Jesus by His followers. According to this view, the *Kyrie* address in the Gospels has no connection whatever with the supreme *Kyrios* title later given to Jesus by the early Church.

According to a different view, the Evangelists have in all these instances of the *Kyrie* address naively carried back into the lifetime of Jesus the practice of the early Church; they make the people in the Gospels speak as the Christians of their own time were accustomed to pray. On this view of the matter we may learn from the Gospels much in regard to what the *Kyrie* address implied to the mind of the early Church, but we can learn nothing whatever as to what it meant to the contemporaries of Jesus, if indeed it was used at all by them. On this view, the instances of the *Kyrie* address in the Gospels, instead of being an anticipation of the later use, would be merely the later use itself anachronistically thrown back into the earlier period.

Neither of these two views appears plausible. To the second we may oppose the simple observation that such a supposition is entirely out of keeping with what we have so far learned con-

cerning the literary habits of the Evangelists. If they were extremely careful to avoid the title "the Lord" in the framework of the narrative, and if, moreover, they resisted the temptation to multiply instances of it upon the lips of the Gospel characters, then it becomes hard to believe that they should have scattered this *vocative Kyrie* broadcast over the surface of their writings, forgetting that it would inevitably be understood in the highest sense, as conveying practically nothing short of the Deity of the Saviour.

But the first view, which finds in all the instances of *Kyrie* merely an expression of politeness, likewise lies open to objection. *Kyrie* does not seem to appear indiscriminately in the speech of all such persons as might be expected to observe the rules of politeness toward Jesus. It is, as a matter of fact, in Matthew and Mark (though not consistently in Luke) restricted to just two classes of speakers: (a) the disciples; and (b) those appealing for supernatural help. Where the approach to Jesus is of a purely disinterested nature, or even from an unfriendly quarter, the formula of address is not *Kyrie* but something else. The following instances are instructive on this point: according to Matt. 26:49, Judas, the traitor, hails Jesus with "Rabbi," in keeping with his not being a true disciple; in Matt. 8:19, the scribe says to Jesus: "Teacher (*Didaskale*), I will follow thee . . ."; and then the Evangelist continues (verse 21): "And another of his disciples said to him, Lord (*Kyrie*). . . ." According to Matt. 26:22, 25, at the supper the true disciples say: "Lord (*Kyrie*), is it I?" but Judas says: "Teacher (*Didaskale*), is it I?"

It is plain, then, that the Gospel writers were guided in this matter by the principle that the address *Kyrie* would have been less fitting in the mouth of certain people. Positively, this implies that to their feeling *Kyrie* expresses something beyond ordinary polite address. There was in it an admixture of religiously colored reverence. This may be inferred from its frequent emergence in precisely those two connections — that of true discipleship, and that of quest for supernatural help. For in those two classes the differentiating feature, as compared with others, lies in the affinity of their state of mind to that of religion.

The question may be raised, however, as to whether the Evangelists, in feeling this affinity, still remained conscious of a per-

ceptible difference between the state of mind reflected in the Gospel events and the full recognition of Deity, with its implication of religious worship, carried by the *Kyrie* address in their own time. We have already concluded that they did feel such a difference between the *Ho Kyrios* of Gospel history times and that of their own time, and felt it to a sufficient degree to make them, as a rule, avoid the title in their own narrative. Perhaps they were likely to feel this difference less in the case of the vocative form *Kyrie*. The practical Christology of the direct intercourse with Jesus would, in filling the word with high content, be apt to keep a step in advance of the more reflective process. It is possible that they may have felt in the *Kyrie* on the lips of the Gospel characters the whole rich meaning of *Kyrie* as used by themselves in prayer, and have rightly done so. One certainly gets the impression from reading the Gospels that Jesus is accosted and treated in them as more than a man. On the other hand, the instances of address by means of *Kyrie* recorded by the Evangelists do not seem to have given them occasion to continue the thread of their narrative with an immediately subjoined, "And the Lord Jesus. . . ." True, there do occur a few such cases in Luke (10:41, ARV; 12:42; 19:8a), but these occur in the passages where the ancient versions render the presence of *Ho Kyrios* in the original text doubtful.

Of course, it must remain difficult to determine the precise shade and degree of religious reverence present in each separate situation. Being in a formative state, the address *Kyrie* was not as yet a fixed quantity. It remained flexible and suited to various states of mind. In this, as we take it, lies the main difference between the *Kyrie* address in the Gospels and the later use of the same form in the early Church. The latter had become absolutely fixed, because every element of relativity is necessarily excluded from a concept which implies Deity. Soon the *Ho Kyrios* and *Kyrie* were felt as identical in religious import, when applied to Christ and to God. Hence the difficulty in certain passages of deciding whether Christ or God is referred to. The *Kyrios* title became a sign of transference of the nature of Deity to Christ.

As is true of all imponderables, the determination of how much or how little may have been expressed on any given occasion will necessarily remain subject to the individual exegete's personal

judgment. There can be no reasonable doubt that in an exclamation like that of Peter in Luke 5:8, "Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord," the maximum of realization of the specifically divine import of the title has been reached, as is also indicated clearly by the accompanying statement: "Simon Peter . . . fell down at Jesus' knees. . . ." The same applies to the words of Thomas in John 20:28: "My Lord and my God," although these, dating from after the resurrection, have no convincing force for the earlier period. The clearest instance of identity with the later usage is found in the words of Jesus Himself in Matt. 7:21, where false disciples are represented as addressing Jesus, in the day of judgment, after this fashion: "Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name. . . ." A use of the name "Lord" for prophesying and performing miracles, such as is here assumed, presupposes the well-developed, superhuman, religious significance of the title, and is formally indistinguishable from the use to which the title "Lord" was actually put in the later Church. True, the statement is in the future tense, containing a prophecy. Yet it remains significant that Jesus, in a statement of this kind, could refer in such a matter-of-fact way to a future practice as destined to be in general use. In order to find this intelligible we must assume that at least a point of contact for that peculiar use of the term *Kyrie* must already have existed at the time of speaking. On the other hand, it is not capable of proof that in each and every case where a sick person addressed Jesus, the title *Kyrie* which was used rose to the same high level of virtual recognition of His Deity. But even in such cases it seems never to have been a mere formula of polite address. An instructive comparison may be drawn with regard to the flexibility of the title "Son of God." This title also is in some cases proximately a designation of the Messianic office, and yet on other occasions it bursts these limits and becomes expressive of a judgment on the superhuman nature of Jesus which is tantamount to a confession of His Deity. Of this more anon.

The ground taken in the foregoing represents a middle position between (a) the theory of absolute equation of the earlier and the later *Kyrie*, and (b) that of an absolute difference between the mere politeness-usage in the lifetime of Jesus and the worship-usage in the early Church. Those who affirm the equation with

the understanding of its being an anachronism, and as not reflecting what was actual or possible during Jesus' life on earth, are to our mind mistaken in both respects. But their mistake on the first point is only a partial one, and the possibility of it is, to our point of view, of great significance and value. That the assertion of complete identity can be made at all proves how much there must actually be in the Gospels that puts the matter far beyond the pale of what is explainable from mere politeness.

The charge of anachronism against the procedure of the Evangelists may seem to derive some support from the observation that Mark, with one exception, avails himself of *Didaskale* or *Rabbi*, and that Matthew, Luke and John not only by the side of this employ *Kyrie*, but also put *Kyrie* in passages where Mark has the other, teacher-term. Does not this look as if the later Evangelists had confounded the role of a *Rabbi* actually discharged by Jesus with the role of a recipient of worship subsequently assigned to Him? How can the *Didaskale* of Mark and the *Kyrie* of Matthew, with the high note of the latter, both be correct for the same occasion? To put it concretely: when Peter at the Transfiguration says, according to Mark: "Teacher (*Rabbi*), it is good for us to be here," and Matthew introduces the same saying by *Kyrie*, has not Matthew unlawfully raised the meaning? It would be a mistake, however, to explain the use of the teacher-terms by Mark on the theory that to this Evangelist Jesus' work was essentially that of a teacher. The entire tenor of Mark's Gospel excludes such an idea. There existed no inducement for him to lower the sense. If one had to choose between the alternatives, the suspicion of incorrectness would fall rather on Matthew. But perhaps the problem may be solved in another way. We must remember that in *Kyrie* and *Didaskale* we are not dealing with the ultimate realities of the speech of Jesus and the people who addressed Him, but with Greek translations from the Aramaic. In the case of non-parallel passages, where the terms used differ, one might assume that in each case a different Aramaic original underlay the Greek rendering. This would eliminate the divergence to some extent. As to the case of parallel passages using variant terms, the question must be put whether there did not perhaps exist an Aramaic word elastic enough in meaning to suit equally well the higher and the lower connotation.

Now the word *Rab*, in its usual form *Rabbi*, seems to meet this requirement. In order to perceive this, it will be necessary first to remove a current misunderstanding in regard to the range of meaning of which this word was capable. We feel *Rabbi* as an exclusively scholastic term of respect. If it had possessed this character to the same extent in the time of Jesus, then Mark's rendering by *Didaskale* would have been the only allowable one. But as a matter of fact, *Rabbi* had in Gospel times no such restricted meaning. It was used in a great variety of applications, in all of which the ideas of obedience and submission stood in the foreground to a far greater extent than in the average relation between a modern pupil and teacher. Hence even in the teacher-use of the term there was given a broader basis for a religiously colored meaning than appears on the surface. Besides this, as we are reminded by Dalman, the word had a high reach of meaning outside of such relations. By the Samaritans *Rab* was even used in address to God. *Rabban*, an intensive form of *Rab*, had as wide a range of application. Both terms, then, were "more than ordinarily reverential forms of address," whose import would by no means in every case be exhausted by the Greek *Didaskale*. "Ruler" would be the approximately correct rendering. An analogy is furnished by the Latin *Magister*, which likewise etymologically, and therefore originally, designates superiors of various kinds, but now has become restricted largely to the sphere of teaching, except in such words as "magistrate," where the original general sense still survives. In the same way the etymology of *Rab* secured for the word a great flexibility of meaning. *Rab* means literally "great one." If we may assume that this was still being felt in the days of Jesus, then the disciples may well have associated with their address of Jesus as *Rabbi* a deeper reverence than the average scribal pupil would express by addressing his teacher as *Rabbi*, or than the non-disciple might put into it when approaching Jesus. The uniqueness of even the teacher-dignity of Jesus, and the admixture of religious reverence evoked by it, are recognizable in the saying of Matt. 23:8, "But be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your teacher, and all ye are brethren." This uniqueness is no less than that of the religious fatherhood, when predicated of God, for Jesus adds: "And call no man your father on the earth: for one is your Father, even he who is in heaven" (Matt. 23:9). It

is not excluded, then, that *Kyrie* in Matthew and *Didaskale* in Mark may be but two different renderings, involving a somewhat different distribution of emphasis, of a common Aramaic term which warranted either emphasis, and associating with each the fundamental ingredient of a peculiar reverence.

Besides the recurrence upon *Rab*, that upon the word *Mar* must be reckoned with as a possibility. *Mari*, *Maran* are the renderings of the *Kyrios* forms in the Syriac versions of the Gospels. *Mari* perhaps comes nearer to the appellative force of *Kyrios* in secular usage. The latter prevailingly seems to designate "owner," not merely "superior," and in *Mari* this note is most distinct; compare Foerster, *Herr ist Jesus*, p. 210. Still, this does not eliminate *Mari* from the sphere of polite address in which it appears coordinated with *Rabbi*. As for controversial bearing, the main fact to be noted is that we have in the Gospels no instances of transliteration of *Mari* as we have of *Rabbi* (but compare Paul's use of *Maranatha*, 1 Cor. 16:22). But indirectly it is easy to see that a synonymous term used in the same connection must have been meant to render another, somewhat differently colored, term and that this other term was *Mari* (compare Matt. 10:24; John 13:13).

Bousset (see below) has objected to the derivation of *Kyrios* and *Kyrie* from these Aramaic forms, that the Greek word ought in that case to carry a suffix, which the Aramaic never omits. That his observation is correct for the Aramaic may be seen from *Maranatha* (1 Cor. 16:22). Paul's use of this is not, of course, absolutely decisive for his having borrowed it from the mother-church. And even if it were, this would afford no proof of its derivation from pre-resurrection usage. Bousset might urge that it arose in the pre-Pauline Hellenistic church, say, the church of Antioch, where the large Syrian element might account for its origin. As to the loss of the suffix in *Kyrios*, *Kyrie*, this must have been due to the word's passing over from Aramaic to Greek speech. The retention of a suffix in connection with *Kyrios* or *Kyrie*, especially with the latter, must have been uncongenial to ordinary Greek idiom. The absence of the suffix in the Greek usage therefore affords no proof for the non-derivation of the term from an Aramaic circle. Paul has side by side the absolute *Ho Kyrios* and the suffixed forms "our Lord," "their Lord." Mary

speaks of "my Lord," John 20:13, and Thomas exclaims: "My Lord and my God," John 20:28. The expansive universalistic force soon acquired by *Kyrios* in the mother-church may also have had something to do with the tendency to dispense with the suffix.

The Lukan *Epistata* seems to be an effort to bring out more clearly the authoritative note in the conception. *Epistates* means "one who is placed over, a superior." The "Master" of our English Bible similarly stresses the attitude of reverence. The King James Version and the English Revised Version both have this "Master" for the Greek *Didaskale*, which may have been meant as an approach to the conception of lordship inherent in the situation, but more probably takes "Master" in the sense of "Teacher." This procedure seems preferable to that of the American Revision (1901), which puts "Teacher" for *Didaskale* everywhere, and reserves "Master" for the Lukan *Epistata*. The rendering "Master" is felicitous on account of its enabling one to feel in the word both elements, that of a pupil's reverence for his unique teacher, and that of a generally religious reverence for his Saviour. In many a mind the two attitudes must not merely have come to meet each other, but must actually have become so closely interwoven as to be practically inseparable. In the later days when the meaning of *Kyrios* had been more definitely fixed, this was no longer possible with the same ease. The concept of lordship in the sense of divine authority and ownership, while by no means excluding the other element, yet has forced it into the background and to a certain degree superseded it.

We conclude, then, that the *Kyrie* address of the time of Jesus' walk on earth is a real precursor of the standard designation of the Saviour from the Apostolic age onwards until the present time. It recognizes His Messianic character and, at times at least, His divine nature and dignity as reflected in His Messiahship. The facts mark one of the lines of internal connection between the religion cultivated by Jesus in His followers and the Christian religion in the normal, historic sense of a later day. The position He has now held for so many ages is not at variance with, but is the legitimate outcome of, the position He held and encouraged people to ascribe to Him in His ministry on earth. Nor is this exclusively based on an investigation of the word-forms in question; it underlies as a broad foundation the general structure of

the relation of the disciples to Jesus in the record. A large group of phenomena revealing to us an altogether unique sense of absolute obligatoriness and appurtenance on the part of His followers — not only tolerated by Jesus, but accepted by Him as self-understood — receives its summing-up and illuminating background from this Lordship. In this respect it even exceeds in explanatory force the title Christ, not as though the latter fell short of it in content and implications, but because the historical circumstances prevented the same practical use in its case. The absolute things asked of the disciples, the unqualified duty to follow — to forsake all others for Jesus' sake, including even the dearest of earthly relationships; the rule that whatever is done to others shall be measured in its value as what is done to Him — all this demands for its ultimate ground His unique Lordship as recognized even at that time.

The presence of one stable element from beginning to end marks the continuity in the history of the conception. This is the element of authoritative ownership. Whether, in the Gospels, we may add to this the idea of ownership and authority *resting on antecedently acquired rights* — as undoubtedly we must in Paul — is not clear. The words *Kyrios* and *Despotes* are both applied to Jesus in His relation to His followers, the latter indirectly in the parables. Usually, in common Greek usage, the difference between the two is that *Despotes* puts the relation on the ground of pure sovereignty of fact, not to be inquired into further as to its reason. Whatever is taught in the Gospels of the mystical element which enters into the nature of communion with Jesus, has no special association with the *kyriotes*. This does not hold true of Paul to the same extent. The Apostle, to be sure, likewise calls Jesus *Kyrios* where submission, ownership, obligation, come under consideration. 2 Cor. 3:17, however, shows that *Kyrios* could enter into the closest union with the Spirit-aspect of the Christian life. But on the whole, where the redemptive basis of the believer's status and his mystical union with the Saviour are spoken of, Paul by preference seems to employ "Jesus Christ" or "Christ Jesus," to which again "our Lord" easily attaches itself, indicating that the servanthip and appurtenance are rooted in what Jesus has done and purchased for the believer.⁶

6. Foerster, *Herr ist Jesus*, pp. 179-191.

Since the year 1913 a lively and penetrating controversy has been carried on in theological circles concerning the origin and role played in the development of early Christianity by the *Kyrios* title. Bousset set the ball rolling with his epoch-making book, *Kyrios Christos* (1913, second edition 1921). For the main problem of his construction he had had precursors in Heitmüller and Böhlig, the titles of whose discussions are given in the list of literature subjoined beneath.⁷ Bousset's view on *Kyrios* is laid by him at the basis of a sweeping revision of the historical development of early Christianity. In view of its largeness of conception and thoroughness of treatment, admiration cannot be withheld from this work. Despite this, however, it has failed to withstand the attack of criticism launched against it from the side of the liberals themselves. Bousset's three main propositions are as follows:

(a) Jesus never bore the title *Kyrios* either during His lifetime or in the circle of the Jerusalem mother-church.

(b) In the pre-Pauline Hellenistic church, particularly at Antioch in Syria, *Kyrios* was the prevalent designation He received as the object of the Christian cult, *Kyrios* being the common title of the cult-god in the pagan religions of that region and elsewhere at that time.

(c) Paul adopted this name into his Christology, but not without greatly modifying its significance under the influence of his

7. About a decade earlier, and outside of the controversy, stands: Sven Herner, *Die Anwendung des Wortes Kyrios im N. T.*, 1903; within it stand the following: Heitmüller, *Zum Problem Jesus und Paulus*, 1912. *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1912; also. *Jesus und Paulus*, in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1915, Böhlig, *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos*, 1913; Bousset, *Der Gebrauch des Kyrios-Titels als Kriterium für die Quellenscheidung in der ersten Hälfte der Apostelgeschichte* in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1914; Wernle, *Jesus und Paulus, Antithesen zu Bousset's Kyrios Christos*, in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1915; Köhler, *Der Kyrios Christos in den Evangelien und der Spruch vom Herrn-Herrn-Sagen*, in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1915; Althaus, *Unser Herr Jesus*, in *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1915; Bousset, *Nachträge und Auseinandersetzungen zum Kyrios Christos*, 1916; Vos, *The Kyrios-Christos Controversy*, in *The Princeton Theological Review*, 1915 and 1917; Morgan, *The Religion and Theology of St. Paul*, 1917; Andrews, *The Title Kyrios as Applied to Jesus*, in *The Expositor*, Series VIII, Vol. XV; Scott, *Dominus Noster: A Study in the Progressive Recognition of Jesus Christ, our Lord*, 1918; Junker, *Jesus der Herr*, in *Zeit- und Streitfragen des Glaubens*, vol. XIV, 1920; Machen, *The Origin of Paul's Religion*, 1921; Foerster, *Herr ist Jesus*, in *Neutestamentliche Forschungen*, herausgegeben von Dr. Otto Schmitz, 2te Reihe, I, 1924.

Pneuma (Spirit) concept; to Paul, *Kyrios* is the equivalent of *Pneuma*.

The cult-limit within which this title was confined thus became enlarged; through its equation with *Pneuma*, *Kyrios* became incorporated into the dualistic-pessimistic-supernaturalistic, in part magical, scheme of the Apostle's theology.

The chief motive underlying this whole construction is not difficult to discern. Although proceeding with apparent objectivity, Bousset does not conceal the fact that his real purpose is to sever the Pauline form of Christianity, with its deification and worship of Jesus, wherein according to him lies the source of the traditional orthodoxy of the Church, from the historical reality of the life of Jesus, in which the latter figured to Himself and His followers as a mere man. He even excludes the *Kyrios* designation from the Christological vocabulary of the Jerusalem mother-church, where, he holds, Jesus' specific title was "Son of Man." This, however, is not inferred from the Book of Acts, but from the Gospels, its occurrence there being taken as indicative of what the circles in which the Gospel tradition originated were accustomed to.

The principal points to be criticized in this hypothesis are:

1. The identification of the *Kyrios* title with cult-practice, even in the pagan religions of Syria and Egypt or the Hermetic circle or Gnosticism, is not borne out by the evidence. Though in much use, *Kyrios* had in all of these environments a far wider range than merely that of a cult-deity. It is important to note this, because the act of borrowing the title on the part of Hellenistic Christians becomes harder to explain than if it had been a simple matter of cult-address. As a prevalent embodiment of paganism in general the reference to Jesus as *Kyrios* would have been more offensive to the Christian consciousness than in the other case of its narrower significance.

2. The character of this middle stage between the mother Church and Pauline Christianity remains too much a mere postulate, and too indefinite, to make such weighty use of it in so momentous a construction.

3. Bousset fails to do justice to the facts as recorded in the Acts and in the Gospels. Passages running athwart his view he is overready to suspect on the flimsiest of critical grounds. By his

method he rules out practically all of the material surveyed above as evidence of a germinating *Kyrios* usage in Gospel ministry times, and as evidence of a further developed usage in the mother church after the resurrection. Owing to this he has an inadequate appreciation of the actual content of the *Kyrios-doulos* relationship as revealed to us in the sources.

4. Though quite willing to use the Gospels as means of reconstructing the hypothetical belief of the mother church, Bousset neglects what they have to teach us as bearing upon the consciousness of Jesus Himself. As shown above, the background of the parables of our Lord with their *Kyrios* and *oikodespotes* — and that, too, in a specifically eschatological connection, assuming the return of the speaker in the quality of *Kyrios* — cannot be so simply set aside. If any confidence is to be placed in the general tenor of the Gospels, the disciples' attitude toward Jesus must have gone far beyond pupils' respect for a teacher.

5. On the other hand, Bousset builds too much on the informing power of the Gospels, when he considers them able to teach us by indirection what was the prevailing Christological name in use in the early Jerusalem church. The Gospels not only could not be expected to teach that that name was Son of Man, but they positively exclude this by confining all of the Son of Man references to the discourses of Jesus Himself. Had the Christian mind out of which the Gospels were born been so accustomed to naming Jesus the Son of Man, then this title would inevitably have been put into the mouth of other speakers in the Gospels in the form of statements about Jesus.

6. As regards Paul, Bousset makes too much of the equation of *Kyrios* with *Pneuma*. This does indeed represent a real and important strand in the Pauline teaching, but the attempt to make it the main thing betrays Bousset's desire to separate unduly the primitive Christian belief from the Pauline faith, so as to create a need for an intermediate stage.

7. The chief cause of Bousset's inadequate treatment of the Gospels and his summary dismissal of their evidence in the matter at issue lies in his attitude toward the Messianic consciousness. While not denying its historicity outright, he yet regards it as having been for Jesus a mere matter of form. Believing this, he

could hardly be expected to regard the Messianic consciousness as the starting point from which so profound a relationship as that connoted by the *Kyrios-doulos* formula would be likely to develop. One bearing the Messianic consciousness as a burden, as Bousset assumes to have been the case with Jesus, would not be apt to cultivate a sense for His own Lordship in the disciples.

CHAPTER X

The Son of God

THE title Son of God opens up to us a new perspective from which to view the Messiahship. The titles we have so far considered describe mainly the manward relations of the Messianic office. But in regard to the title Son of God the direction of our vision is reversed: we consider here primarily the relation of God to the Messiah, and of the Messiah to God. Through this change in point of view the subject becomes richer, but also more difficult and mysterious. Moreover precisely here lie those lines of revelation which connect the soteric function and work of Jesus with the great transcendental verities of our faith concerning Him. Here we see the Messiahship, though existing in time, yet solidly resting upon the eternal things of the Godhead. Here the profoundest Christology of the New Testament shows its ultimate roots. And from this source there falls much clarifying light even on the human relationships which we have hitherto considered.

The sense of the title Son of God has by no means been an inflexible or unchanging one throughout the ages of its Scriptural usage. Various meanings have been and can properly be distinguished. Without prejudging anything, simply for the purpose of introducing clearness into the Biblico-theological discussion, it seems best to give at the outset a brief definition of the several aspects of the meaning around which in modern times the debate has revolved. It will be in place afterwards, when the exegetical enquiry has been completed, to state, by way of summing up, what Biblical evidence there is for each of these uses, and how in their import and genesis they hang together. The name Son of God has been used in four senses, as follows:

1. The purely moral and religious sense, in which it may be translated by "child of God."
2. The official or Messianic sense in which it describes not essential nature but office; as the heir and representative of God

the Messiah could bear the title of Son of God without explicit reflection upon His nature; in this official sense God declared to David that not only his Messianic descendant, but also the earlier kings of his line, would be sons to Him.

3. The nativistic sense; the origin of the Messiah's human nature is ascribed to the direct, supernatural paternity of God; thus in Luke 1 most explicitly, but also in Matt. 1 and John 1:13.

4. The Trinitarian sense, which affirms the sonship as existing in eternity before the world was, as something not merely antedating but absolutely transcending His human life and His official calling as Messiah.¹

These then are the terms and conceptions that will enter into our discussion. By practically unanimous consent, all four of these occur in connection with Jesus, if the New Testament teaching be taken as a whole. But we are discussing the consciousness of Jesus Himself, and can therefore deal only with those aspects of the divine sonship to which our Lord has made reference, or on which He has dwelt in His teaching. That might leave out of account the nativistic sonship, of which we learn only from the statements of the inspired writers of the Gospels. Yet, since this nativistic sonship is most intimately interwoven with and adjusted to other relationships, we propose to include it in our survey of the facts. The presence of the three other aspects of divine sonship, not only in the New Testament, but in the very words of Jesus, can be demonstrated.

However this is, when specifically related to the mind of Jesus, by no means a matter of agreement among all parties. The old "liberal tradition," so long as it reckoned with the Messianic consciousness as a factor in the life of Jesus, ruled out the trinitarian and nativistic aspects from Jesus' mind, and retained historical belief only in the official-Messianic and the ethico-religious senses. And even these two have been reduced to one, since the wave of skepticism in regard to all Messianic claims of Jesus has swept the official-Messianic interpretation of the term by Jesus Himself away. Nothing would remain, then, except this single

1. Because of the role played in it by the Spirit, the nativistic sonship is sometimes called the pneumatic sonship, e.g., by Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte* (3rd ed.), I, p. 181; but it may be remarked against this that the Spirit equally plays a part in the official Messianic sonship, according to the account of the baptism of Jesus; compare Kattenbusch, *Das Apostolische Symbol*, II, p. 577.

belief that Jesus called Himself a "child of God," in a somewhat heightened sense, it is true, but still in a sense not principally different from that in which He desired His disciples to apply the name and its implications to themselves.

In entering upon the scrutiny of the material, it might seem that for the sake of cogency we ought to confine ourselves strictly to deliverances and avowals of Jesus Himself, because these alone cast light upon the consciousness of Messiahship within Him. A moment's reflection, however, will show that this is impossible, because considerable force resides in what lets Himself be told without gainsaying, or allows people to say about Him in His hearing, or even, on occasion, solicits by way of avowal or confession from others. These factors are certainly not without weight, though of course they do not possess the full importance of our Lord's own direct declarations.

Further, a distinction will be made between the Synoptical and the Johannine evidence, not because we consider the latter as unreliable from an historical point of view, but because in John a certain terminology appears, peculiar to this Gospel, and yet to some extent deepening the other designations common to the four Gospels.

We begin with a discussion of the instances in which, according to the Synoptical record, Jesus represents Himself as the Son of God. The passages are: Matt. 11:27 (Luke 10:22); Matt. 17:24-27; 21:37, 38 (Mark 12:6; Luke 20:13); Matt. 22:41-46 (Mark 12:35-37; Luke 20:41-44); Matt. 24:36 ARV (Mark 13:32); Matt. 28:19. Besides these there are fifteen passages in Matthew in which Jesus speaks of God as "my Father": 7:21; 10:32, 33; 11:27; 12:50; 15:13; 16:17; 18:10, 14, 19, 35; 20:23; 25:34; 26:29, 39, 42, 53. In Luke's Gospel there are three instances of this: 2:49; 22:29; 24:49. In Mark none occur.

Matt. 11:27 (Luke 10:22) is by far the most important seat of the testimony which Jesus bears to His sonship. In fact, it marks the culminating point of our Lord's self-disclosure in the Synoptics. The Christology is so high as to call forth the comment

that the words have a pronounced Johannine sound.² Fortunately it is not found in Matthew alone, but also in Luke, so that the advocates of the two-document hypothesis cannot deny its ap-
 purtenance to the Logia-source. Here, then, we have something in the supposedly most ancient source of the sayings of Jesus higher than which there is no statement in the Fourth Gospel. None the less — perhaps it would be better to say, by very reason of this — attempts have been made to deny the authenticity of the words as a statement of Jesus, particularly on account of their containing reminiscences of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Sirach, and further on account of close resemblance to Paul's language in First Corinthians. Pfleiderer and Brandt contend that the passage is a later production on the basis of the Pauline theology, clothing itself in the language of the Old Testament writings named. The prophetic references are the following: Isa. 14:3; 28:12; 40:1, 2; Jer. 6:16; 31:2, 25. In Paul the verses referred to are: 1 Cor. 1:19, 20, 22-28; 2:1-6, 7, 8-10; 3:1.

That there are reminiscences of the passages cited from Isaiah and Jeremiah may readily be granted. This is quite in accord with the saturation of our Lord's mind with the substance and language of the Old Testament. Moreover, it is favored by the observation that direct, conscious quotations from that source are particularly in evidence in the supreme crises of our Lord's career, such as the temptation and the crucifixion. If not a crisis, certainly at any rate a high point in His Messianic career was reached when He uttered the words under consideration; note verse 21 in Luke: "He rejoiced in the Holy Spirit and said. . . ." That the statements "I will give you rest" and "Ye shall find rest for your souls" (verses 26 and 29 in Matthew) are verbally derived from Jeremiah, admits of no doubt. Dependence of Matt. 11:28 on Isa. 40:1 is also more than plausible. As for the points of resemblance to First Corinthians, it is clear that no priority can be claimed for the Pauline statements as over against the words of Jesus. Nor is it on the contrary necessary to think of Paul as here quoting Jesus or writing from unconscious reminiscence of His discourse. The similarities are such as might naturally be expected from the pur-

2. Harnack, *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, pp. 210, 211. It is safe to say that if the contents of the Gospels had come down to us in the form of a Gospel harmony, and the separate Gospels were lost, few critics would have hesitated to assign Matt. 11:25-30 and Luke 10:21, 22 to the Johannine material.

suit of an identical trend of thought (the predestinarian principle as favoring the simple-minded and ignorant) by two independent minds.³

The alleged more thoroughgoing correspondence to Sirach requires a somewhat fuller discussion. The section of Sirach to which the utterance is traced consists of 51:1-30. The identity of thought and structure is found in the following points: (a) The ascription of praise to God at the beginning as in both Matthew and Luke. (b) The praise of Wisdom from verse 13 onward is supposed to Jesus' exalted self-description in the middle of the Gospel passages. (c) The invitation of the ignorant ones, Sir. 51:23-30, is compared to that found in Matt. 11:28-30 (absent from Luke).

There can be, of course, no *a priori* objection to reminiscence, or even structural reproduction, in the mind of Jesus, from a book like Sirach. The question is, whether the similarities pointed out are such as to render a conclusion to that effect unavoidable. A brief review of the facts will leave this in serious doubt. Especially will doubt seem in place, if instead of thinking of an influence through memory upon the mind of Jesus, we should assume that the whole passage as found in the Gospels is a later composition with which Jesus had nothing to do, produced after His death by some unknown contributor or manipulator of the Gospel tradition. For in that case the freedom exercised in the construction of it could not help making the similarities seem far greater than they actually are. The introductions to the two passages have no more in common than the general note of praise, and the invocation of God by the titles Lord and Father. These features are by no means rare in the Old Testament, so that the reminiscence need not be a reminiscence on the part of one author from the other, but both may well have drawn from that common source, which would leave the attribution of the discourse to Jesus above question from a literary point of view. Moreover Sirach praises God as King, a form of address not occurring in the Gospel passage. Jesus speaks of the "Father, Lord of heaven and earth." But even weaker than this claim as to the opening invocation is the assertion of dependence as regards the

3. On the relation between our passage and Paul, compare Harnack, *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 210, note 1.

middle section, which is in each case the main body of the discourse. Here Wisdom and Jesus are alleged to speak closely corresponding words. That Jesus could be and actually was identified with the Wisdom of the Old Testament is inferred from Matt. 23:34-36 (Luke 11:49-51).⁴ But it is fatal to the argument built on this that Jesus in His monologue makes no reference whatever to Wisdom; the concept around which His thought revolves is that of revelation, knowledge, fatherhood, sonship in relation to knowledge. Particularly, the core of Jesus' utterance (verse 27 in Matthew, 22 in Luke) remains entirely untouched by the thought in Sirach.

Finally, as concerns the invitation which, formally considered, is the same in both contexts (Sirach and Matthew), this is a form of appeal not uncommon in the Wisdom literature of the Old Testament. The most striking words of the invitation are derived, as above remarked, not from Sirach but from Jeremiah. Much — far too much — has been made of the rhythmical structure of Jesus' discourse at this particular point, as though this in itself indicated derivation, on the ground of such not being characteristic of the discourse attributed to Jesus elsewhere in the Gospels. It has been held to resemble the style of psalmody, and this feature has been alleged to constitute additional corroboration of the idea that the passage is an imitation of the Sirachian Psalm. But both Evangelists derive what there is of this character from the mood of exaltation in which the utterance was made by Jesus, and explain this mood from the definite historical situation in which He found Himself (Matthew, verse 25; Luke, 21). And apart from this, our Lord's discourse in the Gospels not seldom rises to the plane of semi-poetical rhythm; especially the Sermon on the Mount and the eschatological sections afford examples of this. Finally, as Harnack has pointedly observed, in a freely

4. The assumption that a later writer might have attributed to Jesus the words of Sirach's Wisdom rests on the basis of Luke 11:49-51, putting into the mouth of Wisdom words uttered by Jesus according to Matt. 23:34-36. It is not necessary to find in the passage of Luke the identification of the hypothetical Wisdom with Jesus on the part of the Evangelist. Perhaps he merely represents Jesus as quoting the words of Wisdom (not Sirach). Whether in that case "Wisdom" refers to some lost book, or stands for divine providence, need not be decided here; compare Plummer's Commentary *ad locum*. In no wise does the passage furnish a strict analogy for the assumed borrowing by an early Christian of an extended discourse from Sirach and putting it into the mouth of Jesus, simply because the latter could be identified with "Wisdom."

composed Christian poem the phrase "these things" (Matthew, verse 25; Luke, 21), so closely connecting the passage with the preceding context, would scarcely have been introduced.⁵

After these preliminary remarks on the question of derivation we may now proceed to examine the content of the saying of Jesus, more particularly the content of that part of it which is of immediate importance for our purpose, namely, its Christological center. While Matthew introduces the deliverance in a somewhat indefinite way, placing it after Jesus' rebuke of the unbelieving cities, Luke brings the words into connection with the return of the seventy from their mission. But with Matthew likewise the words appear as having been spoken in view of the twofold outcome of the preaching of the gospel of the Kingdom, rejected by the wise and understanding, but embraced by the ignorant plain people. Jesus rejoices about this in the Spirit, and thanks the Father, Lord of heaven and earth, for having in His sovereignty so ordained it. From the one class it has been hidden, to the other class it has been revealed. The object of this hiding and revealing is "these things," a phrase receiving its reference from the situation out of which Jesus speaks. It relates to the message preached by Jesus Himself or by the disciples. This reference is required not only by the nature of the verb "revealed," but also by the contrast drawn between the wise and understanding, on the one hand, and the babes, on the other — a contrast lying within the sphere of knowledge.⁶ Verse 27 in Matthew (22 in Luke) differs from the preceding only in putting the matter on a more personal basis. Jesus' joy and thanksgiving do not relate to something taking place outside of Himself, in regard to which He, although rejoicing in it, would after all be a mere spectator. Jesus thanks God because His own Person is the pivot, the center, of the whole transaction. The glory of the Gospel dispensation with its sovereignty and wisdom is focused in His own Person: "All things were delivered unto me by my Father." The "all things" here takes up the "these things" of verse 25, and this determines the sense of "were delivered." There is no reference here to the thought of Matt. 28:18: "To me has been given all

5. *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 206.

6. Harnack, *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 207 and note 3.

authority in heaven and on earth.”⁷ The compound verb, *paredothe* instead of *edothē*, tells against such a reference. On the other hand, “delivered” must not be understood of the impartation of knowledge to Jesus in the technical sense of *paradosis* — *tradition* — as Harnack would understand it. Its object is truth, but the act is not an act of informing; it is an act of entrusting, committing the truth for communication to others. “Has been tradited,” in the technical sense of “has been handed down,” would, as between God and Christ, be without analogy in the New Testament.⁸ Moreover, the verb understood of tradition would require the preposition *para* or *apo* instead of *hupo*, as the text reads.⁹ The preposition *para* in the compound verb expresses that God has devolved upon Jesus what is His own special prerogative: the task of revealing the whole truth in all its wide extent. It should be further noted that Jesus does not say “by God,” but “by my Father.” In verses 25 and 26 the term “Father” was occasioned by the form of prayer there assumed by the discourse, but here in verse 27 its occurrence requires special explanation: it serves to account for the absoluteness and comprehensiveness of the task of revelation entrusted to Jesus. Because God is His Father and He is the Son of God, such a delivering of all things in the realm of revelation was possible. Here, therefore, the Messiahship on its revealing side (“all things were delivered”) is put on the basis of sonship (“by my Father”). The two clauses next following: “No one knows the Son but the Father, nor does any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever he (the Son) willeth to reveal him (the Father),” state explicitly what was contained in the preceding by implication: the Messiahship is of such a nature, even as to its revealing function, that it demands for its prerequisite a wholly unique relationship to God. That the Son possesses this is guaranteed by His name and dignity as Son. The intimacy is such that God alone can know Him, and that He alone can know God. The dignity involved in this lies far above the sphere of ordinary human acquaintance; it carries with itself a unique mutual cognition between Jesus and God. God

7. Lütgert in *Beitr. z. Förd. Christlicher Theologie*, III, would interpret our passage of delegation of world-rule, as in John 3:35; 13:3. Similarly, Schumacher, *Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Matt. 11, 27; Freiburger Theol. Stud.*, 1912, pp. 166 ff.

8. Pfeiderer observes this as quoted by Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 207, note 3.

9. *Apo* occurs in *Codex Bezae* (“D”). For *para* no witness exists.

knows Him and He knows God with an exclusive knowledge. Here also, of course, the correlative terms "Father" and "Son" are significant. Our Lord does not say: "No one but God knows me, and only I know God"; what He says is rather: "No one but the Father knows the Son, and no one but the Son knows the Father." These terms are used because they add to the statement of the fact the explanation of the fact, namely that Jesus has this exclusive knowledge of God in virtue of His being the Son; God has this exclusive knowledge of Jesus in virtue of His being the Father. It is a knowledge such as only a father can possess of a son, only a son of a father.

Further, the present tense of the verb should be noted: the reference is not to something that has begun to exist at a point in the past; at least there is no reflection upon this; rather, it refers to something that exists perpetually. It is not a knowledge acquired by a learning to know, but a knowledge possessed in virtue of a state of being. Also the *epi* forming the prefix to the verb adds to the meaning: it expresses thorough, penetrating, intensive knowledge. Luke, who uses the simple instead of the compound verb, conveys the same idea by adding an objective clause of peculiar import: "No one knows who the Son is save the Father, nor who the Father is save the Son." That essential rather than acquired knowledge is meant follows also from the correlation of the two clauses: the knowledge God has of Jesus cannot be acquired knowledge, consequently the knowledge Jesus has of God cannot be acquired knowledge either, for these two are placed entirely on a line. In other words, if the one is different from human knowledge, then the other must be so likewise. It would be incongruous to put God and a creature over against each other in this fashion, as if to say or imply that the exclusive knowledge God has of the creature is like unto the exclusive knowledge the creature has of God. It is evident that the Speaker here moves within the sphere of Deity. The language is so much like that used in the Fourth Gospel that it must *want* to be understood in the same sense. The similarity to such a saying as that of John 10:15 does not merely lie in the words, nor in the theological construction of the relation between Father and Son alone, but chiefly in the reduction of all saving knowledge to a knowledge concerning the Son. Here, as in John, soteriology is Christology.

The interpretation given also explains why the two statements are made in that peculiar sequence. In the abstract, and on the surface, one might expect them to come in the opposite order. After having said: "All things were delivered to me of my Father," it would seem, by way of adding the reason for this, the natural, almost inevitable, thing for Jesus to continue: "No one knows the Father but the Son, and, as a matter of fact, such is, as a rule, the only element seized upon for practical use in the quotation of the passage. Nevertheless this misses a very important point. The twofold statement stands in the closest connection with the twofold principle, likewise stated, that the Father has to reveal the Son and the Son the Father. And, since of these two necessities the revelation of the Son by the Father had already been affirmed in the preceding, viz., in verse 25: "hast revealed these things," the clause about the Father knowing the Son comes first, then the other. For the same reason the explanation of the Son's revealing the Father is explicitly added here, this not having been spoken of in the earlier part of the discourse. The construction thus becomes chiasmic, revelation of the Son by the Father plus knowledge of the Son by the Father coming to stand in inverse order over against knowledge of the Father by the Son and revelation of the Father by the Son. The principle exhibited is that of reciprocity and exact correspondence in the knowledge possessed and in the revealing function exercised on both sides. Thus, in order to perceive the full import of the momentous declaration, one might rearrange and paraphrase it as follows: "No one knows the Son but the Father, and whosoever the Father willeth to reveal him unto, and in like manner no one knows the Father but the Son, and whosoever the Son willeth to reveal him unto."

Still even this does not exhaust the parallelism intended to be brought out, until by the side of the correspondence in sufficient knowledge, the additional correspondence in the exercise of absolute sovereignty is taken into account. To the sovereignty in the work of revealing the Son (verse 25, "for so it has been well-pleasing in thy sight") there answers the sovereignty exhibited by the Son in revealing the Father ("to whomsoever he" — the Son — "willeth to reveal him"). There is not only the same exclusive knowledge on both sides, nor merely the same unique

ability of revelation, but likewise the same sovereignty in dispensing what is to be revealed and to whom, so that the mystery is withheld from the wise and understanding and revealed unto babes by the identical mode of procedure on the part of the Father and of the Son.

Finally it will be perceived at a glance that the high interpretation placed upon verse 27 is borne out by the terms used in verses 28-30. The unique invitation: "Hither to me all . . .," for which analogies can be found only in certain words of Jehovah Himself in the Old Testament, notably in Isa. 45:22, "Look unto me and be saved, all ye ends of the earth," requires as a prerequisite the unique relation to God affirmed of Himself by Jesus. Luke, while not giving these words, nevertheless adds to the Christological declaration a similar statement of soteric import (recorded by Matthew in a different connection, Matt. 13:16, 17): "And to the disciples he said privately: Blessed be the eyes which see what ye see, for I say unto you, that many prophets and kings desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not, and to hear the things which ye hear and heard them not" (Luke 10:23, 24).

It scarcely needs pointing out that in this great deliverance Messiahship and sonship are distinguished. The Messiahship appears in the reception on Jesus' part of the commission to *reveal* all things. But the sonship underlies this as the only basis on which it could take place, and the only basis on which it can be understood. And the sonship of this Messianic Person altogether transcends His historic appearance. It exists, as it were, in a timeless present, where He knows the Father and the Father knows Him. Just as little as "the Father" and "Lord of heaven and earth" are titles derived from the historic situation or soteric undertaking, even so little is "the Son" a designation of Jesus ultimately derived from such. He is called "the Son" not simply because of His being the Messiah, but because His Messiahship is determined by an anterior sonship lying back of it.

Because of its great importance, we cannot dismiss this passage without devoting some space to the controversy which has been waged about its original text. This controversy has scarcely ever been motivated by purely scientific considerations of textual criticism. Nearly always some special theological interest has lain in the background. Two stages, chronologically far apart,

are to be distinguished in the course of this controversy. The first belongs to the age when the young Christian Church found herself involved in a desperate struggle with Gnosticism. The passage was used by certain Gnostics in an attempt to prove that Jesus Himself had been a Gnostic, inasmuch as He emphatically declared that previously to Himself no one knew the Father, *i.e.*, the true Father-God in distinction from Jehovah, the Demiurge, the Creator-God, who alone was known, according to Gnosticism, during the Old Testament period. The method by which the orthodox fathers countered this contention not seldom consisted in showing that in the Old Testament itself such a non-knowledge of God is laid to the charge of Israel in the latter's relation to Jehovah, and consequently "the unknown God" is not different from, but identical with, Jehovah.

The modern critical handling of the text is of a widely different kind. It stands in the service of the "liberal" interpretation of Jesus, and aims at removing this text from the arsenal of the orthodox Church in the latter's contention for the Deity of Christ, who in the ordinary form of the text seems to profess in it His equality with God in the point of mutual knowledge between God and Himself and of coequal exercise of sovereignty with the Father. By its construction and exegesis of the words, the liberal theology made Jesus' consciousness about Himself identical with the "liberal" view in regard to Him, as to all intents not God but a man who, though unique as compared with others in His knowledge of God; yet had to acquire this knowledge after a truly empirical fashion, in a historical process.

As the Gnostics had by their use of the passage attempted to make Jesus one of their company, so the present-day "liberal" theology by the use of it attempts to make Jesus aline Himself with the "liberal" view about His Person and nature. The purpose of the new modern exegesis thus is, of course, a totally different one from that pursued by the ancient Gnostic heretics. The Gnostics wanted to make Jesus repudiate the Old Testament; the liberals want to make Him classify Himself as man and not God. And yet it is a curious fact that two such diverse purposes agree in staking their contention chiefly on the reading and interpretation of a single word in the passage. This word is the verb in the clause: "No one knoweth the Father but the Son." The

question is as to the tense of the verb translated "knoweth." In the standard Greek texts this verb is *epiginoskei* (present tense), but in patristic quotations variations occur, some reading *ginoskei* (present tense) and some *egno* (aorist tense). The aorist, taken as a true past tense, enabled the Gnostic to throw the import of the declaration back into the past period of the entire Old Testament. But it likewise enables the modern "liberal" to conceive of the cognition of Jesus with reference to God in a purely temporal way, as in such sense an act of acquisition as *ipso facto* to rule out His Deity. It should be remembered, however, that the interpretation and critical reading of this one verb are not the only factors entering into the controversy, either of old or now. Besides this, the genuineness of one of the two correlative clauses of which the passage consists (or where the genuineness is recognized, its sequence with regard to the other clause) has played quite a role in the doctrinal appraisal of the statement. Did Jesus parallel the clause about the exclusiveness of the Son's knowledge of the Father by a perfectly similar clause ascribing to the Father the same kind of exclusive knowledge of the Son? Or, should the "Father-knowing-the-Son" clause perhaps be thrown entirely out of the text, as something purposely interpolated in ancient times to buttress the very Church dogma on behalf of which it is now appealed to by the orthodox? Or, if there actually stood two clauses from the beginning, which of the two stood first, that in which the Father is the subject, or that in which the Son is the subject? These things have already been dealt with in the positive exegesis given above to determine the doctrinal bearing of the passage, but it is necessary to remember them here as the critical aspect of the matter comes under consideration.

The modern critical debate about the passage not only furnishes a sort of parallel to the patristic one, but it was actually stirred up and kept up by certain textual phenomena which the ancient controversy is supposed to have brought to light. So these ancient Gnostics become at the present day direct or indirect textual witnesses for what the "liberal" critics consider the original and, from their theological standpoint, most acceptable form of the utterance. To be sure, not even the liberal critics can deny that the textual handling of the words was marked by a certain naivety, because neither the orthodox Fathers nor the Gnostics seem to have been

aware of the importance of noting the precise form of expression in so vital an issue. It evidently was at first a case of loosely plied exegesis, coupled with great freedom in quotation. Tertullian ascribes to Marcion the view that Jesus in our verse preached the *ignotus Deus* of Gnosticism, *i.e.*, the principle that the true Christian God was unknown during the Old Testament period. He makes this statement, however, without betraying the least degree of grammatico-textual concern, and does not seem to have felt any controversial pressure towards a choice between *scit* and *cognovit* (*Adv. Marc.*, IV. 52).

Justin's *First Apology* makes Jesus in our passage accuse the Jews of not having known God, a charge formally much like that brought by the Gnostics against the Old Testament, but at bottom meant quite differently, as appears from the accompanying reference to Isa. 1:3, where the Israelites are condemned for their practical, not for theoretical, ignorance of Jehovah. It is not until we come to Irenaeus that the question of antiquity and correctness of text enters into the debate, and even then by no means so obtrusively as in the case of present-day criticism. Irenaeus quotes our Lord as using the present tense, *cognoscit*, in both clauses. Then, charging the Gnostics with the presumption of wanting to be wiser than the Apostles, he bases this charge on their reading *cognovit* instead of *cognoscit*, which reading enabled them to make the true knowledge of God begin with a cognition-act on the part of Jesus, whereby Jesus Himself was first initiated into that knowledge (*Adv. Haer.*, IV. 6:1).

In his statement of the Gnostic position, Irenaeus further puts the clause about the Son knowing the Father first, whereas in his own quotation of the Gospel, immediately preceding, the opposite order is used. While not explicitly condemning the other sequence, this certainly looks as though he meant to disapprove of it. And in a contiguous passage Irenaeus even reveals some insight into the theological bearings of the utterance altogether beside their proximate importance from an anti-Gnostic, historical point of view. He remarks that the object and the subject of the reciprocal knowledge affirmed are one, which is equivalent to saying that Christ is God (*Adv. Haer.*, IV. 6:7). The Arian controversy helped to sharpen the perception of this fact. Victorinus (*Adv. Arianum*, I. 15) observes that the reason for the mutual

exclusive knowledge between Father and Son lies in the possession of the same substance by both. The above survey of the patristic employment of our passage has been gathered from the thorough rehearsal of the facts by Shumacher, *Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Matt. 11, 27*, pp. 6-10.¹⁰

The critico-textual treatment to which the passage has been subjected in modern times is more complicated. To dispose of the relatively minor issues first, we may begin by noting the variation between the ordinary *paredothe* and the perfect tense *paradedotai* which occurs in a certain group of codices. This is supposed to reveal doctrinal occupation with the words, because a historical act (aorist) seems to be changed by it into a timeless supra-historical act (perfect). We should then have to recognize here a purposeful modification of the text in the interest of orthodoxy. It is doubtful, however, whether such an animus actually underlies this variation in reading, which might in itself be innocent enough. The perfect tense simply marks the enduring result of a past act, but as to the question of whether this act belongs to the sphere of eternity or to that of time, the answer is not determined by the use of the perfect tense alone. The eternal and supra-temporal lies in the following words concerning "knowing" represented as an ever-present state. Justin Martyr uses both tenses, being quite innocent of any desire to make the text fit his theology.

Another minor point relates to the presence or absence of *mou* after *tou patros*. In regard to this, the patristic citations and the versions differ among themselves. No doctrinal bias need have operated here either. Justin, who omits the *mou*, yet strongly

10. Irenaeus' statement that the Gnostics were guilty of text-corruption in substituting the aorist *egnō* for the present *ginōskei* is made by Harnack the basis for affirming the very opposite, viz., that the orthodox preferred the present to the aorist because it suited their theology better, and that they did not decide the question on grounds of fidelity to textual tradition. We understand him to mean this when he says: "The origin of the reading *ginōskei* can be easily guessed from the charge of Irenaeus; the present entered into Luke from Matthew, and it became fixed there from its anti-Marcionite character." It is not, of course, primarily a question of ethics. Still we can hardly overlook the fact that this charge of Harnack casts an unpleasant sidelight on the character of the Church Father Irenaeus, which in turn cannot but affect more or less his critical prestige. Perhaps we should more often remember that the doctrinal farsightedness and critical acumen of the patristic writers can be overestimated; keeping this fact in mind may resolve many an apparent contradiction in their quoting habits.

stresses the uniqueness of the Son-Father relationship. Further, and this can hardly be still called a minor issue, questions are raised concerning the authenticity as well as the integrity of the clause in verse 27c of Matthew (Luke, 22c): "And to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal (him)." The clause, as pointed out above, is strongly expressive of the coequal sovereignty exercised by the Son with the Father in the impartation of saving knowledge. It has been questioned whether the Son was originally the subject of this clause. The stray omission of the explicit subject in certain ancient authorities can scarcely be regarded as proving its original absence from the authentic text, as even Harnack feels inclined to concede. Besides the doubt with reference to the rightful presence of the subject in the sentence, doubt is likewise expressed about the appurtenance of *bouletai* ("willeth") to the clause. With a slight change in the verb, the dropping of *bouletai* would yield *hoi ean apokalypse* ("to whomsoever he may reveal"). All the codices have *bouletai* and so have many of the ancient versions. In the patristic citations there is considerable variation, but the *non liquet* that might, at the worst, result from this is fully made up by clear indications from Origen, Irenaeus, Jerome — indications which also suggest that the real cause for the variation observable lay in the natural desire for greater terseness obtained through the abbreviation. In itself the adoption of the briefer form is of little importance, for even so the thought of the Son's sovereignty in revealing remains. A real divergence of thought only results when the two main clauses of the verse are made to exchange places, for in that case the sovereignty spoken of would be predicated of the Father rather than of the Son.

This brings us face to face with the heart of the critical problem. The main question resolves itself into the three following parts: (a) Did the original text read (*epi*)*ginoskei* in the Son-subject clause, or did it read *egno*? (b) Which of the two clauses, the Father-subject one or the Son-subject one, had the first place in the original text? (c) Ought the Father-subject clause perhaps to be entirely removed from the text? These three questions are not independent of each other, but are mutually interlinked. The Father-subject clause, which stands first in the Received Text, referring to a divine knowledge, automatically excludes the aorist

tense, at least if this be understood in its strictly historical sense of a past transaction. And it is precisely in such a strictly past sense that the aorist with reference to the Son-subject clause is insisted upon. Consequently the symmetry of the logion is destroyed when the verb in the one clause is made (as is inevitable) the present, and the verb in the other clause (as under the pressure of doctrinal preference is next to inevitable) is made the aorist. It scarcely needs pointing out that this destruction of the symmetry is apt to produce a strong temptation toward deleting the entire first clause, thus eliminating the question of symmetry. If we now ask about the evidence as to the points involved, we may for the answer safely confine ourselves to Schumacher's criticism of Harnack, who is the chief modern advocate for changing the Received Text. Harnack presents no less than six reasons in support of his opinion that the original text, so far as capable of reconstruction, read as follows in "Q" and in Luke: "All things were delivered ('tradited') to me by my Father, and no one has learned to know the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal."¹¹ According to Harnack, Matthew modified this allegedly original text in two respects: he substituted the present tense for the aorist, and he added the correlative clause about the Father knowing the Son. Harnack further intimates that Matthew already was guided by a doctrinal motive in introducing these changes. At least he says that they were made by *the same Matthew who wrote 28:18*. In Luke, according to Harnack, the changes were made later and entered from Matthew.

11. It will be noticed that Harnack represents, as the object of the Son's *egnō* not the Father, taken personally and comprehensively, but the *sole fact that God is Father*. The statement expresses nothing else than that Jesus was the first to recognize God in His fatherhood. And in that recognition consisted the essence of Jesus' sonship. To know the Father means to know Him as Father. For the correlative clause, that the Father alone has known or come to know the Son, this would yield an even more strange and strained idea than in the other relationship. But this latter difficulty Harnack meets, as we shall see, by the removal of the correlative clause, on what doubtless appear to him to be sufficient textual-critical grounds. Here we simply remark that, strictly speaking, this peculiar definition of the Son's acquired knowledge is not essential to Harnack's reconstruction of the passage. It would be just as conceivable to understand that Jesus had acquired a comprehensive knowledge of the divine character in every respect, as to confine the knowledge received by Him strictly to the fatherhood of God. At the same time, such contraction of the object of knowledge puts the knowledge just one remove farther from every metaphysical understanding of it, which is what is above all desired by critics such as Harnack. The preference for the aorist tense form and the limitation of the verb's object work together beautifully toward this end.

From among the Fathers Harnack quotes Justin, Tatian, Clement, Origen and Eusebius in favor of the aorist. Only he fails to take into account that all these writers do not have the aorist exclusively, but also use the present interchangeably with it. Does not this phenomenon point to the conclusion that, where no special reason for precision existed, they quoted with a degree of inadvertence? Harnack's view is that Matthew originally had the present, Luke the aorist. For a long time, it seems, *epiginoskei* and *ginoskei* and *egno* appeared as concurrent forms. From this Schumacher draws the conclusion that in one of the two Gospels two forms must have occurred in variant texts, and he thinks that this was in Matthew where *ginoskei* and *egno* were found interchangeably, and he attempts to prove this by reference to the explicit statement of Origen, who in a certain passage, comparing Matthew with Luke, gives *novit* for the former and *scit* for the latter. We submit that this is just as plausible a version of the history of the text as is Harnack's version. Schumacher also calls attention to the fact that there exists such a thing as what grammarians call the Gnostic aorist, a tense without connotation of time. *Egno*, when found with the Fathers, need not in their thinking have carried with it the strictly historical meaning of a past act, for the same Fathers do not abstain from using the same aorist in speaking of the Father's knowing the Son.¹² The double form in the First Gospel may also be due to the twofold possible rendering which the same consonantal Aramaic form might receive. This Aramaic form consisting of the three consonants *yodh-daleth-ayin* could equally well be read as a preterite (corresponding to the Greek aorist) and as a participle (corresponding to the Greek present).¹³

There still remains the question of the sequence of the two correlative clauses. Keim and Wellhausen would have us throw

12. In regard to the Latins, who are also drawn into the debate, it should be remembered that the Latin *novit* very often is as to meaning a real present, and not an aorist. It means: "to have possession of the knowledge of." The only sure proof of equivalence of the form used to a Greek text with aorist is when *cognovit* appears. This is a real historical aorist. Harnack and others also appeal to the other pure aorists in the preceding context (*apekrupsas, apekalupsas, egeneto, paredothē*). This appeal has no force because these other aorists all refer, by common consent, to temporal acts, and therefore they should not be considered so many reasons for what may be expected in our passage, where the time- or eternity-character of the affirmation is the very thing at issue.

13. Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, p. 233.

out the entire first clause in which the Son is the object. Wellhausen's argument is very terse and summary: "The clause should not stand first and can not stand last." And Harnack calls the whole idea of the Father's knowledge of the Son an exceedingly strange idea. The whole context revolves, he observes, around a knowledge of which God is the object, and within such a train of thought there is no place for a knowledge of the Son by the Father. This whole reasoning of Harnack's rests upon an inadequate apprehension of the drift of the passage as a whole. Verse 25 shows that there is a revelation imparted by the Father. This revelation has for its central object "the Son." Consequently an absolute and exclusive knowledge of the Son by the Father forms its indispensable prerequisite. But, it is further urged, the term *egno* does not fit into the nature of the divine knowledge, which, as divine, cannot be described by an historical tense. But we may answer that the occurrence of *egno* as descriptive of the Father's knowing might be explained either on the principle of inadvertence in quoting or on the understanding of the aorist as Gnostic.

Harnack still further adduces the argument that the clause, "and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal" does not properly connect with the statement about the Father's exclusive knowledge of the Son, to which it nevertheless in certain forms of the Lukan text appears immediately subjoined, a combination which would involve that the Son was the interpreter of Himself and not of God. And in general, he observes in another place, the whole statement about the Father's knowledge with the Son as object is in conflict with the natural sequence of thought, since the delivering of all things to the Son had just been spoken of, to which the logically proximate sequel could only be that the Son in consequence knows the Father. Every interposed reference to the other process of the knowledge of the Father concerning the Son is, he holds, out of place. And the position which the sentence might occupy at the close of the entire logion is likewise held to be impossible because it brings the object of the last-mentioned knowledge, the Son, in conflict with the fact that the Son is at the same time represented as the revealer, which is again unnatural.

Both considerations are without force. In our positive exposition given above we have explained why on purely contextual

grounds the declaration that the Father knows the Son, not only *can* come first in order, but *ought* to come first because the revelation of the Son as the center of "these things" had been first spoken of (Matthew, verse 25; Luke, 21), and needed first to receive an explanation of its basis. To this, however, there was no need of adding the sovereignty-affirmation clause, since that idea also had already found clear expression in the preceding context (Matthew, verse 26; Luke, 21). On the other hand, after the exclusive knowledge of the Father by the Son had been affirmed there was immediate need of joining to it the statement covering both the fact of the revelation made by the Son and the principle of sovereignty on which this revelation is exercised. The clause in question is precisely in the place where it ought to be, and its alleged incongruousness to the surroundings should afford no ground for doubting the authenticity of the entire sentence of the Father's knowledge of the Son. The difficulties here are of Harnack's own creating. They are partly due to his over-free handling of the text.

The next passage containing an affirmation of sonship by Jesus with reference to Himself occurs in the episode of the demand for the payment of the half-shekel. It is recorded by Matthew alone, 17:24-27. Jesus asserts His freedom from paying the tax prescribed by the law on the ground of His being a son, who as such should be exempt from taxation. For determining the nature of this sonship, everything depends on the question whether Jesus' assertion of freedom applies to Himself only, or also to Peter. On the former view, a unique sonship must be thought of, something in which Peter does not share. On this supposition it will, of course, still remain undetermined whether the unique sonship is a Messianic sonship or something even higher. In both cases the reasoning would be equally cogent: both the Messiah-Son and the intra-divine Son are free from the obligation to pay the tax.

On the other hand, if Peter be included in the exemption, then the sonship must be of a kind that Jesus and the Apostle could possess in common. What naturally suggests itself in this connection is the filial relation to God characteristic of the Kingdom of God in distinction from the Old Testament order of affairs. It is somewhat difficult to choose between these two views. The use

of the plural in verse 25 ("then are the sons free") is not decisive, because it is induced by the setting of the figure, which speaks likewise, and naturally so, in the plural ("of whom do the kings of the earth take custom or tribute? of their own children, or of strangers?"). Jesus, in His application of the figure ("therefore the sons are free") might have retained the plural for the sake of conformity to the figure. Two other circumstances come under consideration which unfortunately point in opposite directions. On the one hand the original question, while put to Peter, had made no mention of Peter, but only of Jesus: "Does not your teacher pay the half-shekel?" On the other hand, through the miracle Jesus provides for both Peter and Himself, and explicitly enjoins Peter: "Give unto them for thee and me." On the whole, the last consideration seems to carry the greater weight. It is therefore probable, though not absolutely certain, that Jesus here ascribes to Himself a sonship in the ethico-religious sense.¹⁴

More that is of importance can be gathered from the parable of the wicked husbandmen (Matt. 21:33-46; Mark 12:1-12; Luke 20:9-18). The Lord of the vineyard sends servant after servant, and when the mission of all these has proved fruitless, he sends his son (Matt.) or his one beloved son (Mark) or his beloved son (Luke). Here it is clear that sonship involves a higher dignity and a closer relation to God than the highest and closest official status known in the Old Testament theocracy. More is expected from the mission of the Son, precisely because He is the Son. And the parable further implies that the Son is the last, the final, ambassador, after the sending of whom nothing more can be done. The Lord of the vineyard has no further resources; the Son is the highest messenger of God conceivable. Hence absolute destruction befalls the husbandmen as the penalty for rejecting the Son; no sooner is the Son introduced and cast out than the whole process of God's dealing with the theocracy reaches its termination. Herein lies the reason why Jesus rectifies the answer

14. On the interpretation given above the episode contains a lesson concerning the attitude the disciples are to assume toward the Old Testament institutions. By paying the tax for Peter and Himself, not on the principle of legal obligation, but from the desire to avoid giving offense, our Lord virtually justified the continued observance by Jewish Christians of the Old Testament mode of life, with the proviso that this should be done in a spirit of freedom, from the desire not to harm others, not from a sense of legal obligation carrying with it the idea of meritoriousness.

given by the rulers to His question: "What will the Lord of the vineyard do to those husbandmen?" They had answered: "He will miserably destroy those miserable men, and will let out the vineyard unto other husbandmen, who shall render him the fruits in their season." This answer assumed that nothing more radical would follow than a change of administration; that Caiaphas and his fellows, the Sanhedrists, would be destroyed, and other rulers put in their places, after which the theocracy might go on as before. Jesus corrects this facile assumption; to His mind this answer was utterly inadequate. They had not appreciated the full gravity of the rejection of the Son of God as entailing the complete overthrow of the theocracy, and the rearing from the foundation up of a new structure in which the Son, thus rejected, would receive full vindication and supreme honor: "Did ye never read in the Scriptures, the stone which the builders rejected, the same was made the head of the corner; this was from the Lord, and it is marvellous in our eyes? Therefore I say unto you, the Kingdom of God shall be taken away from you, and it shall be given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof; and he that falleth on this stone shall be broken to pieces, but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will scatter him as dust." All this attributes to the sonship of Jesus transcendent significance, such as can be measured only in terms of the consequences of rejecting Him.

It might indeed be said that this need not go beyond Messiahship, because rejection of the Messiah-Son is serious enough to account for all the destructive results mentioned. Nevertheless we believe that the parable invites us to go further than this. Allegorizing of parables should, of course, be avoided. But allegorizing exists only where incidental features having no organic connection with the central point of the parable are regarded as significant on their own account. Such is not the case here. We insist upon the point that the Son is represented by the very structure of the parable as being the Son *before His mission*. His being sent describes, in figurative terms, His Messiahship, but this Messiahship was brought about precisely by the necessity for sending one who was the highest and dearest that the lord of the vineyard could delegate: "They will reverence my Son." The sonship, therefore, existed antecedently to the Messianic mission; otherwise the main, central thought of the parable is injured. And

the terms employed to describe the sonship fully bear this out. He is the "beloved Son," the "one beloved Son," dear to the Father, whether He be sent or not, but on account of His dearness He is the only possible person equal to the emergency. What links these two conceptions of antecedent sonship and Messiahship together in the same manner is the thought of the Son's being the heir. For heirship, again, is nothing else but Messianic possession of all things. Because He is antecedently the Son, He is made the heir. Here then, as well as in Matt. 11, we can see how clearly Jesus carries into His Messianic life much of the content of His filial life, and yet this does not justify the complete identification of the two relationships. His filial status covers the whole extent of His Messianic function, but we cannot say *vice versa* that His filial status, as to content and dignity, is exhausted by His Messiahship so that "Son of God" would here figure as a mere Messianic title.¹⁵

A sonship with reference to God higher than the average Jewish conception of Messiahship is implied in Jesus' reasoning with the scribes about the Messiah's being "the Son of David" (Matt. 22:41-46; Mark 12:35-37; Luke 20:41-44). Not a few modern commentators assume that the form of the question, "How do they say that the Christ is the Son of David?", requires a negative answer as to the question of fact: He is not, or cannot be, the Son of David. This, they believe, is further indicated by the argument drawn from Psalm 110, in which the phrase "my Lord," put into David's mouth, seems to be exclusive of the other relationship, that of father and son, between the two. And the conclusion drawn impresses them as even more decisive: "If therefore David calls him Lord, how is he his son?" And yet, even though this exegesis may seem grammatically easy or even imperative, it is historically beset with serious difficulties. The question immediately arises, what interest could Jesus have in raising and arguing this genealogical point with the Pharisees. Davidic descent could not have constituted to His mind a *disqualification* for Messiahship, however much or little significance He might have attached to it in the abstract. On the few occasions where He was addressed by this title, Son of David, there is no evidence

15. Compare Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Matthaeus*, in loc.

of His having resented or repudiated it.¹⁶ It would be foolish to read into the situation an allusion to the virgin birth, for the virgin birth and Davidic descent are not mutually exclusive. Neither for Jesus Himself nor for the early Church could the question of Davidic sonship have figured as an issue against Judaism.

To the foregoing there is added another difficulty when we remember how the descent from David was a fixed item of belief among the early Christians. Besides the testimony of the genealogies in Matthew and Luke, witness is borne to this belief by Acts 2:29, 30; 13:22, 23; Rom. 1:3; 2 Tim. 2:8; Rev. 3:7; 5:5; 22:16. The point we wish to urge here is not that these passages in themselves prove the fact of the descent from David; that may be left to one side so far as our present purpose is concerned. But the widespread conviction of the Davidic descent certainly proves that Jesus could not possibly have denied His descent from David in so open a manner as the exegesis referred to assumes to have been the case, for in the face of such an explicit denial the uniform assumption that He was thus descended could not have established or maintained itself.

Once more, the Pharisees were not naive enough to think that genealogical descent from David, as such, would have interfered with the Messiah's being David's Lord. Nor is it permissible to interpret the whole incident as a mere argumentative tilt of Jesus with His opponents, not implying any commitment on Jesus' part to the Davidic descent of the Messiah, either pro or con. Besides, our Lord speaks in a tone too serious for us to interpret His question as a mere effort to involve the Pharisees in a contradiction, for He reminds them quite solemnly of the fact that David called the Messiah "my Lord" *in the Spirit*. It is evident that we must eliminate the entire genealogical element from the interpretation. "David's Son" is used here in the technical sense of a Messianic title. As such it carries with itself, in the Christology of the Pharisees, certain assumptions. These assumptions can best be summed up in the statement that the Christ was held to be David's "heir." And in the conception of His being David's heir, the view found expression that He derived His sovereignty and powers from David. This involved further the belief that

16. Matt. 9:27; 12:23; 15:22; 20:30, 31; 21:9, 15.

the Messiahship moved in the national-political sphere, for it was *only* in that sphere that inheritance from David could be the determining factor. It is this belief that our Lord wants to criticize, and He does so by placing over against the Pharisees' ideas the other, true type of Messianism, that which lifts it to a higher, supra-political plane, the plane of the world to come — not, indeed, as that world was understood by His opponents, but as it was conceived by Himself. This kind of eschatology finds characteristic expression in the name "Lord of David." The contention is between two types of Messianic hope marked respectively by the conceptions of inheritance from David and lordship over David. Looking at it from this point of view, it is not permissible to concentrate the whole argument on the one suffix "my" and the noun "Lord" which it accompanies. The lordship for which Jesus contends, on the basis of the Psalm, is of such a comprehensive and unique character as to overthrow at one stroke the entire Pharisaic eschatological and Christological structure. Hence Jesus takes pains to quote enough of the Psalm to make the content and purview of the lordship unmistakably clear: it amounts to sitting at the right hand of God and subjection of all enemies underneath the Messiah's feet. *That* the Messiah could not possibly have inherited from David, no matter how surely His genealogical connection with the latter might be established. Now in Mark and Luke it is not stated, at least not explicitly, that this transcendental aspect of the Messianic sovereignty likewise has a sonship related to a higher source underlying it. Even in Mark and Luke, to be sure, this fact is intimated, because sitting at the right hand of God and inheriting world-sovereignty inevitably suggest the conception of sonship as their natural basis. But the form of statement in Matthew goes further in this direction. Here the question reads: "What think ye of the Christ? *Whose* son is he?" This suggests that, corresponding to the Pharisaic derivation, which underlay the Pharisaic type of Christology, there is another kind of derivation, that from God Himself, which alone can explain the transcendental Christology. The Messiah must be God's Son in order to be capable of the things predicated of Him in the Psalm. Here, then, the divine sonship of Jesus is represented as the basis of that higher character of the Messiahship which expressed His own ideal: because He is the Son of God, He rules

the world to come. Nor do we think it straining the words too much if we find in Jesus' statement the implication that the Messianic sovereignty must cover the world to come because only as an inhabitant of the world to come could David be subject to it. The conclusion of the matter is that while sonship connotes Messiahship, it at the same time points back to a higher relationship from which the Messianic relationship derived its unique character. The utterance should therefore be placed on a line with the passage in Matt. 11 and the parable of the wicked husbandmen. With the latter it has in common that as the Son is spoken of objectively there, so the Christ is here, without being explicitly identified by Jesus with Himself.¹⁷

It is somewhat difficult to decide in what sense Jesus is called "the Son" in the saying of Matt. 24:36 ARV (Mark 13:32): "Concerning that day or the hour no one knoweth, not even the angels in heaven, neither (not even) the Son, except the Father." It is evident that a not-knowing in regard to eschatological matters is here predicated of Jesus. At the same time a knowledge higher than that possessed by angels is ascribed to Him. Only as compared with the Father does He fall short in not possessing the information referred to.

Two things have contributed toward finding the standard for the scale of knowledge affirmed in the several *natures* of those enumerated. In regard to the angels it has been assumed to mean necessarily a matter of nature, as securing a certain degree of insight or knowledge, to which lower natures have no access. And, on the other hand, the distinction between the Son and the Father has seemed to point in the same direction, because these forms

17. Spitta, *Streitfragen der Geschichte Jesu*, pp. 167-172, rightly insists that the antithesis between "David's son" and "David's Lord" has for its background the distinction between this world and the world to come. Only in connection with this he has his own peculiar explanation of the episode. In his view, it belongs to the dispute with the Sadducees about the question of the resurrection. In Matthew and Mark the true connection has been lost, he holds, through inserting the account of the ruler's enquiry concerning the greatest commandment, so that in these Gospels as we have them the point of the argument appears directed against the Pharisees and scribes. But in Luke, he asserts, the true continuity has been preserved, although even here Spitta assumes that verses 37-40 do not belong to the original discourse because in them the point of argumentation is different from that in the foregoing and in the sequel. The real import of our Lord's reasoning, according to Spitta, is that from the two-fold designation of the Messiah as David's son and David's Lord the reality of the resurrection follows, because these two names can belong only to the two successive states of this age and the age to come.

with the article are, in the Synoptics, always used of the specific relation of Jesus to God. Sometimes even from the side of orthodoxy this interpretation is seized upon on account of its vindicating for the Son a superangelic nature, which then, since no specific nature between the angels and God is known to exist, is straightway identified with the divine nature, so that the passage becomes an argument for the Deity of Jesus. But this view overlooks the fact that in the same respect in which superiority of knowledge to the angels is affirmed, inferiority of knowledge with regard to God is also affirmed. Consequently, by basing the argument on the difference in nature, full Deity would not be attained, but some nature midway between the angels and God — a result compatible with Arianism, but not with the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. As a matter of fact the two considerations stated above do not compel us to think of diversification of nature as underlying the scale construed. Throughout Scripture the angels are messengers, that is, carriers of information communicated to them, not of information arising out of their own natural endowment with knowledge.

And the contrast between "the Son" and "the Father," while it specifically concerns the mutual relation between these two, still is not limited to a description of their extra-Messianic or supra-Messianic divine relationship within the Trinity. The current paraphrase of the argument in the following form: 1. Man knows certain things by nature. 2. The angels know more things in virtue of their superior nature. 3. The Son knows still more things in virtue of His still superior nature — this paraphrase will have to be abandoned. There is, moreover, something in the character of the knowledge spoken of that forbids us to conceive of it as a kind of knowledge such as would depend, for its accessibility, on a qualification of nature. The knowledge denied to men, angels and the Son is a knowledge specifically of "that day" (the day of judgment) and of "the hour" (the time of the coming of "that day"). Such a knowledge is not subject to greater or less accessibility by reason of nature, for it is a knowledge concerning a definite point of chronological fact, the reason for the chronological emergence of which can lie only in the decree of God, and can become the property of others only through definite information granted to them.

The correct paraphrase, therefore, will have to read: 1. Men are informed of certain things. 2. Angels are informed about more things. 3. The Son, in virtue of His Messianic office, is informed about still more things; but this question of "that day" and its hour has not been communicated even to Him as an item of official knowledge.

As to how this matter-of-fact ignorance is to be explained in One who elsewhere claims for Himself a knowledge of God equal to God's knowledge of Himself (Matt. 11:27), cannot even be indicated on the basis of this passage alone. Of course it is necessary to maintain that whatever ignorance existed in the Son must have existed only within the limits of His human nature. But this is no more than a statement — highly valuable, indeed, as such — by which we guard the vital doctrine of the two natures of Christ. It does not really elucidate the problem psychologically, if we may so speak. In reality it only leads us to the threshold of the ulterior problem as to how the interaction of the two natures possessed by the one subject, and that particularly in the matter of knowledge, is to be understood. To return again for a moment to the first form of paraphrase, above rejected, it is of course not permissible first to affirm that the Son's superiority to the angels is due to His divine nature, and then, when the inferiority in knowledge to God is considered, to explain this by reference to the possession of a human nature by Jesus. This would be an exegetical mode of measuring with two measures, which can be allowed as little in exegesis as in any other sphere of life.

Still another problem, no more solvable than the preceding one on the basis of this saying alone, lies in the fact that our Lord has elsewhere made definite predictions concerning "that day," and to some extent also concerning its hour of coming, which seem hard to reconcile with any view that would find in our passage an avowal of unqualified ignorance. Upon this phase of the problem also we cannot enter here. We content ourselves with drawing the conclusion that Jesus is here called "the Son" in virtue of His Messianic office, with the understanding always that the office is so high in the scale of divine commissionership as to assure the highest degree of initiation into the counsel of God to the possessor

of the office, as compared with all creatures, not excluding even the angels.

Before passing on to the cases in which others employ the title Son of God in speaking of Jesus, we must briefly look into the statements of our Lord Himself that imply His sonship with reference to God through speaking of the latter as "my Father." It is not easy to determine how much of official consciousness, or even of consciousness higher than official, flows into this. The clearest case is perhaps Luke 22:29, where the words "as my Father appointed to me a kingdom" represent the appointment of Jesus to the Messianic office as the result of God being His Father. In other instances the phrase has a decided official coloring; the Father is acting in relations determined by the Messianic function of Jesus: He receives the confession made by the Son with reference to a believer, and Jesus seems to find the guarantee for this in the Father's honoring the word of the Son (Matt. 10:32, 33).

A recognition of the authoritativeness of the One called "my Father" is voiced in the saying about the plant which my heavenly Father planted not (Matt. 15:13). The vision of the face of "my Father" in Matt. 18:10 joins fatherhood and sonship to the Messianic consummation. In Matt. 18:14, "it is not the will of your Father that one of these little ones should perish," the reading of the MSS varies between "my Father" and "your Father"; the former has Messianic sound; the latter would lie beside the present discussion. In verse 19 of the same context the Messianic idea shines through: it is the Sender of the Son who fulfills the prayers of the disciples. The kingdom is prepared for the followers of Jesus by God in the capacity of "my Father," Matt. 20:23, and it is as the King that Jesus speaks in the last day: "Come, ye blessed of my Father" (Matt. 25:34).

The Kingdom-idea, and with it the Messianic idea, emerges in the word about the new wine to be drunk in "the Kingdom of my Father," Matt. 26:29. The legions of angels that could be sent by "my Father" would be sent in the defense of the Messiah. The promise of "my Father" (that is, the thing promised by my Father) belongs to the sphere of Messianic fulfilment (Luke 24:49). In two instances in Matthew the official sense and the higher sense are most intimately united; this is the case where

Jesus speaks of the comprehensive revelation-commission given to Him as given by "my Father," and yet the term "Father" is here charged with super-Messianic, divine content, as has been shown in the discussion of Matt. 11:27 above.

The other instance is in Matt. 16:17, where the disclosure to Peter of the Christhood of Jesus is attributed to "my Father in heaven," and yet in the confession of Peter the perspective is extended from "the Christ" to "the Son of the living God."

The more or less clear instances of the ethico-religious connotation are the following: Luke 2:49, "in my Father's house"; Matt. 7:21, "he that doeth the will of my Father"; Matt. 12:50, "whosoever shall do the will of my Father who is in heaven, he is my brother, and sister, and mother"; Matt. 18:35, "so shall also my heavenly Father do unto you, if ye forgive not every one his brother from your hearts." In most of the sayings here grouped together no certain decision can be reached. The chief cause for this will have to be sought in the fact that in the consciousness of Jesus, since these varied relationships were not mechanically added, but, as we hope to show later, were organically united, no expression of the one can have been possible without an inner side-reference of feeling to the other.

CHAPTER XI

The Son of God (*Continued*)

ASCRPTION OF THE TITLE TO JESUS BY OTHERS

JESUS is called the Son of God in the Synoptic Gospels by the following speakers: Satan and the demons; His enemies of the Jewish opposition; the disciples; the angel Gabriel at the annunciation to Mary (Luke 1:35); the voice from heaven at the baptism and the transfiguration.

The demons employing the title thereby express proximately their knowledge that Jesus is the Messiah. Hence they use the title Son of God interchangeably with "the Holy One of God" (Mark 1:24; Luke 4:34). It should not be overlooked, however, that in their use of it the title necessarily exceeds anything that could be applied to a purely natural being. Wrede, as we have already had occasion to note, acutely observed that the fact of the demons recognizing our Lord's character *first* implies the supernaturalness of this character. What the demons display is not mere inferential knowledge gathered from observation of Jesus' procedure and actions, for in that case not the demons, but the disciples closely associated with Him, would have been the first observers. The knowledge on the part of the demons is rather of an intuitive, supernatural kind. Because they are themselves supernatural spirits, they "scent," according to Wrede's realistic description, the supernatural in Jesus. It is a case of spirit recognizing spirit. Hence we are told in Mark 3:11: "And the unclean spirits, whensoever they beheld him, fell down before him, and cried, saying, thou art the Son of God." An equally illuminating incident is that recorded in Mark 5:6, "And when he saw Jesus from afar, he ran and prostrated himself," and crying out with a loud voice, said: "What have I to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of the Most High God?" (verse 7). (Compare the parallel passage in Luke 8:28). It is true that the verbs here

describing the acts of the demons, *prospiptein* and *proskunein*, are not exclusively used of religious veneration. Therefore they do not of themselves constitute a valid argument for the recognition of the Deity of Jesus on the part of the demons. Other passages show that these acts might apply where only an acknowledgment of royal dignity is involved (Matt. 2:2, 8, 11; 18:26; Mark 15:19). But even in such cases the line between a sub-religious and a religious act should not be too sharply drawn, because deification of rulers prevailed. The two verbs, and especially *proskunein*, have also a specifically religious meaning in which they express prostration before a higher supernatural power. The latter is the word used by Jesus in His answer to Satan: "It is written, thou shalt worship the Lord thy God and him alone shalt thou serve." And there can be little doubt that the act of the demons partook of this character: it was a recognition of His lordship and power in the world of spirits. It anticipated that of which Paul speaks in Philippians, that at the naming of the name of Jesus every knee shall be made to bow, of those under the earth no less than of those in heaven and on earth. It does not necessarily follow from this that the demons by such prostration implied that they recognized the absolute Deity of our Lord. They might not have been over-particular in the matter of paying religious homage to one regarded as of a lower rank than the Highest God. Compare Mark 5:7, where the demon says to Jesus: "I adjure thee by God." But it is certain that the demons are represented as discerning something supernatural in Jesus' Person. Some have even thought that the demons are meant by Mark to represent pagan deities. This would mean that these gods recognized Jesus' superiority to themselves and acknowledged Him to be the true God.¹

The same implications are present in the manner of Satan's address to Jesus at the temptation. He also knew Jesus immediately, as soon as the latter had begun His work. His knowledge, like that of the demons, was not the result of observation, but was a supernatural knowledge. When Satan twice addresses our Lord as "the Son of God," he combines with this not merely Messiahship in general, but specifically a type of Messiahship lifting Him

1. Compare Johannes Weiss, *Das älteste Evangelium*, pp. 51, 52. On the subject of demoniacal classification of Jesus, compare Lepin, *Jesus Messie et Fils de Dieu*, pp. 277, 278.

far above the level of the natural. Satan concedes not merely the power to perform miracles, and the right to special protection, and the title to rule over the kingdoms of the world, as belonging to Jesus, but also suggests the assumption by Jesus of an attitude of sovereign self-sufficiency such as is opposite to all creaturehood and faith.

It might, perhaps, be objected to the above train of reasoning that the supernatural element which formed the object of the demons' recognition of Jesus was nothing else but the presence of the Spirit in Him. But this is not indicated in the Gospel account; rather, the opposite is implied. The demons say, "We know thee, who thou *art*," relating the supernatural to the Person of Jesus rather than to His equipment. In general, the possession of the Holy Spirit, while actually referred to as the source of the supernatural in Jesus' works, is by no means uniformly, nor even frequently, thought of in such connections. In most cases the attention is drawn to something back of that — to a personal, not merely charismatic, qualification — and it is precisely this element that finds expression in His sonship as acknowledged by the demons.²

From the demons and Satan we pass on to the human enemies of Jesus. At His trial, the Sanhedrists took Jesus' affirmation of His divine sonship as blasphemy. This charge indicates that sonship, as claimed by Jesus, cannot have been to their minds the simple equivalent of Messiahship. It is true, efforts have been made to account for the incrimination on that basis. But the mere claim to Messiahship, even though in the opinion of the judges unsubstantiated, cannot have been regarded as blasphemous. Nor could the blasphemy have been found in the fact that Jesus persisted in making this claim under circumstances that rendered it preposterous. All this could, at the utmost, prove deceit on Jesus' part, or folly, but not blasphemy. And the circumstances that were most flagrantly at variance with the Messianic pretension were of the Jews' own creating. They themselves were responsible for His arrest and impending death. It would have been a strange conceit, therefore — so strange, indeed, that not even the passion of extreme hostility could wholly account for it — if they

2. Weiss, *Das älteste Evangelium*, pp. 48, 49.

had charged Jesus with figuring in a blasphemous situation, which they themselves had brought about.³

Something might perhaps be said in favor of this mode of reasoning, if Jesus Himself before the Sanhedrin had insisted upon His death as essential to His Messiahship, but this He did not do. Paul might have reasoned thus to justify his persecution of the followers of Jesus, for to Paul the crucifixion was already an accomplished fact for which he was not himself personally responsible. But in the case of the Jews, it was they who would decide whether Jesus was to die or not. A Talmudic passage quoted by Dalman shows that false Messianic pretensions, while under certain circumstances punishable by death, were not considered blasphemous in themselves: "Bar Koziba reigned two years and a half. When he said to the Rabbins, I am the Messiah, they answered him: of the Messiah it is written that he judges by smell; let us see whether he is able to do this. When they saw that he was not, they put him to death."⁴ There is no reference to blasphemy in this; it appears to have been purely a question of fact; Bar Koziba was executed as a deceiver. But Jesus was condemned as a blasphemer. The high priest rent his garments over it.

Nor can the blasphemy have been found in the word against the temple at first charged against Jesus. For, according to Mark's account, the testimony offered by the witnesses did not bear out the truthfulness of this charge, and it had to be abandoned. Moreover Jesus did not reply when it was uttered against Him. But with regard to the actual blasphemy the high priest states explicitly: "What need have we of witnesses? Behold, now, ye have *heard* the blasphemy." Nor could a word against the temple have been regarded as in itself blasphemous, because it could not be construed as a direct insult to God. Jer. 26:11 does not prove

3. Even Holtzmann is caught in this argument in a circle when he says: "One abandoned by his friends, captured by his enemies, helplessly delivered to the fate of being cast out by his people and executed in disgrace . . . such a man dares to lay claim for himself to the most sacred expectations of his people . . . and thus dares to surrender these expectations to the most cruel disappointment; if this is not blasphemy, what does deserve the name?" (*Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu*, p. 33).

4. *Die Worte Jesu*, I, p. 257. Bar Koziba, "the son of lying," was a name applied to him after his failure. Originally he was called Bar Kochba, "son of the star," referring to Num. 24:17. The idea of judging by smell is derived from Isa. 11:3.

that the prophet's utterances against the temple were regarded as blasphemy by his enemies; rather, they were considered high treason, on which the penalty of death was set.⁵

Nothing remains, therefore, but to conclude that the blasphemy lay in Jesus' claim to be the Son of God. But we must not suppose that this was regarded as something altogether apart from His claim to Messiahship. Rather, in the opinion of His accusers He carried His Messianic Son of God claim to a point where the implied identification with God rendered it blasphemous. It may remain an open question whether the words of the high priest borrow the compound phrase "the Christ, the Son of God" from the lips of Jesus, or whether they reflect this compound idea of sonship and Messiahship as an element of accepted, orthodox Jewish Christology. In the former case, the high priest would not be committing himself to any such superhuman conception of Messiahship. We should then have to paraphrase his question as follows: Dost thou then actually claim such an extraordinary, impossible dignity? In the other case, the conception would be recognized as orthodox, and the avowal required would consist in whether Jesus Himself claims to be this correctly conceived superhuman Messiah. In either case the charge of blasphemy would be relevant, from the standpoint of the high priest. But on the former view it would be more than a blasphemy of sinful pretension; back of that would lie the blasphemy of Christological heresy infringing, by its very daring, on the prerogative of God. The high priest and his counsellors cannot have been overmuch concerned about the construction of the Messianic dogma, which did not lie particularly in the line of Sadducean belief. In a matter of this kind they would be likely to voice the common orthodox view, and there is hardly evidence that the orthodox party had reached the conception of a divine, or at least of a

5. Wellhausen thinks that the Gospel tradition still reveals knowledge of the word against the temple as the real ground of Jesus' condemnation, and that the tradition betrays an effort to obliterate this — from the later Christian standpoint — objectionable feature. He believes, however, that Matthew was not actuated by such a motive. In our judgment this alleged distinction between Matthew and Mark is without any real basis. For Matthew also says (26:59) "false witness." How does this differ from Mark, who says simply "witness" in 14:55, but "false witness" in 14:57? Luke omits all reference to the two witnesses and their charge concerning the temple. It is this silence that Wellhausen regards as suspicious — certainly a very slender thread to bind his interpretation to. *Das Evangelium Marci*, p. 133.

superhuman, Christ. It is, therefore, plausible to assume that the blasphemous character was found both in the framing of the concept itself, and in Jesus' claim that it was realized in Himself.

At any rate, Jesus in His answer acknowledges both that He is the Messiah, and that He is such in the exalted Son of God sense. On this view, His words were a confession of faith as well as a claim to office. That He attached the highest conceivable meaning to the claim which He made, is evident from the prophecy which He added: "Ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of the Power and (Matt. and Mark, not Luke) coming with (Matt., 'upon') the clouds of heaven." Both these ideas, that of session at the right hand of God, and that of coming with the theophanic clouds, furnish an authentic interpretation of Jesus' understanding of the nature and extent of the sonship confessed by Him. It is true, He does not repeat the phrase "Son of God" in His answer, so as to link the two high predicates named directly to it. But there was a sufficient reason for the substitution of "Son of man" for "Son of God" at this moment, without any intention of disavowing "Son of God" as too high and stamping "Son of man" as of lower import. Jesus obviously wished to declare before His judges that in the future the relation between them and Himself would be reversed: He would then be the Judge, and they would be the accused. To express this, a reference to the Son of man and His coming with the clouds of heaven was the appropriate form. Luke very clearly brings out that he understands the compound phrase "the Christ, the Son of God" in the climactic sense above indicated (so high a Christ as to reach up to sonship of God), for he separates the two parts: first the Sanhedrists say, "If thou art the Christ, tell us"; Jesus answers this with the declaration that the Son of man will from now on sit at the right hand of the power of God; then, by means of *oun*, the further question is attached: "Art thou then the Son of God?" Here "the Son of God" obviously means "the Christ who will sit at the right hand of the power of God."⁶

6. Brandt, *Evang. Geschichte*, pp. 56-62, argues from the later regulation of the Mishna (Sanh. VII, 5) that blasphemy could be charged only where there was a formal enunciation of the name of Jehovah, to the effect that Jesus could not even have been condemned for claiming superhuman sonship, and that therefore the entire account of the trial before the Sanhedrin must be rejected as unhistorical. Johannes Weiss (*Das älteste Evangelium*, p. 319) replies to this that the procedure of the Sanhedrin cannot be measured by such a strict definition,

In the next place, we shall examine the testimony borne by the disciples of Jesus in the Gospels. Into the memorable confession at Caesarea Philippi, it is only in Matthew's account of the episode that the sonship of Jesus is involved. According to Matthew Peter said: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Matt. 16:16). Mark has: "Thou art the Christ" (Mark 8:29). Luke gives: "The Christ of God" (Luke 9:20). Possibly Matthew's fuller version is not independent of his rendering of what happened on a previous occasion in which likewise Peter figured prominently, that of Jesus' walking upon the sea (Matt. 14:22-33). Matthew and Mark (Mark 6:45-51) both relate how Jesus came upon the sea to the disciples' boat, but Matthew alone tells about Peter's attempt to meet Jesus on the water.⁷ And Matthew alone relates that the disciples prostrated themselves before Jesus, saying, "Thou

7. Luke does not refer to this event at all. John does (6:16-21).

since it was not so much a question of condemning Jesus to death in a formally correct manner, but of finding a moral and religious basis for justifying his denunciation to Pilate as one worthy of death. Holtzmann likewise thinks that the Jews were only too ready to overlook legal irregularities for the sake of bringing about the death of Jesus (*Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu*, p. 35). But both Mark and Matthew imply formal condemnation, and neither indicates by so much as a word that the Sanhedrists were playing a part in the matter. They must have believed themselves to be strictly within the terms of the law. It will therefore have to be assumed that the stricter rule found in the Mishna had not yet been formulated at that time.

It may be of interest here to register the grounds assigned by various writers for the condemnation of Jesus where the ground of His having laid claim to sonship in a superhuman sense is rejected. The following are the main opinions on this question:

1. The most common view: Jesus was condemned because He claimed to be the Messiah.
2. Because He claimed future session at the right hand of God (Dalman).
3. Because of assertion of Messiahship in the face of His desperate plight (H. Holtzmann).
4. Because of His saying about the removal of the kingdom of God from the Jews (Matt. 21:43); so Stark, *Protestantische Monatshefte*, 1902, pp. 291-309.
5. Because of the utterance concerning the destruction of the temple (Mark 13:2; 14:58); so Wellhausen, who would excise Mark 14: 61, 62, and appeals to Mark 15:29 and Acts 6:13, 14 (*Das Evangelium Marci*, pp. 132, 133).
6. Because of the teaching of Jesus with reference to various things in general; so Merx, who finds this in Luke 22:71, after deleting the words immediately preceding, "What further need have we of witnesses?" thus obtaining the resultant statement: "We have heard him speak ourselves" (*Vier kanon. Evangelien*, II, p. 478).

The variation of opinion among these writers on so cardinal a point in the life of Jesus is highly significant.

art truly the Son of God.”⁸ It is alleged that this utterance is unhistorical, not only because of its absence from Mark, but palpably so, because Mark speaks of the astonishment of the disciples, which he explains from the fact of their hearts having been hardened (Mark 6:51, 52) and that even after having witnessed the miracle of the loaves. According to the plausible exegesis of Weiss, the amazement of the disciples is not the amazement of utter lack of comprehension; it is rather the amazement of dawning apprehension, a sign that the hardening of their hearts was now to some extent passing away. The “for” explains why they were now for the first time amazed: it was in contrast to their having utterly failed to understand (and even to be amazed at) the sign of the loaves. Thus interpreted, Mark’s account, while less full than Matthew’s, in no wise contradicts the latter, but leaves room for what the latter has in addition.

But whatever may be thought of this harmonizing proposal, it may be safely assumed that the Evangelist Mark intends the lack of comprehension to refer to something beyond mere Messiahship. Whatever the historical appraisal of the facts by criticism may be, if we can take the Evangelist Mark at his word, at any rate, there was on this earlier occasion a complex of fact involving the supra-human nature of Jesus. And this is absolutely certain in the case of Matthew. The recognition of this is of decisive importance for understanding the mind of Matthew with reference to the Caesarea Philippi episode of chapter 16. The name Son of God cannot in the Evangelist’s opinion have borne a lower meaning on the second occasion than on the first. In the earlier passage the character of the miracle by which the confession was called forth, followed as it was by an act of worship, indicates how the sonship of Jesus was understood. It was our Lord’s marvelous power over the forces of nature — a power able to draw even Peter within the sphere of its operation — that made the disciples exclaim as they did. And the miracle was not a specifically Messianic miracle, but rather a direct manifestation of superhuman character. Through it, the disciples for a moment

8. Zahn, *Evangelium des Matthaeus*, p. 512, observes that Matthew does not use *alēthōs* like *amēn* (as Luke sometimes does), and that therefore it does not constitute a separate asseveration, but belongs adverbially to *ei*; the proper rendering then would be not “truly thou art. . .”, but “thou art truly. . .”, and this would presuppose that the conviction was not new in itself, but had been newly confirmed by what had happened.

caught a vision of this character of Jesus as such, apart from its reflection in the Messiahship. This appears from the form which their exclamation assumed: *Theou huios ei*. They recognized Jesus as Son in His relation to God. The article before "Son" is omitted, which could not have been done had the phrase been intended as a Messianic title, for the Messiah is referred to as *ho huios tou Theou*. And for the same reason the genitive "of God" has the emphatic first place in the phrase: "Of God truly Thou art a Son." As Zahn strikingly observes: "They declare not who Jesus is, but what kind of a Person Jesus is. The question of 8:27, 'What manner of man is this, that even the winds and the sea obey Him?' here receives its answer, not, of course, after the manner of a theological formula, but in the unreflected expression of an overwhelming experience." The *potapos estin houtos* (What manner of man is this?) likewise is peculiar to Matthew, and therefore takes its rightful place by the side of the passages in chapters 14 and 16.

In respect of momentary dissociation from the idea of Messiahship the witness of Matt. 14:22-33 stands even higher than the famous confession of Caesarea Philippi. But it has supreme value also through its bearing upon the latter. It is true, the Messiahship and the sonship are in the Caesarea Philippi episode linked together. If there were no reference to the Messiahship there, then there would be an irreconcilable conflict between the account of Matthew, on the one hand, and those of Mark and Luke, on the other. As it is, there is no such conflict. Only, for reasons which we cannot discover, Mark and Luke record only part of the confession as it is recorded by Matthew. We must not, however, from a harmonizing motive, interpret the words "the Son of the living God" as if they were intended by Matthew as a mere further specification of "the Christ." This would be, of course, an easy way of harmonizing the accounts, but it would come into conflict with the plain indications of the context in Matthew itself. These indications have been admirably pointed out by Zahn, and it will suffice for our purpose to restate them briefly.

In the first place, Peter's confession is represented as the result of a strictly supernatural revelation given him by God; not "flesh and blood," that is, not man, not human nature, has led Peter to make this confession, but the Father of Jesus, and more particu-

larly the Father *in heaven*, which stresses the revelation-origin of Peter's confession still more strongly. The verb "has revealed" reminds of Matt. 11:27, where it is said that only the Father knows the Son, and where the context represents it as the exclusive work of the Father to reveal the Son. If this reminiscence is not accidental, we shall have to infer that Jesus finds here a concrete instance of such revelation by the Father of His unique sonship. Peter is one of the simple and unwise ones to whom it is the Father's good pleasure to reveal the truth concerning Jesus. The phrase "my Father," instead of "God," also suggests that the disclosure made to Peter had reference to the paternal and filial relationship between God and Jesus. Even if the higher sense of a super-Messianic sonship were not required by the resemblance of the train of thought to that of chapter 11, we should still have to say that, considering our passage by itself, the mere fact of Jesus' Messiahship could scarcely have been represented by Jesus as requiring, in the case of Peter, such a strictly supernatural revelation for its knowledge and acceptance. The ordinary means of self-disclosure during our Lord's long association with Peter would have sufficed for the basis of a mere confession of Jesus' Messiahship.

Secondly, the antithesis between "Son of man" in the question of Matt. 16:13 and "Son of the living God" in the confession in verse 16 can scarcely have any other meaning than to raise Jesus' sonship above the purely human sphere. Peter must mean to say that the Son of man is more than the Son of man, that He is indeed none other than the Son of God. But, if Son of God were taken as a mere Messianic title, it could not, as such, form any contrast to Son of man, for Son of man is in itself a very high Messianic title.

Thirdly, the characterization of God as "the living God" points to a sonship transcending Messiahship. It is true, of course, that "the living God" is a not uncommon designation of God, amounting almost to a semi-proper name. When used in a strong asseveration where the emphasis rests on the truthfulness of the assertion, it need involve no more than a means of heightening the latter, and need not imply any reflection upon the inherent meaning of the phrase. But in the present case it is not the veracity of what Peter says that comes under consideration. The main point is

rather the content of the character ascribed to Jesus, and for defining this the naming of God in this peculiar way cannot be without significance. In a question of the sonship of Jesus the fact of His being the Son of *the living God* must add something to the import of the sonship. It would seem to imply that in and through Jesus God has manifested Himself as the God who imparts life, and that in the manifestation and transmission of this life of God Jesus has shown Himself the veritable Son of God, partaking of the life and life-giving character of God Himself. If the sonship is thus associated, not merely with a mission from God, but with the essential character of God as possessing life, then the sonship spoken of transcends Messiahship, and appears as the outcome, not merely of the will of God, but of God's nature, and correspondingly it cannot but be descriptive of *nature* in the case of Jesus.

Fourthly, the pointed correspondence between the confession of Peter and the avowal made by Jesus in answer to Peter requires that in the former the ascription of an element of supernaturalness shall be recognized. Our Lord declares: "I, on my part, say unto thee. . . ." The Greek brings this out very strongly through the use of the pronoun: *kago de soi lego*. Now the import of this avowal, made with reference to Peter, centers in the fact that our Lord contrasts the natural name of Peter, Simon Bar-Jonah, with a higher name, Kepha, a name which puts him into an altogether new category, as the rock upon which the supernatural structure of the Church is to be raised.¹⁰ This perfectly corresponds to the fact that Peter had substituted for a purely official interpretation of Jesus in which at best the element of supernatural origin and nature remained in the background, an interpretation in which this latter element was stressed. Jesus adds that upon Simon Bar-Jonah, changed into Kepha, Petros, Petra, He will build His Church. Now as a matter of fact the Church is not built upon the Messiahship of Jesus alone, but has through the ages confessed Jesus as the divine Son of God by origin and nature.

10. Zahn's interpretation differs from that given above in that he finds in the contrast between Simon Bar-Jonah and Petros a symbol of the contrast between "flesh and blood" and *apokalypsis* as the source of the knowledge spoken of; *Das Evangelium des Matthaeus*, p. 536.

The sonship of Jesus with reference to God likewise enters into the annunciation of the nativity and the supernatural birth of Jesus of the Virgin Mary. In Matthew's record, it is true, this does not lie so clearly on the surface as it does in Luke's. In the former the supernatural character of the birth, to the exclusion of all human paternity, is affirmed in 1:18, 20. But more than this is implied, and that not merely in the background of the Evangelist's mind: the very words of the annunciation in 1:21 suggest the Deity of the child, in the form of equivalence to Jehovah. Of course the appointment of the name Jesus — "Jehovah is salvation" — does not of itself affirm this, for as before under the Old Covenant, so now also the name might have been borne by the child as a standing witness to the fact that Jehovah is salvation, without thereby meaning that the child is Jehovah. In reality, however, the context here makes the situation far more concrete than would be the case under general circumstances. When after the appointment of a name meaning "Jehovah is salvation" there is immediately added the explanatory statement, "For it is he that shall save his people from their sins," no other interpretation remains possible than that Jesus will function as Jehovah, and that this truth is conveyed by His name. Still even this does not go to the extent of putting the close identification with God in the form of Jesus' being the Son of God. It is not rash to infer, however, that this latter lay actually in the mind of the Evangelist, since it is hard to tell how he could have conceived the identification in "saving" with Jehovah on any other principle than that of sonship.

It is different in Luke's account of the annunciation to Mary by Gabriel. Here it is foretold that the child shall be called "the Son of the Most High," 1:32, and "the Son of God," verse 35. And this is stated in such a way as to imply that the birth is due to the paternity of God working through the Holy Spirit. It is true, in verse 32 the two things of Mary's bearing a son and His being called "the Son of the Most High" are simply joined together without causal explanation of the one from the other. The language used does not compel the inference that the sonship will be derived from the mode of the birth. But this could not be stated at the beginning, because in the first greeting the mode of birth is not yet defined as supernatural, it simply being stated that she has

found grace with God, and will conceive and bear a son. In verse 35, on the other hand, the specific announcement of the supernatural conception having been introduced, the divine sonship of the child is immediately brought into connection with this by means of *dio*: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee, *wherefore* (*dio*) also the holy thing that is born ('being begotten') shall be called Son of God." The nature of the connection should be sharply observed: the angel does not say that, because conceived of the Holy Spirit, He shall *be* the Son of God, but that for the reason stated He shall be *called* Son of God. The name will be consciously associated with the manner of birth. In the other case "Son of God" might have a purely Messianic sense: because supernaturally born He shall be the Messiah; as it is, "Son of God" has the nativistic sense: people shall give Him the name "Son of God" in view of His conception from the Holy Spirit. And in the light of verse 35 there is every reason to take the name in verse 32 in the same sense, so far as the intent of the angel is concerned, although here the connection could not as yet be drawn by Mary. Nativistic sonship and Messianic kingship are clearly enough distinguished in the statement: "This one shall be great, and shall be called a Son of the Most High, . . . and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his father David, and he shall be king over the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end." The implication, therefore, is clearly that God can be called the Father of Jesus, and Jesus can be called the Son of God so far as the origin of His human nature is concerned because this origin was due to a direct paternal act on the part of God. True, it is not said in so many words that God *begets* Jesus. Nevertheless the words "Holy Spirit" and "Power of the Most High" amount virtually to this very thing. The Holy Spirit comes under consideration as the Power of God, that through which God works; what takes place, therefore, is meant as an act of God.

This becomes still more plain when we notice the language used: the word *episkiazein* ("overshadow") suggests that the power of God comes in the form of a cloud, for such a figure cannot be used for power in general, but only for power embodied in the form of a cloud. This is further confirmed by the account

of the transfiguration, where we find the same word, "overshadow," used in all the Synoptics, and that distinctly in conjunction with the cloud: "a cloud overshadowed them." But this cloud in the transfiguration is a cloud indicating the presence of God; it is the theophanic cloud. This appears in two ways: Matthew describes it as a luminous cloud, which makes us think of the Old Testament theophanic cloud; and all the Synoptics state that the voice came out of the cloud, marking the cloud as a special vehicle of God's revealing presence. We have also the testimony of 2 Peter 1:16-18, which describes the voice of God on the mount of transfiguration as a voice borne by the Majestic Glory, that is, a voice proceeding from the *Skekinah*. To say that the conception of Jesus was accompanied by a theophany does not involve that there was an appearance of God in human form, nor that any physical act of begetting took place; the theophanic presence, as just shown, is precisely the same as at the transfiguration, where no shape or form was seen. The representation is at the farthest distance from those of pagan mythology. It simply serves to characterize the act of impregnation as in the strictest and most direct sense an act of God, however accomplished — an act of God in virtue of which Jesus could properly be called "Son of God."¹¹

This nativistic sonship seems to be referred to in one other connection in the Gospel of Luke. When in the genealogy, 3:38, Adam is called "the son of God," this is evidently done to bring out the analogy between him and Jesus. As Adam had no human father, and in this respect differed from all the persons forming

11. Compare Briggs, *The Messiah of the Gospels*, p. 49: "The conception of Jesus in the womb of the Virgin Mary differs from all other conceptions of children by their mothers in that there was no human father. The place of the human father was taken by God Himself, not that God appeared in theophany in human form to beget the child after the analogy of the mythologies of the ethnic religions: but that God in theophany in an extraordinary way, unrevealed to us, and without violation of the laws of maternity, impregnates the Virgin Mary with the holy seed. The words of the angel imply a theophanic presence; for though it might be urged that the coming of the Spirit upon her was an invisible coming, after the analogy of many passages of the O.T., yet the parallel statement that the divine power overshadowed her cannot be so interpreted. For it not only in itself represents that the divine power covered her with a shadow; but this is to be thought of after the uniform usage of Scripture as a bright cloud of glory hovering over her, resting upon her, or enveloping her with a halo of divinity in the moment when the divine energy enabled her to conceive the child Jesus." Compare also Plummer, *Commentary on the Gospel of Luke*, p. 24.

the intermediate links in the genealogy, being a product of the direct creative act of God, so Christ, "the last Adam," was supernaturally called into being (as to His human nature) by God Himself. Perhaps the thought of this analogy in the mind of Luke furnished the reason for his so placing the genealogy as to make it immediately precede the account of the temptation of "the last Adam," which continues the parallelism to the fact that both alike were proved and tempted. The difference, however, continues to exist, that Adam was created whilst the production of the human nature of Jesus was a begetting, since the continuity and organic connection with the human race through the mother had to be reckoned with.

The divine voice from heaven at the baptism and the transfiguration constitutes the highest witness borne to Jesus' sonship, apart from His self-testimony. In connection with the baptism the only difference in the Synoptical record consists in the fact that Mark and Luke bring the words in the form of an allocution addressed to Jesus, whereas Matthew gives the statement in the third person, "This is my beloved Son." There is a difference, however, between the voice at the baptism and that at the transfiguration, consisting in the fact that on the later occasion, according to all three Synoptics, the words "hear Him" were added. This addition probably had something to do with the proximity of the passion at the time of the transfiguration, which made it appropriate that Jesus should be accredited anew of God, and with increased emphasis, in view of the impending events, which might have seemed to call His claims into question. The only difference here, comparing the Synoptics among themselves, is that Matthew contains the clause "in whom I am well pleased" repeated from the baptism. The "chosen" of Luke is not a real difference from the "beloved" in Matthew and Mark, for it probably has adjectival force. At any rate, these differences are negligible so far as the determination of the import of the sonship of Jesus is concerned. For the latter the only thing coming under consideration is the relationship between the two clauses "my beloved Son" and "in whom I am well pleased."

It is clear that on the rendering "I am well pleased" the second clause amounts to little more than a tautology, no matter whether the former be understood of mere Messianic sonship of or super-

Messianic, ontological sonship. The "being well pleased" does not come up to the "beloved" of the first clause; indeed, it is an anticlimax. But this difficulty disappears immediately if *eudokesa* be rendered by "I have chosen." This is not a rendering of last resort, but one of perfect naturalness and not infrequent occurrence. The aorist means "on whom my good pleasure has settled."¹² The sentence then comes to stand: "This is my beloved Son, whom I have chosen in my good pleasure." But this sentence still admits of a twofold construction, depending on whether the first fact stated is taken as the result or the cause of the second fact expressed. On the former view we obtain: This is my beloved Messianic Son, because my choice has fallen on Him for this office. This construction regards the sonship as Messianic: it speaks of the Messianic dignity of Jesus as a result of the divine election. On the other view the result is as follows: This is my beloved Son, on whom, because He is that, my choice for the Messiahship has fallen. Two considerations incline us to adopt the latter construction. One is the occurrence of the divine declaration on the two high occasions of the Gospel history. If even in other situations the super-official sonship is revealed and recognized in the record as lying back of the Messianic sonship, we should feel it as an inadequacy were it not here given its legitimate place. The other consideration is that had Messiahship been expressed in the first clause under the figure of sonship, then the more natural mode of expressing the cause of this Messianic sonship would have been to employ for this likewise the same figure in terms of generation: This is my Messianic Son whom I have begotten.¹³

Of course, in the abstract there would remain the possibility that the sonship spoken of in the first clause is not superhuman, ontological sonship, but ethico-religious sonship, and that the declaration is to the effect that God, from among His many sons bearing this character, had selected Jesus for the Messianic office. Such an interpretation might suit the modern view of the life of

12. Compare for instance Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Matthaeus*, p. 144, note 66. I Macc. X, 47 is especially instructive: "Having the choice between Alexander and Demetrius, they chose Alexander" (*eudokēsan en Alexandrōi*).

13. This observation is confirmed by the variant reading of Luke 3:22 in Codex D (Bezae), the Itala and some Patristic citations which read: "Thou art my beloved Son; this day have I begotten thee" (in dependence upon Psalm 2:7 Zahn is inclined to adopt this reading as authentic).

Jesus, were it not for the fact that on this view itself Jesus was altogether unique in the possession of such ethico-religious sonship, it being the very purpose of His Messianic election to communicate it to others. What is held to be the end of the Messianic appointment cannot at the same time be regarded as an antecedent state of fact already realized in many others.

The interpretation adopted above will appear all the more plausible if the full force of *agapetos* ("beloved") in Biblical Greek is recognized. In all cases where this adjective appears with *huios* ("son") it transcends the general meaning of "beloved," so as to signify *beloved in a unique sense*. Hence in the LXX it stands as the rendering for the Hebrew *ben jachid* ("only son"), and can even become synonymous with *monogenes* ("only begotten"). A sonship so unique does not permit us to restrict its meaning to that of a bare figure for Messiahship. The voice declares two things: first, that Jesus, in a peculiar sense, and antecedently to His calling, is the Son of God; and secondly, that the divine good pleasure has come to rest upon Him for the Messianic appointment. And the former clause explains the second. The passage belongs in the small group of statements which give us a glimpse of the relation existing between our Lord's Deity and His redemptive function in the incarnate state. It is the name Son of God which holds these two aspects in His life, the eternal aspect and the temporal aspect, together in a common designation.

Among *the others* who ascribe divine sonship to Jesus, we may also count the Evangelists. True, it might be said that their opinion and mode of speaking is immaterial for dealing with the self-consciousness of Jesus. From a methodical point of view this is undoubtedly so. And yet it is unnatural to overlook the fact that the Evangelists wrote with the historical material before them, and that, however much they might have felt the influence of the Christological development in the early Church, they could scarcely have conceived and propagated an opinion that was entirely unsupported by, or utterly at variance with, the historical data. How high or how low an idea they associate with the divine sonship of the Lord ought to throw some weight in the scale.

Fortunately we can quote unquestionable testimony in this respect from within the ranks of the critics themselves. It is

coming to be more and more widely acknowledged that all the Evangelists — not only John, but likewise the Synoptics — understand the name Son of God in a sense which they connect with Jesus' nature, a sense higher than the purely Messianic one. The Evangelists had no other belief in this matter than was the common belief among those for whom in the first instance they wrote. Wrede has made this superabundantly plain as regards Mark, and if it be said that Wrede had a special motive, connected with his theory, for maintaining it, then we may quote a well-known New Testament scholar for whom no such special motive existed, Johannes Weiss, who says: "Even as Paul regards Christ as a divine being, and places all emphasis on his descent from heaven, and no emphasis on the mode of his birth, so our Evangelist (Mark) does not deem it necessary to make any reference to the birth of Jesus." And, a little later: "He is for Mark the Son of God, who has free disposal of the power and omniscience of God."¹⁴

It is true, neither Wrede nor Weiss considers this as historically reliable evidence of the actual facts in the life of Jesus. To them it is merely a question of the literary and doctrinal standpoint of these writers. From our standpoint we would submit that such a viewpoint on the part of the Evangelists and of the public for which they wrote does not admit of easy explanation unless we accept the facts as true. Mark has written his high Christology into the very first sentence of his Gospel: "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God."

Having now completed our induction of the Synoptical data bearing on the divine sonship of Jesus, we may be permitted to put the question in what relation, if any, the several references and meanings of the title Son of God stand to one another. This is not a question of bare fact, as though for the constructive relationship the same direct witness could be gathered from the sources as we have found to be available for the matter-of-fact applications themselves. What we have studied is the reality of life, which, even though it be supernatural life, does not lose the flexible, plastic character pertaining to life everywhere. No rigid adherence to any single sense of the title is observable anywhere, not even where its reach transcends the limits of a time-circum-

14. Johannes Weiss, *Das älteste Evangelium*, pp. 43, 49.

scribed state. In the Synoptics there is scarcely a passage revealing the intra-divine (Trinitarian) sonship in isolation. In by far the most cases the one reference passes over into the other, and it is sometimes hard to decide where the one stops and the other begins. Such deliverances as the monologue of Matt. 11:27 and the voices at the baptism and the transfiguration, while almost blinding our vision with the light of Deity, nevertheless mediate this vision for us through the perspective in which the specifically divine appears as subservient to the officially Messianic. The Son, who alone knows the Father, and who is known of the Father alone, and who speaks of these things in sublime language, is none the less the Son to whom all things were delivered by the Father. The One on whom the good pleasure of the Father came to rest is also the One who was antecedently the beloved Son. The last messenger sent to the wicked husbandmen is sent last for no other reason than that He represented to the Father, quite apart from His mission, the highest One who could be sent. These cases ought to caution us against the inference that the writer of a particular passage, because he singles out a specific aspect of Jesus' sonship, was on that account ignorant of or opposed to every other construction of the idea. The four aspects distinguished do not represent four successive stages in the Christology of the early Church. They are rather mutually coherent aspects of the one fundamental fact of Jesus' divine sonship.

In order to make this interrelation clear to ourselves in detail, we must draw a careful distinction between the sequence in the sphere of being and the sequence in the sphere of revelation. It is obvious on the surface of the matter that the order need not — in fact cannot — be the same in both spheres. That which is the *outcome* of the higher naturally appears in history as the medium for the disclosure of that higher thing, and consequently appears earlier in time.

Beginning, then, with the order in the sphere of being, we note that the highest thing is the pre-temporal, pre-mundane sonship of the Second Person of the Trinity with reference to the First. This is called sonship, and that not only in the Fourth Gospel, but likewise in the Synoptics, so that the Trinitarian dogma need not introduce any foreign, metaphysical terminology for the expression

of this part of its content, but can remain in touch with the simple form of statement found in the Gospel record itself. The importance of this first fact cannot be overestimated. It is absolutely essential to the Deity of our Lord, because it places Him, jointly with the Father, above the relativity of all created being and development, not merely as concerns His Person, but also so far as the supreme intra-divine relation, connoted by His name, is concerned. To put the matter pointedly, without shunning even the semblance of paradox, we might say that this aspect of the sonship would have existed even if there had been no world, no man, no religion, no redemption and no Messiahship at all.

Secondly, out of this develops, and to it is adjusted, the Messianic sonship. Our Lord's eternal sonship qualifies Him for filling the office of Messiah. This office is such, and implies such a relation of close affiliation with God, such an acting as the absolute representative of God, such a profound communion of life and purpose with God, that only a Son in the highest sense can adequately fill the office. Thus the office of Messiahship calls for a *Son*. But the reverse is also true: the sonship calls for a peculiarly high type of Messiahship. If the high office seeks a high person, the high Person likewise requires that the office shall be made commensurate with His character and dignity. This results in imparting to the Messiahship a filial character, and so renders the name Son of God appropriate in a Messianic sense. From this it will be seen that the Messianic sonship is not really something separated from the eternal sonship; Jesus is not Son in two senses that have nothing to do with each other. The Messianic sonship is simply the eternal sonship carried into a definite historical situation.

In the third place, the Messiahship involves the assumption by the Messiah of a human nature, His introduction into the human race, as a member of the same. Had this Messiah been any other than the eternal Son, or any other than a filial Messiah, He might have been born after some other fashion than through direct supernatural begetting on the part of God, through the Holy Spirit, without human paternity. But, being what He is, it was eminently appropriate that also in the mode of His introduction into the human race, the mode of filiation should be followed — that He should be born as even in His human nature literally the

Son of God, thus having His human birth in full harmony with the general character of His Messianic and His eternal filial relation to God. This again, therefore, is not a third sonship, not something new, but simply the carrying out of the first and second aspects into the definite issue of the incarnation.¹⁵

Finally, in the fourth place, the incarnation involves that the incarnate Messiah shall lead a truly human life. In such a life there is, of necessity, a religious and moral relation to God. As man, Jesus had religion, the only perfect religion that ever existed on earth since the days of paradise, and He likewise possessed a perfect ethical life. But, being in three antecedent senses the Son of God, it became fitting that in Him this religious and moral relation to God should receive a marked filial character — that not only in the general sense in which every child of God calls God his Father should Jesus also do so, but that even in this matter, where there exists such a close analogy with the experience of all believers, there should enter something unique, because the principle carried through in the three preceding relations requires application here also. In prayer to God and in obedience to God Jesus could call God Father as no one else can ever do, the reason for this being not only His possession of a perfect religious and moral experience, but chiefly that His religious and moral sonship was inevitably colored by the consciousness of sonship in the three preceding senses. Even here, then, there is not added a new fourth thing independent of the first three, but the new thing that results, results from the carrying through of those preceding aspects of His sonship into a new peculiar situation.

Such is the order in the sphere of existence. Next we shall consider the sequence as it appears in the sphere of revelation. Here the Messianic sonship, not the eternal sonship, comes first.

15. From the above it will be seen that there is truth in the close connection established between the virgin birth of our Lord and His Deity. It is, however, a mistake to suspend the Deity on the virgin birth as its ultimate source or reason. The impossibility of this appears when we observe that the virgin birth has reference to the human nature of our Lord, and cannot, therefore, without confusion of the two natures, be regarded as the cause of Deity. Being an event in time, the virgin birth cannot be productive of something eternal. To suspend the Deity of Christ on His virgin birth would lead to a lowering of the idea of Deity itself. Yet, the feeling is quite correct that those who deny the supernatural birth are also prone to deny the true Deity of our Lord and His eternal existence with God before the world was. The combination of affirming the true Deity of Christ while denying the fact of His virgin birth is not a normally sane position, but a mere theological oddity.

In fact, during the Old Testament period this Messianic sonship stands alone, and is not as yet brought into clear connection with the other. While divine predicates are given to the Messiah in the Old Testament, as, for instance, in Isa. 9:6, yet these are not associated with His being the Son of God. The basis of the Messianic sonship lies in 2 Sam. 7, where God promises that He will be a Father to the Davidic king, will discipline him when necessary, but will not finally reject him forever. Then in Psalm 89 this is worked out so as to represent the Davidic king as the firstborn Son of God, the highest among the kings of the earth. In Psalm 2 this conception receives a wider range, since here it is seen to involve nothing less than inheritance of God's rule over the world. In the course of time revelation could not fail to draw the inference that a world-ruler in such a comprehensive sense must needs be superhuman.

In Psalm 110 the terms are even stronger, speaking of session at the right hand of God, but here the idea of sonship does not enter. But neither in Psalm 2 nor in Psalm 110 is the affirmation of Deity explicitly made. In Psalm 2:7 the appointment to this world-rule, expressed in terms of sonship, is still represented as an event in time, therefore as Messiahship, for Jehovah says: "Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee." We cannot here investigate in what relation this sonship of the theocratic King stands to the sonship attributed in the Old Testament to the nation of Israel, whether the Messianic idea is in its origin independent of the latter, or connected with it. At any rate in point of time the national application precedes the Messianic one.¹⁶

Next, we meet with the sonship of the Messiah in the Apocalyptic literature. In Enoch CV, 2, God says: "I and my Son." In IV Ezr. VII, 28, God speaks of the Messiah as "my Son, the Anointed." In IV Ezr. XIII, 32, 37, 52; XIV, 9, He is simply called "my Son." In the last-named writing there seems to be an allusion to Psalm 2, because the mountain upon which the Messiah comes down and which the nations attack is Mount Zion. It should be observed that the Apocalyptic

16. Some writers maintain that in the Psalter passages (Psalms 2 and 89) the King of Zion, called the Son of God, appears only as an emblem of the nation of Israel; compare Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, I, p. 220. See the present writer's *Eschatology of the Psalter* in *The Princeton Theological Review*, 1920, pp. 29-35 (reprinted in *The Pauline Eschatology*, 1952, pp. 323-365).

writings named seem to be precisely the ones among this class of literature that have the highest Christology, investing the Messiah most distinctly with supernatural attributes and functions, perhaps even to the point of ascribing pre-existence to Him. It is promised to the seer in IV Ezr. that he will be taken up from among men and made to dwell henceforth with God's Son, until the times shall have been fulfilled.¹⁷

Coming to the Gospels, we find that immediately at the nativity the Messianic and the nativistic sonship are associated. In Luke 1:32 reference to the former is at least the most natural interpretation so far as the understanding of Mary was concerned, for she would naturally have connected the name "Son of the Most High" with that which she up to that point knew of sonship of the Coming One, and that doubtless was the Messianic connotation. Then, as we have seen, in verse 35 the nativistic idea is joined to this. It is worthy of observation, however, that in all the revelations that cluster around the nativity the name Son of God in the purely Messianic sense does not occur. Subsequently in the Gospels also revelation refrains from using "the Son of God" independently in Messianic connections. It is always meant as something intimately connected with Jesus' Messiahship, to be sure, but still as something in reality lying back of the latter. It would be far from the truth to assert that the name Son of God has in the Synoptics a simply Messianic and not an ontological sense. This may be true of the appraisal of Jesus by others, but in the innermost circle of revelation it is not so. In fact here one would look in vain for the separate Messianic title. It appears only in combination with the ontological sense, and that in such a way as to give the major stress to the latter.

It should further be noted that there is observable a difference in sequence between the situation where the disclosure comes direct from the mind of God, and the situation where it passes through the apprehension or confession of the disciple. At the baptism and the transfiguration the ontological sonship comes first, and the Messianic status is added as something resulting from it. The same is true where the joint statement of both facts, the

¹⁷ The passage in Enoch where God says "I and my Son" occurs in a section declared by some scholars to be an interpolation; in that case the manner of speaking might be due to later Christian influence. Compare Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, I, p. 221.

intra-divine and the historically Messianic one, issues from the mouth of Jesus Himself, as in the monologue of Matt. 11:27. In such cases the sequence indicated is the only natural one, because, if we may so speak, that is the order of the divine experience from which the revelation springs. On the other hand, where the disclosure comes through the utterance of man, as is the case in the confession of Peter at Caesarea Philippi, the order is with equal naturalness reversed: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," for this sequence corresponded to the experience of Peter, who had had the Messiahship disclosed to him by the Father in heaven in such a way as to see the divine sonship in one and the same perspective with it as its indispensable background. Peter, having no experiential knowledge of the mode of existence within the divine Being, was raised to his first apprehension of it through observing its presence and operation in the Messianic work.

CHAPTER XII

The Son of God (*Continued*)

THE SONSHIP OF JESUS IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

THE signs of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel were recorded in order that the readers might "believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God" (John 20:31). This is, therefore, pre-eminently the Gospel of the Saviour's sonship, and ought to be studied for the very specific purpose of determining what this conception meant both in our Lord's own utterances and in the apprehension of the Evangelist.

So long as the philosophico-theological interpretation, in distinction from the acceptance of it as history, prevailed, a very high, indeed the highest ontological, view was taken by the critical exegetes of the names of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, and in this respect by a curious agreement the critics found themselves at one with the doctrine of the Church, though of course always with the difference that the things which the Church in the simplicity of her faith took and accepted from the lips of Jesus, the critics explained from a source of speculation, opened up much later than the historical life of Jesus, and sending forth a doctrine that would, according to the critical scholars, have been utterly strange and uncongenial to the mind of Jesus could it have been submitted to Him.

Over against this high appraisal of the content of teaching, philosophically considered, joined to a thorough unbelief as to its historicity, stood the attitude of the Apologetes, who defended both the content of the teaching and its provenience, more or less directly from the historical Jesus. At the same time these apologetic writers, who have done so much to vindicate the orthodox views of the Church in regard to the apostolic origin and historical trustworthiness of the Gospel, reveal a tendency to part company with the accepted Church exegesis in certain respects. This ap-

appears most distinctly in the assignment of the various names of the Savior to the several states of His existence. The Trinitarian construction of the Church has always felt that such designations as the Logos, the Son, the Only begotten Son, were intended by the Gospel to apply to the pre-incarnate, that is, the pre-temporal, pre-mundane state of the Person of whom they are predicated. The Church has found in the Fourth Gospel the main, if not the exclusive, source for its teaching on the deep things of God.

On the other hand, it was only human in the apologetes for the historical character of the Gospel to endeavor to approximate its content as much as possible to the plane of the Synoptical teaching of and about Jesus, for the simple reason that thus, in their judgment, one of the chief obstacles to its historicity could be removed. It was held, therefore, critically speaking, even in orthodox circles, that the characteristic names mentioned above should be derived from the incarnation, so that through this event, and not apart from or prior to it, the Evangelist meant to call Jesus the Logos, the Son, the *Monogenes*. These, it was believed, were titles that had currency and meaning only in the earthly, redemptive sphere, not in the transcendental, eternal world from which Christ originated. They held that He was neither Logos, nor Son, nor *Monogenes* from eternity, but only became what these names stand for through His entrance into the world of time.

Or, where this is not affirmed of all three of these names, it is at least maintained with regard to one or two of them. It should be noted, however, that in the view of such writers the denial of these names to the Christ in His pre-existent state is by no means equivalent to the denial of the reality of His pre-existence as such. It was only held that the Subject who bore these names in His earthly appearance did not bear them in His preceding state of eternity; the Evangelist meant his readers to employ some other term to name Him in that. For example, according to Zahn, who makes all three of the names temporal rather than eternal, the Evangelist had at his disposal no other term to designate the pre-incarnate Jesus than simply "God."

This tendency to regard the great names as purely temporal received further backing from the Ritschlian quarter. Here all that savors of the speculative and metaphysical is removed from

Christian teaching. Harnack's exegesis of the Gospel, with its sharp distinction between the metaphysically colored Prologue and the ethically colored Gospel, and his refusal to recognize the Prologue as in any sense a programme for the ideas in the Gospel, clearly reveals the influence of this Ritschlian motive. For such as still set store by the great theological doctrines, for which the Fourth Gospel has pre-eminently furnished the basis, the tendency referred to may easily seem fraught with danger. One may be inclined to feel that the historical character of the Fourth Gospel has been saved only at the expense of its theological importance. While we are encouraged to maintain our confidence in the actual derivation of this body of teaching from the lips of Jesus, yet we cannot escape the conclusion that somehow in the apologetic process which has buttressed this confidence the former richness and distinctiveness of the teaching have been lost — lost to such an extent that the Fourth Gospel, on this basis, no longer appreciably increases our store of knowledge gathered from the Synoptics.¹

Of the three titles named, our concern here is exclusively with the second and third, the titles of Son and Only Begotten. The Logos title admittedly forms no part of the vocabulary of Jesus.² As to the Messianic "Son of God," if we were to believe the charge that the Evangelist has removed the historical Jesus entirely out of the bounds of actuality into the realm of philosophical transcendence, then we would expect this Messianic title to be submerged entirely. So far from this being the case, we find it represented on several occasions, on one of which it appears in the most pointed form based on Jesus' manhood alone. In 10:34-36 our Lord expressly vindicates His right in virtue of His Messianic

1. The author may here refer to his articles on *The Range of the Logos-Title in the Fourth Gospel*, in *The Princeton Theological Review*, Vol. XI (1913), pp. 365-419, 557-602, where the facts and their bearing on the Christology of the Fourth Gospel are given in detail.

2. Nearest to the application by Jesus of the Logos idea to Himself, and actually divined there by some, is the statement in the passage John 10:34-36. Here a contrast is drawn between those to whom the Word of God merely came, and Him who was sanctified and sent into the world as the personal bearer of the Word of God. If, however, an allusion to the Logos concept were intended, it would scarcely have been clothed in the form of so subtle an allusion. Grill, *Untersuchungen über d. Entst. des vierten Evangeliums*, thinks that the allusion is real, not, of course, as an idea of Jesus, but as in the mind of the Evangelist, p. 34. Harnack, on the other hand, finds in this free, unspeculative handling of the term "Word of God" clear evidence for the correctness of his thesis, that the body of the Gospel, in distinction from the Prologue, is not framed upon the Logos idea (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*,) 1892, pp. 206ff.

calling to bear the name in question: "Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods? If he called them gods unto whom the word of God came . . . say ye of him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am Son of God?" The reference is to Psalm 82:6, where the judges of the Old Testament theocracy — or, if we are to believe critical expositors of the Psalter, the pagan gods—are addressed by Jehovah as "gods."³ "God standeth in the congregation of El; he judges among the Elohim: I said, Ye are Elohim, and all of you sons of El-jon" (verses 1, 6). Our Lord construes this peculiar address to magistrates as "gods" to be made on the ground of their having been made recipients of the Word of God, possibly the divine word of appointment installing them in their position as representatives of the authority of God.⁴ They therefore were pronounced gods in view of their office. Now on the same ground of appointment and comprehensive investment with the divine sovereignty Jesus bases His claim to the title Son of God. He places the sanctifying before the sending into the world, because it preceded the latter, and a suggestion of pre-existence accompanies the statement, reminding us that that which is highest in point of nature can be joined to that which is purely official.⁵

Our Lord, therefore, does not here take into account His Deity and relation to God antecedently to His Messianic functioning. He here stakes the issue wholly on His temporal appointment. The reason for this fact, which at first may seem strange in view of the transcendent claims made by Jesus elsewhere in this Gospel, is not far to seek. The charge of blasphemy had been brought against Him as a man: "For a good work we stone thee not, but for blasphemy, and because thou, *being a man*, makest thyself God" (verse 33). The argument is from analogy: the judges were entitled to the name in that official sense, and on the same ground Jesus is entitled to it, hence even on the basis of the Jews' own accusation there was no blasphemy involved.

3. Compare Cheyne, *The Origin of the Psalter (Bampton Lectures)*, p. 120. This exegesis is not that of Jesus, for He proceeds on the assumption that those addressed were "men."

4. Compare Ex. 21:6, where the English has "judges" but the Hebrew is "gods" (*Elohim*).

5. Compare in the immediate context verse 30: "I and the Father are one." It is clear that the Evangelist recognized no contradiction between this and verses 34-36.

But the argument is not wholly from analogy; it is also *a fortiori*: there was a wide difference between those to whom merely the Word of God came, and Him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world; Jesus' Messiahship carries with itself an all-comprehensive authority: it involved consecration in heaven and being sent into the world. Still this *a fortiori* element in the argument does not affect the common ground of delegated authority on which the two cases compared are put. It is a question of more and less, but still a question of more and less in the same sphere.

Some have found interwoven with this still further an argument *a majori ad minus*: if they could rightly be called *gods*, I, who have greater mission, can certainly call myself at least *the Son of God*. On this view of the matter Jesus would not, at least not for the purpose of argument, be laying claim here to the name God. It seems to us, however, that the distinction between God and Son of God is not animadverted upon. In the Psalm "gods" and "sons of the Most High" are used in parallelism. And in the context of Jesus' discourse it is not merely divine sonship that He affirms of Himself, but likewise oneness with the Father, the being of the Father in Him, His being in the Father. Obviously in the intent of the discourse being the Son of God includes being God.⁶

The passage commented upon is, however, by no means the only reference to the Messianic sonship of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel. There are quite a number of statements in which Jesus speaks of Himself as Son with a connotation of Messianic dependence upon and subordination to the Father. Nor does the name Son appear in such connections without special significance; it is evidently introduced for the very purpose of expressing the thought referred to. According to 13:3, the Father gives all things into the hands of the Son; according to 5:19, 20, the Son can do nothing of Himself but what He sees the Father doing. . . for the Father loves the Son and shows Him all things that He Himself does, and will show Him still greater works; according to 5:26, the Son has it as a gift from the Father to carry life in Himself; according to 5:43, the Son came in the Father's name; according to 6:57, the Son lives because of the Father in the same

6. So Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Johannis*, p. 463.

way as the believer lives because of eating Christ; according to 8:34, 35, the Son specifically *as son* has authority to set free the bondservants of sin, and possesses the right to abide in the house for ever; according to 10:17, 18, although Jesus has power to lay down His life and take it again, yet, on the other hand, He does so in obedience to a commandment received from the Father; according to 10:25, He does His works in His Father's name; according to 12:49, all His saying and speaking rests on a commandment which the Father that sent Him gave unto Him; according to 14:28, the Father is greater than the Son⁷; according to 14:30, 31, His going forth to meet the prince of the world is out of obedience to His Father's commandments; according to 15:10, the Son has kept the Father's commandments; in 20:17, even the risen Christ speaks of the Father as His Father and His God.

It would be rash, however, to assert that in all these instances the Messianic concept exhaustively accounts for the turn given to the expression. Obviously the Subject who makes these utterances speaks out of a consciousness at the same time both transcending and including the temporal Messianic relationship. This is precisely the peculiarity of the whole representation; in it the ontological sonship and the Messianic sonship are most closely interwoven. In 6:69, Peter's confession has the same form and sequence as in Matt. 16, and for the reasons there stated points to a sonship that is climactic of the Messiahship. In 8:16, 18, 23, there is a clear interweaving between the ideas of fatherhood and sonship, on the one hand, and those of Jesus' being of another world, of His being the absolute equivalent of God, so that to know Him is to know the Father also, on the other hand.

As in Matt. 11:27, mutual knowledge is said to exist between the Father and the Son in John 10:15; 14:6, 7, 9, 11. The Father appears as the source of the Messianic commission in its all-comprehensiveness, and the provenience of the Son from a higher world is associated with this. The crowning statement is that of 10:30: "I and my Father are one," and that in a context, as we have seen, which stakes the title of sonship on the Messianic commission. The inbeing of believers in Jesus, joined to His

7. According to 10:29, the Father is greater than all; but in this verse the "all" does not include the Son,

own inbeing in the Father and the Father's inbeing in them (14:20; 17:22-24) — the God-mysticism, as it has been called, as the consummation of the Christ-mysticism of Paul, and in fact an anticipation of the latter — certainly passes beyond the highest potentialities of Messianic appurtenance as such, and can find its explanation only in the super-official, supernaturalistic sphere. On what has been tabulated above, a sonship higher than and anterior to the Messianic sonship must be postulated, and it can be fully demonstrated, as we shall presently see, from what the Fourth Gospel (both Jesus and the Evangelist) teaches in regard to the *Monogenes* sonship and the pre-existence.

According to some expositors, however, this mysterious and transcendent something that shines through the Messianic avowals needs no metaphysics for its explanation. It is believed to be fully accounted for by the possession and influence of the Spirit; it is held to be simply the extension into the subsequent life of Jesus of the relationship first established in the incarnation, and confirmed in the baptism. This construction is the positive counterpart to the denial that the names Son and Only Begotten reach back into the pre-existent state. Among recent writers Lütgert has made this view the basis for his entire construction of the Johannine Christology.⁸ He assimilates in this point the Synoptics and John. In both equally Jesus is regarded as the Son of God, according to Lütgert, because of His possession of the Spirit. He connects this pneumatic sonship, not only with the few instances in the Fourth Gospel where Jesus speaks of the Spirit as His endowment, but also with the far more numerous passages which attribute to Him a seeing and hearing of the things of God and a descent from heaven. Usually such statements, especially those of the latter class, are brought into connection with the pre-existence of the Son. In His pre-existent state Jesus saw and heard the heavenly things; it was from heaven that He came down (anthromorphically speaking) into the flesh. According to Lütgert the statements mean that Jesus, through the Spirit, continually has His origin in the sphere of heaven. Lütgert, while not denying the pre-existence theoretically, yet as a matter of fact

8. Lütgert, *Die Johann. Christologie*, in *Beitr. z. Förd. Christl. Theol.*, pp. 1-139; especially pp. 4:67: *Der Sohn Gottes und der Ursprung Jesu aus dem Himmel*.

relates practically all the passages on which the doctrine of Jesus' pre-existence is based to the Spirit-fed life of Jesus on earth, so that, except for the explicit teaching of the Prologue, there would hardly remain any necessity for affirming the pre-existence.

It cannot be admitted that Lütgert has made this construction plausible. Nowhere — not even in the Synoptics — is the possession of the Holy Spirit represented as constituting Jesus the Son of God. There is no causal connection traced, as we have shown at an earlier point, between the Spirit-baptism and the sonship. *He did not become the Son through receiving the Spirit*; on the contrary, He was baptized with the Spirit because He was already the Son. The Pauline soteriological analogy is instructive here: while born *kata pneuma* (according to the Spirit) Christians receive the Spirit because they are sons of God (Gal. 4:6; Rom. 8:15, 16). In John 1:33, 34 the descent of the Spirit is not regarded by the Baptist as the productive source of Jesus' sonship, but only as the source of knowledge concerning it. Objectively the reception of the Spirit is connected only with the (future) act of bestowing the baptism of the Spirit on others: "On whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending . . . He it is who baptizeth with the Holy Spirit." On Lütgert's view verse 34b ought to have read (connecting directly with 33a): "On whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending . . . He is the Son of God." It is true that the Fourth Gospel knows of a present hearing and seeing of the things of God on the part of Jesus, and brings this into significant connection with His Messianic sonship. And on general principles, though this is nowhere explicitly stated, we may conceive of these processes as mediated by the Spirit (1:51; 5:19, 20, 30). But, even if this function of the Spirit be recognized, none of these statements yields the specific idea that such receptivity of Jesus with regard to the influence of the Spirit makes Him the Son of God. And these passages by no means cover all that the Gospel has to teach concerning the seeing and hearing of heavenly things by Jesus. The fallacy of Lütgert's argument lies in his assumption that the unique knowledge of Jesus can have only one source; if, therefore, a present seeing and hearing is attributed to Him, then all His seeing and hearing must be assigned to the present life. But the temporal seeing and hearing

do not exclude nor render superfluous the eternal seeing and hearing in the state of pre-existence.

In some cases the reference to the pre-existence is marked clearly enough either through the different tense or the different verb used, or even by explicit statement. In 3:31, the subject is described as "the One who comes from heaven" (present tense), and the experiences attributed to Him are: "He has seen" (perfect tense), and "He did hear" (aorist tense). In 6:46, the subject is "the One who is from God," and the act is: "He has seen" (perfect tense); here the uniqueness of the vision of God affirmed of Jesus also requires its reference to the pre-existence, for the Spirit-communion enjoyed by Jesus during His earthly state was not absolutely unique, but only differed in degree from that enjoyed by others. In 8:38, there is a pointed contrast between the perfect-character of the process claimed by Jesus and the aorist-character of that ascribed by Him to the Jews: "I speak the things which I have seen (*heoraka*) with my Father: and ye also do the things which ye heard (*ekousate*) from your father."

Even more forced than the attempted explanation of the time-forms of expression is that attempted in the case of the local forms of statement. Because in the case of believers such expressions as "to be of God," "to be from above," pertain to the earthly mode of existence, therefore, it is held, when the same or similar expressions occur of Jesus, they must everywhere in His case have only the same earthly meaning, and even such strongly local descriptions as "to have come from God," "to have descended from heaven," must be kept down to the earthly level of existence. But here also there are characteristic differences between what is said of believers and what is said of Jesus. It is never affirmed of believers that they have *come* from God or from above; their origin from God is always expressed in the present tense, except where the verbs "to be born" and "to be begotten" are used, and here the verbs are verbs never used of Jesus.⁹

Here also Lütgert's argument is ultimately based on the postulate that a two-fold explanation of the heavenly character or provenience of Jesus cannot have lain in the mind of the Evan-

9. Except in the newer reading of John 1:13, *hos egennēthē*.

gelist. Because in 3:34 the fact of Jesus speaking the words of God is based on "He giveth not the Spirit with measure," therefore the statement "He has seen and did hear" in verse 32 must likewise be wholly explainable from Jesus' possession of the Spirit. And, because in 6:63 the quality of Jesus as the bread of life is brought in connection with the influence of the Spirit, therefore all the strong expressions used in the context about His coming down from heaven (verses 33, 38, 41, 42, 50, 51, 58, 62) must be interpreted solely in terms of earthly, temporal existence, without reference to the eternity factor. To our view, on the other hand, the special character of the Fourth Gospel lies largely in the fact that it combined and closely interweaves the several factors which together make up the supernatural in Jesus.

The full significance of this intra-divine, Trinitarian sonship, as taught in the Gospel, cannot be satisfactorily set forth until after a thorough examination of the name *Monogenes* and the question of the pre-existence. And since these cannot be properly treated except in connection with the nativistic sonship, we reserve them till that point. Before that we shall deal briefly with the one other aspect of the sonship not yet taken into consideration, the so-called ethico-religious sonship. Much is made of this by all interpreters who profess to discover a difference between the Christology of the Prologue and that of the body of the Gospel. The foremost defender of this position is Harnack. According to him, the difference lies not merely in the mode of construction, the Prologue employing the deductive process, that from the philosophical conception of the Logos downward, whilst the body of the Gospel employs the inductive-historical process, that from the phenomena in the life of Jesus upward, but there is also a real difference observable in the content of the doctrine itself. The Christ in the body of the Gospel is said to be to a far less extent, if at all, a metaphysical Christ. His sonship and all the other elements connected with His Person, such as light, life, truth, etc., have quite a different shade of meaning in the body of the Gospel than the Prologue started out to impart to them, according to Harnack. With reference to the sonship in particular, it is pointed out that in the body of the Gospel this is put upon an ethico-religious basis: Jesus is the Son in virtue of an ethical

and religious union with God, not because of any ontological mode of existence in the eternal sphere. The sonship originates and perpetuates itself in the sphere of spiritual fellowship between God and Jesus.

Lüttgert, finding the core of the sonship in the control of Jesus by the Spirit, comes to what is virtually the same conclusion: "As the Son He is obedient to God, and as the One that is obedient to God He is the Son," although in the order of precedence Lüttgert at least would place the former before the latter. But this simply means that in the reciprocal ethical process between God and Jesus the action on the Father's side precedes, whereas on the side of the Son it follows: "The act of Jesus which performs the will of God does not spring from Jesus Himself, but He performs it, because God shows and gives it to Him; such is the manner in which God makes Him his Son by giving Him his work and his word."¹⁰

The best way of testing this theory and sifting the elements of truth in it from those of error consists in tabulating as simply as possible the actual facts registered by the Gospel. In doing this it will have to be remembered that the ethical sonship cannot be cleanly separated from the Messianic relation. It is precisely in the latter that room for the interplay of religious and ethical reactions is created. Consequently it will be hard to tell whether the mention of the sonship and the fatherhood entering into certain statements is due to the ethical and religious communion between Jesus and God alone or, at least in part, perhaps chiefly, to the Messianic status that calls for ethico-religious conduct on the part of Him who is the Son, that is, the Messiah. It goes without saying that where the Messianic idea flows in the sonship cannot be proven to consist in the ethico-religious attitude or disposition of Jesus, far less can it have originated from the latter. But, even were it possible to isolate the ethico-religious, and have it in pure solution, still the conclusion would not be permissible that it gave rise to or produced the sonship. All that could properly be said would be that it appeared characteristic of the dignity or privilege of sonship of God in the common spiritual sense. The conception that moral and religious perfection should produce the Messiahship is strange in itself, for to

10. Lüttgert, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

the Messiahship belong quite a number of other-complexioned requirements than those pertaining to ethical and religious perfection alone. There is in this a strong reminiscence of the erstwhile liberal theory about the genesis of the Messianic consciousness: because Jesus uniquely possessed these perfections, He felt it incumbent upon Himself to mediate them unto others, and in that vocation consisted His Messiahship. It is scarcely necessary at the present day to observe that this is a purely imaginary and thoroughly unhistorical conception of Messiahship, which no one in Jesus' time could have framed — least of all Jesus Himself. But even in regard to the ethico-religious, considered abstractly in itself, it would be contrary to all analogy to think that men create their divine sonship by being good or pious: the idea everywhere is that an antecedently given sonship asserts and evidences itself in moral and religious acts.

The facts, carefully considered, carry in no wise further than has been above indicated. The obedience of Jesus is frequently associated with His sonship; as Son He keeps the commandments of God, 10:18; 12:49; 14:31; 15:10. Further, the keeping of the commandments is represented as essential to the retaining by Jesus of the love of God, 15:10. In both these respects there exists an analogy between the filial relation of Jesus to God and the relation of believers to Jesus, 14:15, 21, 23; 15:10. Of course, in all this there is no ground for affirming that Jesus ascribes an ethico-religious origin to His sonship. The obedience is in accord with the sonship, but nowhere does the obedience appear as either the essence or the ground of the sonship. When Jesus is said to abide in the love of God by keeping His commandments, this is not equivalent to saying that He gained the love of God by keeping His commandments, or that He became the Son of God by so doing.

Sometimes the idea is that the sonship is demonstrated by ethical conduct, as in 8:37-40, but this also differs from saying that the sonship sprang from the ethical conduct. The passage most frequently quoted to substantiate this train of thought is 4:34: "It is my meat to do the will of him that sent me." In this passage, however, there is no specific reference to sonship, as though the sonship grew up, or was nourished, from doing the will of God. The meat is that which sustains the spiritual and vocational

life of Jesus; the text does not say that the meat feeds His sonship. Jesus does not even say "the will of my Father," but only "the will of him that sent me." What our Lord means is that the pursuit of His Messianic calling is so refreshing and satisfying to Him as to render the use of physical food unnecessary at times. He does not even affirm that this is the case under all circumstances, but simply affirms (without the use of the article): "it is food," that is, it sometimes takes the place of food.¹¹

The view has been held that according to the Gospel Jesus' ethical relation to God is the form in which His metaphysical union with God comes to consciousness.¹² This is solely based on the assumption that for the incarnate Christ there existed no other form of knowing His relation to the Father except the ethical form. This would involve a species of kenosis which is entirely foreign to the whole trend of the Gospel. Were Jesus shut up to this one way of realizing the supreme aspect of His union with God, then what would become of His claim to reveal the Father comprehensively in virtue of absolute identity with the latter? The claim would be reduced to extremely modest proportions, not only by the restriction to the ethical sphere implied in this, but also by the absorption of all the rich content of the life of God by this one particular element in it.

In conclusion it should be observed that the terminology of the Gospel in no wise favors the extreme identification between the sonship of Jesus and that of believers which the over-stressing of the ethical and religious application of the idea to Jesus necessarily carries with itself. With regard to believers the characteristic name in John is not *huioi* but *tekna*. The latter, being derived from *tiktein*, lays stress upon the nature and subjective condition belonging to sonship, less than upon position and status, whereas *huios* is the richer, more inclusive term, which has room for both aspects, that of status and that of inherent quality. The distinction is not, of course, exclusive, although on the whole it is characteristic. Even where, as in 1:12, it is a matter of receiving *exousia* ("the right") to become children of God, the gift conferred is described by the word *tekna*, not by *huioi*.

11. Compare Zahn, *Das vierte Evangelium*, in loco.

12. So Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch d. N. T. Theol.*, II, p. 443.

On the other hand, Jesus, through faith in whom the sonship is obtained, appears not as the *teknon* but as *ho huios*, in which phrase the article, singling Him out from all others, should be noted. In the discourse of 8:21 ff., where the status and authority of Jesus in the house of God are defined, involving His authority to deal with others on the principle of emancipation, yet the result of the act is not described in terms of sonship but of freedom: "If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed" (verse 36). Only in verse 35, "The servant abideth not in the house for ever, the son abideth for ever," there may be a case of the naming of those who are emancipated sons by co-adoption, but even here this is not certain, because "the son" who abides for ever may mean Jesus Himself; He may intend to contrast with the expulsion of the Jewish enemies His own permanent abode in the theocracy.

In 1 John 3:2 there seems to be an eschatological outlook into the future "sonship" of the readers, namely, in the words "we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is," but in the address which opens up this future state unto them they are called for the present *tekna*. Compare John 11:52 ("the children of God," *ta tekna tou Theou*), and 20:17, where Jesus places the disciples pointedly on a footing with Himself in the possession of God as Father: "I ascend unto my Father and your Father," though even this way of speaking does not efface the distinction between the two relations, for the Father is Father to the *teknon* as well as to the *huios*. Of course it should not be overlooked that here, and especially in the Epistles of John, the affectionate mode of address, and that in the plural, almost made the use of *tekna* unavoidable. Compare 1 John 2:1, 12, 13, 18, 28; 3:7; 4:4; 5:21.¹³

The question of the presence of the nativistic sonship in John involves one of the most difficult of exegetical and Biblico-theological problems. At the outset, in speaking of John, the distinction between the frame of the Gospel (including the Prologue) and the words of Jesus ought to be kept clearly in mind. It is one thing to say that the Prologue refers or alludes to the supernatural birth of our Lord's human nature, and another thing to

13. The address of the disciples as *paidia* by Jesus (John 21:5) has no bearing on the above question.

say that Jesus in His own discourse speaks of it, or makes allusion to it. The solution of this latter problem is intimately connected with the meaning and the reference of the term *Monogenes*. If that term should be found to relate to the incarnation, then Jesus' characterization of Himself by means of it proves Him to have been aware of whatever peculiarity or uniqueness belonged to that event. But if, on the other hand, the term *Monogenes* should be found to have no reference to the coming in the flesh, in that case a different meaning, belonging to another sphere of existence, being associated with it, the term would not carry a nativistic interpretation of Jesus' sonship. For Jesus' own self-revelation as the Son of God in the nativistic sense, the entire issue is contingent upon the reference of this one term. But this is not so as regards the Evangelist, particularly not so in the Prologue.

To be sure, it would likewise be true of the Evangelist that the reference of the term *Monogenes* to the incarnation would be decisive for his view of the incarnation as imparting a nativistic aspect (among other aspects) to the Saviour's sonship. But in the case of the Evangelist, the same fact can be made plausible without suspending the argument, even to the smallest extent, on the technical term *Monogenes*. The statement of 1:13 contains, either by implication or explicitly (which of the two is the case depends on which of the variant readings is adopted as the authentic text), the affirmation of the supernatural introduction of Jesus into the world. The Evangelist here describes the manner of birth of those believing on the name of the Logos as a birth "not of bloods (plural, *haimaton*), nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." On the ordinary reading of the text, which at the beginning of verse 13 has *egennethesan* ("who were born"), this is the correct translation. But this is such an extraordinary way of characterizing the birth of believers as to render the conclusion well-nigh unavoidable that the writer in penning it must have had his eye on some other extraordinary birth, the remarkable features of which he found reproduced, as it were, in the spiritual birth of believers. And this analogous, archetypal event, in conformity to which he found the birth of believers to have been fashioned, could only have been the birth by which the Logos became flesh. Nor does this conclusion rest

merely on the general impression conveyed by the language of the statement; it is favored — not to say demanded — by certain features in the phrasology itself. The threefold turn given to the thought of a possible opposite to a birth from God — “not of bloods, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man” — requires a special motive for its use. This special motive cannot be found in the desire to emphasize the supernaturalness *in general* of the birth of believers. For that purpose the mere antithesis of “not of the flesh but of God” would have been fully sufficient. “The flesh” over against “God” means nature over against super-nature. Because in the present case this general form of the antithesis did not satisfy the writer, since he wished to define the precise mode of the super-nature involved, he was careful to characterize the contrast in a most pointed threefold form: it was a birth with which neither “bloods,” nor “the will of the flesh,” nor “the will of man” had anything to do.

Again, the further specification of the denial of entrance of the will of the flesh by denial of any influence on the part of the *will of man* demands notice precisely because it seems, on the surface, to be redundant. It may be confidently affirmed that it adds something to the preceding negation. The birth could have been contrary to the flesh, and yet this would not of itself have excluded participation of the male in its production after some fashion or other.¹⁴ That to which the Evangelist refers was a birth which was supernatural in that specific form that the factor of man did not enter into it in any way whatsoever. Moreover the denial of the cooperation of blood is clothed in a most unusual form. The ordinary contrast is between “flesh and blood,” on the one hand, and “God,” on the other.¹⁵ In our passage the ordinary compound phrase “flesh and blood” is separated into its two component elements, and of each of these two elements it is stated separately that they were not involved in the process under discussion.

Besides this, the ordinary sequence of the compound phrase is reversed; the denial is made with regard to “bloods” first, and then with regard to “the will of the flesh.” All this indicates that for the writer the main emphasis rests on the exclusion of blood

14. Compare Gal. 4:29.

15. Compare Matt. 16:17.

from the process of birth that furnished him with the analogy for the birth of believers. While this is clear, it is not so easy on the surface to see how the Evangelist could be intent upon altogether denying the factor of blood in the becoming flesh of the Logos. The case is so singular that it might occasion a degree of temptation to interpret the words as affirming a docetic entrance of the Saviour into the world altogether without the medium of generation or conception on either the paternal or the maternal side. This, however, is excluded by the several occasions on which the mother of Jesus is mentioned in the Fourth Gospel, and that not merely as a matter of common belief among the Jews (6:42), but as a simple statement of fact on the part of the writer (2:1, 3, 5, 12; 19:25). Under these circumstances the view of Zahn, that the plural *haimaton* was chosen on purpose to deny the presence and operation of more than one blood in the birth or begetting, deserves serious consideration. The plural *haimata*, to be sure, is not unusual, but wherever occurring always bears the sense of "bloodshed," and never appears where the contrast between the creature and God is involved. Strictly speaking, for the precise expression of the idea suggested by Zahn, the dual ought to have been employed: "not of *two* bloods," but this precision was not available, since in the language of the New Testament the dual had entirely passed out of use. Finally, the very perceptible stress that is placed in the whole statement upon the exclusion of the will-element, an element usually associated with the male side of the process spoken of, points to the same conclusion, namely that the writer wished to compare the birth or begetting of believers with an analogon in which the male factor played no role whatsoever.

The above reasoning holds true on the basis of the ordinary text with its plural verb. Even with that reading retained, the birth of Jesus with the paternity-element eliminated must be alluded to by way of implied comparison. But the case becomes immeasurably stronger if the singular of the verb be adopted as the original text reading.¹⁶ It is only necessary to write down the rendering of the passage with this text adopted in order to perceive immediately its great significance: "But as many as received

16. For the contextual, internal and critical evidence in favor of this reading compare Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Johannis*, pp. 72-77. The argument is strong.

him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on the name of him who *was born* not of bloods, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." The statement becomes the most direct and lucid description of what is called the virgin birth. No plainer language could possibly have been used for the purpose.

But no matter whether the text be changed or not, no matter whether the doctrine in question be found here by implication or explicitly, this passage ought to set at rest forever the facile assertion that the virgin birth is referred to in only two of the Gospels. For two, *three* will have to be substituted; not as if it were a matter of one more or one less witness — for those who believe in the authority of Scripture a single clear-spoken testimony ought to be as decisive as many — but rather because this Johannine evidence, in accord with the general character of the Fourth Gospel, adds the profound theological illumination to the mere statement of the fact as found in Matthew and Luke.

We shall now proceed to ascertain what light is cast upon the sonship of Jesus by the term *Monogenes*. The question is a two-fold one: it concerns both the inherent significance of the word, and also its reference. The word occurs in the Fourth Gospel in four passages: 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18; and once in 1 John 4:9. The other New Testament occurrences — none of them Christological — are: Luke 7:12; 8:42; 9:38; Heb. 11:17.

There are instances where the second component part of the term loses its force so as to make *monogenes* practically equivalent to *monos*. An only child can be called *monogenes* without reflection upon the question whether it be the only one the parents have ever possessed or brought into the world. A glance at the non-Johannine, non-Christological references cited above makes this clear. Perhaps even in such cases the *-genes* adds a shade of tenderness and poignancy of grief on account of loss through the reflection that the child was a *begotten* child, valued as the offspring of its parents, without, however, implying that there never had been any others.

In the Septuagint *monogenes* appears, consequently, as the translation of the Hebrew *jachid* ("only"). With reference to parentage there is only one instance of this, Judges 11:34: "she

was *monogenes* to him."¹⁷ In a metaphorical sense it is predicated of the soul, called in the Hebrew *jachid* and in the Greek *monogenes*; in the latter, of course, all force of the *-genes* has been lost, the idea being simply that man possesses one soul only, and no more. *Monogenes*, therefore, can be equivalent to "only," excluding all others from the same relationship. The important question is, whether the attrition of use had so obliterated all feeling for the ending *-genes* as to render the term incapable of conveying the thought, where desired, that there was not only a single son, but that back of his existence there lay also a single begetting. For this there is no proof, nor would it be easy, from the nature of the case, to furnish such proof. The etymology of the word remained so perspicuous as to keep its original force within the limits of possible resurrection. Evidently the emergency in the Christological case was for John of an altogether extraordinary kind, and as such required unusual forms of expression. We must, therefore, keep open the possibility that the term *monogenes* has to teach us something about the uniqueness of the *provenience* of Jesus, no less than something about the uniqueness of His sonship as such. The manner of introduction of the word and its adjustment to the context in each case alone can lead to a more or less plausible judgment in this matter.

It has been maintained that not only is there no force inherent any longer in the ending of the word but that also the first part, *mono-*, need not be understood numerically at all, it having become in certain cases a mere metaphorical designation for one "highly beloved." This would take the ontological, no less than the ontogenetic, element out of it. A son could be called *monogenes* simply because he was precious to his parents, without regard to the question whether or not he was the only child. This contention at first sight seems to be justified by the fact that *monogenes* and *agapetos* ("beloved") appear as synonyms in the Septuagint. The appearance, however, is deceptive. A careful examination of the passages shows that the synonymity occurs only where both terms are the rendering of the Hebrew *jachid*. To carry out the view under consideration it would be necessary to ascribe to *jachid* this same metaphorical, non-numerical mean-

17. The other Greek versions have *monogenēs* for *jachid* in genealogical relations elsewhere also; e.g., Aquila in Gen. 22:16.

ing, or else to assume that the translators of the LXX had obscured the true intent of the Hebrew word through reducing it to the qualitative level of the adjective "beloved." The fact is rather that in such cases *agapetos* has been raised to the level of *monogenes*, with the numerical background of uniqueness or exceptionality retained. In such connections "beloved" does not signify "beloved as any son would *as a matter of course* be beloved of his parents," but beloved in a special sense, to a special degree. And this is precisely the association *jachid* frequently carries with itself: "Take now thy son, thine only son, whom thou lovest" (Gen. 22:2; compare verses 12 and 16).

The soul is not called *monogenes* simply because it is precious, but because it is precious in view of its uniqueness: a man has but one life to lose. Indeed it may be plausibly held that in certain New Testament statements likewise *agapetos* attracts to itself this idea of exceptional love on the basis of numerical uniqueness; we believe that it ought to be understood thus in the case of the voice from heaven at the baptism and the transfiguration of Jesus; our Lord here figures not merely as the possessor of the love of God, but as the possessor of the divine love in view of His being the only Son of God.

In Mark 12:6: *eti hena eichen, huion agapeton* ("He had yet one, a beloved son"), the two attributes do not seem to be independent of each other; the second derives its force from the first: "one son, and therefore beloved, as an only son is." Our contention is that there is more in the word than the expression of belovedness; this of course does not mean a denial that the element of belovedness is really present, or even emphatically present. What we mean to insist upon is that this belovedness rests upon the affirmation or implication of numerical oneness as its basis. In John 3:16, 18 the phrase *huios monogenes* undoubtedly stresses the unique value of the Son to the Father, as embodying a unique degree of belovedness, so that it can measure the greatness of God's love for the world; only the idea finds much stronger expression when *monogenes* is understood to contribute to the effect aimed at by reminding of the absolute uniqueness of the Son in His being-relation to the Father. If this passage alludes to the history of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, as in all probability it does, this

will afford positive proof of the inclusion in *monogenes* of the force of the Hebrew *jachid* ("only").

Monogenes is then at least the equivalent of *monos* ("only"). In the foregoing we have left it an open question whether in the compound adjective the ending *-genes* is otiose or not. To this point we now return. There is reason to believe that the Johannean usage does attach a significance of its own to the form *-genes* which makes up the second part of the word. Our reasons concern the two occurrences in the Prologue and the one in the First Epistle. They are not directly applicable to the use of the term in the mouth of Jesus (3:16, 18), although of course any conclusion arrived at in regard to the meaning of the word as used by the Evangelist will inevitably cast its weight into the scale, first so far as the Evangelist's understanding of Jesus' word is concerned, and next so far as the actual intent of Jesus Himself is concerned. And this is altogether independent of the question of the historicity of Jesus' discourse in chapter 3 of the Gospel. The writer cannot have meant to put less into the term where he records Jesus' use of it than where he introduces it in the Prologue in his own statements. But the question will have to be *decided* on the basis of the Prologue and the Epistle.

The facts are as follows: the context in 1:14 speaks of the *gennasthai* either of Jesus or of believers in verse 13, and in verse 14 *gignesthai* occurs with reference to the incarnation. Likewise in 1 John 4:9 the process of *gennasthai* forms the central topic of the preceding context, besides its playing a prominent role in the Epistle as a whole. The proximity of the very idea of begetting or being born in both these cases suffices to create a strong presumption in favor of the significance of *-genes*. To this must be added that in both 1:14 and 1:18 the idea of *endowment by derivation* seems to be alluded to. In verse 14 the glory beheld in Jesus is described as a *doxa hos monogenous para patros* ("glory as of the only begotten of the Father"). We take this not as a comparison ("a glory such as any only begotten son would derive from his father"), but as a statement of correspondence between what was seen in Jesus and what might be expected in

the Only begotten Son from the divine Father.¹⁸ *Para* is not to be construed with the *-genes* in *monogenous*, but with the implied idea of receiving (so Zahn) or coming from (so Godet) the Father. Two reasons, therefore, are mentioned for determining the standard of the glory of Christ: first, that it is a glory of a *monogenes*, and secondly, that it is a glory received from the Father, or a glory of One who came from the Father. Both reasons are stated coordinately: *hos doxan monogenous* and *hos doxan para patros*. This coordination will be much more natural and complete, if in *monogenes* there be felt the same idea of the Son's being derived from the Father.

The whole, therefore, might plausibly be paraphrased as follows: such a glory as the Only begotten would have in virtue of His begetting or birth, and such as He would derive from the Father. As to 1:18, the variant readings of *ho monogenes huios* ("the Only begotten Son") and *monogenes Theos* ("God only begotten") do not differently affect the question before us.¹⁹ No matter which of these two be favored, nor whether on the latter *monogenes* be construed as an adjective with *Theos*, or be construed with a supplied *huios* ("Son"), to be coordinated with *Theos*, or whether it be taken as a noun to which *Theos* would belong as an adjective ("a divine Only begotten"), it is clear that the ability of the Son to declare God, to explain which *monogenes* serves, is not so well accounted for by "Only Son" as by "Only begotten Son." Were one to insist upon "only," then the explanation would have to be sought in the fact that an only son has the fulness of being, stored up in the father, all to himself, whereas in a case of many children this fulness of being might be conceived as distributed over the many, and only partially present in any single child. But even this understanding would have for its inevitable, though unexpressed, concomitant the idea of things passing over from the parent to the child. But in the latter case *-genes* would not contribute to the expression of the thought implied. It is certainly more natural to give *-genes* its proper force than not to do so. The *Monogenes* can declare God, because He alone, through His derivation from God possesses the likeness to

18. Godet, very precisely: "Une gloire comme doit être celle du Fils venant d'aupres du Père." Compare particularly his statement about the absence of the article before *monogenous* and *patros* (against Weiss); *Commentary*, in loco.

19. Compare Hort, *Two Dissertations*, 1876, pp. 12-15.

and acquaintance with God required for such a task. In fact, if *monogenes* be directly attached as an adjective to *Theos* as its noun, "Only begotten God" becomes the only possible rendering, for "Only God" would yield an impossible thought. To be sure, in case of the other constructions (the One who is both *Monogenes* and God, or the divine Only begotten) no such decisive judgment can be rendered. Still even in that case to assume reflection upon the derivation-idea is just as natural as the opposite.

If the *-genes* in *monogenes* be given a force and meaning of its own, the next question is, whether it should be brought into connection with *gignesthai* ("to be born") or with *gennan* ("to beget").²⁰ In the Septuagint *gennan* is usually the translation of the Hebrew *holid* ("to generate"), but occasionally it is used to render *jalad* ("to give birth"). As in Hebrew the Qal form is sometimes used of the father, so in Greek the male form *gennan* ("to beget") is sometimes used of the mother. Both translations, therefore, "Only begotten" (English versions) and "Only born" (Dutch and German versions) are equally warranted from the linguistic point of view. Although Nicodemus in John 3:4 understands the term from the maternal side, this is not decisive as to Jesus' intended meaning, since He, correcting Nicodemus' misunderstanding, might have used the phrase as meaning "to be begotten again" or "from above."

The First Epistle of John gives us guidance here, at least so far as the understanding of the writer is concerned. To be sure, 1 John 5:18 leaves the matter in doubt, since both of the two words used there — *gegennemenos* and *gennetheis* — may refer to believers, in which case to have been begotten or to have been borne, to be begotten or to be born, are equally plausible; or *gegennemenos* may refer to believers and *gennetheis* to Christ, in which case likewise the choice between the two possible render-

20. Holtzmann, *N. T. Theol.*, II, p. 438, calls the conception "*doppelstrählig*," by which he means that *-genēs* was intended to suggest both the idea of generation and that of birth. He finds the same intended equivocalness in 3:3, 7, where *anōthen gennasthai* would, according to this idea, be made to render double service by expressing in one phrase the two meanings of which it is capable, namely, "to be born anew," and "to be born from above."

ings remains open for both participles.²¹ But, while this is true of this one passage considered by itself, the case becomes different when the teaching of the Epistle as a whole, as reflected in other passages, is taken into account.

In 3:9 and 5:1 the idea of "begetting" is unequivocally expressed, in the latter through the use of the active aorist participle *gennesanta*, and in the former through the mention of the *sperma* ("seed") of God. In the light of these two references the more or less ambiguous passages, 2:29, 4:7 and 5:4, will have to be interpreted, and finally, 5:18 likewise. The idea of a divine generation being thus prominent in the First Epistle of John, this cannot but create a presumption in favor of finding this same idea in the Gospel in 1:13, 18 and 3:3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and in the three passages where *monogenēs* occurs. And the parallelism between believers and Christ pervading the Gospel requires us to understand that as believers are "begotten" of God, so Christ also is. The emergence of *monogenēs* in both contexts where this idea of the "begetting" of believers occurs fixes the meaning of the word, with tolerable certainty, as "Only begotten."²²

So far as the traditional interpretation refuses to void the *-genes* of force, it may be said to rest on a substantial exegetical foundation. But the view — likewise possessing ancient credentials — which places the unique begetting in the pre-existent state, is more doubtful. The predicate *monogenēs* is one of the mainstays of the venerable dogma of the eternal generation of the Son by the Father. Nor is this a mere musty theologoumenon of the ancient Church. Critics of the Tübingen school, from Baur to Pfleiderer, have stood for the same interpretation. On the other hand, the more conservative and apologetic exegetes of the Gospel incline

21. On the choice between the reference of *ho gennētheis* to Christ or to the believer the form and sense of the pronoun in the clause "He keepeth him" or "himself" depend. If *ho gennētheis* is Christ, then He is the One who keeps the believer; if it is the believer, then he keeps himself (*heauton*).

22. Everybody, so far as we know, is accustomed to find the *monos* of *monogenēs* in the Son: He is the only one possessing the character and bearing the predicate. It seems somewhat strange that God should not have come under consideration as the *monos*: "begotten of One." That would put Jesus' case and that of believers in John 1:13 on the same footing. But that would hardly account for the detailed phraseology used. That believers in their new birth have sprung from God alone required no such circumstantial denials as are found in John 1:13. Besides, *henogenēs* ("begotten of one") would have seemed the proper word for that.

towards attaching *monogenes* to the incarnation.²³ And most of them, in doing this, treat the *monogenes* character and the sonship in general as inseparable. In the abstract the opposite to the latter is not inconceivable. The Evangelist might have conceived of Jesus as "the Son" from eternity, and yet have represented Him as becoming *monogenes huiois* through the incarnation.

In view of the close coherence of the several parts of the Fourth Gospel's Christological teaching, however, this is not likely. Consistency will drive to the position that, if *monogenes* be related to the incarnate state, the sonship as such will have to receive the same reference, and the Trinitarian construction of the triad Father, Son, Spirit, as eternally inherent in the Godhead might seem in danger of losing its Johannine support, which, theologically speaking, might appear a serious matter. Still the doctrine of the Trinity in the New Testament does not rest on the Fourth Gospel alone. Exegetical considerations, apart from all dogmatic preference, will have to speak the decisive word. For ourselves, we do not venture to settle the question positively, and, while frankly confessing our preference for the Trinitarian explanation, wish to make a fair statement of what, in our view, may be said on both sides of the question.

In favor of the eternal generation reference the following may be said. In the first place, the text *monogenes Theos* ("God only begotten") in 1:18 favors it; according to 1:1, the Logos in His eternal state is *Theos* ("God"). If, therefore, the adjective *monogenes* be directly joined to *Theos*, and the joint phrase rendered "an only begotten God," that is, one who, *as God*, is only begotten, then some such process as has been called the eternal generation will be implied. But it must be remembered that the reading *monogenes Theos* is uncertain. And, even if the reading be accepted as genuine, the direct conjunction *monogenes Theos* is not necessary. No objection can be raised on principle against the rendering "one who is both *monogenes* and *Theos*." As careful an exegete as Zahn proposes to render it thus. The *Theos*, then, would be derived from the pre-existent state, but the *monogenes* character would be derived from the incarnation. To this, however, it might be objected again that then the sequence ought to have been the reverse, namely, *Theos monogenes*, as re-

23. For the names see Holtzmann, *N. T. Theol.*, 2nd ed., II, p. 436, note 1.

flecting the chronological order of the two qualifications, not only in the reality, but also in the order of their occurrence in the Prologue, *Theos* appearing in verse 1 and *monogenes* not until verse 14.

No conclusive argument can be drawn from the participial clause *Ho on eis ton kolpon tou Patros* ("who is in the bosom of the Father"). A not unnatural way of understanding this would be to find in the present tense an expression of the timeless, pre-mundane existence of the Son in the bosom of the Father, like unto the timelessness of the *en* ("was") in the first verse of the Prologue. But, even so understood, this would only yield certainty if *ho on* ("who is") be construed with *huios* ("son") in *monogenes huios* ("only begotten Son"). When the other reading is followed, the being in the bosom of the Father might be restricted to His *Theos einai* ("being God"), and not extended to His *monogenes einai* ("being only begotten"). Besides this, however, the participle *on* ("is") is by some exegetes interpreted from the standpoint of the Evangelist's speaking, so as to make the words mean: "who is *now*, through His return to heaven, in the bosom of the Father." On this rendering, of course, all reference to the pre-existent state falls away.

In the second place, the communication of life by the Father to the Son, as described in John 5:26, and especially the fact that Jesus derives this life as Son from the Father as Father, according to 6:57, are held to point to an act on the part of the Father in which not only the sonship but the life of the Son originates. And the Son being eternal, this act must of necessity belong to the sphere of eternity. It must antedate the *en archei* ("in the beginning") with which the Prologue opens. To this, however, it might be replied that neither of the two passages quoted speaks of the pre-existent One; in both Jesus is believed to refer to Himself as incarnate. The sonship, therefore, derived in them from the divine paternity, might be understood as Messianic sonship. In the context of 5:26, the idea of Messianic sonship certainly occurs, because, as shown above, we have here a sonship involving dependence and subordination. Moreover, the gift of life to the Son is coupled with the gift of authority to the Son, which latter unquestionably lies within the Messianic sphere. The life also comes under consideration as the source of quickening at the

resurrection, which again seems to characterize it as Messianic life. Finally, emphasis is placed in this connection on the human nature of Jesus as qualifying Him for the execution of judgment. Equally close is the connection between the filial life attributed to Jesus and His Messianic work in chapter 6; verse 57 links together His having been sent by the Father and His living because of the Father. He is life in the sense in which He gives life. And He gives life as possessed of flesh and blood, which those who believe on Him must eat and drink (verses 51 and 53).

At the same time it will have to be recognized that there is also another element present in the representation here. It is repeatedly stated that Jesus as bread came down out of heaven. His possession of life, therefore, also is associated with His heavenly origin, and, since this heavenly origin presupposes the pre-existence, it can scarcely be understood of the incarnation. He must have been bread while in heaven; He must have possessed this life while pre-existent in heaven. This opens up the possibility that of this pre-existent life also the Son would have been able to say: I have it because of the Father; and the possibility that in His actual statement of verse 57 the two relations — that of the Messianic Son and that of the pre-existent Son — flow together. It is not possible here to affirm anything with much certainty.

Thirdly, according to John 3:16, 18; 1 John 4:9, the sending of the Son into the world is a sending of the *Monogenes*. Therefore, it may be argued, Christ is *Monogenes* apart from and previous to His mission into the world. This is certainly the only natural interpretation. To be sure, it has been argued that as "God sent the prophets" is a common way for expressing the thought that He sent those who are *now* recognized as prophets — in other words, that He sent them *to be* prophets — so God sent the Logos into the world in order that in the world He might possess the dignity and function of *Monogenes* through the incarnation. Only this does not account for the emphasis resting upon the self-sacrifice involved on the part of God in sending His Son into the world. The idea that God *sent* His Son, that He *gave* His only begotten Son, is robbed of its force if the *Monogenes*-filial character is regarded as beginning with the incarnation.

In the fourth place, all through the Fourth Gospel at one and the same time a parallel and a distinction are drawn between the sonship of Jesus and that of believers. Now the term *Monogenes*, calling attention to the distinctiveness of Jesus, and not to the similarity, could hardly have been employed with reference to the supernatural human sonship of the Saviour, for in that case, while the resemblance and parallelism might have been strikingly accentuated, the distinction would have been lost sight of. As we have seen, there is a likeness between the two processes, but it remains within the sphere of analogy, without entering upon that of identity. To say that the peculiar features of the virgin birth render it sufficiently unique to justify the *Monogenes* character hardly meets this objection. For from that point of view the rebirth of believers, without earthly father and mother, appears still more unique and singular. But if *Monogenes* has reference to an eternal act, terminating upon the pre-existing One, it will retain its full force, side by side with the analogy existing between the sonship of Jesus and that of believers.

A fifth, and somewhat uncommon, argument may be drawn from John 3:12. Here Jesus distinguishes between the earthly things He has been telling Nicodemus (which the latter did not believe), and the heavenly things not as yet communicated (which Nicodemus would find it far more difficult to believe). From the context it will be seen that "the earthly things" dwelt upon related to the mysterious idea of birth from above. This in itself was a sufficiently strange and supernatural event connected with the Spirit. If then there is set over against this something far higher still, and that likewise something in the line of generation — for otherwise the comparison would lie between heterogeneous things — our thought is involuntarily drawn to a process of generation in heaven, and this could hardly be anything else but the generation of the heavenly Son by the heavenly Father as an act belonging to heaven in the highest transcendental sense, in view of which the rebirth of believers, or their birth from heaven becomes, comparatively speaking, an earthly thing. In view of it even the virgin birth might have been called an earthly event without detracting from its supernatural character.

In support of the opposite view, that which connects the divine generative act with the incarnation, the following may be said.

In the first place, the point at which the term *Monogenes* is introduced in the Prologue has been deemed significant as indicating the time when Jesus became the *Monogenes*. This point is at 1:14, immediately after the reporting of the event "the Word became flesh." Nor, we are told, is this order merely accidental; a vital nexus exists between the point of introduction and the manner of introduction: the beholding of the glory of the Logos, and the recognition of it as such a glory as only the *Monogenes* could receive from the Father, could not take place until the incarnation had occurred. Before the incarnation the Son was simply *Theos*, and as *Theos* He shared in the invisibility pertaining to God as such (John 1:18). This argument from the order of occurrence in the Prologue depends for its validity, however, upon the assumption that the structure of the Prologue is chronological. But this very point is a matter of doubt. The reason why the Evangelist does not introduce the idea of *Monogenes* until verse 14 may not have been chronological at all. Up to this point he is intent upon bringing out the revealing character of the pre-existent One. For the expression of this, other concepts than that of *Monogenes* sonship may have appeared to him more suitable. Therefore he calls Him the Light and the Word, and refrains from calling Him the Son until somewhat later. This need not imply that He was not *Monogenes* or Son prior to the incarnation, but may simply imply that it seemed to the Evangelist less suitable to represent Him from that point of view until the incarnation came to be mentioned.

As a matter of fact, according to quite a number of respectable exegetes, John does not first in verse 14 speak of the incarnate One, but several times already in the preceding verses, when He is represented as being in the world, and not being known by the world, of coming to His own, and His own receiving Him not (verses 10, 11). Still it will have to be acknowledged that *Monogenes* in 1:14 has more force if connected with the incarnation than if placed back of it. Of 1:18, on the other hand, this cannot be maintained. To be sure, the *exegesis* ("declaring") of God is the work of the incarnate Christ, and His *Monogenes* character appears as a qualification for this. But, whether it is a qualification which He brought with Him out of the pre-existent eternal state, or something acquired in the moment when He be-

came "flesh" cannot be determined. The *Theiotes* (Deity) is equally with the *Monogenes* character a qualification for this task, and the former at least is contributed by the eternal pre-existent state of the Logos.

Secondly, the context in Chapters 1 and 3 favors the reference to the supernatural human birth of Jesus, because in close proximity the new birth, or the birth from above, of believers is spoken of, and some analogy between this and the *Monogenes* birth seems to lie in the mind of the writer or speaker. Now this analogy would more naturally suggest itself between two supernatural *historical* acts than between two acts of which the one lay in the transcendental, eternal world, and the other in the sphere of time. The analogy between the origin of the human nature of Jesus and the regeneration of believers seems to lie more in the sphere of the comparable, because both are temporal, and moreover soteric, acts, than an analogy between the intra-divine eternal generation and the rebirth of believers.

But the question arises: If *Monogenes* becomes descriptive of an act in time, and if *Monogenes* and Son are so closely connected, then what support remains in the Fourth Gospel for the doctrine of the pre-existence of Jesus as Son in the world of eternity? We shall have sharply to note the form of the question as here put. It is not the question whether the Fourth Gospel yields ample support for the eternal pre-existence of the One who became incarnate, but exclusively the question whether in this pre-existent state He already possessed the character of the Son of God. The figment of a purely ideal pre-existence, as Beyschlag advocated it in his day, may now safely be considered a surmounted view. On all sides it is admitted that the Fourth Gospel contains the doctrine of a real pre-existence of Jesus. The only doubtful point remaining can be: Did He pre-exist as Son? It seems odd, after all that has been preached by the critical school in regard to the philosophico-theological, transcendental complexion of the Fourth Gospel, that a question like this should still be proposable and somewhat difficult to answer. But one ought clearly to realize that the strange situation has arisen through the bringing down of *Monogenes* to the sphere of temporal relationship. If it were not for that, there could not be the slightest doubt as regards the appurtenance of the sonship to the pre-existent state. For an

eternal *Monogenes* character carries with it an eternal sonship. A temporal *Monogenes* character, while by no means carrying with it a temporal sonship, yet makes the arguments for an eternal pre-existent sonship more difficult to procure. Apart from this, however, certain other considerations explain the scarcity of direct, explicit evidence on the point at issue, and these considerations ought to be taken into account.

Our Lord speaks throughout from the historical standpoint of His incarnate life. He does not speak with the careful precision of a theologian. He contents Himself with claiming present sonship, sonship at the time of speaking, in the state of incarnation. He teaches both clearly enough: I am the Son, and I was pre-existent; but He does not take pains to combine the two explicitly and say: I was pre-existent *as the Son*. This we could hardly expect Him to do. The *Person* of the Saviour is so unqualifiedly and so emphatically carried back by the Gospel into the pre-incarnate state, that it may well have appeared superfluous to affirm of the sonship that it reached back into the same state. Further, the Gospel employs the title Son of man, as we shall soon have occasion to observe, with peculiar reference to the heavenly origin and character of Jesus. This has had the result of forcing the name Son of God out of passages where it might otherwise naturally be expected to occur. This ought not, however, to be explained to the prejudice of the Gospel's acceptance of the eternal sonship, as Harnack seems inclined to do. There is no point in "the Son of man" against "the Son of God."

But, if not directly and explicitly, at least indirectly and impliedly, the divine sonship is carried back into the pre-existent state. Here we may again argue from John 3:16, 18, as we did above with reference to *Monogenes*. The self-sacrifice of God consisted in the fact that He let His Son go out into the world. This, therefore, is a sending connected with the Son's transition from His pre-existent into His incarnate life. He was God's Son apart from and previously to that. There is in this respect a difference between the separableness of an eternal Son from a temporal *Monogenes*, and the separableness of an eternal *Monogenes* from a temporal Son. While not required by the evidence, as we have seen, yet the former is a feasible construction; the reverse cannot be carried through for the reason that *Monogenes* is unthinkable

without Son. Further, the love of God toward Jesus in the Fourth Gospel is something that goes specifically with the paternal and the filial relationship. In 17:24 Jesus ascribes to Himself the enjoyment of this love "before the foundation of the world."²⁴ Again in 6:46 the words "He that is from God (i.e., Jesus) has seen the Father," are most naturally understood of the vision of God which Jesus possessed as Son in the pre-existent state. It will be noticed that the reference is not here to a vision of God in general, but to a vision specifically of "the Father." If Jesus in that state saw God as Father, then the Father must have seen Him as Son. Once more, the correlative terms Father-Son occur as much in contexts where the pre-existence is spoken of or approached as in other contexts. There is no semblance of effort in the Fourth Gospel to avoid them in such connections.

24. It is different with such a conception as *doxa* ("glory"), which does not necessarily go with sonship. Hence John 17:5 in itself, apart from comparison with verse 24, is not conclusive. The "glory" might be considered as a gift bestowed upon the Son at the time of His incarnation. It might be the concomitant of the Logos character, and not specifically associated with sonship.

CHAPTER XIII

The Son of Man

IN A previous chapter, with purely apologetic intent, we touched upon various questions connected with the title Son of man. The linguistic difficulties encountered in it by many writers, and the role played by these difficulties in the denial of its historicity, were briefly looked into. We endeavored to sketch the possible development of what appeared to be with Daniel a descriptive phrase into a formal title. According to our conclusion the figure to which it is attached in Daniel 7 was from the outset the figure of the Messiah; the title did not first more or less accidentally, through some sort of misunderstanding, change into a name for the Messiah. Certain Gospel passages in which, it was alleged, the pre-Messianic, generically human understanding of the phrase could still be seen shining through, were examined, and, with a single exception, found to afford no support to that opinion, because the very import of the passages in question excluded the interpretation of Son of man as simply man.

There is, however, one phase of the critical treatment of the title that has not yet been touched upon, and which is supposed by not a few of the most advanced group of critics to have an important bearing on the question of the antiquity and original import of the phrase. It has been taken in hand by the modern *religionsgeschichtliche* school. This school is fond of finding as much as possible of the Biblical material cradled in Oriental mythology or in Hellenistic syncretism. The application of its methods to the phrase Son of man inevitably tends toward carrying back the origin of the title to a much higher antiquity than the critics deriving it from a comparison in Daniel had been accustomed to assume. Nor would this be merely a question of antiquity. Connected with ancient mythological lore, the phrase would be apt to prove a regular name or title, and to bear on that account a far more realistic significance than had been attributed to it in the interpretation of the Danielic usage.

As in some other points, so here some real good might have resulted from the adoption of a method which in the abstract could only bode evil. In reality, however, nothing substantial has been produced to prove the ancient existence of a pagan "Son of Man" figure, such as might be likely to have a real connection with the Biblical figure in Daniel or the Gospels.

On close investigation the appeal to the so-called *Urmensch* ("Primal Man") appears highly problematical. Adapa, the son of Ea, is described in Babylonian sources in such terms as might at first give the impression of a resemblance, at least in name, to the Son of man. But the phrase in question, *Zer ameluti* or *Zer amiluti*, seems to signify rather "Sprout of mankind" than "Sprout of man." The *Urmensch* would be a naturally solitary personage, but this Adapa is regent over a populous region, dwells in a city and associates with bakers. The fact of his being anointed, as implying a degree of likeness to the Messianic figure, is beset with uncertainty.

Somewhat closer to the Gospel delineation of the Son of man would come the feature of Adapa's ascent into heaven, but that is too general an experience in such mythological environments for much to be built on it. Assyriologists further affirm that King Sennacherib called himself "Adapa, the incarnate god of a new era." This seems to be the language of pagan eschatology grandiloquently applied to himself by an Oriental monarch, but others have called the textual basis for this in doubt, and at any rate there is nothing in it to link it to the Son of man conception. The whole figure of Adapa possesses so many, from the Biblical standpoint, uncongenial characteristics as to render its incorporation into Old Testament or Jewish eschatology difficult to conceive.

Next to Adapa, Marduk, the son, like him, of Ea, has been represented as a prototype of the Son of man. Winckler asserts that Ea is designated "the god Man," and that consequently his son Marduk must have been considered as "Son of Man." Here again nothing is certain, for the words argued from, *ila amelu*, can with equal warrant be made to mean "the god of mankind." And of an application, as distinct from mere inference, of the title Son of man to Marduk there is no trace. Surely, all this yields a slender enough thread to suspend Winckler's talk about "a Babylonian Christ" upon. Nor could Jesus have found warrant

in such pseudo-resemblances to call Himself, in imitation of the Saviour character of Marduk, "the Saviour."

In modern interpretations of Hellenism we are again confronted with the *Urmensch*. He occurs in the Hermetic literature, in Philo, in Gnostic speculation. But in all these cases the figure stands for the whole of mankind. It symbolizes the old sad story, eternally repeating itself in each individual, of man's lapse into the material. Where a real connection between this mythical being and the Biblical Son of man is drawn, as Reitzenstein and others have discovered, it appears to have been first established by Christian Gnostics. Nor is it probable that this Hellenistic *Urmensch* should depend upon certain Persian and Indian figures bearing the same name, for the meaning and function of these are quite different from what the myth stands for in Hellenism. In the Persian and Indian mythologies the *Urmensch* serves to explain the genesis of the entire present world on the principle that through his sacrifice the world comes into being. The thought is cosmical, and the myth is connected with the cultus in which through the sacrifice of a man or animal the renewal of nature in Spring is effected. In Hellenism, on the other hand, the myth is anthropological. But in either of its forms, whether there be connection or not, the representation has nothing to do with, and no bearing whatever upon the picture in Daniel and the title in the Gospels. In some of the documents Christ even appears separately by the side of this mythical son of man. Elsewhere, as in the preaching of the Naassenes, preserved by Hippolytus, Christ, as ectypical of the first man, is designated as the Son of man.¹

Dismissing all these speculations as of no practical bearing on our present purpose, which is to ascertain the meaning Jesus

1. The best discussion of the facts concerning the alleged mythological antecedents of the "Son of Man" is found in Hertlein, *Die Menschensohn-Frage im letzten Stadium*, 1911, where the literature references are carefully given. Compare also the present writer's review of Hertlein's book in *The Princeton Theological Review*, 1912, pp. 324-330. Hertlein falls back upon Daniel and the symbolic significance of the figure there to the exclusion of all Messianic import. Only he has a peculiar view about the dating of Daniel 1-7 and the role these chapters played in the early Church. He holds that they were written about the year 70 after Christ; chapter 7 is dated with great precision as having been composed between July 69 and July 70. But more interesting than this is the writer's assignment of the fourth beast to the Roman power, an exegesis at which the shades of Hengstenberg and Hävernick must have rejoiced. To be sure, what they derived from supernatural prophecy Hertlein makes contem-

Himself put into the title, we shall proceed to classify the material in the Gospels according to the associations which the use of the title by Jesus more or less obviously bear. Its frequency of occurrence — more than 80 times in the Synoptics and John combined — calls for notice. Possibly there is some connection between this and the fact of its being a title which Jesus alone employs of Himself in the Gospels.

Its occurrence is unevenly distributed, the greater number of instances belonging to the closing period of our Lord's life, after Caesarea Philippi. The sporadic character of the earlier employment of the title has led to the attempt to eliminate it from the earlier record, the more so since its exclusively apocalyptic import seems easier to maintain with the use of it concentrated toward the end of our Lord's ministry. The three methods relied upon in attempts to effect this elimination are: 1. The discovery of a generic use of the phrase, which we have already noticed. 2. The assumption of editorial insertion. 3. Chronological re-arrangement, with or without the support of parallels.

These early instances in the Synoptics are the following: Mark 2:10; Matt. 9:6; Luke 5:24 (held to be a case of generic use); Mark 2:28; Matt. 12:8; Luke 6:5 (alleged generic use); Luke 6:22 (editorial insertion assumed, on the ground that Matt. 5:11 has, instead, "for my sake"); Luke 7:34; Matt. 11:19 (alleged substitution of the title for the pronoun "I"); Matt. 8:20; Luke 9:58 (disarranged chronology, the statement occurring in Luke after Caesarea Philippi); Matt. 10:23 (disarranged chronology due to the influence of Matthew's topical scheme of grouping); Matt. 12:32; Luke 12:10; Mark 3:28 (in the former two references, alleged misunderstanding of the generic usage); Matt. 12:40 (chronological displacement, alleged because of occurrence of Luke 11:30 after Caesarea Philippi); Matt. 13:37, 41 (said to belong to a late period in Jesus' ministry, but to have been transposed owing to Matthew's topical arrangement).

poraneous with the actual history of the fourth beast and its developments. It is all regarded as *ex eventu*. As to the significance of "Son of man" in the Gospels, Hertlein holds that the title can teach nothing concerning the real history of Jesus; it only lifts the veil from an episode in the history of the production of the Gospel picture. Here he falls back upon the hypothesis of Wrede: Jesus' use of the title reflects His consciousness of the cryptic nature of His Messiahship. He holds that Jesus calls Himself "the Son of man" to conceal His Messianic character.

There is neither need of nor warrant for these critical operations. The dependence on the apocalyptic scene in Daniel has naturally brought about a preponderance of the eschatological references, but since to all intent the phrase is a Messianic title, nothing hindered its occasional extension backward into an earlier stage of the Messianic career. This may have caused some wonderment to the popular understanding, such as is, perhaps, reflected in the phrase "on earth" in Mark 2:10, but that to Jesus' own feeling a restriction to the heavenly environment or to the final scenes of His earthly ministry was not imperative, is clearly shown by His insistence upon the opposite through forgiving sin and working miracles *on earth*.

Still even here the nature of the sovereignty exercised, the forgiving of sin, may be reminiscent of the judgment-function to be exercised at the end of things. The lordship over the Sabbath seems to have no particularly eschatological association. In the case of Luke 6:22, on the other hand, it may well have been present in the mind of the Speaker, for the reference seems to be to the divisions between men and men so characteristic of the end, the variant "for my sake" in the parallel passage of Matthew rather favors this. In Luke 7:34, "the Son of man came eating and drinking," the introduction of the title may be actually due to avoidance of the pointed "I," but this would be something quite different from using it as a mere inoffensive pronoun; it will here have to be put on a line with the other instances where speaking of Himself in the third person springs from a motive of humility in Jesus; only the means used for this is not the employment of an idiomatic substitute for the pronoun "I"; the title, kept by the speaker, whom it designates in the third person, serves the purpose most admirably.

In Matt. 10:23 the eschatological environment (compare comment on Luke 6:22 above) renders the introduction of the title Son of man eminently fitting, especially since a *coming* of the Son of man is spoken of. With regard to Matt. 12:32 and Luke 12:10, we must admit the possibility of a misunderstanding of the generic "son of man" as giving rise in the translation to the Christological title "Son of man," particularly in view of the parallel text in Mark; but this has nothing to do with the question of chronologically premature emergence of the title.

Matt. 12:40, with its reference to the three days and three nights in the belly of the whale, is so thoroughly eschatological as preclude all surprise at the appearance of the title in such a connection. Finally, Matt. 13:37, 41 can be easily accounted for by the judgment-function spoken of in the latter verse, and the prospective assimilation of the terminology of verse 37 to this. When the investigation of the usage is no longer placed upon the basis of literary production, but attached to the objective historicity of the events themselves, no serious difficulties are encountered.

After all, however, these earlier instances are but a prelude to the full, resonant chorus of the later days, when the final issue of our Lord's ministry was felt to be hastening on to its decision. These later passages connect the title with the *parousia* of Jesus in power and glory. The mention of the clouds of heaven in some of them proves dependence on the scene in Daniel. The references are: Mark 8:38 (Luke 9:26); Mark 13:26 (Matt. 25:31 Luke 21:27); Mark 14:62 (Matt. 26:64); Luke 22:69; Matt. 13:41; 16:27, 28; 19:28; Matt. 24:27 (Luke 17:24; Matt. 24:37, 39 (Luke 17:26); Matt. 24:44 (Luke 12:40); Luke 12:8; 17:22, 30; 18:8; 21:36. There is, however, a significant difference between the situation in Daniel and that in these *parousia* predictions. In the latter the Son of man not seldom appears as Himself conducting the eschatological judgment. But in Daniel the judgment belongs to the Ancient of Days, before whom the Son of man is made to appear. Inasmuch as in the Enoch Apocalypse the judging function of the Son of man *does* receive mention, it has been thought that, in part at least, the representation of Enoch must have influenced our Lord in His depicting of the final scenes. But over against this stands the absence in Enoch of a feature made prominent by Jesus — as prominent as the judging itself — namely, the coming with the clouds of heaven; and it is precisely this feature that is found in Daniel. Besides, great emphasis is placed in Daniel on the figure described as "like a man" receiving "dominion and glory, and a kingdom" comprising all the peoples and nations and languages, and destined to be of everlasting duration. Between "reigning" and "judging" there is an easy transition in eschatological representations; compare Matt. 19:28,

The main thing these passages have derived from Daniel is, however, the atmosphere of the supernatural in which they are steeped. The "coming" is a theophany-like coming, a coming out of the other world. Nothing else in the Gospels has so impressed the stamp of the supernatural and the superhuman upon the self-portrayal of Jesus as these "Son of man" passages dealing with the *parousia*. Nothing but the avowal of sonship from God in the highest sense can be placed by the side of them in this respect. True, our Lord speaks in these passages of His future, eschatological coming, of what we call His second coming.

Another question to be raised in connection with this *parousia* group of utterances is whether any perceptible emphasis rests in them upon the humanity of Jesus. That such should be the case does not necessarily follow from the presence of this element in Daniel. When once the descriptive phrase has turned into an official title, it becomes released to a certain extent from the obligation of being intrinsically significant everywhere, although it does not on that account lose its aptitude for being so if occasion requires. It will have to be admitted that in general the setting of the passages under review does not particularly call for any suggestion of the human nature of the Person depicted in the act of His eschatological appearance. The reasons usually found for the description "like unto a man" in Daniel do not seem naturally transferable to the coloring with which the *parousia* is depicted by Jesus. It is said that in Daniel the description "like a man" is evoked by the desire to make the figure who stands over and for the kingdom of God a vivid contrast, in its manlikeness, to the bestial nature of the figures representing the world-kingdoms, and on that account portrayed as beasts ascending from the sea, that is, from the nether world. This manlikeness is then most frequently, with a somewhat modern turn of thought, conceived as *humaneness*.² It is difficult to escape from the impression that a contrast between the beasts and the One "like a man" is actually

2. This supposedly humane character of the figure, taken to symbolize the kingdom of God or its King, was a veritable treasure-trove for the humanizing liberal theology. Some went so far as to find in the phrase "like a man" a characterization of the ideal humanity exemplified in the Kingdom. Applied to Jesus, it made Him the ideal man. From their assumption of its actual emergence in the prophecy others then concluded that the influence of Greek thought is traceable here, which would imply, of course, the late origin of the book of Daniel.

intended in Daniel. The question remains, however, whether this contrast should be placed, in such a semi-modern fashion, in the sphere of humaneness. Of that at least there seems to be no indication in the sequel of the account in Daniel, nor would this fit particularly into the tone and tenor of the prophecy. Probably the contrast will have to be found elsewhere, with a closer adherence to the ancient way of looking at things. The beasts of Daniel's vision are bestial in a far more profound and realistic sense than merely through their deficiency in humaneness. The spirit of the nether world, from which the beasts are seen ascending, is a spirit of enmity against God, a spirit of blasphemy. The vision itself interprets the bestiality in this direction. The lion having eagle's wings is made to stand upon two feet as a man, and a man's heart is given it. That is to say, he is checked in his flight of exaltation to heaven, and is made to feel his impotence. This suggests that the figure coming with the clouds, and described as "like a man," bears this character for a deeper reason likewise. His humanity signifies the opposite to all overbearing pride before God; it is submission to the divine authority, and on the basis of this He is invested with regal power and glory by the Ancient of Days. But, while this trait is not reproduced in the *parousia* sayings about the "Son of man" in the Synoptical Gospels, there are two passages in the New Testament which lay stress on the possession of human nature by the eschatological Judge. One is a saying of Jesus Himself, recorded in John 5:27: "He gave him authority to execute judgment, because he is a son of man." It should be noticed that in the Greek both "son" and "man" lack the article, which proves that what is intended here is not the technical title, but simply the common phrase designating an individual of the human species. It is not further explained in what respect human nature qualifies the Judge for executing His function. That it enables Him to enter subjectively into the thoughts and feelings of those to be judged is usually assumed, but is not capable of verification. Still it is natural to surmise that our Lord in uttering this saying alluded to the title "Son of man," which He bears as judge specifically, and that consequently some real connection between the name and the function must have existed in His mind.

The other passage is from Paul's address in Athens, Acts 17:31: "Inasmuch as he has appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness, by *a man* whom he has ordained." Here likewise some stress is laid on the Judge being a man. Reference to the title "Son of man" here is not impossible. Still, in view of its non-occurrence elsewhere in Paul, this seems improbable. Our conclusion on this point must, therefore, remain suspended.

The second group of passages containing the title consists of those in which Jesus couples it with statements concerning His approaching suffering, death and (sometimes) resurrection. To this class belong: Mark 8:31 (Luke 9:22); Mark 9:9 (Matt. 17:9); Mark 9:12 (Matt. 17:12); Mark 9:31 (Matt. 17:22); Mark 10:33 (Matt. 20:18; Luke 18:31); Mark 14:21 (Matt. 26:24; Luke 22:22); Mark 14:41; Matt. 12:40 (Luke 11:30); Matt. 26:2; Luke 22:48.

That the joining together of the title with these peculiar predicates is not accidental appears not only from the constancy of occurrence, but also from its frequency, beginning precisely where the direct announcement by Jesus of His approaching passion sets in. With this group a small number of other statements may be reckoned which differ from the preceding in that they couple with the name "Son of man" not the crisis of the passion specifically, but in a more general way the life of humiliation leading up to this crisis. To this little group belongs the well known ransom passage, Mark 10:45 (Matt. 20:28); further, the saying about the Son of man not having where to lay His head, Matt. 8:20 (Luke 9:58); as a third there may perhaps be added to these two the declaration of Luke 19:10: "For the Son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost."³ The ransom passage forms, as it were, a transition from the large group of passion predictions to this smaller group of more generalized character, since it first speaks of the ministry of the life as a whole and then represents this as issuing into the climax of death.

How is this preference for the use of "Son of man" in such connections to be explained? It has been attempted to derive this feature indirectly from Daniel. Great suffering is there foretold

3. In Matt. 18:11, the same sentence is believed to be an insertion into the text, although many authorities, some ancient, have it. The RV places it in the margin.

for the people of the saints, and, inasmuch as the Son of man appears identified with the people, the identification is supposed to extend to His suffering with them. Or, it has been thought that the combination was obtained from Daniel in an even more indirect way. The manlike figure, it is argued, symbolizes the spirit of obedience and submission to God in contrast with the overbearing behavior of the beasts, and with this in principle the destiny to suffer was given. Neither of these explanations appears plausible. Nothing is intimated in Daniel about sufferings in store for the One like unto a man. And the ideas of obedience and submission are not simply equivalent to the idea of suffering and death. Nor should it be urged that the repeated use of the verb "must" in joining subject and predicate together in these statements proves the implicit presence of the idea of suffering in the "Son of man" conception as such. For this "must" is simply the expression for the necessity of the fulfilment of Scripture. The Old Testament has fore-announced the passion, but this does not imply that it has done so specifically in the name of the "Son of man."

For the real explanation we shall, it seems to us, have to approach the problem from the opposite point of view. The thought of humiliation and death is not analytically obtained from the name Son of man. Rather, it is joined to it on the principle of contrast. The conjunction to insert for paraphrasing is not "because" but "although." It is not that He must undergo humiliation, suffering and death *because* He is the Son of man, but that *although* He is the Son of man such a destiny is, paradoxically, in store for Him. When to our average feeling the name has become associated with suffering and sorrow, this is largely due to the preconceived impression that it preponderatingly designates the human nature of our Lord with an implied contrast to the divine nature. In such a contrast the human nature as the seat of weakness and humiliation easily imparts this same aspect to the name by which it is supposed to be described. As will presently appear, the names "Son of God" and "Son of man" cannot be thus simply distributed over the two natures of Christ as descriptive of the divine and the human respectively. Nor do the facts of the usage bear out such an impression. The mention of the resurrection jointly with the passion and death in some of

the sayings shows that the conception of "Son of man" does not exclusively go with the thought of debasement and shame. The name as easily enters into the prospect beyond the passion, opened up by the Transfiguration, as the name "Son of God" (Mark 9:7, 9).

As little as in the name Elijah there is any suggestion of the maltreatment inflicted upon that Old Testament prophet, so little is the name Son of man prophetic of the similar and more severe indignities that are to befall Jesus (Mark 9:12, 13). The special disgrace associated with the delivery of the Son of man to the Gentiles (Mark 10:33) points rather to a designation of high inherent dignity than to the opposite. The betrayal of the Son of man is an extreme crime, not merely, it seems, because committed upon the Messiah in general, but particularly because it is inflicted upon that high, majestic type of a Messiah which the name Son of man connotes (Mark 14:21). That the betrayal is a betrayal into the hands of sinners likewise may perhaps point to the same train of thought (Mark 14:41). The Son of man is the One greater than Jonah and Solomon, who is not appreciated in His greatness by His own generation (Luke 11:30-32). In all these instances the note of dignity and majesty is more or less clearly perceptible.

In the saying that contrasts the shelterless Son of man with the foxes and birds the contrast loses its point if Jesus is set over against these animals merely as a man, generically, and even more so if He is set over against them as a weak, humiliated subject *per se*. The very point of the saying obviously is that the highest of the high, according to the name borne by Him, should nevertheless have to do without such common creature comforts as even foxes and birds enjoy.

In the sayings about "saving" and "ministering" the condescension is fitly measured only if "Son of man" connotes the innate majesty of our Lord. There is no reason, then, to assume that for Jesus the name had ceased to possess the same glorious significance that had once for all been stamped upon it through the vision in Daniel. It was a name of honor and splendor throughout. But for this very reason it admirably served the purpose of Jesus to impress most strongly and pointedly upon the disciples the startling character, and through that the supreme importance, of His

passion and death. As in other instances of our Lord's teaching, so here also paradox serves the double purpose of provoking attention and of conveying emphasis. Even the transcendent glory which belongs of right to the Son of man Messiah as portrayed in Daniel cannot in the least dispense Him from the experience of humiliation and death. Indeed, we may go even one step further and find it intimated that, notwithstanding the paradox involved, the glorious Son of man can come to complete revelation only after the impending disgrace and death shall have been suffered and surmounted. That the name itself was associated in the mind of Jesus with the highest conception of glory finds further support in the peculiar use He makes of it in the third person. In part at least this will have to be explained from our Lord's profound humility, which made Him shrink from coupling the exalted predicates involved with the pronoun "I."⁴

A third group is formed by the passages in the Fourth Gospel. These deserve separate treatment on account of the peculiar associations with which our Lord there handles the title. It occurs in the Fourth Gospel twelve times, counting in 9:35, where the manuscript reading varies between "Son of God" and "Son of man." The other references are: 1:51; 3:13, 14; 6:27, 53, 62; 8:28; 12:23, 34 (twice); 13:31.

It will be observed that in all these instances the title is used by Jesus as a self-designation. The Evangelist does not employ it of Jesus. This is true likewise of the Synoptists, but in the case of John it is more significant because the latter takes repeated occasion to name Jesus by some characteristic title, which is not to the same extent true of the other Evangelists. The fact has an important bearing on the historicity of this manner of self-designation on the part of Jesus, a question to which we shall have occasion to return presently.⁵

The title, it will be further noticed, occurs in John from the very beginning of Jesus' ministry. This also is in harmony with that phase of the Synoptic representation of earlier occasional use

4. A similar motive may be observed at work in Paul, when he attributes the experience of the visions, and the being caught up into the third heaven, to "a man in Christ," although it is evident that he means himself (2 Cor. 12:1-4).

5. The only exception to this, John 12:34, is only apparently such. Here Jesus' opponents ask: "Who is this Son of man?" But, as the "this" indicates, this question is merely a reference to the statement they had just quoted from Jesus Himself: "The Son of man must be lifted up."

which is not seldom made subject to doubt, even where the frequent eschatological use towards the close of our Lord's ministry is not called into question. In the case of John, however, neither inequality of distribution nor effort at avoiding the use of the title can be observed. Quite obviously what induces the use of the name in Jesus' discourse is the nature of the subject matter spoken of on each occasion. In the majority of instances this subject matter concerns Jesus' provenience from heaven, or His return to heaven, or His consequent appurtenance to heaven. Sometimes the coming from and the return to heaven are joined together as co-expressed in the name, for example, in 3:13, 14: "No one has ascended into heaven, but he that descended out of heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven. And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up . . ."; likewise in 6:62, "What then if ye should behold the Son of man ascending where he was before?" In other cases only the one direction of this twofold movement finds expression; thus 1:51, where the derivation from and enduring contact with heaven are illustrated by Jacob's ladder with the ascending and descending angels. In 8:28 and 12:33, 34 only the return movement to heaven included in the "being lifted up," if not exclusively expressed, is dwelt upon. The same purpose is served by the thought of glorification with the Father which is coupled with the name in 13:31. On the other hand, the statements of 6:27, 53, 62, while presupposing the descent of the One to be eaten out of heaven, seem to place the main emphasis on the fact that the "flesh" and "blood" of the Son of man must be eaten and drunk, and thus to associate the title with the possession of human nature by Jesus, which renders Him eatable as flesh and blood; compare verses 51 and 62. So far as the latter motivation predominates, verses 27 and 53 belong to the next group to be examined.

The fact stands out significantly that in the Fourth Gospel the title Son of man connotes the heavenly, superhuman side of Jesus' mysterious existence, and that consequently it becomes the classical expression of what is called His pre-existence. This great truth is even more clearly taught in connection with the title Son of man than it is in connection with that title in whose wake we would more confidently expect to meet it, the title Son of God. And while in the Synoptical utterances the *parousia*-transcenden-

talism stands in the foreground, in the Johannine sayings the thought is shifted backward to the pre-temporal, pre-mundane life in the eternal past out of which the Son of man came.⁶ The Son of man is here rather the One who *came* than the One who *is to come (again)*. But the point to observe is that in this retrogressive setting of the title and its combination with the "coming" of the son of man there is equal, if not greater, resemblance to the Danielic vision as there is in the Synoptical parousia pictures. For there can be no doubt that the scene in Daniel means to describe the introduction of a superhuman, heavenly Being into the lower world, and that after a theophanic fashion. Having regard to the Synoptists only, one might say -- and it has been said -- that the traditional doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ is something different from, and more restricted than what these *parousia* predictions imply. It has been argued that in them the pre-existence is conceived with reference to the second advent only, and that they, therefore, connote the existence of Jesus in heaven now, and that only, and so fall short of the Church doctrine. Daniel would teach a pre-existence proleptically, prophetically conceived, something in no wise inconsistent, it is alleged, with the origin of Jesus through birth into history. Jesus in utilizing the imagery for His *parousia* predictions would have given the true interpretation of Daniel, and thus we should be robbed of the principal Old Testament passage introducing the note of pre-existence into Old Testament prophecy. The Fourth Gospel is said to be inexact when it represents Jesus as building on the scene in Daniel a conception of pre-existence in the solid, realistic sense of His having actually been with God before the world was.

This whole argument rests on the error of carrying back the New Testament distinction between the first and the second coming of Christ into the prophecy of Daniel. There is all the less warrant for this, since even in the New Testament terminology this distinction is by no means clearly formulated, but only in process of becoming so. To Daniel the Messianic *parousia* is as yet an undivided whole. If the occasion and the surroundings

6. In Mark 2:10 the implied contrast to "on earth" is "in heaven." But this is not intended in the mind of the Jews to point back to a heavenly pre-existence or a heavenly existence at the time of speaking. The reference is to a future heavenly state and function.

of this Danielic vision bring it with themselves that those features which belong to the culminating issue of the Messiah's career are chiefly dwelt upon, this does not justify the conclusion that a descent from heaven placed back of the Messiah's advent can have reference to such culmination only. If in the hands of our Lord the Messianic advent resolves itself into two instalments, a first and a second appearance, then the general signature of the undivided advent, such as the supernaturalness of the theophanic character and the celestial provenience of the coming, can be indiscriminately applied to either stage, which is not denying, of course, that the features Daniel seized upon may find a more realistic fulfilment in the second stage than in the first. We have no reason to affirm that to Jesus' mind His Son of man character belonged exclusively to the end of the world. He clearly found it expressed in both stages of His appearance, and in doing so He did not misinterpret the words in Daniel.

Nor dare we even say that the perceptible difference between the Synoptical utterances and the Johannine discourses is on either side of an exclusive character. Even in John the combination of the title with the eschatological epiphany is not lacking, at least if the explanation of the judging function from His being a man, in 5:27 is intended by Jesus as an allusion to the name Son of man — a conclusion almost impossible to avoid. In the Synoptics, on the other hand, we meet with a number of passages where Jesus couples the coming of the Son of man with functions which He exercised during His earthly ministry. "The Son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost," and "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" require, as pointed out above, that the full, supernal sense of the "coming" as a coming from heavenly glory be put into them, in order to make this glory a proper foil to the depth of humiliation into which our Lord descended. Jesus plainly was conscious of being the Son of man and acting as such through His entire earthly ministry, and not exclusively (though more emphatically so) at the cosmical close of His Messianic career.

But, it might be asked, does not the appearance of the Danielic figure in the likeness of a man preclude every reference of the celestial origin of this figure to a pre-incarnate state? Do we

not, after having in the manner indicated forced it to describe Jesus' initial appearance, obtain a conception utterly at variance with the Church doctrine of the pre-existence of the Messiah in the form of God? As for Daniel, the simple answer may be given to this objection, that the descriptive phrase "like unto a man," if it goes beyond fixing symbolically the contrast to the beasts, serves only to render the Person coming upon the clouds describable. How else should He have been made to appear, if not in human form? Is not that the ordinary form of angelic appearance? The phrase "like unto a man" surely is not intended to teach anything as to the nature of the coming One's existence in the heavenly world. He came from there; on that the emphasis rests; and on that the evidence for the pre-existence, generically considered, depends, not on the phrase describing the form possessed before or assumed at the point of His entrance into the sphere of the visible. He came from the world of the divine, and assumed visible shape through the likeness of a man: it is hard to see what inconsistency exists between the two statements. And the portrayal of the coming as a theophanic coming clearly shows that the former statement must be reckoned with no less than the latter. In the Old Testament such a coming is spoken of only where something actually divine descends from the higher regions to earth; in fact, the description is customary for the appearance of God Himself in theophany.⁷ At bottom it is not different with the descriptions of the incarnation either in John or in the Synoptics. Do Matthew and Luke mean that because Jesus entered into appearance in the form of a human babe, therefore nothing different or higher lay back of that? It is incredible that when these accounts were written such a time-circumscribed Christology would have satisfied the writers. Certainly the Evangelists see far more in Jesus' ultimate provenience than could be expressed in terms of emergence in human nature, however supernaturally the emergence might have been brought about. And the matter allows of testing at the other end also: because the Evangelists conceived of the Christ coming at the *parousia* in humanly visible form, must they on that account have believed that the Christ existing during the interval in heaven was a human Christ and nothing more? Was there any-

7. Compare Psalm 18:10 ff.; 97:2 ff.; 104:3; Isa. 19:1; Nahum 1:3.

one at that time who believed this? And why should it have been different with the consciousness and outlook of Jesus Himself?

The next, and exceedingly small, group of passages consists of the instances where the use of the title reveals reflection on Jesus' part on His human nature. In the Synoptics Mark 2:27, 28 belongs to this category. The Son of man is lord of the Sabbath because the latter was made for man, not man for it. What binds the premise and the conclusion together is the principle that whatever concerns man as such falls under the jurisdiction of the Son of man. Why this statement cannot be accounted for on the ground of a translator's misapprehension of the generic Aramaic phrase *bar-enash* has already been explained. Man as such could not possibly have been considered by Jesus sovereign over the Sabbath. The Sabbath comes under consideration as one thing — and an important one, for Jesus says "even (or, also) of the Sabbath" — among the things to which the lordship of the Son of man extends. From John the looser (non-titular) use of the phrase in 5:27 may be put by the side of Mark 2:27, 28. But we have here also the statements of 6:27, 51, 62, already commented upon in the preceding group. The context of these passages is peculiar in that it joins together the two features of descent from heaven and the possession of human nature by Jesus as a necessary equipment for imparting the food and the life spoken of. According to verse 62, the Son of man ascends to where He was before, which yields the idea of His being a heavenly figure throughout, for the future no less than for the past. In one respect, to be sure, this future stage of Jesus' existence in heaven differs from that of the past, since, as pointed out above, the original coming of the Son of man from heaven does not imply with John His pre-existence there *in human form*, "the flesh" being only the visible manifestation through which the Logos appears and acts among men, when become incarnate, John 1:14. Whether there are indications in this discourse of the future functioning of the human nature in or from heaven is well worth most careful investigation. The references to future activity seem to be plainly present, the only question being whether in these the close association between existence in heaven and human nature, celestially conceived and attaching

to the name Son of man, still continues to operate in the mind of Jesus. It is not, of course, necessary for showing this that the title shall explicitly occur in these statements, for the whole drift of the discourse, with the repeated emergence of the name and the emphasis upon the "coming down," even where the name is not explicit, furnish sufficient warrant for that. What needs closer investigation is the actual futurity of the acts and processes described, and the further question, whether it be an exclusive futurity with which Jesus speaks of something not yet possible in His present earthly state, but reserved for the state in heaven after the Son of man shall have ascended to where He was before.

From the tenses used nothing can be inferred with certainty. In verse 27, "the food which the Son of man *shall give* you," the text is subject to doubt, many good authorities reading "*gives* unto you" in the present tense; hence the future occurrence of the giving cannot be proven from it; neither, however, can the present, if it be preferred, prove that the giving belongs to the time of speaking or to the earthly state, far less can it prove the exclusion of the giving from a future state. It is possible to find here a so-called un-chronological present used for characteristic description. In verse 33 likewise the tenses are unrestricted as to time, and are descriptive of function only: "that which comes out of heaven and gives life." In verses 39, 40, 44 and 54, on the other hand, we are on more certain ground, for in these verses the resurrection is spoken of.

Nor can the strictly future reference here be questioned on the ground that in the discourses in the Fourth Gospel, as in Paul's Epistles, eschatological occurrences are drawn into the present. This is undoubtedly true, and true not only of the resurrection, but also of the judgment: 5:21, 22, 25; 8:26, 50; 9:39.⁸ Nevertheless such a mere anticipation of the eschatological is excluded in John 6, partly because Jesus here speaks in the future tense, partly because He adds the determining phrase "in the last day" in all four of the instances cited above. This points to a stage in which the Saviour will assert His life-giving power, not merely in the generically soteric sense displayed on earth, but in quite

8. Over against these must be placed a number of statements in which the exercise of such a present judgment seems to be denied, and the judgment referred to the Father and the last day: John 3:17; 5:29; 8:15; 12:47.

a specific sense peculiar to that crisis. The Son of man plays a role, quite in accordance with the Synoptical representation, in the resurrection and the judgment at the end of the world, according to the Fourth Gospel. Only, the discourse in John adds the feature that the authority and power for this eschatological function of making alive is derived from His origin as Son of man from heaven, and from what He is in virtue of this. According to the peculiar wording of 6:27, "the food which abides" is that which produces eternal life; otherwise the form of expression "the food which feeds unto eternal life" might have been expected. It is His abiding, eternal quality which makes Him the Bestower of this bread; in fact the bread is identical with Himself; the effect could not be otherwise than the Giver (verses 35, 48); hence in verse 51 He calls Himself "the living bread which came down out of heaven." It is therefore certain, at any rate, that the Son of man in His capacity as Son of man performs the task of the impartation of a life which renders the recipient incapable of death.

The question now recurs whether there is reference here at all to a present exercise of this task, or whether the entire process is projected by Jesus into the future, either into the eschatological crisis, or at least into the intervening period from the resurrection onward till the end. On the surface the observation might seem relevant that, according to the tenor of the whole Gospel, the activity of Christ in the pre-resurrection state and in the post-resurrection state is continuous, and that no incision can be made which would exclude any particular act from the former and assign it to the latter.

A reference to the atonement, the giving of His "flesh" into death for the life of the world, has been found in 6:51. The future tense used, "which I *will give*" — and on the reading of the Received Text even twice used, "the bread which I *will give* is my flesh, which I *will give* for the life of the world" — has invited this interpretation. When, however, the second "which I will give" is deleted by eminent textual authorities, the reference to the atonement becomes much less obvious. In the context, the statement serves the very natural purpose of explaining how Jesus could at one and the same time be the bread of life in Person and also the Giver of the same bread. The statement that the bread

which He will give consists of His flesh solves the apparent riddle, for, if one gives himself, he is both gift and giver in one. That this bread is to be given at some future stage for the life of the world does not necessarily imply a reference to the atonement. The phrase "for the life of the world" when viewed in the light of the entire discourse, suggests a rather more direct communication of Himself as food than the act of the atonement would be. The atonement is, to be sure, the presupposition of every act of giving of Himself for nourishment on the part of Jesus, but it is not, strictly speaking, identical with such an act itself.

The next thing to be thought of would be the action of Christ in the Lord's Supper. That the eating of the flesh and the drinking of the blood are separately mentioned fits in well with this idea. Also the realistic way in which the partaking of the body is described as a *trogein*, literally a "chewing," an audible eating, as it were, would lead us to think of something more intensified and differently complexioned than the common spiritual act of believing as such. By omitting in the present connection the words "and now is," which occur in John 5:25, Jesus may have desired to indicate that the reference here is to something of which it cannot as yet be affirmed that it now is. Paul also has compared the observance of the Lord's Supper with the eating of the manna in the wilderness by the fathers (1 Cor. 10:1-11). Further, the point of departure for the discourse in the feeding of the five thousand may be taken into account; perhaps there is an allusion to the later term "eucharist" as a favorite name for the Supper in the twofold repeated use of the verb *eucharistein* ("to give thanks") in John 6:11, 23, although here, of course, the opposite relation may have existed, namely, that the name "eucharist" for the Supper may have been derived from this context in John and the corresponding passages in the Synoptics. The views of the Supper found in Ignatius, Justin and Irenaeus seem actually to have been colored by the discourse of John 6. If Calvin was right, the discourse of John 6 appeared to the Evangelist in the light of a substitute for the account of the institution of the Supper which he did not intend to record. It must be acknowledged that these arguments throw considerable weight into the scale for understanding the specific act described as taking place in the celebration of the Lord's Supper.

The main difficulty under which this interpretation labors, and it is a serious one, arises from the fact that in this very context Jesus, as He also does elsewhere in the Gospel, derives the same effects here attributed to the eating of His flesh and the drinking of His blood to the simple act of receiving Him and believing on Him (John 6:35, 40, 47). As a rule it is assumed by those adopting the view outlined above that the effect of faith in Christ and the effect of celebrating the Lord's Supper are, if not specifically different, at least greatly differing in intensity. The alternation of the two forms of statement — "believing" and "eating and drinking" — in such close proximity speaks against this view. We feel inclined, therefore, to leave the question in suspense, the more so since for our proximate purpose the evidence is independent of a decision of the point. The Son of man as a heaven-descended Being, and as returned to heaven, contributes by His human nature — more particularly, by His glorified human nature — to the saving process of communicating His human life to the disciples. Whether He does so in the Supper only, or merely more intensively through its observance, may remain an open question.⁹

All this, it will have to be acknowledged, is but scant material to warrant the current impression that the title Son of man stands specifically for the identification of our Lord with human nature in such a thoroughgoing sense as to render it the opposite to Son of God for designating the divine nature. That it lent itself to such use the couple of passages commented upon prove, but the usage does not seem to have found early development. There are, however, two passages in the Epistles which do reflect on this side of Christ's constitution in dependence on the Son of man idea. These are 1 Cor. 15:27 and Heb. 2:6-8. The Pauline passage does not explicitly contain the title, but probably the Apostle had it in mind in borrowing from Psalm 8 the statement about the subjection of all terrestrial created things to man (compare the parallelism in verse 4 of the Psalm between "man" and

9. Zahn, who strongly argues in favor of the reference to the Supper, is thereby forced to draw a sharp distinction between faith in the Saviour, and eating His flesh and drinking His blood: faith appropriates the incarnate Person of Jesus, but does not eat His flesh. In order to make the distinction believing and receiving life in a higher way plausible, he even in John 3:3, 5 puts faith before the birth from above. *Das Evangelium des Johannis*, p. 353.

"the son of man"). In Heb. 2 the statement of Psalm 8 likewise forms the point of departure; in the entire quotation of verses 6-8 the subject spoken of is, quite in agreement with the meaning of the Psalm, mankind generically. Only the writer of the Epistle remembers that the Psalm, being a creation-Psalm, speaks of destiny appointed, not of attainment as already at that point realized, and thus is led to observe that the actualization has in principle come about only, as yet, in Jesus, and will through Him pass on to His people — a thought all the more easily connected with the words of the Psalm, because in the latter itself there is a pointed contrast between the lowliness and insignificance of man as such, and his high destiny through divine appointment; and the writer of Hebrews sees this striking contrast repeating itself in the sequence of Jesus' humiliation and exaltation. Although the transition from the generic son of man to the Messianic Son of man can be thus naturally explained, it is still more plausible to assume that this transition was facilitated by the writer's familiarity with the titular use of the phrase. Only there is no reason to assume that he interpreted the Psalm as *directly* Messianic.

There is less of theological coloring in Paul's simple statement in 1 Cor. 15:27. Still the ease with which he borrows the Psalm's language to describe Christ's career of conquest, not deeming a word of explanation necessary, leads to the same surmise, namely, that the phrase Son of man had standing as a title among the Apostle's readers, and was by them, as well as by himself, associated with the human nature of Jesus. The reference to Jesus' subjection at the close of His career of conquest tends to confirm this. Paul stresses that God is not included among the "all things" subjected to man, and transfers this feature to Christ.

Of an influence from the Book of Ezekiel upon the formation or employment of the title Son of man there is no trace in the Gospels. In the prophecy it serves to remind the prophet of his creaturehood and weakness over against God, who condescends to speak to him. For those who would understand the combination of suffering, death, humiliation with the title in the mouth of Jesus as partaking of the nature of an analytical judgment, the derivation of its meaning from Ezekiel (or the Psalm) would almost seem to be inevitable. We, on our part, having explained

the combination in such passages on the principle of contrast, have no occasion to recur upon any other Old Testament source but that in Daniel. Finally, it will be observed that neither in Paul nor in Hebrews is there any allusion to the Danielic scene.

Not all the sayings in which Jesus employs the title can be subsumed under the four preceding groups. There are instances where apparently it simply designates the Messiah, and the choice of it is determined by no other reason than Jesus' partiality to the name. In such cases the things predicated of the Son of man are results of His Messiahship, but not necessarily of that phase of His Messiahship which the title Son of man particularly connotes. An illustration of this is found in the introductory words of the interpretation of the Parable of the Sower, Matt. 13:37: "He that soweth the good seed is the Son of man."

Having the Gospel data now before us, we are prepared to put the question as to what induced our Lord to avail Himself so largely — almost exclusively — of the name Son of man for designating His Messiahship. Some have thought of it as a cryptic title, intended by Jesus rather to veil than to reveal His claim to being the Messiah.¹⁰ At one time this was a not uncommon theory; later, owing to the attention paid to the eschatological element in the Gospels and to the investigation of the occurrence and usage of the phrase in the Apocalyptic literature, it lost favor. More recently it has been revived by Dalman. While deserving commendation for championing the linguistic possibility of the use of the Aramaic equivalent of the phrase "Son of man" in the mouth of Jesus, this scholar has at the same time based upon the indefiniteness of the phrase in the Aramaic idiom a claim that it supplied Jesus with a term into which He could put Messianic significance for His own understanding and that of His more intimate followers, yet in such a way that it could be overlooked or misunderstood as to its proper import by outsiders, from whom He desired to keep His Messianic dignity secret. These outsiders would not have needed to find more in the term than the ordinary

10. Compare Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 266: "It had become a dogma of theology that Jesus used the term Son of Man to veil his Messiahship, that is to say, every theologian found in this term whatever meaning he attached to the Messiahship of Jesus, the human, humble, ethical, unpolitical, unapocalyptic, or whatever other character was held to be appropriate to the orthodox 'transformed' Messiahship."

meaning "man." But this theory fails to commend itself, if for no other reason, because it suggests a deliberate attempt on the part of Jesus, not merely to keep His Messiahship hidden, but to cause the name for it to be misunderstood. Whatever secrecy there was at one time about the consciousness of the Messianic vocation belonged to the fact as a whole; there is no evidence for its having attached itself to this one particular title. As to the hearers before whom our Lord used the designation, there is not the slightest trace of its having awakened curiosity or surprise by reason of its mysteriousness as such.

The two passages most often cited in support of the secret significance are Matt. 16:13 and John 12:34. In Matthew (but not according to the parallel passages in Mark and Luke) Jesus puts the question designed to elicit Messianic confession in the following form: "Who do men say that the Son of man is?" or, according to another reading: "Who do men say that I, the Son of man, am?" If one could be sure that the rendering in Matthew here reproduces the precise form of the original question, rather than the rendering in Mark and Luke (in whose versions the words read simply: "Who do men say that I am?"), then it would seem to imply a degree of uncertainty, up to that point, on the people's part in interpreting it, such as had allowed of association with other than Messianic concepts. It is far from impossible, however, that Matthew has employed the appositional phrase for no other purpose than to add greater distinctness. Plainly the question in Mark and Luke also, interpreted from our Lord's point of view, allows of no other understanding than this: "Who do men say that I, who know *myself* to be the Messiah, am?" The whole peculiarity of Matthew, then, amounts to the fact that he has made this implied thought of definite self-knowledge explicit, and has used for that purpose the title most frequently used by our Lord Himself for voicing such self-knowledge elsewhere.

According to Matthew himself there had been but few occasions, previous to this episode in the Gospel history, where Jesus had introduced the title, too few by far to have given rise to such wide questionings about it. Even supposing, however, that a mystic haze had enveloped the name in the minds of the people, it would yet by no means follow from this that Jesus' use of the title had been deliberately intended to produce or foster such

an effect. The purport of the question, no less in Matthew than in Mark and Luke, appears to be nothing else than whether the people believed Jesus to be the Messiah or some other figure, not whether they interpreted the name Son of man as Messianic or not. As a matter of fact, in the isolated instances of earlier usage the Synoptics are at one in representing the name as perspicuous to Jesus' hearers. In the question whether the Son of man has power on earth to forgive sins, the point at issue was as to the region or state in which He could exercise this power — whether on earth also, or only in heaven — but this very formulation of the issue presupposes acquaintance with and a measure of understanding of the title Son of man and what it stood for, on the part of those who questioned Jesus' right to assume such authority. Nor is it different in the case of the argument concerning the lordship of the Son of man over the Sabbath, for this also Jesus expects to be understood and recognized, at least in the abstract. As for the disciples, the representation that the angels shall in the last day gather the evil elements out of the Son of man's kingdom (Matt. 13:41) is obviously, to the mind of the Evangelist, quite innocent of any intent to create a sense of mystery in their minds. To carry through this whole theory of deliberate secrecy it will evidently be necessary to go back of the Evangelists and to substitute for the situations described by them quite different ones, which they have failed to appreciate.

The other passage which has been claimed as lending countenance to the cryptic character of the title from the standpoint of the people is John 12:30. Here the multitude ask: "How sayest thou, the Son of man must be lifted up? Who is this Son of man?" The perplexity of the Jews, however, does not concern Jesus' use of the title Son of man. On the contrary, the Jews appear to have had a fixed opinion as to what befitted the Messianic figure so designated. What they were unable to understand concerned the one feature specified by Jesus, that He must be *lifted up* — something which seemed to them to imply a departure of the Messiah after His appearing: "We have heard out of the law, that the Christ abideth forever: and how sayest thou, 'The Son of man must be lifted up?'" They simply apply what Jesus had said on previous occasions in regard to the lifting up of the Son of man to the Christ. It will be noted that in the immediately

preceding discourse Jesus, while speaking of the fact of His being lifted up, couples with the statement the personal pronoun "I" rather than using the phrase "Son of man" as the subject. That the hearers themselves, without more ado, from mere memory, make the substitution of "the Christ" for "the Son of man" proves how familiar they are with the import of the phrase. It was fully understood to mean the Messiah. Hence in their further question, "Who is this Son of man?" the wonder expressed cannot refer to the title as such. It admits of no other paraphrase than: "What kind of a Son of man (Messiah) is this that thou art speaking of?" But, if the promiscuous multitude could thus criticize a novel turn given to the title, it goes without saying that there could have been nothing secretive about it in the intent of Jesus.

The question arises, however, how this familiarity with the name, even on the part of the Jewish multitude in our Lord's lifetime, can be reconciled with the evident avoidance of its use in the circles of early Christian believers, an avoidance to which the entire body of the New Testament literature, outside of the Gospels, bears witness. This avoidance is not, to be sure, entirely without exception, for Stephen exclaimed: "Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God" (Acts 7:56). In Rev. 1:13; 14:14, on the other hand, there is close adherence to the scene in Daniel 7, and consequently no more than a description: "like unto a son of man." The rareness of the use in early Christian circles must be acknowledged. By no means, however, can this acknowledged rareness be turned into an argument against the historicity of the Gospels in this matter. Where this is done one very important consideration is overlooked. In the Gospels themselves — both the Synoptics and John — the title is exclusively a *self-designation* in the mouth of Jesus. There is in the Gospels not a single instance of objective reference by others to Jesus as the Son of man. If it were not for the sayings and discourses of Jesus recorded in the Gospels, these would represent the same phenomenon of the absence of the title as do the Epistles of Paul. Or reversely, if the Epistles had had frequent occasion to introduce the Lord as speaking — to quote directly from His sayings during His earthly ministry — then they too would very likely have

quoted Him as introducing and describing Himself as the Son of man. The problem of scarceness of occurrence in the New Testament outside of the Gospels must obviously be explained on some other ground than that of unacquaintance with the title.

Nor can any theory of later origination of the title in the early Church account for the facts, if due regard be had to the peculiar form in which the phenomenon appears. Let us grant that a Messianic designation in general might conceivably have entered into the early Christian vocabulary *de novo*. But this is not the phenomenon that confronts us. The *ab extra* production of a Messianic *self-designation* which yet remains wholly restricted to the speech of Jesus Himself concerning Himself, is something far too artificial to be seriously entertained.

In all likelihood the same reason which restrained the disciples during Jesus' lifetime on earth also restrained the later New Testament writers from adopting the title as a means of referring to Jesus. There must have clung to the title a peculiar subjective coloring, which rendered it almost indelicate to remove it from our Lord's own lips to those of others. No such feeling appears in the Apocalyptic literature. The Similitudes of the Book of Enoch speak quite freely of the Son of man with a third-person reference. But for those who had associated with Jesus in His ministry, to whom Apocalyptic speculation had become living experience, and who had moreover observed the extreme humility with which Jesus had guarded His utterances about Himself, connected with this name, in the form of the third person, we may well assume a feeling of delicacy of this nature to have had a real determining influence. To them the name had obtained the greater part of its meaning from the fact that on the one hand Jesus applied it to Himself, and on the other hand He applied it under a veil of profound humility. They would not have said so easily as the multitude did, "Who is this Son of man?" With this agrees further the indirect allusive way in which Paul (1 Cor. 15:27, 28) and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (2:5 ff.) reveal their acquaintance with the name.

Still, after all, there must have existed in our Lord's mind a potent reason why He preferred this way of designating Himself to all others. Other names He might acknowledge, or at least not repudiate, but this name stands alone as the name that was

His favorite, and as a result became in His use almost eliminative of other names, the name Son of God only excepted, though even the latter did not attain to the same frequency as Son of man upon His lips. If we see correctly, this potent reason lay in the fact that the title Son of man stood farthest removed from every possible Jewish prostitution of the Messianic office. In this respect it surpasses even the well-accredited Old Testament titles of a different, though not in themselves objectionable, type. In close adherence to the spirit of the scene in Daniel from which it was taken, it suggested a Messianic career in which, all of a sudden, without human interference or military conflict, through an immediate act of God, the highest dignity and power are conferred. The kingship here portrayed is not only supernatural; it is "transcendental." It moves in an altogether different sphere from the kingdom which the spirit of Judaism favored and expected.

By calling Himself the Son of man Jesus imparted to the Messiahship His own heaven-centered spirit. And the height to which He thus lifted His Person and His work may well have had something to do with the hesitancy of His early followers to name Him with this greatest and most celestial of all titles. As a matter of fact, we can still test this by ourselves. Neither in the language of private piety, nor in that of common worship, hymnodic or otherwise, has the title Son of man ever become thoroughly domesticated. And it is perhaps good that this should be so.¹¹

11. Where the title Son of man reappears in Patristic literature it begins to mark the theological distinction between the two natures of Christ, the other name used for this purpose being the Son of God. Thus in Justin Martyr and Ignatius.

CHAPTER XIV

The Saviour

THE Messianic task is conceived in a variety of ways. These do not always attach themselves to the Messianic names. Some of the functions which Jesus performs as Messiah are to such an extent the direct outcome of the constitution of His Person as scarcely to require separate naming. The work inheres in Him who performs it. It is the method of the Fourth Gospel to resolve the Saviour's task into the several aspects of what He is by His eternal nature or His historical equipment. Life, light, truth, grace — such concepts as these in the case of Jesus practically cease to be abstractions, and rather pass over into concrete personal names. There is, however, one comprehensive term in which Jesus — and after Him the New Testament witnesses and writers — have characteristically described His mission. This is the term *sozein* ("to save").

The nouns going with this verbal form do not occur frequently in the Gospels. *Soteria* and its cognate *soterion* occur only six times: Luke 1:69, 71, 77; 2:30; 3:6; 19:9. *Soter* is found three times: Luke 1:47; 2:11; John 4:42. Of these nine occurrences of these terms taken together, only two belong to the speech of Jesus Himself: *Soteria* in Luke 19:9 and John 4:22.

In the remainder of the New Testament these terms are of more frequent occurrence. It is true that the personal name *Soter* is no more frequent in Acts than it is in the Gospels, being confined to two passages: 5:31 and 13:23. But *soteria* immediately in Acts springs into greater prominence, appearing six times: 4:12; 7:25; 13:26, 47; 16:17; 27:34. In the Epistles, on the other hand, *Soter* is relatively frequent, even when the Pastoral Epistles, where for some special reason the references accumulate, are not counted in. It appears nine times outside of the Pastorals: Eph. 5:23; Phil. 3:20; 2 Pet. 1:1, 11; 2:20; 3:2, 18; 1 John 4:14; Jude 25. In the Pastorals alone, with reference either to

God or to Christ, we have: 1 Tim. 1:1; 2:3; 4:10; 2 Tim. 1:10; Tit. 1:3, 4; 2:10, 13; 3:4, 6; a total of nine cases. *Soteria* becomes quite pervasive in the Epistles, being found no less than 35 times (including the three instances in the Apocalypse).

The degree of prominence of the idea in the Gospels should not be measured by the infrequency of the occurrence of the terms "Saviour" and "salvation" in these writings. Back of these technical terms lies the use of the verbal concept "to save," and of this there is no scarcity in the Gospels. For the present our main concern is with this. It is not, however, so easy as it might at first seem to determine the sense connected by Jesus and the Evangelists with the term "to save." "Saving" is one of those conceptions which by the very commonness of usage have suffered attrition of meaning and have lost the sharp contours of their original import. The average sense connected with the term in the present-day religious mind is the very general one of deliverance, without any very clear reflection upon either the "wherefrom" or the "whereto." On the whole, the negative sense predominates in a more or less hazy apprehension.

In any effort to penetrate this haze of generality, a distinction ought first of all to be made between two meanings which *sozein*, according to its ordinary Greek usage, bears. It can signify (a) "to deliver"; and (b) "to heal." And, if we may believe the etymologists, the latter represents the original concept out of which the former developed as a general term for all deliverance from any kind of evil, no matter whether less or more serious. *Sozein* is connected with *sos*, to which word the Latin *sanus* is cognate. It would thus naturally come to mean "to render sound," "to render whole," "to heal." But there are too many examples of words under the influence of the Biblical spirit transforming and deepening themselves, than would permit us to count this, without more evidence, decisive as to the matter in hand. We must investigate the Biblical facts by themselves. In doing this a weighty presumption ought to be created by the facts in the Gospels, particularly the usage of Jesus Himself. It is also true, however, that we cannot refuse to pay attention to the subsequent New Testament usage; since this latter could hardly be a total departure from the usage of Jesus, it is bound to influence our opinion as to the purport of the usage of our Lord.

Close adherence to the curative explanation has been favored by the fact that "saving" appears most frequently, though by no means exclusively, in connection with the healing miracles of our Lord. The passages are: Matt. 9:22 (Mark 5:34; Luke 8:48); Matt. 27:42 (Mark 15:31; Luke 23:35); Mark 3:4 (Luke 6:9); Mark 5:23; 6:56; 10:52; Luke 7:50; 8:36, 50; 17:19; 18:42. In these episodes of healing there is some contact for the therapeutic interpretation of *sozein*. In Mark 5:34 the word effecting the miracle is *isthi hugies* ("be thou whole"). Still further, our Lord occasionally speaks of Himself as a physician (Matt. 9:12; Mark 2:17; Luke 5:31). In the ancient Church there seems to have been more or less current a view of Jesus as the great Physician of souls. This may have been partly due to the influence of the Stoic philosophy regarding its own propaganda as aimed at the healing of man.¹ It will be observed, however, that Jesus' word just cited is no reply to a criticism that He healed the degraded classes, but to disapproval of His conduct in eating with them. It is not, therefore, relevant to the question as to what "to save" means in cases of healing. Besides, the words spoken by Jesus in reply were evidently of a proverbial nature, being similar in this respect to the challenge addressed to Jesus by the people of Capernaum: "Physician, heal thyself," which does not necessarily contain any implication that His critics wanted acts of healing repeated in their city.²

1. Compare Harnack, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (1902), pp. 72 ff. At that time a parallelism was even drawn between Christ and Asklepios.

2. As touching this point, there is a lack of uniformity in the rendering of *sōzein* in the English Bible. The AV renders "to make whole," except in Mark 3:4 and Luke 6:9, where the addition of "life" as the object of the verb compelled the rendering "to save." The RV in its text agrees with this general rendering, but places "to save" as an alternative translation in the margin. The RV disregards its own precedent by rendering in Matt. 14:36 and the parallel Mark 6:56 "were made whole," without marginal alternative. In the taunting words of the priests: "He saved others, himself he cannot save" (Matt. 27:42; Mark 15:31), the change to "saving" could not be avoided, for although the reference of "he saved others" is obviously to the healing miracles, yet the idea of "healing" was not under the circumstances applicable to Jesus. Hence both the AV and the RV in this instance render both members of the sentences by "to save." The inevitableness of departure from the rule in this case is a proof of the inadequacy (not to say incorrectness) of the rendering "to make whole" in the ordinary instances. Only when the specific sense of *sōzein* is realized does the aptness of the parallelism appear: Others He rescued from death (by healing them); Himself He cannot rescue from death.

It is beyond denial not only that in all these instances cures actually took place, but also that the word *sozein* includes in its meaning that very aspect of the transaction. But too rashly the inference has been drawn from this that the curative aspect exhausts the concept, or even that it stands at the center of its significance. It can easily be shown that the translation "to heal" or "to cure" would seriously obscure the actual state of fact. In all these cases there is a specific background, and this also — indeed, before all else — is intended to be conveyed by the word itself. *Sozein*, in the Gospels, while connoting the healing act, never describes it from the purely medical or therapeutic point of view. The healing purpose is subordinated to a higher purpose, and this higher purpose furnishes the chief reason why the occurrence is denominated as it is.

What is this higher idea that stands in the background? It is that of *the transference out of the sphere of death into the sphere of life*. The whole concept moves, even when confined for the moment to the sphere of healing, along far deeper and more solemn lines than the Hellenic contrast between normality and abnormality. The Hellenic idea is not to any appreciable extent religious; but in the Biblical usage the antithesis between death and life is always religiously colored, and it does not lose any of this coloring when the transition from the one sphere to the other is described by the verb *sozein*. That there is involved such an extreme contrast between the issue of life and death appears from the opposition in which *sozein* stands to *apokteinein* and *apollunai* (Mark 3:4; Luke 6:9).

In the case of the daughter of Jairus, the ultimate intent of the process in the natural sphere is explicitly added: "That she may be saved and she shall live" (Mark 5:23). Those who challenge Jesus to save Himself from the cross, meaning to rescue Himself from death, appeal to the healings by which He has exercised this power, that is, His deliverance of others from death.³ It might be objected to this whole line of reasoning that the intent to preserve life is the intent of every physician, so that after all this joining of the ideas of life and salvation does not carry us beyond the sphere of beneficence and philanthropy. But this

3. Clement of Alexandria, in *Ho Paidagōgos*, II, 1, 5, 8, explains that the Creator has given man food and drink for the sake of man's being "saved," that is, in order that man may escape death from starvation and thirst.

would overlook the distinctly religious nature of the transaction involved: it is not life as such, not physical life as an ultimate end in itself, but life religiously considered, that is aimed at. This explains the function which faith plays in the matter. The reminder that "thy faith hath saved thee" occurs in the healing episodes, no less than in purely spiritual connections, such as the anointing of Jesus by the woman in Luke 7:50.

Besides, no perceptible difference seems to be felt between a case of disease-removal and one of demon-expulsion, and in the latter the religious complexion of the act is obvious, as in Luke 8:36. Instead of the exorcism being toned down to the level of a mere act of healing, the implication is rather that the acts of healing are of the same realistic religious significance as the other, and equally with them belong to the category of transference from the influence of death into the sphere of life. And the acts of doing good by healing referred to in Acts 10:38, at least in part, consisted in healing those that were oppressed of the devil.⁴ Here the technical term for healing is used (*iomenos*), which makes the association of the two lines of thought still closer. How easily the concept of healing passed over into that of spiritual deliverance can best be felt from Acts 4:9-12, where the healing of the impotent man, characterized as "a good deed," immediately gives rise to the reflection that in none other but the One in whose name this deed has been accomplished does there exist *he soteria* ("the salvation"; observe the article in the Greek, which is omitted in the English Bible). Not even the representation that healings are symbolical of corresponding transactions in the spiritual sphere quite adequately reproduces the train of thought; there is more here: these miracles are in themselves exemplifications of the work of "saving," for all disease and infirmity are at one and the same time the consequences of sin and the forerunners of death. Even Philo clearly perceived this when he said: "Infirmity and sickness are neighbors to death."⁵

The miracles of our Lord are only very partially and superficially interpreted when regarded as primarily philanthropic acts. They belong rather to the great redemptive movement involved

4. Compare Wendland in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, V, p. 351, under *Sōtēr*.

5. Philo, *De Legatione ad Gaium*, 2, quoted by Wagner, *Ueber sōzein und seine Derivata*, in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, VI, p. 211.

in the coming of the Kingdom — in fact, they are “signs of the times,” for not discerning which our Lord reproaches His opponents (Matt. 16:3). Placed in the light of this, the “salvation” brought by them cannot possibly be restricted to the amelioration of individual or social conditions. Sin plainly is the ultimate cause from which the necessity for them arises, as shown by John 5:14. Hence the two parallel aspects in the activity of Jesus are the removal of physical disability, and absolution from sin (Mark 2:7-12). In the Fourth Gospel the supreme miracles of giving sight to the blind and life to the dead are explicitly represented as corresponding to similar spiritual processes.

These conclusions drawn from the miracles of healing are corroborated by the use of *sozein* in other physical transactions where no disease is involved. The deliverance from the peril of the storm (Matt. 8:25); the prevention of Peter's drowning in his attempt to walk upon the waves (Matt. 14:30); the taunting challenge to Jesus to “save” Himself from the cross, as He had “saved” others; the ironical representation of Elias' appearance for the purpose of Jesus' “salvation” (Matt. 27:49); — all these agree in implying that “to save” is to snatch from imminent death and to open to the person concerned the gate of (continuance in) life. In these instances the evidence is even stronger than where healing takes place, for the disorders which the latter rectifies are not always in themselves critically fatal (consider, for example, the cases of blindness, lameness, deafness, etc.), although, as observed above, they are to the feeling of Jesus and the Evangelists symptomatic of the principle of death, and in their ultimate issue they are inseparable from death.

Matt. 24:22 (Mark 13:20) may also be reckoned with this group: the shortening of the tribulation, lest no flesh should be “saved,” can be understood only with reference to the extinction of all physical life through the calamities spoken of, although another exegesis would understand the term “saved” here in its technical, spiritual sense, the persecution being represented (hyperbolically) as so strong as to involve, humanly speaking, even true believers in the general apostasy. But against this exegesis seems to speak the fact that the calamities referred to are not of such a nature that they could be escaped through apostasy from the faith. In favor of the exegesis under considera-

tion speaks the mention of "the elect" as those for whose sake the days of tribulation are shortened, and also the occurrence of this term in the neighboring context (verse 24 in Matthew, 22 in Mark). If this be preferred, then the passage belongs to the next group, dealing with salvation in the technical sense.⁶ In that case the contingency of the falling away of the elect is reckoned with only for rhetorical effect; in reality, no such contingency exists, as is indeed indicated by the inclusion of the phrase "if possible," and also by the shortening of those days by God precisely in order to prevent its happening.

It is scarcely conceivable that these two groups of occurrence of the word, that of healing the diseased, and that of deliverance from the peril of death, should have lain unrelated in our Lord's mind. And such a possibility appears still more unlikely, if we give the idea its larger setting in the development of Scriptural usage as a whole. The Greek Old Testament uniformly has *sozein* as expressing deliverance from danger, frequently, though of course not always, of deliverance from danger of death, and hardly ever, so far as we have been able to ascertain, as descriptive of healing from disease as such.⁷ And, as will be presently shown by a brief examination of the later New Testament employment of the word, the same rule prevails there. Therefore, unless one be prepared to abandon the continuity of revelation at such an important point, and to isolate Jesus in the central part of His soteric consciousness from what preceded and what followed Him, the result stated above appears inevitable.

How inherently present the polarity of life and death is in the concept may be estimated from the fact that the Syriac Peshitto version has as its favorite rendering of *sozein* in the Gospel passages the verb *achjah* ("to cause to live"). This occurs in Matt. 1:21; 9:22; 10:22; 16:25; 18:11; 19:25; 24:13, 22; 27:42; Mark 5:23, 28, 34; 10:26, 52; 13:13, 20; 16:16; Luke 6:9; 7:50; 8:12, 48, 50; 9:24, 56; 13:23; 17:19; 17:33 (twice); 18:26, 42; 19:10; 23:35; a total of 30 times. Over against this

6. Compare Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Matthäus*, ad locum.

7. For the association of "salvation" with death and life in the Old Testament, to the suggestion of "healing" comes I Kings 13:31, "lay my bones beside his bones" (that my bones may be saved). Wendland, in article *Sōtēr*, in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, V. p. 348, observes that the Hebrew *yasha* and its derivatives come nearer to the true import of *sōzein* than "healing."

stand 2 instances where *chalam* is used (Mark 5:23; John 11:12); 3 where *assi* occurs (Matt. 9:21; Mark 6:56; Luke 8:36); and 6 where *pazzi* is found (Matt. 27:40; Mark 15:30, 31; Luke 23:39; John 12:27); and finally two where the verb *parak* is used; a total of 13 cases of verbs other than *achjah* being used to render the Greek *sozein*. It will be noted that some of the passages having *achjah* refer to miraculous cures.

We now turn to the cases where *sozein* occurs in the technical spiritual sense. It is in these that its association with death and life is most clearly perceptible. The classical passage is Matt. 16:25-27 (Mark 8:35-38; Luke 9:24-26). The peculiarity that here the *sozein* is represented as the act of man, due to the antithesis between "losing" and "saving," does not affect the intrinsic meaning of the word.⁸ As among the three Synoptics the only important variation is that Matthew has in the second clause "shall find" instead of "shall save." The saying does not, as too often interpreted, refer to two qualitatively different kinds of life between which a man might choose to cultivate the one type or the other. The idea is not that by a natural law of recompense in the Kingdom of God, if a man chooses to sacrifice the lower type of life-interests, he will inevitably, through that very act of self-sacrifice, develop a higher and far more valuable kind of life. The meaning is rather that the exchange or recompense takes place in the judgment-reckoning of God: the sacrifice of earthly life through cross-bearing and identification with Jesus (Matt. verse 24; Mark verse 34; Luke verse 23) will in the day of judgment, when the Son of man comes with the holy angels to render to every man according to his manner of doing, bring the recompense of being able to save one's life, that is, of "being saved." The object of the "saving" throughout is "the life," just as in the case of the non-saved it is "the life" that is lost, so that the "not-saved" is "the lost." If "to be saved" means to find one's life, then

8. In this making man the subject of the saving act, the passage does not, of course, mean to depart from the practically constant usage of Scripture, which ascribes the saving act to God, not to man. The close connection of "saving" with the healing miracles should be sufficient to preclude this misunderstanding. Only metaphorically, in the sense of instrumentally causing to be saved, can man appear as the subject in the saving act (Rom. 11:14; I Cor. 7:16; I Tim. 4:16; James 5:20; Jude 23). The theory that the Gospel, or Jesus, only makes man *salvable*, but does not *actually* save him, finds no support in the Gospels, nor indeed anywhere in the Scriptures.

the opposite, described as "losing one's life," must be equivalent to death.

Luke, quite in keeping with this, has in the second clause *zoogonesei* in the practically identical statement of 17:33.⁹ This parallel passage makes still clearer, if there were any further need of it, the eschatological setting of the situation presupposed. The emphasis on the transcendent value of the human soul in Matt. 16:26 (Mark 8:36; Luke 9:25) is what has led the exegesis astray. For this transcendent value, in view of which the whole world cannot be counted a sufficient equivalent for "the soul" or "the life," comes under consideration with reference to the judgment.¹⁰ The idea is that in the judgment-forfeiture of the soul to God, the possession of the entire world would not avail for redeeming it. This point of view is plainly indicated by the verb *zemiousthai*, which occurs in all three of the Synoptics, no less than by the emergence of the terms *lutron* and *antallagma*, both signifying "price of exchange." This saying of Jesus, then, we may safely conclude, most closely associates the idea of "salvation" with the thought of "life." Even the clause "whosoever shall seek to save his life" is kept within these terms. The man is represented as, in the trial of persecution, seeking to seize his life out of potential loss. The "seeking to save" is not mere clinging to life, or mere effort to retain it, as the rendering "preserve" in Luke 17:33 might lead us to think, but carries out the specific note of seeking to retain it in the end, in spite of disloyalty to Christ. The future *apolesei* is not a purely logical future of consequence, but hints at the futurity of the day of retribution.

Another saying of spiritual reference which clearly associates "being saved" with inheritance of and entrance upon life is found in Matt. 10:22; 24:13; Mark 13:13: "he that endureth to the end shall be saved." To refer this to deliverance from the persecutions described would render the statement tautological, and void it of promisory content, since the very enduring until the end implies non-destruction till the end. The positive opposite of destruction must be intended, namely entrance upon life beyond the judgment. Parallels are found in James 1:12 and Rev. 2:10.

9. Compare also "he shall find it" in Matthew here as well as in 10:39. *zōgonein* is also found in Acts 7:19; I Tim. 6:13.

10. Notice the *gar* marking the connection of thought in both Matthew and Luke.

A similar result is obtained from Matt. 19:25 (Mark 10:26; Luke 18:26). The disciples ask: "Who then can be saved?" This "can be saved" simply repeats in different words the thought from the preceding context regarding the extreme difficulty of a rich man entering into the Kingdom of God. To the mind of Jesus and of the disciples, however, these two thoughts again are equivalent to the idea from which the entire interrogation started, that of "having eternal life": "Master, what good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?" (Compare Acts 16:30).

Still another indirect proof of the life-goal of *sozesthai* is furnished by a comparison of Luke 13:23 with Matt. 7:13, 14. The aspect of *sozesthai* which ought to engage the inquirer's solicitude is not the numerical question of the many or the few, but rather that of the personal experience of the process himself. This process is further described as an "entering in by the narrow door." The "narrow door" is familiar to us from Matt. 7:14; it is the "strait gate" and the "narrow way" leading unto "life."

In the Fourth Gospel the same equivalence of "being saved" and "obtaining life" may be gathered from 3:16, 17. Here the two propositions "not perish, but have eternal life" and "not to judge the world, but that the world should be saved" make "being saved" practically identical with "having eternal life." The two propositions are joined by "for" (*gar*), indicating the continuity of thought. Again, in John 10:9 entering in by the door, which is Jesus, results in being saved. In verse 10 the same result is expressed by the words: "I came that they may have life."

To the same conclusion leads the antithesis between *sozesthai* and *apollusthai* in Matt. 18:11; Luke 9:56; 19:10. The verb *apollunai* has two meanings: "to lose" and "to destroy." Both meanings occur in the soteric vocabulary of Jesus. "The lost" are "the missing ones," specifically "those missing to God," those displaced from the normal religious relationship to Him as the center of life. The figures of the lost sheep, the lost coin, the prodigal's departure from his father's house, sufficiently illustrate this, without the necessity of adding doctrinal explanation. When the rectifying activity of Jesus is set over against such "being lost," it naturally assumes the form of "seeking" and "finding" (Matt. 18:11). Here it might be thought that the association with the idea of life is remote from the figure. Yet this would

not be quite exact, not even within the setting of the figure of the lost sheep itself, because when an animal is lost the fear will always obtrude itself that what has wandered away must be in danger of some sort, perhaps in danger of death, so that seeking followed by finding amounts to deliverance from fatal peril. But it is by no means the mere suggestiveness of the figure that injects this element into the concept. From the parable of the prodigal son we learn that a specific transference from the sphere of death is contemplated, because the two descriptions "was lost and is found" and "was dead and is alive again" stand side by side as equivalent statements. The *apollusthai* is here compared to a state of death, something that goes beyond the mere idea of being missing. The reason is that in the reality, shining through the parable, the absence of the sinner from God involves a termination of the process of religious life. What is here described is precisely what the later theology of the Church came to call "spiritual death." With it *sozesthai* as a restoration to life is bound up. In the story of Zacchaeus the words "salvation is come to this house" prove that not prevention of some future calamity but actual rescue from a certain state into its opposite state is involved. What is true of *apollusthai* in the weaker, semi-parabolic sense is true *a fortiori* of the same word in its stronger, more realistic, eschatological reference. Where "being lost" obtains the sense of "being ruined," "being destroyed," it is plain that nothing less than death and life can be at stake. To such an eschatological death-*apoleia* ("perdition") refer Matt. 7:13; 10:28; John 17:12. This of course describes far more than a state of alienation from God. It expresses the absolute, eternal ruin awaiting the evil-doer at the end. Translating it into terms of "death" it would be what the theologians have called "eternal death." That *apoleia* is not more frequently connected with this most solemn of all things in the Gospels may be due to a hesitancy on our Lord's part to lift the veil lying over these terrors of the judgment.

A side glance at the remainder of the New Testament may perhaps be of service for impressing upon us the intimate connection that existed in the mind of the early Christians between the contrasts "to be saved" *versus* "to be lost" and "to receive life" *versus* "to be a prey to death." As in general, so here also the doctrinal precision and richness of elaboration are greater in the

Apostolic period than in the beginnings of the process inaugurated by the revelation through Jesus. In Rom. 5:9 ff. the two clauses "we shall be saved through him from wrath" and "we shall be saved by his life" appear as naturally correlated. In 1 Cor. 3:15 Paul distinguishes between the destruction of a man's life-work by fire in the judgment and the man's own *sozesthai* out of it "as if through fire"; through the escape from the destruction he himself at least enters into a positive state beyond. In Eph. 2:5, 8 the words "made us alive together with Christ" and "by grace ye are saved" are coupled together. In James 2 verses 14 and 17 are connected by the principle that something dead cannot produce life; this principle is expressed in the form that a *dead* faith is unable to *save*. 1 Pet. 3:21 says of the *soteria* linked with baptism that it is accomplished through the resurrection of Jesus Christ. In Acts 3:15 and 5:31 the title *archegos* ("Prince") is applied to Christ, because He through His resurrection is the first to enter into the realm of life, but this is significantly associated with His leadership in salvation. He is "a Prince and Saviour" and ("the Prince of life.") According to Eph. 5:23 Christ is the Saviour of the body, that is, of the Church, in like manner as the man is the head of the woman, that is, through providing for the sustenance of her life. What is expected from the *Soter*, whom the Christians are looking for from heaven, is that He shall change the body of their humiliation and make it like unto His own glorious body (Phil. 3:21).

The conclusion that "saving" means to rescue from death unto life necessarily depends for its further filling up with content on the view that is taken of "life." In the Biblical development of the idea two aspects of life may be distinguished, an objective and a subjective one. The former is the older of these. It denotes the sphere or realm of blessedness in which, under the favor of God, the pious live, whereas the other (the subjective aspect) denotes the inward potency of life as a spiritual possession. This latter was in course of time born out of the spiritualizing and internalizing of the former. The beginnings of this appear in the Synoptics, but it is in the Fourth Gospel that the transition from the earlier to the later concept is in full view. Moreover, the idea of life as an objective state or realm had during the later stage of the Old Testament revelation been projected

into the future. Life began to mean the eschatological kingdom of blessedness in store for the people of God. And it is to this that the concept of "salvation" primarily attaches itself. This will account for the fact that the negative pole of the idea is not seldom described in terms of the judgment. It is from the judgment, from the wrath to come, from sin and its consequences, that salvation is expected. This is understandable only — but also fully understandable — if the objective character of the life-state be clearly kept in the foreground, for all these descriptions of the *terminus a quo* for saving serve only as so many forms to register the barriers confronting the sinner and keeping him from the inheritance of and the entrance upon life. Thus understood, they do not weaken the close interdependence of life and salvation, but rather bear indirect witness to it. Later on, and in the same degree as the life-concept is internalized, salvation becomes associated with the inward processes and states pertaining to the Christian experience. But even so these never appear wholly detached from the ideas of life and death. Regeneration is a part of salvation in this internal aspect, but according to John 3:3-5, 16 and Tit. 3:5-7 it does not on that account cease to find its essence and point of arrival in "life."

Since the negative element of the "wherefrom" and the positive one of the "whereunto" are inherent in the idea of salvation and are inseparable from each other, it might seem as though the question which of the two bears the stronger emphasis were a futile one. Still this is not wholly so. Even in so simple an idea, with only two correlated aspects, the human mind is incapable of impartially distributing its attention so as to grasp both aspects in a single act of cognition, feeling the positive in the negative and the negative in the positive. Much will depend on the momentary state of feeling. At one time the distressing evils being experienced may be so vividly realized, and the peril encountered so keenly felt, that the blessedness to follow after the removal of these evils may be for the moment lost sight of, as it were, and the believer may rest contented with dwelling upon the relief of the escape as in itself a supreme joy. And again, the attention may be so fixed upon the positive satisfaction to follow as to lose sight of the "seven deaths" lying between. B. Weiss insists on the negative aspect being everywhere the central one. It

would be more accurate to stress the opposite, only adding that there scarcely is any reference to the "whereunto" from which the sense of deliverance experienced is entirely absent. There is often even more than a bare side glance at that. The "Saviour" never becomes, as he frequently does in pagan parlance, an indiscriminate provider of all sorts of happiness.¹¹ The strongly developed sense of religious and ethical evil from the outset prevents such a lapse into downright hedonism.

Perhaps a slight difference may be made in regard to the question at issue between the verb and the noun. The verbal idea of "delivering from" is abstract. *Soteria*, the noun, is not always an abstract name for the process, but more often a concrete form for expressing the resulting state, and therefore it is more apt to keep the balance of thought inclining towards the positive side. This somewhat subtle difference may be illustrated from a comparison between Luke 1:47, 77 and Matt. 1:21. The consciousness of salvation of the woman who anointed Jesus may well have had a strong admixture of the sense of sinfulness, for she is bidden to "go in peace" (Luke 7:47, 50). It ought not to be forgotten that what would seem to the modern reader at first sight preponderatingly negative may have had to the earlier Christian way of feeling a somewhat different coloring. As indicated above, the salvation from judgment, which in itself is certainly negatively complexioned, may nevertheless have carried to the mind a positive sense of joy, because the judgment figured as the falling away of the last barrier to entrance upon consummate blessedness. The compound verb *diasozesthai* (Matt. 14:36; Luke 7:3; Acts 23:24; 27:43; 28:1, 4; 1 Pet. 3:20) seems to reflect this peculiar shade of feeling. On the whole we shall have to say that the specific contribution of the New Testament to the development of the idea of "salvation" lies in the emphasizing and clarifying and enrichment of the positive side.

The English Bible is fortunate in having "Saviour" as its rendering for *Soter*. "Saviour," although less easily carrying well-defined associations, is for that very reason pliable in both directions. The German *Heiland* is a present participle of the verb *heilen*, which has the sense of *gesund machen* ("heal," "make sound"). This

11. Compare Wendland, *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1904, p. 351.

lays too much stress on the negative side, marking the positive only by implication as a consequence of healing. On the other hand, the Dutch *Zaligmaker* carries prevalently the association of the bestowal of *zaligheid* ("blessedness"). The Latin *Salvator* underlies all these Germanic versions, but seems etymologically more negatively colored than the Latin noun *salus*.¹²

The foregoing is interlinked with the question whether to Jesus (and the Gospels generally) the act of saving belongs to the present or to the future. So far as Paul is concerned, good arguments may be quoted in favor of the view that the original reference was eschatological, and thence carried back into the present and the past. As a matter of fact, three representations are found in Paul: (a) the *soteria* is past to the believer, Eph. 2:5, "by grace have ye been saved"; (b) nevertheless it can be represented as still in process of realization, 1 Cor. 1:18, "the word of the cross is to them that *are perishing* foolishness, but unto us who *are being saved* it is the power of God";¹³ (c) there is a certain part of the act still outstanding, Rom. 5:9, "much more then, being now justified by his blood, *shall we be saved* from (the eschatological) wrath through him." Both the present and the future aspects of the matter obviously played a large role in the consciousness of the early Christians, as the merest survey of the passages in the epistolary documents immediately shows. In the teaching of Jesus likewise both sides are represented with sufficient clearness. The healing miracles place the occurrence in the present; the "salvation" enters into Zacchaeus' house with the entrance of Jesus Himself; and it is explicitly attributed to the woman who anointed Jesus. On the other hand, the Caesarea Philippi discourse prophesies that the man now willing to follow Jesus in His life-sacrifice will obtain the salvation of life in the future, when the Son of man comes to judge. And this holds true of our Lord's eschatological discourse in general. He that endureth to the end *shall be saved*; he that has believed and been baptized *shall be saved*. The same double aspect is met with in Acts 2:40, "Save yourselves from this crooked generation," which means, paraphrased, "By separating yourselves from this wicked genera-

12. Compare Wendland, *Sōtēr*, in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1904, p. 348, note 2.

13. Unless the present participles should be used unchronologically, as participles of characteristic description.

tion provide for your salvation in the judgment that will overtake the wicked at the end." Compare Acts 2:47, "And the Lord added to them day by day those that were saved." (Thus the text of the RV; the margin has "those that were being saved"; the AV reads "such as should be saved.")¹⁴

Another matter may be briefly touched upon here, namely the question whether in the *Soter-soteria* terminology there is perceptible any influence, either by way of promotion or by way of reaction, from its prevalence in pagan circles, particularly the cult of rulers or the mystery religions.¹⁵ It has been truly remarked that such pagan derivation is not only implausible in itself, but also entirely unnecessary in view of the large documentation of the usage in the Old Testament, and that not by any means merely in a politico-national but likewise in a specifically religious sense.¹⁶ Harnack thinks that the singleness of the use of *Soter* by Paul in Phil. 3:20 (he does not recognize the Pastoral Epistles as genuine writings of Paul) evinces a studied avoidance, on Paul's part, of the use of the title with reference to Christ. The tenor of the passage, with its political side glance ("our *politeia* is in heaven") might seem to favor Harnack's view, but it cannot be deemed probable in view of the copious employment of *sozein* and *soteria* by the same Paul, for these last-mentioned terms were not rare in the pagan cult of the emperor, nor otherwise in pagan parlance.

The phenomenon of the sudden emergence of *Soter* with great frequency in the Pastoral Epistles is somewhat surprising. It has been brought into alleged connection with the mystery religions. Wendland, however, in the article cited above, dismisses this theory with the somewhat summary remark that the flourishing period of the mystery cults belongs to the religious romanticism of the second century after Christ. He is more inclined to fall

14. The majesty clinging to the function and name finds, of course, more eloquent expression where they are used of the judgment-epiphany at the end. Compare James 4:12.

15. Some pertinent remarks on this point are found in Wagner, *Ueber sōzein und seine Derivate im N. T.*, in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1905, p. 232. There is also a fuller discussion by Wendland in the same periodical, under the title *Sōtēr*, 1904, pp. 335-347.

16. The evidence for the intra-Biblical sources of the terminology is even stronger in regard to "salvation" than it is in the case of "redemption." There is certainly no occasion to fall back upon the pagan deification of man — something which to every Christian, no less than to every Jew, must have been offensive.

back on the general custom of deifying and worshipping rulers in the Hellenistic age. The same writer also controverts Soltau's suggestion that in the Gospels the advent of Christ was consciously and deliberately set over against the advent and soteric work of Augustus.¹⁷ That Jesus should be called the *Soter tou kosmou* (John 4:42) is in his opinion something entirely outside the range of Jewish Christology and foreign to the mind of Jesus. This objection would have to be based on the universalism implied in the genitive *tou kosmou* ("of the world"), but since this universalism is inherent in the Fourth Gospel, and the word *Soter* needs no credentials to the Christian mind, or to the mind of Jesus, it is difficult to see why the combination of these two naturally indigenous elements should have to be traced back to a foreign source.

Soter is not foreign to the Old Testament; it occurs more than a dozen times in various relations. Peter, who in his Second Epistle shares the frequency of *Soter* with the Pastorals, used the name early, if any reliance is to be placed on the authenticity of his speeches in Acts. Further, the speech of Paul in Acts 13:23, and also Jude 25 and 1 John 4:14, must be taken into account, the last of these being probably dependent on the statement in 4:42 of the Gospel of John.

Apart from the Pastoral Epistles, all this need cause no wonder. As to the Pastorals, it should be remembered that in these the Father and Jesus share together the frequency of the appellation. It has been suggested that the studied emphasis on the term may have something to do with the Gnostic contention which denied to the God of the Old Testament the predicate of *Soter*. The Gnostic use of *Soter* differs in important respects from that of the New Testament, although in Gnostic circles *Soter*, rather than *Kyrios*, was the favorite designation of Jesus — the reverse of what prevailed in Christian circles.

The modernizing of the character of Jesus has seized upon the *Soter* idea with a certain eagerness, because it seems to offer a point of contact with the favorite liberal conception of Him as a humanitarian idealist. The title "Saviour" seems best adapted to mark Him as the Uplifter and Benefactor, bent mainly upon relieving all manner of distress and abnormality among men. Un-

17. *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1904, pp. 351-353.

fortunately, revealed in their true historic sense, the title and function of *Soter* prove themselves ill-fitted for incorporation into this philosophy of the life of Jesus. It is becoming increasingly clear that the "saving" of the New Testament is at bottom, not only something far deeper and more comprehensive, but also something differently oriented, than this modernized version of the vocation of Jesus which is read into the Gospels. In this respect the half century of toil of the "liberal" theology, instead of rehabilitating the historical Jesus, has only resulted in the construction of a far different figure — a figure which is now being felt to be unhistorical after all. And at no other point, perhaps, has the disillusionment attending this result proved so poignant as here.

CHAPTER XV

The Messianic Death

THAT the Gospels regard the death of our Lord as the very core and climax of His life on earth appears most clearly from their structure, which makes the narrative gravitate toward the end. The force of this observation lies not in the chronology alone. It was unavoidable, of course, that the account of the Gospel ministry should have the passion for its finale; after the death nothing further of His doings and teachings could be related; the death from the nature of the case had to stand at the close. But, while from the point of view of biography a brief statement of the fact and its circumstances would have been sufficient, what we are actually offered is a passion-epos stretched to the utmost limit of what the subject matter will bear, the length and fulness of which render the Gospels, considered merely as pieces of literature, ill-shapen through the disproportion of their parts. Apart from the question as to whether such an arrangement of the material faithfully reproduces the perspective of Jesus in regard to His own task, there can be no doubt concerning the conviction of the Evangelists on this point. They stood near to the events, and they have given them this unique interpretation. The Gospel is to them neither more nor less than a Gospel of the passion and death of Jesus. And we may be sure that there is expressed in this not an abstract colorless acceptance of the overwhelming facts as mere facts, undetermined as yet by any philosophy of their significance. It is a theological understanding as much as a true regard to historical happening that has inspired and penned these closing accounts of our Lord's life.

The modern formula: "an atonement without a theory of atonement," besides being self-contradictory, since the very term "atonement" is already the product of theory, certainly stands far removed from the way of thinking of these earliest witnesses to

the fact. The frequent representation met with today, as though a mere rehearsal of the bloody scene, a mere holding up of the martyred figure of the Saviour, could have had the tremendous effects caused by the Gospel of the Cross, savors far more of modern sentimentality than it does of a sound historic knowledge of the mentality of those to whom the evangel of the cross was first presented. Some theory must be put behind and into it, if its religious efficacy is to be made at all understandable. True history, worthy of the name, does not live without philosophy. Nor does Sacred History live without a fundamental theology incarnate in it.

But this is not only true of the early interpreters of the fact; after the fact had become a matter of the past; it is equally applicable to Jesus Himself, while as yet the fact lay before Him in the future. He certainly cannot for any length of time have regarded it as a blind on-coming fate. To assume this, or merely to think it possible, would endanger our conviction of the transparency of His religious mind. The fact itself would remain intolerable, until some theological construction rendered it otherwise. At this point theology and apologetic necessarily run into one, as the first sermons on the death and resurrection of Jesus, recorded in Acts, clearly illustrate.

And what is thus psychologically certain *a priori* receives ample support from the record. It appears that the main illumination brought by Jesus to bear on the mystery of His death issued from the consciousness of His Messiahship. The fact was too tremendous and strange a fact, and the Messiahship was too comprehensive and centralizing a life-category, for the two to have been kept from entering upon the closest of unions. Whoever acknowledges the historicity of the Messianic consciousness is thereby *ipso facto* precluded from placing the prospect of death in Jesus' mind in any other than a Messianic perspective. And a death Messianically viewed cannot but acquire the character of absolute necessity with reference to the fulfilment of the Messianic program. A thought-scheme that would render it barely tolerable, or let itself become reconciled to it after some peripheral fashion, would be next to worthless for a mind like that of Jesus. To Him the Messianic interpretation of His death was from the outset the only one that could possibly be entertained.

The facts on record are in full harmony with this postulate based on the inherent nature of things. Of course the impossibility that the death should at any time have been considered without adjustment to and incorporation in the Messiahship, does not carry with it the necessity that the reverse is likewise true. In the abstract, the idea of a Messiahship not including the thought of death is conceivable. But only so in the abstract, not in the light of the data which the Gospels supply. The Gospels do not countenance the favorite modern idea that the prevision and acceptance of His death came to Jesus in result of unforeseen, unwelcome turns in His career, necessitating modification of a program in which the death did not originally figure. For, while references to this tragic event are not frequent in the earlier part of the teaching, for a reason presently to be stated, the few references occurring during this earlier period are explicit and chronologically fixed beyond doubt, so that every thought of absence of the expectation of death from the mind of Jesus, at least from a very early point, is excluded.

A comparatively early reference to His death is made by Jesus in the parabolic statement about fasting (Matt. 9:15; Mark 2:20; Luke 5:35). The point of the statement, considered purely as parable, is that a season of joy is not a fit time for fasting. But very naturally, by the manner of allegorical adaptation, Jesus' mind projects itself beyond this into the so entirely opposite future when joy shall have given place to grief. At that time, He says, the children of the bride-chamber will fast. This taking away of the bridegroom cannot refer to anything else but His own death, and specifically His death as the Messiah; otherwise the central figure in the festivities would not have been called "the bridegroom." The allegorical way in which the parable is enlarged has, to be sure, given rise to doubt concerning its intactness, or even authenticity, but without sufficient reason, unless one were to consider every use of a parable by Jesus, for subsidiary allegorical purposes, unhistorical. Few at the present time would be willing to adopt this puristic canon of Jülicher and others as an inexorable criterion for exegesis and criticism of the parables of our Lord. How naturally the side reference to the sorrowful mourning days is introduced merely as a corroborative foil to the main idea of the inappropriateness of fasting in days of joy! The structure of the

discourse differs little in principle from the method, elsewhere observable, of putting a two-sided truth forward in two parallel parables. And the time of this utterance of Jesus must be comparatively early, not so much on account of its early place in Mark, but rather because the situation described points to a period when the issues between the group of John's followers and the circles of Jesus' disciples had not yet been sharply defined.

But why, it will be asked, if the prospect lay early in Jesus' mind, did the expression of it tarry so long? It is not until the episode of Caesarea Philippi indicated the rapid approach of the crisis that the subject was introduced in the intercourse between Jesus and the disciples. The solution of this difficulty must be sought in the conjunction of the death with the Messiahship. Had the Messiahship become a topic of professed instruction to the disciples at some earlier point, then doubtless the teaching about the necessity and meaning of the death would likewise have emerged in its wake at this earlier point. The minor problem is, therefore, swallowed up in the larger one. The latency of the passion-consciousness had something to do with the restraint exercised in regard to the Messianic disclosure. The too early introduction of the passion motif would have rendered the Messiahship of Jesus still more unacceptable than it was of itself. It was the unmistakable stamp of suffering and death now placed upon the Messiahship that did away with all further secrecy and hesitation.

But this also worked in the opposite direction. The explicit announcement of the death could no longer wait beyond this point. If the Messiahship was to be safeguarded from misinterpretation, the idea of the approaching death, which alone could effectively serve as the instrument for this, had in its own turn to be safeguarded lest it should fail to be understood as an integral element in the Messianic eventuation. The order in which things are made to proceed at this momentous juncture of Gospel history is obviously determined by Jesus with the utmost care. After first eliciting from Peter the confession of His Messiahship, He immediately subjoins to this the needful characterization of the Messiahship through the injection of the idea of His death. The one protected and balanced the other.

Care should be taken, however, not to place the two ideas entering into this episode entirely upon one line, as though in both

cases it was equally a matter of revelation *de novo*, and that for Jesus Himself no less than for the disciples. For Jesus there was no revelation involved at all. Nothing in the account of the Evangelists suggests that at this point there entered as something new into His consciousness either the conviction of Messianic calling or the sense of approaching Messianic death, or both combined. Both these are plainly treated as pre-existent in Jesus' mind previously to this occasion. As regards the disciples, particularly Peter, the idea of Jesus' Messiahship is not represented, any more than in Jesus' own case, as an object of instantaneous revelation given at this particular moment. It is true, Jesus declares to Peter that not flesh and blood but the Father in heaven has *revealed* to him the momentous fact voiced in his acknowledgment: "Thou art the Christ." But nothing goes to indicate that the supernatural impartation called a "revealing" was a single, momentary act closely preceding Peter's confession. The Evangelist, who placed Matt. 14:33 — in time as well as in order — before chapter 16, must have conceived of the revelation as a somewhat extended process. The only thing that is actually new in the Caesarea Philippi transaction is the disclosure of the necessity and imminence of Jesus' death *to the disciples*. This is the one item that to them (but not to Jesus) had been unknown before. It had been unknown at least in this explicit form, as clearly appears from the impression produced upon Peter by Jesus' disclosure of it. It would, however, be rash to conclude that there had previously been no intimation whatever of Jesus' death to the disciples. From a relatively early date Jesus had held out to the disciples a prospect of persecution, and one coupled with the reminder that in that respect they would have to participate in the Master's experience, and could not expect to fare differently than He. Even in the Sermon on the Mount — that favorite source of comfort for those who do not fancy a cross-centered Gospel — there is not a little to this effect; note, for example, Matt. 5:11, 44; compare Matt. 10:16-39.

Our Lord simply takes for granted that there will be a breach between His followers and the world. And, since the cause of this breach is placed in their identification with Him, the underlying supposition doubtless is that the same conflict is in store for the Master Himself, only after a more principal fashion. And there

is no point in Jesus' life where this mental attitude can be said to have first begun. The "sunny" and untroubled days of "fair Galilee" are, when exploited in such a sense, a pure fiction. There never was in the life of Jesus an original optimistic period followed later by a pessimistic period. As the approaching of the dread crisis did not render Him despondent towards the end, so neither did its comparative remoteness render Him sanguine at the beginning. The intrusion of such a terrifying thought as the thought of His death, in the specific form belonging to it, must have been, could not have failed to leave behind it the evidence of a sudden shock. But there is no evidence of any such sudden shock in the Gospels.

It has already been granted that from Caesarea Philippi onwards the professed instruction concerning the fact of Jesus' death, and to some extent concerning its soteric significance, begins. We must therefore next examine this material somewhat in detail. It would be foolish to expect even here, after the fount of revelation on the momentous theme had been opened, a carefully constructed and in all respects unambiguously formulated doctrine of atonement, although, as will be shown presently, there is one saying which actually makes an approach to such a formal statement.

The predictions of passion and death (sometimes including, sometimes omitting, mention of the resurrection) are three in number, and they reveal an increasing tempo of emphasis and clearness. They are found, substantially alike, in all three of the Synoptics, as follows: (a) Matt. 16:21-28; Mark 8:31-9:1; Luke 9:22-27. (b) Matt. 17:22, 23; Mark 9:30-32; Luke 9:43-45. (c) Matt. 20:17-19; Mark 10:32-34; Luke 18:31-34.

From these predictions several important points may be gathered. Jesus here expressly declares His approaching death to be an integral part of His Messianic task. This was done, not merely by attaching the prediction of it directly to Peter's confession of the Messiahship, but even more clearly by coupling the announcement with the subject "Son of man." It is not in any private or even any merely prophetic capacity that He will undergo this experience, but as the Fulfiller of the Messianic vision seen by Daniel. This already implies the absolute necessity of what is to happen, since the Messianic program is from the nature of the

case unalterably fixed. But it is in addition traced back to explicit prophecies from the Old Testament. Several times the term *dei* ("must") is introduced to express this. *Dei* does not in the first instance refer to an intrinsic soteric necessity, but to the necessity of Scripture fulfilment, than which, from our Lord's attitude toward the Scriptures, no higher kind of necessity could be conceived.

Hence the third prediction, according to Luke (18:31), has: "Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and all things that are written by the prophets concerning the Son of man shall be accomplished." It would be a mistake, however, to regard this necessity, because proximately derived from Scripture, as forming to the mind of Jesus a mechanical, irrational fulfilment of mere words. In His view, prophecy expressed beforehand the will and purpose of God, and God's will and purpose do not operate after the manner of blind fate, but because of an inherent rational purpose. This shows that in tracing the event back to the intelligent purpose of God, our Lord placed behind the facts a reasonableness for their occurrence. They were facts luminous from within. To express it in theological language, Jesus posited in these statements not merely the event of the atonement, but likewise a theory of the atonement, in spite of whatever modern aversion to doctrinal theorizing on this matter may assert to the contrary.

But the statements go still further in this direction. In one important principle this theory is brought forward from the background and given concrete shape, and this happens to be not in regard to any subordinate point but in regard to the highest bearing the theory could possibly have, namely, its bearing upon God, Our Lord most plainly teaches that His suffering and death are in their deepest significance necessary *for the sake of God*, even before they can come under consideration as to their effect upon man. This finds expression in the first of the three passion prophecies, Matt. 16:22, 23. When Peter exclaimed: "Be it far from thee, Lord, this shall not be unto thee," Jesus replied: "Get thee behind me, Satan; thou art a stumbling-block unto me, for thou mindest not the things that are God's, but those that are of men." Here the contrast is sharply drawn between the things of God and the things of men. It would be an injustice to Peter to explain this severe utterance of Jesus as inspired by a criticism of

any sordid, selfish considerations underlying the Apostle's behaviour, as though Peter's aversion to Jesus' program sprang from a fear that the death of the Master might bring with it danger, and perhaps also death, to the disciple. On the contrary, Peter's motives were also religious in a way; he was probably concerned about the Messiahship of Jesus, which he thought incompatible with the Messiah's death; and no doubt he was also concerned about the effect of such an untoward event upon the people of Israel, because Jesus' prediction involved not merely the fact of His death as such, but specifically that He would die at the hands of the leaders of the nation, so as to become the victim of a murder perpetrated by Israel upon Israel's Messiah. Still all such considerations Jesus characterizes as, under the circumstances, minding the things of men. There is an infinitely higher interest at stake, namely, the interest of God. So long as regard was had only to the benefit man could derive from the cross, the cross might appear undesirable and to be avoided. Jesus accepted the cross out of a motive of love for God even more than, and before, He accepted it because of His love for man. His submission to the cross was a supreme act of religious devotion.

From this it will be felt how unhistorical the representation is that Jesus faced death as a martyr because He saw no possibility of escape from it provided He desired to remain faithful to the principles of His mission. The issue may be sharply formulated by the statement that His death appeared to Him not so much *inevitable* as *indispensable*. He does not say to Peter that the circumstances require His death; what He does say is that the interests of God demand His death. Hence also He characterizes Peter's suggestion, not as a mistake, but as a temptation; and Peter is not at first instructed, but rebuked. The implication plainly is that in the cross Jesus renders a positive service to God; that for Him to die is an act of obedience, whereas to withdraw would be a wrong committed against God. The suggestion of withdrawal partakes of sin.

The more specific information as to how God is interested in the death of Jesus, and how that death at the same time subserves the religious interests of man, is supplied by the so-called ransom passage (Matt. 20:28; Mark 10:45): "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a

ransom for many." It is true, the saving effect of Jesus' death is not here touched upon for its own sake, but in order to illustrate and enforce the duty of self-sacrificing service devolving upon the disciple. The disciples were indignant on account of the request that James and John should be given the places of highest honor in the eschatological Kingdom. Our Lord rebukes both the spirit that inspired the request and the spirit of indignation which the request provoked in the others. He characterizes it as identical with the spirit animating the rulers of the Gentiles: "Ye know that they which are accounted to rule over the Gentiles exercise lordship over them, and their great ones exercise authority upon them." The pagan princes exploit their subjects for their own selfish ends. But in the Kingdom of God the opposite principle is to prevail: "Whosoever would become great among you shall be your minister, and whosoever would be first among you shall be servant of all." Then Jesus represents Himself as the ideal example of such conduct, and for this purpose points to His own death as the consistent carrying out of the principle of self-sacrifice in the service of others. His death is the culminating act in His life of service. It is plain, therefore, that He does not dwell upon the objective purpose or effect of His death, but apparently upon the subjective spirit only that was revealed in it, as an example for His followers. Now it is commonly urged that, such being the connection of the words, we are not permitted, nor should we endeavor to derive, any light from them upon the objective soteric purpose served by the death because, it is alleged, by the very purpose for which the words are spoken every Godward intention is excluded from consideration. And yet, decisive though this argumentation may seem to be, it is overthrown at once by the technical redemptive language which Jesus employs.

Jesus does not speak simply of giving His life to set an example for others to follow, nor of giving His life to benefit others in some unspecified manner, but specifically of *giving His life a ransom for others*. How shall we reconcile the palpable fact that ethical, altruistic instruction is intended as the primary lesson of the whole utterance, and that yet none the less the specific terminology of redemption is drawn into it, even though this seems so utterly beside the obvious purpose of the exhortation? The answer to this question is not difficult to find. Jesus touches upon

the ransom aspect of His death, because, so far from militating against its ethical motif, it most powerfully enhances the force of the latter. He who suffers and dies for another does a great thing, but he who suffers and dies for another by putting himself in the place of the other as a sin-bearer, and submitting vicariously to the punishment due to the other, does a far greater thing. Jesus has done the greater — the greatest — thing, and this is what lends supreme force to His example. Therefore the exclusion of the thought of vicarious atonement as of no conceivable bearing on the ethical lesson is fundamentally wrong. In fact there is nothing else that could exercise so cogent a force for binding the example upon the conscience of the disciples as this very thought of vicariousness inherent in the example.

In endeavoring to ascertain the precise implications of the altruism thus commended for imitation, we must sharply distinguish between the objective goal of the process and the spirit in which it is carried out. Jesus, of course, did not mean that through self-sacrificing conduct His followers should ransom one another in the technical redemptive sense. The effect joined to the process was in this technical redemptive sense joined to it in His own case only. Nevertheless the animating principle was capable of imitation and repetition in the conduct of the disciples. So far as the effect is concerned, Jesus represents His death as the means for setting others free. This fits naturally into the terminology of redemption: *lutrousthai*, "to buy free for one's self."¹

The presence of the idea is also postulated by the contrast affirmed between the aim of the rulers of the Gentiles and that in force among Christians, of which latter the highest exemplification is found in Jesus' vicarious life-surrender. If the Gentile rulers seek to enslave their subjects, Jesus seeks to place His followers in freedom. There is a figure in the form of expression, but the figure ought not to be used for eliminating the substance of the comparison. Some would have it that the figure of "ransoming" is purely incidental, chosen for no other purpose than to emphasize that the liberating of others was for Jesus a costly procedure, involving great spiritual expenditure — that in dying

1. The middle is the regular form for the action of the one who does the redeeming; he buys free for himself. The active *lutroun* is used of the previous owner, who, for a consideration, lets the object of the redemption go free.

to free others He paid a high price, but that, strictly speaking, He did not die so as to pay a ransom technically, that there was neither giving nor receiving, and that it would be foolish to press the figure so far as to ask to whom the ransom was paid, or for what it was an equivalent. One form of this view is that advocated by Johannes Weiss. He thinks that Jesus expected from His death the effect of His enemies being moved to repentance, a view that, if actually representing Jesus' intent, would classify Him, at least so far as His proximate enemies were concerned, with the adherence of the Moral Influence theory of the atonement.

So far as known to us, no instances have been adduced of such a figurative way of speaking in which the phrase *psuchen dounai lutron* was merely a proverbial phrase for supreme costliness of procedure. Wherever else it occurs, it always carries with it far more definite implications based on the general belief in vicariousness, religious or otherwise, prevalent at that time in Judaism. And, apart from this, there is one other reference in the teaching of Jesus which makes use of this concept in such a way as to fit in perfectly with the use here made of it. In fact, the resemblance, perhaps it were better to say the identity, is such as to make it hard to believe that our Lord did not have the earlier saying in mind when making this utterance. As to their general import Matt. 16:26; Mark 8:36, 37; Luke 9:25 have been examined above. We here simply need to remind ourselves of the role played by this saying by the idea of extreme wealth being offered to and rejected by God in the day of judgment as a ransom for the forfeited soul. If a man should possess himself of the whole world it would in that eschatological peril of the loss of life profit him nothing: "What shall a man give in exchange for his life?" (Matt. 16:26; Mark 8:37).² So much moralizing and spiritualizing has been practiced upon this statement, so much has been preached about the "infinite value" of the human soul — and that as one of the few great central truths in our Lord's teaching — practically all on the basis of this one passage, that the

2. The Greek word here used is *antallagma* ("exchange"); this stands in the Septuagint for the Hebrew *kopher*, more usually rendered by *lutron*. Through their recurring upon the same original the equivalence of the two Greek terms is guaranteed.

solemn tone and face with which according to the context the statement was spoken are well-nigh forgotten.

This other saying of Jesus obviously rests upon two Old Testament passages which, if an actual connection exists, render the import of the ransom passage still more clear. The first of these Old Testament passages is Psalm 49:8, 9, where the Psalmist speaks of the wealthy wicked. However great the power of their wealth may be in this life, yet it will not avail to save any of them when God requires their soul (or life) in death: "None of them can by any means redeem his brother, nor give to God a ransom,³ for the redemption of their soul is costly, and must be let alone forever." The second passage is Job 33:23-26. Elihu speaks of a man stricken with fatal disease as follows: "Yea, his soul draws near unto the pit, and his life to the destroyers; if there be with him an angel, an interpreter, to show unto man what is right for him, then he is gracious to him, and says, Deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ransom: his flesh shall be fresher than a child's; he returns to the days of his youth."⁴

These passages are chiefly interesting because they add two new things to the idea already found in the Gospel passages. In the first place, they add the thought that the ransom may be conceived vicariously, as given by one man for another; none can redeem his brother; that is, while the idea in the abstract is suggested, the negation of its concrete possibility in the situation referred to is immediately added. In the Job passage we have, on the other

3. Here the Greek word in the LXX is *exilasma*, another rendering for the Hebrew *kopher*.

4. It should be added, however, that the Hebrew text in the Job passage and in its context is extraordinarily obscure, as a simple comparison with the following translation of the LXX-text will show at a glance: "If there were a thousand death-bringing angels, not one of them shall injure him, provided he conceive in his heart to turn back unto the Lord," etc. Here the interpreter ("angel"), acting in the interest of man, taking pity upon him and interceding for him on the ground of having found a ransom appears in the quite opposite role of one of the numerous possible death-bringing agents of the divine retribution. And not only is the character of the angel thus changed, but also the idea of "finding a ransom" disappears, although in the sequel the general description of the forgiving and healing and life-restoring mercy of God remains. Had such a text stood before the mind of Jesus, it is doubtful whether the idea of His own ransom-giving would have been connected with it by Him. With the Hebrew text the matter is totally different. While this also has its minor obscurities and its possible corruptions, still without much difficulty it yields a sense fitting into the thought of Jesus, as above indicated. True, the mystery of the "angel-interpreter," the "one out of a thousand," remains. It is not easy to tell precisely where the analogy for this figure can be found in the Old Testament.

hand, the thought that under certain circumstances, which are described in highly mysterious language, a possibility of reversing the almost-accomplished destruction, and even of turning it into its opposite, may be conceived.

And, secondly, in the passage in Job we meet the idea that if something different from mere wealth were offered, the purpose in view might be accomplished. If someone should say: "Deliver him from the pit; I have found a ransom," then God would accept the proposal and restore the sick man to health and vigor. Now it is not unlikely that in framing the ransom statement our Lord had his other utterance from the Caesarea Philippi episode and these two Old Testament passages in mind. His words seem to carry the implication that what no man can do either for himself or for others, He will accomplish by offering His own life as the "ransom," in view of which the lives of many will be redeemed. His life has greater purchasing power than the whole world, which, though a man should have gained it, he could not acceptably offer in exchange for a forfeited soul. Jesus offers to God a full equivalent, He gives His own life, and it works as a ransom for many.

But our Lord's statement alludes to still another Old Testament text. It is strongly reminiscent of Isaiah 53. In this chapter the Servant of Jehovah, under the figure of a lamb, is depicted as undergoing suffering and death vicariously for the deliverance of the people. The features which, to our mind, place this allusion beyond doubt are: (a) the words "to give his life" coincide with Isa. 53:12, "because he surrendered his soul (life) unto death"; (b) the *diakonein* ("ministering") in our Lord's statement corresponds strikingly with the name of Him whom the prophecy depicts, "the Servant of Jehovah." In the Septuagint text of Isa. 53:11 there is an even closer approach to the Gospel saying, for this reads: "him who served many"; (c) those who benefit by the vicarious service are called, both in the prophecy and in the words of Jesus, "the many": verse 11, "my righteous Servant shall justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities"; verse 12, "he bare the sins of many, and made intercession for the transgressors"; (d) the idea of payment, of restitution of value, is certainly present in Isaiah 53 and perhaps present in the words of Jesus, for the Servant is spoken of as making his soul an *asham* ("trespass offering") with which the idea of payment for with-

held value was associated in the Law, and Jesus' gift, while from one point of view a "ransom," is at the same time the supreme service, one surely rendered, not merely to man, but likewise, and primarily, to God. That our Lord found Himself back in the figure of this prophecy is proven by Luke 22:37, "For I say unto you that this that is written must yet be accomplished in me, And he was reckoned among the transgressors: for the things concerning me have an end." The joint occurrence of no less than four points of identity of thought adds great support to the belief in a vital connection between the prophecy of Isaiah and our Lord's reference to His ransoming task.

Since, in view of the things observed, we are forced to put a vicarious, technically redemptive construction on the ransom passage, it becomes not only permissible (with all proper respect for the horror of allegorizing), but even imperative, to ask: To whom, according to Jesus' understanding of the matter, was the ransom paid? And to this there can be only one reasonable answer: He conceived of it as being paid to God. This follows from the entire representation in the Caesarea Philippi discourse, where it is declared impossible that in the day of judgment man can give anything to the Judge, that is, to God. It follows no less from the passages in the Psalter and Job just commented upon: "None of them can by any means redeem his brother, nor give to God a ransom for him"; in Job the angel-interpreter addresses God when saying, "I have found a ransom, deliver him from the pit." It follows still further from the dependence of our passage on the Servant of Jehovah prophecy in Isaiah, for there the surrender of the life of the Servant is plainly conceived as a gift to God, if for no other reason because it figures as a sacrifice, which as such could be brought to God only.

Within the limits of the vicarious interpretation a certain difference of construction in regard to the words *anti pollon* ("for many") remains possible. Some exegetes prefer to construe the phrase "for many" with the subject of the verb "to give": the Son of man came to give His life a ransom in the place of many giving their lives a ransom. Jesus gives His life effectually, instead of an ineffectual giving such as the others might have attempted, or might have been forced to give in punishment. But this is not in itself a plausible construction; it leaves too much to be supplied.

Moreover, the forcible yielding up of life in punishment would hardly be called a "giving of life." The natural construction from every point of view is to construe "for many" with "a ransom." The sense results that Jesus gave His life a ransom *in exchange* for the many, that is, for the lives of the many that were in bondage. Jesus by giving His own life as a ransom purchased their release.

But who, we may ask in conclusion, are meant by the "many"? As intimated above, some interpreters find here a reference to the hardened mass of the Jewish people, and this so particularly as to exclude from the transaction even Jesus' disciples. Sometimes this is done on the ground that with reference to the disciples Jesus never speaks of the necessity of any ransom being paid in their behalf. But it cannot be proved that Jesus anywhere, either explicitly or indirectly, denies the necessity of a ransom for His followers in order to the forgiveness of sin. Not seldom the parable of the prodigal son is made to render service in proof of such an anti-atonement theology. We are told that in that the father in the parable receives the son back and forgives him without so much as the mention of punishment or even probation, therefore God cannot have been conceived by Jesus as requiring satisfaction in order to forgive the repentant sinner. This, of course, results from an abuse made of the parabolic form of teaching such as forces the parable to answer questions which it was never meant to answer. The sole point of the parable is that God forgives out of free grace, asking the sinner neither to bring anything nor to do anything. How this procedure of free grace is made possible by God for Himself is a question which the parable neither asks nor answers. But neither does it teach or imply that there is no such process set in motion by God to attain the desired result. If such a method of exegesis were to be followed in regard to other features in the parable, one might argue with equal warrant that Christ plays no part whatever in the return of the sinner to God, that there is no need of any Saviour. Thus the parable would not only teach that there is no atonement, it would likewise teach that there is no Saviour. Or, going a step farther, the parable might be made to teach that God does nothing to seek out the sinner in his estrangement, that He only waits until the sinner returns of his own accord to the father's house. If we are to derive our

entire theology from the parable of the prodigal son, we shall have to face the fact that the parable not only mentions no atonement, but also contains no Christ and no Holy Spirit. This reduces the entire exegesis under discussion *ad absurdum*.

Polloi ("many") cannot be so construed as to exclude others than the hardened Jews from the operation of the ransom. Nor should the reason why Jesus speaks of "many" be sought in His desire to throw emphasis on the limited intention of the atonement. There is no implied antithesis to *pantes* ("all"). The simplest solution of the problem lies in the contrast between the One who gives the ransom and the many who are ransomed by it. "Of the one . . . unto the many" (Rom. 5:15) would be the Pauline formula that would express the intent of Jesus at this point with precision.

The concrete reason, however, for the form chosen obviously lies in the prophecy of Isaiah, where, as remarked above, the "many" are mentioned repeatedly as beneficiaries of the life-sacrifice of the Servant. And the motive for the introduction of the idea in the case of Isaiah appears to have been precisely the same as we have surmised it to be in the case of Jesus. Isaiah wants to stress that through this vicarious act of the Servant, who is but One, the many members of the people are benefited. The best commentary on this feature of the representation, both as regards the prophet and as regards Jesus, is found in Isa. 53:11: "He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied: by the knowledge of himself shall my righteous servant justify many; and he shall bear their iniquities."

In conclusion, the most convincing proof for the correctness — indeed, the unavoidableness — of the vicarious interpretation lies in the effort of not a few critics (such as Pfleiderer) to deny its authenticity, and that on the ground of its reflecting the later Pauline doctrine of the death of Christ. We are told that the idea embodied in the passage must be placed to the account of Mark, who stood under the influence of Paul, and from whose Gospel it entered into Matthew. From the critical standpoint this is without any foundation, but exegetically it proves that the vicarious sense is written large on the very face of the words. That sense, and that sense alone, will naturally interpret them.

A third Synoptical utterance in which our Lord refers to the saving significance of His death is found in the words spoken at the institution of the Lord's Supper. It is neither possible nor necessary here to investigate the question of the Supper as a whole in all its historical and doctrinal bearings. An almost unsurveyable bulk of literature has accumulated around it.⁵ The sole point on which we fix our attention concerns the part assigned to the death of Jesus in effectuating the benefits spoken of or symbolized. Of course, it is in reality impossible to deal with this point in detachment from the general situation, the less so since it obviously forms the center of the act as a whole. Still, much that is not of direct bearing on the death-feature can be left out of consideration without detriment to our attempt to understand the latter. So at the outset the question of the historicity of the event, not infrequently denied at the present day, can be omitted from our investigation. Further, the whole debate about what is called "the real presence" of the Lord in the elements in some form or mode may be by-passed. Still further, the controversy as to whether the rite observed, if it was observed, was meant to be repeated, or formed a unique, unrepeatable occasion, is beside our present purpose in considering the Supper.

We start from the supposition that the Lord's Supper found and finds its analogy in the Old Testament sacrificial meal. Paul represents it from this point of view in 1 Cor. 10:16-21. More particularly, it is associated with the Passover, which was a sacrificial meal joined as a second part to the first act of slaying the sacrifice and manipulating the blood. Paul speaks of the cup in the Supper as "the cup of blessing," a technical designation of one of the cups in the Passover celebration.

Still further, the occasion of the ratifying of the Sinaitic covenant, to which certain words of the institution refer backward, had a program of sacrifice connected with it, and this culminated in the sacrificial meal partaken of upon the mountain before Jehovah, according to the close of the account in Ex. 24:9-11. Now,

5. Out of this voluminous literature the following may be specially mentioned: E. Grafe, *Die neuesten Forschungen über die urchristliche Abendmahlsfeier*, in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1895, pp. 101-138; Spitta, *Die urchristlichen Traditionen über Ursprung und Sinn des Abendmahls*, in *Zur Geschichte und Litteratur des Urchristentums*, pp. 205-337; Haupt, *Die ursprüngliche Form und Bedeutung der Abendmahls Worte*.

if for the reasons stated the Supper appears as a sacrificial meal, then the death, occupying the central place in the significance of this meal, cannot have been considered by Him who instituted it otherwise than as to all intents a sacrifice. Paul, aside from his reference to "the cup of blessing," bears witness to this conception of the Supper as a sacrificial meal by calling it "the table of the Lord," for this name is meant in strict analogy to the communion of Israel after the flesh with the altar, and even, from a formal point of view at least, to the pagans' eating from the table of idols (demons), both of which refer to the eating of the meat of sacrifice (1 Cor. 10:18-21).

Jesus, in representing His flesh and blood, and that not in their integrity, but as broken and poured out, as the food-substance in the Lord's Supper, clearly points to Himself as the sacrifice to which the Supper, as its sacrificial meal, was attached, and there is not the slightest reason for doubting that this understanding of the matter had come down from the Master to the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:23). Now the thing to be determined is, how the sacrificial death stands related to the religious status or condition of the disciples. What benefits did our Lord intend them to derive from it? What, to His mind, was its soteric significance? It is but natural in this connection to think first of all of the forgiveness of sin secured by the underlying act of sacrifice and conveyed by the meal. There is a solid basis for this view in the words of institution. No matter whether we take the Matthaean-Markan or the Lukan-Pauline form of these words, and no matter what view may be taken critically of the interrelation between these accounts, it is on every view plain that Jesus must have connected the removal of sin and of the consciousness of sin with His own death and with the Lord's Supper.

In the case of the bread this is plainer in Luke and in Paul. In Luke Jesus states that the bread is His body being given for the disciples; in Paul, that it is His body being broken for the disciples. In the case of the cup we have the same form of statement in Luke, though not in Paul, namely that the blood is poured out "for you." According to the usual Pauline terminology the *huper* ("for"), literally meaning "in behalf of," "for the benefit of," is associated with the sin-removing effect of the death of Jesus. "Christ died *huper hemon*" means regularly with Paul: Christ

died for the taking away of our sins, in order to our justification. Compare Rom. 5:8; 8:32; 14:15; 1 Cor. 1:13; 15:3; 2 Cor. 5:15; Gal. 1:4; 2:20; 3:13; Eph. 5:25; 1 Thess. 5:10; 1 Tim. 2:6; Tit. 2:14.

It ought to be acknowledged that *huper* in itself does not and cannot express the vicarious idea of "in the place of," as has not infrequently been contended. Yet nevertheless it is certain that Paul in writing *huper* had in mind, as the more concrete and specified idea associated with the act that took place, the conviction that it was in reality an act *anti* ("in place of"). Why, then, it will be asked, did he not remove all doubt by writing *anti*? The answer to this is that the Apostle's proximate end in view as he wrote his Epistles was not the resolving of our doctrinal questionings. He evidently knew that his readers could not help associating the *anti* with the *huper*. The more general idea leaves room for the more concrete and specific conception. Nor was a positive reason lacking why the Apostle should have preferred *huper* to *anti*. There is something in *huper* that remains unexpressed by *anti*, just as reversely there is something in *anti* that *huper* in itself cannot express, but only leaves room for supplying in thought. The element that *huper* brings out, and that *anti* would not of itself have brought out, is the intentional, voluntary direction by Christ of His death towards the end of the removal of our sins. The word puts into the expression of the objective act its benevolent self-sacrificing purpose. That the self-sacrifice meant is in fact a self-substitution was so plain on the surface of the Apostle's preaching as to need no special prepositional reminder.

If the matter lies thus with the form in which Paul records the institution of the Lord's Supper, there is no reason for doubt, and every reason for belief, that the import is the same in the Synoptics. The Lukan "which is given *huper*" certainly cannot have any other meaning. And the abbreviated statement of Mark and Matthew, "this is my body," cannot have been meant to conceal in its abbreviation a point against Paul. The same applies to Luke's rendering of the words with the cup (blood): it is poured out *huper humon*. How fully and clearly Matthew understood this *huper* may be seen from his perhaps more or less paraphrasing statement: "This is my blood . . . which is poured out for many

unto the remission of sins." If Mark here contents himself with the more generalizing form of statement "which is poured out *peri*," — "concerning many" — a form, it will be noted, which is not absent even from Paul's writings, this cannot have meant a denial of the Pauline vicarious conception. From a mere study of the words, therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that Jesus intended His death towards the removal of sin, and the Supper towards an appropriation of its removing effect through forgiveness.

It would, however, be a very inadequate method to study this matter from the form of the words only. The background of the situations to which it refers or alludes should be taken into account. In the ratifying of the Sinaitic covenant, described in Ex. 24, the manipulation of the blood is made conspicuous. If, as we may believe, Jesus' words about another covenant made to rest in His blood point back to this momentous occasion in the history of the Old Testament people of God, we should be able to gather from them something concerning the significance of blood in such a transaction. In Exodus it enters as sacrificial blood. Can we infer from this that its use was to any extent expiatory, connected with the removal of sin and uncleanness from the people?

The expiatory interpretation of sacrificial blood, at one time so commonly accepted, has in critical circles largely given way to a widely different theory, according to which the blood had at first nothing to do with the expiation of sin, but was simply sacramental blood effecting a life-union, physico-mystically conceived of between the deity and its worshippers. Robertson Smith, in his epoch-making lectures on *The Religion of the Semites* (1889) has been the chief modern sponsor for this view, which, however, has received not a little criticism even from critical quarters. It has been applied to the account of the covenant-making in Ex. 24. The fact that half of the blood is here applied to the altar (verse 6) and the other half sprinkled upon the people (verse 8) might well seem at first sight to favor the thought of a blood-union between Jehovah (as present in the altar) and the people. Still, the separation of these two acts by the intermediate act of the reading of the book in the audience of Israel, and the people's formal agreement to obey its contents (verse 7) tells strongly

against this interpretation. For, if the intent had been to symbolize the close sacramental union, effected through one blood, the impression of this would have been weakened by the insertion of a transaction of a totally different, legal character between the two; the two acts ought to have been performed in immediate succession. For this reason it is better to assume that the application of the blood to the altar in verse 6 has the usual expiatory significance. It first creates in the people that removal of uncleanness which is necessary to give access to Jehovah's presence, and thus it enables them to hear and accept His words.

The injunction of Ex. 19:10, 22 furnishes an exact parallel. In Ex. 24:6-8, the half of the blood kept in the basins is subsequently sprinkled upon the people as a sign of their covenant-acceptance with God, whence also it is called "the blood of the covenant," verse 8b. That here it has no mystical significance is made clear by the added explanation: "the blood of the covenant which Jehovah has made with you concerning all these words."

The same modern view of the blood-symbolism has also been applied to the blood of the Passover sacrifice. Here, however, the idea of cleansing is clearly present in the bunch of hyssop (Ex. 12:22) by which the blood is put upon the lintel and side posts of the doors, for the hyssop stands everywhere for lustration.

One more item coming under consideration as favoring the expiatory significance of the broken body and poured out blood is the addition of the prepositional phrase *huper pollon* ("for many") in Mark; *peri pollon* ("concerning many") in Matthew.⁶ In discussing the ransom passage we found this to be one of several indications of dependence of that passage upon Isa. 53. And Isa. 53 is an intensely vicarious prophecy. There is some reason, then, to believe that where in the Supper the same allusion recurs it will have no other meaning than it had in Isaiah and in the earlier saying of Jesus.

If, then, the expiatory significance of the Saviour's death is sufficiently vouched for by the words of institution, when these are duly considered with historic surroundings and precedents in mind, the question next presents itself whether this, after all, exhausts their meaning. A closer examination reveals that Jesus' death is not interpreted by Him as purely retrospective, in the

6. Luke has *huper humōn* ("for you").

sense of its doing away, through expiation, with the disciples' past. It also lays the foundation for a new religious status. This finds expression in the word spoken with the cup: "this is my blood of the *diatheke* which (the blood) is poured out in behalf of many" (Mark); "this is my blood of the *diatheke* which is poured out concerning many" (Matthew); "this cup is the new *diatheke* in my blood which is poured out in behalf of you" (Luke); "this cup is the new *diatheke* in my blood" (Paul). To be sure, the close conjunction of the covenantal character of the blood and its being, according to Matthew, "unto remission of sins" reminds us that under no circumstances can the *diatheke* be separated from the forgiveness of sins.⁷ Strictly speaking, therefore, the introduction of the covenant-idea in itself does not postulate a positive, prospective effect apart from its lasting expiatory force upon the future status of the disciples. And yet, the characterization of the *diatheke* as "new" in Luke and in Paul suggests that the term has a wider outlook than that of furnishing a mere annulment of the past.

Even in the case of the Sinaitic *berith*, the inauguration of it by sacrifice was felt to confer the fulness of religious privilege pertaining to the old dispensation. The partaking of the meal before Jehovah plainly signified this, for this feast upon the mountain included a vision of Jehovah. Besides this, it cannot be denied that there runs an eschatological strain through the words of institution of the Supper, when these are considered in the light of their near context. When Paul enjoins his readers to proclaim the Lord's death "until he shall come," this certainly is not intended as a mere chronological remark concerning the perpetual validity of the observance of the Supper in the Church. It suggests rather the idea that when the Lord shall have come the necessity for further observance of the sacrament will no longer exist, and this in turn gives rise to the thought that in the present observance of it there is an anticipation of what the eschatological state has in store for the believer.

Still here again the idea is not to be left out of sight that the prelibation enjoyed must constantly take its point of departure

7. Jer. 31:34 also connects the future forgiveness of sins with the eschatological "new" *berith* ("covenant"). Still it will be noted that this does not form the central substance of the gifts spoken of in verses 33 and 34. It comes in only at the end.

from the Lord's death, for this, and not the outlook into the eschatological future, is the theme of the "proclamation" enjoined. In all the Synoptics our Lord's mind is represented as turning in the midst of the celebration to an eschatological fulfilment, as it were, of the feast which is for Him the last on earth. He will not drink after that of the fruit of the vine until He shall drink it new in the Kingdom of God.⁸

Certain Old Testament passages which speak of the Messianic blessedness under the figure of a great feast have also been mentioned in this connection, especially Isa. 25:6-8. Rabbinical and Apocalyptic parallels for the enjoyment of the Messiah Himself in the coming age are also quoted in comparison. Even John 6 and 15:1-8 have been appealed to as evidence for the possibility of such a train of thought in the mind of Jesus.

But the burden of the proof will have to lie in the words of institution of the Supper. In view of these we incline to the interpretation that our Lord finds in His death the basis for a comprehensive inheritance of the blessedness of the Kingdom of God, particularly in its eschatological prospect. But the peculiarity of the evidence is that when proceeding to inquire into the precise connection existing between this cause (the Messianic death) and its effect (the comprehensive content of the Christian salvation) we receive no clear and definite answer, but are thrown back upon the expiatory character of the death as *in perpetuum* underlying the blessedness of the future. Would it be permissible to introduce the intermediate thought that Jesus' death, inasmuch as it introduces Him Himself into the eschatological realm, furnishes the guarantee for the joint inheritance of the same with Him by the disciples? On that understanding of it the death would open up the blessings of the coming state with a measure of detachment from the atoning aspect of the death. In the closing chapters of the Fourth Gospel the presence of this thought is familiar enough. That it shines through the words of

8. Luke's text makes no explicit reference to the "drinking" of the wine new in the Kingdom, but even here this is clearly implied in the negative statement, "from now I shall no longer drink," etc. It will be noted that Matthew's *meth' humōn* represents the occasion when Jesus will drink again as that of a *joint feast* in the Kingdom of God.

the institution of the Supper we do not venture either to affirm or to deny.⁹

In the preceding remarks we have proceeded on the basis of the translation of *diatheke* by "covenant." The status of the question would of course be entirely changed if "testament" were substituted for "covenant," and Jesus considered as the testator. From the death of a testator positive privileges and possessions *ipso facto* flow to the beneficiaries named in his will. The connection between Jesus' death and the content of the disciples' blessedness would in this way be directly established. But this would furnish more an apparent than a real solution of the difficulty. For the question would still remain wherein the point of comparison lay between the operation of the death and the resultant good, in both cases.

In the case of a testator the result is the direct consequence of his ceasing to live — something which obviously would not apply to the case of Jesus. The corresponding aspect of the efficacy in His death would have to be sought in its deeper significance as an expiation or in some other way. In the Epistle to the Hebrews use is actually made of the analogy between Jesus' death and that

9. In recent times doubt has been entertained about the authenticity in the account of the institution of the Supper, not merely of the adjective "new" with *diathēkē* (which occurs in Luke and Paul only), but likewise in regard to the originality of the entire *diathēkē*-concept in the oldest form of the record. The concept is supposed to have entered from Paul. On this question compare the remarks of Wrede in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, I, pp. 73 ff. Wrede's scepticism on both points is almost entirely based on the unusual combination of the words in the phrase *to haima mou tēs diathēkēs* ("my blood of the covenant"), as found in Matthew and Mark, a construction which he regards as so clumsy and un-Greek as to make the later insertion of *tēs diathēkēs*, dragging behind as it does, practically certain, which then in turn casts doubt on the original presence here of the whole idea. No one will assert that *to haima mou tēs diathēkēs* is an exemplary construction, judged by the standards of classical Greek. But it by no means follows from this that such a construction is absolutely intolerable also in Hellenistic composition. Far less does such a conclusion follow, if due account be taken of the Aramaic words lying back of the Greek. Wrede disposes of the latter uncertainty too easily. It should be remarked in connection with this debate that the presence or absence of "new" as the adjective with *diathēkē* is not of primary doctrinal importance. Whether the word "new" was uttered by Jesus or not, the *diathēkē* of which He spoke could under the circumstances be none other than a "new" one. And it is worthy of notice that from this institution, or, to say the least, promise of a different *diathēkē* light is thrown upon His consciousness of Messiahship. Who else but the Messiah could presume to regulate in this comprehensive fashion the entire religious relation of the people to God? The case is virtually the same here as with the institution of the Apostolate. The latter also is inconceivable on any other basis than that of the Messianic consciousness. For obviously the number of the Apostles is determined by the number of the tribes of Israel.

of a testator (9:16, 17). This is done to express the certainty of effectuation, and then only for a moment. Elsewhere in the Epistle to the Hebrews *diatheke* does not mean "testament." On the inner, soteric connection between death and salvation, this throws no light, since the writer construes this in quite a different way, which has nothing to do with testamentary procedure.

In our opinion there is, aside from this passage in Hebrews, only one context in the New Testament where the rendering "testament" for *diatheke* is indicated or required. This one context is Gal. 3:15 ff. It has been thought that for the choice of "testament" in the institution of the Lord's Supper support may be gained from Luke 22:29, 30: "I bequeath unto you a kingdom, even as my Father bequeathed unto me, that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom." But fatal objections lie against this proposed construction and rendering. It would make the assignment of the Kingdom to Jesus by the Father, by force of parallelism, of the nature of a bequest — a representation for which no analogy can be found anywhere. We shall, therefore, at any rate in the second clause, have to render: "as my Father appointed" — not "bequeathed" — "unto me," and this makes the entire parallelism between the Father's *appointing* and the Son's *bequeathing* an impossibility, so that, if for no other reason than that of safeguarding the parallelism, we are forced to take "bequeath" out of the first clause likewise. Besides this, the most plausible construction of the sentence is as follows: "I appoint unto you, even as my Father appointed unto me a kingdom, that ye shall eat and drink at my table in my kingdom." Therewith the last vestige of support for the introduction of the testamentary idea in this passage disappears. It is plain that the privilege of eating and drinking is not a proper subject to be assigned by manner of testament, although the endowment with a kingdom (on the old construction) might be.¹⁰

To the above discussion of the Synoptical material a brief statement may be added in regard to the interpretation put upon the

10. A fuller discussion of the *diathēkē* problem and of the alternate renderings "covenant" and "testament," is given by the author in two articles on *Hebrews, the Epistle of the Diatheke*, in *The Princeton Theological Review*, 1914, 1915. See also *The Epistle's Conception of the Diatheke* in the author's syllabus *The Teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews*, pp. 7-17 (issued 1944 by the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Episcopal Church, Philadelphia).

death of Jesus in the discourses of the Fourth Gospel. That the Fourth Gospel as a document which, in addition to its record of Jesus' teaching, also reflects the apostolic doctrine of the writer, could not fail to give some expression to the importance of the Saviour's death, which had long before that come to be an article in the fundamental faith of the Church, might, of course, be *a priori* expected. The narrative of Jesus' life reveals the same gravitation towards the momentous close in the Fourth Gospel as in the Synoptics. There must have existed a well-defined conception as to the soteric meaning of the event underlying this structure and distribution of the material. Or, if any doubt could remain about this, it would soon be removed by a side glance at the First Epistle of John, where Christ is represented as the *hilasmos* for sin (2:2; 4:10). The choice of the *nomen actionis*, instead of *hilaster* or *hilasma*, shows that to John's mind Christ was the embodiment, the precipitate, of this soteric provision made by God for the removal of sin. Throughout the Epistle the emphasis on sin is a heavy one (1:8, 9, 10; 2:2, 12; 3:4; 4:10; 5:16-19). The aim of the mission of Christ into the world is even said to consist in the divine purpose "to take away sins," and the plural of the noun shows that here some form of expiation for the *actual* sins committed must be thought of, something lying specifically in the sphere of justification.

The "paraclete" of 1 John 2:1 also is a condensing term for Christ's value for the dealing with sin. But the narrative in the Fourth Gospel reveals the same interest in this important concern. In the testimony of the Baptist to Jesus which John records, he twice introduces Jesus as "the Lamb of God which takes away the sin of the world" (1:29), and by omitting in the second instance (1:36) the participial clause ("which takes away the sin of the world"), he reveals that the figure of "the Lamb of God" had already for him become fixed as a term with definite expiatory meaning; the second clause really needs no expression, for it could be analytically drawn from the first; to call Jesus "the Lamb of God" implies an affirmation that He is the One who takes away the sin of the world. That the figure rests on Isa. 53 is more than probable, and this derivation vouches for the vicariousness of the idea of "taking away" sin. It makes no essential difference whether the verb be understood of "taking upon one's self" or of

the "taking away," that is, "removing out of the midst." The verb is capable of both renderings (Matt. 9:6; 11:29; 21:43). The close dependence on Isaiah, and the sacrificial terminology (apart from the ritual of the Day of Atonement) seem to speak in favor of the former understanding, but it goes without saying that the taking up was always conceived as an act preparatory to the removing.

It will be noticed that the present participle *ho airon* proves that the taking up or taking away has acquired to the speaker the character of a fixed soteric designation; the lamb is the sin-bearer set for that; his significance consists in it. In spite of all this evidence for the occupation — or even preoccupation — of the Evangelist with the concept of atonement, we should remember that the Fourth Gospel was not written primarily for a soteric purpose; its primary purpose is theological. According to 20:30, 31 the author was guided in his selection of material by the desire to convince his readers that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that, believing, they might have life through His name. The salvation is here, as elsewhere, lifted to the high plane of receiving through faith the revelation of Jesus as divine into one's self. It is a revelation which not merely informs but which, through supernaturally informing, saves. This may have had something to do with the relative absence, in the Fourth Gospel, of stress on the principle of objective atonement. But the absence of stress on this principle is only relative, as we have just shown.

Coming now to the teaching of Jesus Himself recorded in the Fourth Gospel, we find that the background of vicarious expiation is no more absent here than it is in the narrative of the Evangelist. According to 3:14-18 the lifting up of the Son of man, which certainly includes as its first stage the lifting up on the cross,¹¹ has for its proximate purpose that those believing on Him should not perish, but have eternal life. The same purpose, described in identical words, underlay God's giving of His Only Begotten Son, 3:16. And it is still more sharply defined in this, that the believer should not be condemned (3:18). All of this, it will be observed, moves in the objective forensic sphere: it speaks of what we call the atonement, and admits of no other interpretation, if viewed without prejudice.

11. Compare John 12:32.

John 6:51 has already received sufficient comment in connection with our study of the title Son of man. If the words "which I will give" should be deleted, as even so orthodox a commentator as Zahn proposes on textual grounds, then the statement "my flesh for the life of the world" need no longer be pointedly referred to the crucifixion; it might be understood of the giving of Himself by the glorified Christ from heaven. Then "the flesh" and "the blood" would lose their association with the broken body and the shed blood of the crucified Christ. If so, they could, however, scarcely be left in their generality, but would have to be given specific reference to the Supper, and this, unless we ascribe to John and his circle a peculiar non-expiatory theory about the Supper, would of itself in a measure restore the connection with the atoning death.

After this allowance has been made, however, we cannot say that the substitutionary theory in its forensic form constitutes the specific teaching of Jesus on His death according to the Fourth Gospel. The latter must be sought in the representation that death gives to Him and to those belonging to Him access to God and to heaven. If a word be needed to characterize it, we would call it the "priestly" interpretation of the Saviour's death. It finds its closest analogy in the Epistle to the Hebrews and in the First Epistle of Peter. The comparison is useful in this respect also, that it warns us against thinking that its application, with a peculiar ritual terminology, is meant in any way as a neglect or negation of the forensic idea, for both in Hebrews and in First Peter this is too unequivocally expressed to be conceived for a moment as having lain outside the doctrinal horizon of these writers.

The peculiar phenomenon here met with is that instead of the method of the atonement being stressed, as with Paul, its ultimate point of arrival stands in the center of the attention and determines, through a certain backward influence, the forms in which the process itself completes itself. Thus in Hebrews the sacrifice of Christ serves the purpose of "purifying," "sanctifying," "perfecting," and all three of these representations receive their specific meaning from the idea of worship-approach to God.

According to Peter, Christ died, the Just for the unjust, that He might bring us near unto God. The death of Jesus negatively

takes away the disqualifications and positively bestows the qualifications necessary for the worship-service of God in the heavenly sanctuary. To be sure, the chief disqualification consists in the presence of the uncleanness of sin, but the removal of that is described in terms of priestly cleansing rather than in terms of forensic satisfaction. A great deal of hindrance to the correct appreciation of the point of view of the Epistle to the Hebrews has been created by rashly identifying these terms with the Pauline ones, and forcing the latter thoughtlessly upon a circle of thought that is differently oriented. Purifying, sanctifying, perfecting, lie with Paul in the moral, subjective sphere, as is especially clear in the case of "sanctification." But in Hebrews the last named has as a rule nothing to do with the subjective moral transformation of the believer. It describes, on the contrary, what has been done through the sacrifice of Jesus outside of the believer, to render the way to God open for him. In Pauline language we should call this "justification," although that would not exactly reproduce the point of view. The most serious mistake made in this field lies in the theory that whereas Paul regards the atonement as an objective process, the Epistle to the Hebrews subjectivizes it. The opposite is true: in Hebrews "to cleanse" means "to cleanse the conscience," that is, to take away the consciousness of sin, and to this would correspond that most objective of Pauline concepts, namely, "justification."

Now this whole trend of thought has its preformation in what our Lord teaches about His death in the Fourth Gospel, especially towards the close of His ministry as recorded in that Gospel. It was a correct instinct that led to naming the prayer of Jesus in John 17 the *high priestly* prayer, for this outpouring of soul expresses the high mood of One who goes before and draws His own upward with Himself out of this world into the light above. To speak with Hebrews, Jesus is the "Forerunner." His supreme desire is that where He is His disciples shall be also (14:3; 17:24). He "sanctifies" Himself for them, that they also may be "sanctified." The process here described is not a process of removal of sin, for as such it would not be applicable to Jesus; it is the solemn dedication of the Priest for His approach to God, which at the same time, in virtue of His identification with those whom He serves in a priestly capacity, is communicated to and participated

in by them likewise. The resemblance of this statement to Heb. 2:11 is most striking, for there we read in almost identical words: "Both he that sanctifies and those that are sanctified are all of one."

Jesus lays down His life for His friends (John 15:13), and He does so voluntarily (10:18; compare with Heb. 9:14). The mention of "election" as underlying the oneness between Jesus and His own belongs likewise to this priestly train of thought (John 6:39, 44; 15:16, 19; 17:2, 6, 11, 12; compare Heb. 2:13). Possibly from this conception some light can be made to fall on the "lifting up" which Jesus holds in prospect for Himself. Through His death plus His ascension He enters upon that uniquely fruitful state, from which by way of intercession and unlimited endowment with power the most universalizing effects will be made to extend in every direction. Herein lies the reason why both for His individual disciples and for the chosen organism of the world it is better that He should go than that He should remain (John 12:24, 32; 16:7).

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